Space, China's Tactical Frontier

Abstract

In recent years, China has made stunning progress in its satellite reconnaissance capabilities. Starting from almost no capacity for live surveillance ten years ago, today the PLA has gained the capability to support real-time tactical naval operations from space. China's suite of electro-optical, synthetic aperture radar, and electronic intelligence satellites would be key to its anti-access/area denial capabilities, through which the PLA could deny the United States military the capability to operate with impunity close to its shores. Furthermore, these achievements suggest a shift towards more military-dedicated space assets and form the contours of a crucial support system for expanded PLA operations.

Key Words:

• China
• Space Security
• Satellite Reconnaissance

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Samuel Liu, Anton Wishik, Gerard Brachet, Brian Weeden and Ted Molczan for their assistance and advice in this research.

Notes

¹Futron's 2009 Space Competitiveness Index.

²Greg Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis, ‘A Place for One's Mat: China's Space Program from 1956–2003’ (American Academy of Arts and Science 2009), 22.

³Mark Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 1999), 37–9.

⁴David Finkelstein, ‘China's National Military Strategy: An Overview of the Military Strategic Guidelines’, in Roy Kamphusen and Andrew Scobell (eds), Right-sizing the People's Liberation Army, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College 2007), 102.

⁵During the crisis, while the USS Independence was quickly deployed to international waters near Taiwan, the USS Nimitz had to sail from the Persian Gulf. The PLA was apparently not aware of the location of USS Nimitz throughout the episode. See Eric A. McVadon, ‘PRC Exercises, Doctrine and Tactics toward Taiwan: The Naval Dimension’, in James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (eds), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, (Washington DC: National Defense UP 1997), 270.

⁶Eric Hagt, ‘Integrating China's New Aerospace Power in the Maritime Realm’, in Maritime Implications of Chinese Aerospace Power, US Naval War College (CMSI) volume, 2011.

⁷See Evan Ellis, ‘Advances in China – Latin America Space Cooperation’, China Brief 10/14, 9 July 2010.

⁸Inactive satellites include Ziyuan-2A, Ziyuan-2B, CBERS-2, CBERS-2B, Tansuo-1 (Shiyan-1), Tansuo-2 (Shiyan-2), Shiyan-3, Yaogon-1, Shijian-6A/B/B/C/D/E/F, Huanjing-1A.

⁹For CBERS, Huanjing, Fengyun satellites: Zhang Peng et al., ‘General Introduction on Payloads, Ground Segment and Data Application of Fengyun 3A’, Frontiers of Earth and Science in China 3/3 (2009), 367–73; Zuo Jingzhao, ‘Environmental Satellites as Environmental Stewardship to Achieve Large-scale, Rapid, Accurate, Dynamic Monitoring of Cyanobacteria, Dust Storms and Pollution Incidents' (), Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic of China, 21 May 2010, <www.zhb.gov.cn/zhxx/hjyw/201005/t20100521_189772.htm>.

¹⁰Congratulatory letters between various institutes involved in satellite projects often follow satellite launches, e.g., <www.ie.cas.cn/xwzx/tpxw/200904/t20090424_275663.html>.

¹¹The following are likely capable of high-resolution imaging: Yaogan-2, Yaogan-4, Yaogan-5, Yaogan-7, Yaogan-8, Yaogan-11 and Tianhui-1. The remaining EO satellites are Beijing-1 and Huanjing-1B.

¹²We thank Gerard Brachet, president of France's Air and Space Academy and founder/ former CEO of Spot Image (1982 to 1994) for information on the specifications of commercial satellites.

¹³SAR capabilities vary, but drawing from the available literature, the sensor's FOV could be defined by a minimum elevation angle of 20 degrees and a maximum elevation angle of 80 degrees.

¹⁴For space-based radar see, Alternatives for Military Space Radar, Congressional Budget Office, 2007 and Tian Ye et al., ‘Automatic Precise Geometric Correction for HJ-CCD Imagery’, 38th International Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing Conference Proceedings, 259–63.

¹⁵First reference to SAR is in the 6th FYP (1981–85) but research on the first generation appears to have begun in 1988 under Project 308 of the 863 Program. Plans for second generation SAR were incorporated into 11th FYP (2006–10) and the National Medium and Long Term S&T Development Plan 2006–20 ().

¹⁶Jiang Jingshan, Earth Observations in China: Present Status and Future Developments, published in the Working Group on Calibration and Validation, Feb. 2008.

¹⁷Su Jianwei, Song Yuan, and Xu Linzhou, ‘Electronic Reconnaissance Effectiveness Analysis of Ocean Surveillance Satellite to Surface Ship’ (), Shipboard Electronic Countermeasures () 32/4 (Aug. 2009), 52.

¹⁸Chang Xinya, Zhang Lihua, and Tao Chenghua, ‘Analysis of Location Accuracy Based on Three-Satellite Time Difference of Arrival System’ (), Spacecraft Engineering () 16/4 (July 2007), 121-6.

