‘Getting COIN’ at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army

Abstract

This article reassesses the extent to which the British Army has been able to adapt to the counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. While adopting Farrell's definition of bottom-up military adaptation, this article contends that the task force/brigade level of analysis adopted by Farrell and Farrell and Gordon has led them to overstate the degree to which innovation arising from processes of bottom-up adaptation has actually ensued. Drawing on lower level tactical unit interviews and other data, this article demonstrates how units have been unable or unwilling to execute non-kinetic population-centric operations due to their lack of understanding of the principles of counter-insurgency warfare.

Key Words:

• Counter-insurgency
• Military Innovation
• Afghanistan
• British Army

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the following for their feedback on earlier drafts: Col. Alex Alderson, Stefan Elbe, Colin Elman, Victor Olivieri, and Pascal Vennesson and the two blind reviewers of this article. I would also like to thank Lt. Gen. Paul R. Newton, Commander Force Development and Training (Land), and the two former Directors General Land Warfare, Maj. Gen. Andrew Kennett and Maj. Gen. Nick Carter for having sponsored my research on and given me access to theBritish Army. The work on this article was funded and made possible through the 2010–11 Research Fellowship granted to me by the Leverhulme Trust.

Notes

¹Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (Aug. 2010), 567–94; Farrell, ‘“Appraising Moshtarak”: The Campaign in Nad-e-Ali District, Helmand’, RUSI Briefing Note, June 2010, <www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Appraising_Moshtarak.pdf>; Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, ‘COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan’, The RUSI Journal 154/3 (June 2009), 18-25. Robert T. Foley et al., ‘Transformation in Contact: Learning the Lessons of Modern War’, International Affairs 82/2 (March 2011), 253–70.

²According to British doctrine brigade level command is tactical. Yet, the brigades – essentially their headquarters – that deployed to Helmand basically carried out command and control and planning duties. The tactical execution of kinetic and non-kinetic engagements on the ground was mostly the domain of battlegroup level units and below.

³Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 567–94.

⁴Henceforth, ‘Herrick’ and tour number.

⁵Farrell, ‘“Appraising Moshtarak”’; Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 567–94; Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 18–25

⁶Correlli Barnett, The Swordbearers: Studies in Supreme Command in the First World War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode 1963), 11.

⁷Andrew Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/5 (Oct. 1996), 907.

⁸See, Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984).

⁹See, Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (London: Cornell UP 1994).

¹⁰Grissom, ‘The Future’, 908. See, also: Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (London: Lynne Rienner 2001).

¹¹Grissom, ‘The Future’, 930. See, Eliot A. Cohen, ‘Change and Transformation in Military Affairs’, Journal of Strategic Studies 27/3 (Sept. 2004), 395–407.

¹²See also, Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War (Washington DC: Georgetown UP 2011).

¹³James A. Russell, ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (Aug. 2010), 595–624; See also his book, Innovation, Transformation and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–07 (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2011).

¹⁴Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 569; Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 18–25.

¹⁵Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 570.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷See, C. Marlene Fiol and Marjorie A. Lyles, ‘Organizational Learning’, The Academy of Management Review 10/4 (Oct. 1985), 803–13.

¹⁸Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 569; Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 18–25.

¹⁹Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 567–94; Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 18–25.

²⁰Author interview with Col. Joe Felter (US Army), ISAF CAAT Commander, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 2 March 2011. Confirmed in author interview with CW2 John J. Roberts (US Army), Lessons Learned Advisor, CAAT, ISAF HQ, Kabul, 13 Oct. 2011.

²¹See, Zeev Drory, Israel's Reprisal Policy, 1953–1956: The Dynamics of Military Retaliation (London: Frank Cass 2004), 7–39.

²²Giandomenico Majone and Aaron Wildavsky, ‘Implementation as Evolution’, Policy Studies Review Annual Volume 2 (London: Sage 1978), 109.

²³Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1985), 7.

²⁴Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 567–94; Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 18–25.

²⁵Lt. Col. Frazer M. Lawrence, Commanding a Combined Force (CF) – Some Personal Insights (unclassified report). This view was shared by other battlegroup commanders interviewed.

²⁶See, Jonathan Dowdall and M.L.R. Smith, ‘Counter-insurgency in the Grey: The Ethical Challenge for Military Conduct’, Contemporary Security Policy 30/1 (April 2010), 34–60; Simon King, ‘Strategic Corporal or Tactical Colonel? Anchoring the Right Variable’, Defense & Security Analysis 19/2 (2003), 189–90; Gen. Charles C. Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’, Marine Corps Gazette 83/1 (Jan. 1999), 18–22, <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm>.