¹⁹Daily coverage for the satellite's potential field of view (or ‘field of regard’) was chosen as the figure of merit because of its relevance and ease of interpretation. This measure is a component of multiple studies on satellite constellation performance, e.g.: Douglas Pegher and Jason Parish, ‘Optimizing Coverage and Revisit Time in Sparse Military Satellite Constellations: A Comparison of Traditional Approaches and Genetic Algorithms’, Naval Postgraduate School thesis, September 2004; and Christopher J. Didier, ‘A Commercial Architecture for Satellite Imagery’, Naval Post Graduate School thesis, September 2006.

²⁰See Jeff Hecht, ‘US Spy Sats in “Wrong” Orbits’, Space Daily, 8 Aug. 2001, <www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-01v.html>

²¹Little is known about the orbit of USA-144, which many observers believe to be a stealthy version of the Keyhole satellite series. For this exercise, the satellite was placed in a roughly circular orbit with an inclination 65 degrees and altitude of 800 km, in accordance to the most widely held theories among hobbyist satellite watchers.

²²The optimistic case for the US was defined as: EO sensors with 60 degree off-nadir capability; SAR with minimum elevation angle of 20 degrees, maximum of 80 degrees; ELINT range of 3,128 km; 5-degree minimum elevation from target; all 15 satellites/pairs included and 4 commercial satellites; direct sunlight viewing only for commercial satellites. The pessimistic case was defined as the same as above, with the following exceptions: the oldest Keyhole, Lacrosse, and NOSS satellites non-functioning; 50 per cent of EO passes obstructed by inclement weather; 10-degree minimum elevation from target; no commercial satellites included.

²³A simulation taken just one year ago – absent these three recent high-orbiting assets – would have put the potential reconnaissance coverage between the two much closer. If China launches an additional 2–3 satellites into higher orbit, the gap would again be narrowed substantially.

²⁴China would need to develop something similar to the US HULTEC (hull-to-emitter correlation) database. See Dwayne A. Day, ‘Above the Clouds: The White Cloud Ocean Surveillance Satellites’, Space Review, 13 April 2009.

²⁵See Charles P. Vick, ‘MENTOR (Advanced ORION)’, GlobalSecurity.org, <www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/trumpet.htm>.

²⁶Gao Kun, ‘The Long March 5 Carrier Launch Vehicle Will be Launched in 2014’ ( 5 2014 ), People's Net ( ), 24 Jan. 2009.

²⁷See Ian Easton and Mark Stokes, ‘China's Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments: Implications for US Air and Naval Operations’, Project 2049 Institute, 23 Feb. 2011.

²⁸Piggy-backing would limit the satellite size in GEO thus falling far short of the kind of coverage 100 meter-wide dishes the United States uses.

²⁹Hae-Dong Kim and Ok-Chul Jung, ‘Genetic Design of Target Orbits for a Temporary Reconnaissance Mission’, Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 46/3 (May–June 2009), 725–8.

³⁰Chen Weixia, ‘First Chinese Satellite to Avoid Space Debris Control Task Completed Successfully by CASC’ (), Sina.com, 1 Nov. 2009, <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2009-11-01/1024572141.html>.

³¹‘An Unnamed GAD Base Makes Breakthrough, Controls Two or More Satellites Simultaneously’ (), Huanqiu, 18 March 2010.

³²Brian Weeden, ‘Dancing in the Dark: The Orbital Rendezvous of SJ-12 and SJ-06F’, Space Review, 30 Aug. 2010, <www.thespacereview.com/article/1689/1>

³³Even through the course of several wars and numerous crises, the United States has not significantly maneuvered its reconnaissance satellites. One exception was in response to Operation Desert Shield/Storm, which prompted the maneuvering of two Keyhole satellites into orbits with particular repeating ground tracks; however, these were one-time maneuvers and the satellites remained in those orbits for years afterward. Most other orbital adjustments were small maneuvers likely used either to maintain the orbit or to avoid space debris. We thank veteran satellite watcher Ted Molczan for this point.

³⁴Richard D. Fisher, ‘China's Growing Micro Satellite Prowess', Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategic Center, February 2009 (unpublished).

³⁵‘First Launch of Meridian Project's Tianying-4A can Improve Radar Accuracy’ ( 4A ), XinhuaNet, 3 June 2010. ‘The Ideal Sounding Rocket – “Sky Eagle”’ ( – ), China Military Conversion (), Jan. 2002; and on LM-6, see Cheng Changming and Wang Xiaojun, ‘Selected Plans for New Generation Small Launch Vehicles’ (), China Aeronautics Society 2005 Academic Expert Exchange Conference on Launch Vehicle Systems ( 2005 ).