²⁷Within the Army, NCOs constituted in July 2011 around 83.5 per cent of total trained manpower. Of the total 94,230 Army personnel, 71,540 held the rank of corporal or below. See, Defence Analytical Services and Advice, Table 2b – Strength of UK Armed Forces 1 – Full Time Trained Personnel Serving Against the Requirement, and Table 2.8 Strength of UK Regular Forces by Service, Sex and Rank, at 1 April 2010, <www.dasa.mod.uk/>.

²⁸See, Deborah D. Avant, ‘The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars’, International Studies Quarterly 37/4 (Dec. 1999), 409-30; Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine.

²⁹For a detailed account of the restructuring of the Army's lessons learned process, see, Foley et al., ‘Transformation in Contact’, 253–270.

³⁰Both have highlighted 52 Brigade's deployment during Herrick VII (Oct. 2007–April 2008) as a major turning point in the Army's approach to COIN in Helmand. See, Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 567–94; Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 18–25.

³¹Paddy O'Toole and Steven Talbot, ‘Fighting for Knowledge: Developing Learning Systems in the Australian Army’, Armed Forces & Society 37/1 (Jan. 2011), 49.

³²Such material was used to understand the context in which personnel operated and for corroborating or rectifying information disclosed during interviews.

³³See, Elizabeth Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars’, International Security 19/4 (Spring 1995), 65–93; Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991), 7.

³⁴See, Andrew Mumford, The Counter-insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare (London: Routledge 2011).

³⁵See, David Betz and Anthony Cormack, ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy’, Orbis 53/2 (Spring 2009), 319–36.

³⁶See, Warren Chin, ‘British Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan’, Defense & Security Analysis 23/2 (2007), 201–25; Robert Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: What Now for British Counterinsurgency’, International Affairs 87/2 (March 2011), 297–315.

³⁷Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’, 305–6.

³⁸Anthony King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan’, International Affairs 86/2 (March 2010), 322 and 313.

³⁹King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign’, 313.

⁴⁰See, Foley et al., ‘Transformation in Contact’, 253–70.

⁴¹ Army Inspectorate Review into the Implementation of Policy, Training and Conduct of Detainee Handling (London: Ministry of Defence 2010), 18.

⁴²According to Army Doctrine Publication Operations (5-6), hybrid threats combine ‘military conventional, irregular and high-end asymmetric threats, sometimes concurrently and in the same place’.

⁴³OPTAG Briefing, STANTA, 4 May 2011.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Author interview with Lt. Sam Whitlam, Platoon Commander, B Company, 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment, Colchester, 26 April 2011. Similar comments shared in author interview with Capt. Daniel Krause-Harder-Calthorpe, Platoon Commander, Left Flank Company, 1st Battalion Scots Guards, Catterick, 10 March 2011 and Capt. Ed Michell, Operations Officer, Corunna Company, 1st Duke of Lancaster's Regiment, Catterick, 15 March 2011.

⁴⁶Author interview with Lt. Col. Andrew Cullen, SO1 Training Division, OPTAG, STANTA, Thetford, 4 May 2011. On the British sequence of COIN operations, see, AFM Countering Insurgency, 4.14–4.16.

⁴⁷Author interview and email correspondence with Col. Alex Alderson, Director, and Lt. Col. Dickie Head, SO1 COIN Education, Afghan COIN Centre, 16 February and 11 Aug. 2011.

⁴⁸Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 567–94.

⁴⁹Ibid., 590–1.

⁵⁰See, Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations Part 10: Counter Insurgency Operations – Strategic and Operational Guidelines (London: Ministry of Defence 2001), Chapters 6 (Intelligence), 10 (Psychological Dimension), 12 (Operational Public Information) 13 (Civil Affairs), and AFM Counter Insurgency Operations, Chapters 5 (Intelligence) and 6 (Influence Activity).

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²See, Col. Alex Alderson, ‘The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine after the War in Iraq 2003-2009’ PhD Thesis, Cranfield University 2009.

⁵³See, Maj. Gen. Michael T. Flynn et al., Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Washington DC: Center for New American Security 2010).

⁵⁴Author interview with Lt. Col. Lincoln Jopp, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion Scots Guards, Catterick, 11 March 2011. Similar frustrations were shared in author interview with Lt. Col. Nick Lock, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion Royal Welsh, Chester, 31 January 2011.

⁵⁵Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 590–1.

⁵⁶Author interview with Sgt. Cameron MacDougall, Multiple Commander, Left Flank Company, 1st Battalion Scots Guards, Catterick, 10 March 2011.