³⁶In Beijing, see ‘World's Largest Small Satellite Testing and R&D Base in Beijing's Aerospace City is Completed’ (), 16 Dec. 2004; and for Xi'an, see Tang Bailu, Xia Xiaobo and Peng Liguo, ‘50 Billion Yuan for Restructuring the Aerospace Industrial Clusters’ (500 ), 21st Century Business Herald (21 ), 10 June 2008.

³⁷‘National Security Space Strategy’, US Department of Defense, Jan. 2011; and ‘Report of the Commission to Assess Threat to the United States of an EMP Attack’, Report Issued to the House Arms Services Committee, April 2008.

³⁸Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics () (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press 2005).

³⁹Discussed in Pan Youmu, ‘Exploring National Aerospace Security Strategies in View of Air and Space Integration’ (), China Military Science () 19/2 (April 2006); Liang Zhaoxian and Shen Shilu, ‘Space Countermeasure in View of International Space Laws’ (), Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology () 15/2 (April 2004).

⁴⁰E.g., Li Bing et al., ‘On the Evolution of the PLAN's New Strategic Thought’ (), Military History () (June 2010), 40.

⁴¹Donald Martin, ‘A History of US Military Communications Satellite Systems’, Crosslink 3/1 (Winter 2001/2002); and ‘Military Satellites History - Part 1’, MilsatMagazine, May 2008.

⁴²Kulacki and Lewis, ‘A Place for One's Mat: China's Space Program from 1956–2003’, 23.

⁴³Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2009), 190–5.

⁴⁴Civilian use of space was emphasized beginning with the 8th Five Year Plan in 1991.

⁴⁵ Jane's Space Systems and Industry, accessed 17 June 2010.

⁴⁶Gao Fei, Hu Xujie, Gao Lingyuan and Liu Xiangmin, ‘An Analysis of the Action of Space Information Support on Missile Operations’ (), National Defense Science and Technology () 29/4 (2008), 10–12; Wu Weiqi and Zhang Yulin, ‘Optimization of Space Information System for Long-range Precision Strike’ (), Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command & Technology () 17/3 (2006), 37–9; Easton and Stokes, ‘China's Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments’, 15–16.

⁴⁷Eric Hagt, ‘Integrating China's New Aerospace Power in the Maritime Realm’, chapter in forthcoming book Chinese Aerospace Power: Emerging Maritime Roles (US Naval Institute Press 2011).

⁴⁸Authors' interviews with former GAD officer and staff in remote sensing centers based in academic institutions.

⁴⁹Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘China's Anti-access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 307.

⁵⁰Jeff Foust, ‘Space Challenges for 2011’, Space Review, 3 Jan. 2011.

⁵¹ China's Space Activities in 2006, State Council Information Office, Oct. 2006.

⁵²See China National Space Administration website, <www.cnsa.gov.cn>

⁵³The majority of China's space programs have developed indigenously with limited outside assistance, with some exceptions as Kevin Pollpeter points out in ‘Upward and Onward: Technological Innovation and Organizational Change in China's Space Industry’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 407.

⁵⁴The rapid progress of China's satellite sensor development can be seen in the quick succession of SAR satellites.

⁵⁵Fisher, ‘China's Growing Micro Satellite Prowess’, Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategic Center, 1–2.

⁵⁶Weeden, ‘Dancing in the Dark: The Orbital Rendezvous of SJ-12 and SJ-06F’.

⁵⁷Tai Ming Cheung, ‘The Chinese Defense Economy's Long March from Imitation to Innovation’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 329.

⁵⁸Zhu Yilin, ‘CAST's Standardized Satellite Platforms’ (), Spacecraft Engineering () 16/1 (Jan. 2007), 10–17.

⁵⁹Other examples: Four generations of FSW satellites were used to launch 23 satellites between 1974 and 2005. Also, CAST-968 has already been used for at least nine satellites that are known across a range of systems and their functional payloads.

⁶⁰Mahnken, ‘China's Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective’, 302.

⁶¹Zhu Yilin, ‘CAST's Standardized Satellite Platforms’, 15.

⁶²For general overview of program R&D planning, see Niu Xinguang, Analysis on National Defense System Armament Construction (Beijing: National Defense Industry Publishing House 2009), 158–62.

⁶³China's defense technology is increasingly synced with doctrine and strategy. See Cheung, ‘The Chinese Defense Economy's Long March from Imitation to Innovation’, 332.

⁶⁴Plans include 15 more in the Haiyang series by 2022; 9 more Huanjings; 9 more Beidou 2/M by 2012 and 20 more by 2020; 2 more CBERS by 2013; 19 in several Fengyun series by 2020; 3 more in the Sinosat series and a Ziyuan-3 by 2011.

⁶⁵Thomas G. Mahnken, Secrecy and Stratagem: Understanding China's Strategic Culture (Sydney: The Lowy Institute for International Policy 2011).

⁶⁶Interviews with PLA scholars at National Defense University and the Academy of Military Science.