⁵⁷Author interview with Maj. Paul Blakesley, 2IC, 1st Battalion Duke of Lancaster's Regiment, Catterick, 15 March 2011.

⁵⁸The MRX is the final brigade-wide PDT exercise, which is carried out prior to deploying in-theatre.

⁵⁹Author interview with Maj. Peter Flynn, 2IC, 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment, Colchester, 26 April 2011. Similar observations in author interview with Maj. Rupert Kitching, Officer Commanding, Left Flank Company, 1st Battalion Scots Guards, Catterick, 11 March 2011.

⁶⁰Author interview with Lt. Col. Frazer Lawrence, Commanding Officer, 1st Duke of Lancaster's Regiment, Catterick, 15 March 2011.

⁶¹Author conversations with several Army captains and majors during fieldwork trips carried out in 2011. See also, Lt. Col. Sacha Tomes, ‘Afghanistan – A Cultural Conundrum Too Far?’ British Army Review 149 (Summer 2010), 20–3.

⁶²Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 579.

⁶³Author interview with Capt. Rob Reese, Influence Officer, 1st Battalion Royal Welsh, Chester, 31 Jan. 2011. See also, David Rose, Delivering Strategic Communications and Influence in Afghanistan, 24 Oct. 2010, <www.thecornwallisgroup.org/cornwallis_2010/Rose.pdff>.

⁶⁴Author interview with Maj. Stephen Boardman, Influence Officer, 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment, Colchester, 27 April 2011 and with Colour Sergeant Paul Keeble, Influence Officer, 1st Duke of Lancaster's Regiment, Catterick, 14 March 2011.

⁶⁵Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 579.

⁶⁶Author interview with Lt. Col. Gerald Strickland, Commanding Officer, 1st Royal Gurkha Rifles, Folkestone, 9 February 2011.

⁶⁷In several battlegroup PORs connectivity capabilities were also highlighted as being deficient.

⁶⁸Author interview with Capt. Ed Michell.

⁶⁹Author interview with Lt. Col. Frazer Lawrence.

⁷⁰See, Maj. S.W.M. Chandler and Capt. Emile Simpson, ‘A Post-Operational Review of the Shade Shift Approach to COIN’, British Army Review 150 (Winter 2010/2011), 15–22.

⁷¹Author interview with Maj. Neil Richardson, 2IC, 1st Royal Gurkha Rifles, Folkestone, 9 February 2011.

⁷²Author interview with Lt. Col. Nick Kitson, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion The Rifles, Ministry of Defence, London, 4 February 2011.

⁷³Author interview with Lt. Col. Lincoln Jopp.

⁷⁴ Tactical Directive, Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, 6 July 2009, <www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf>.

⁷⁵See, ‘General Petraeus Issues Updated Tactical Directive: Emphasizes “Disciplined Use of Force”’, Headquarters International Security Assistance Force – Afghanistan, <www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/general-petraeus-issues-updated-tactical-directive-emphasizes-disciplined-use-of-force.html>.

⁷⁶Author interview with Lt. Col. Frazer Lawrence.

⁷⁷Author interview with Lt. Col. James Coates, Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment, Colchester, 27 April 2011.

⁷⁸Author interview with Cpl. George Scott, Section Commander, B Company, 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment, Colchester, 27 April 2011.

⁷⁹Author interview with Sgt. Neil Harvey, Platoon Sergeant, Right Flank Company, 1st Battalion Scots Guards, Catterick, 11 March 2011.

⁸⁰Author interview with Cpl. Carl Jackson, Section Commander, C Company, 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment, Colchester, 27 April 2011.

⁸¹See, Farrell, ‘“Appraising Moshtarak”’.

⁸²Most notably, the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards. See, Farrell, ‘“Appraising Moshtarak”’.

⁸³In 2010, there were 411 civilian compensation claims due to collateral damage, civilian casualties and deaths caused by British units. Most occurred between April and Dec. 2010, that is, following the redeployment of 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards. See, ‘Afghanistan civilian compensation: the sums received from UK forces’, The Guardian, 28 March 2011, <www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/2011/mar/28/afghanistan-civilian-compensation>.

⁸⁴Author interview with Maj. John Fry, Commanding Officer, Anzio Company, 1st Duke of Lancaster's Regiment, Catterick, 14 March 2011. Similar observations shared in author interview with Maj. Rory Shannon, Officer Commanding, Right Flank Company, 1st Battalion Scots Guards, Catterick, 10 March 2011.

⁸⁵Author interview with Capt. Stephen Healey, Platoon Commander, Bravo Company, and with Maj. Angus Henderson, Battalion 2IC, 1st Battalion Royal Welsh, Chester, 1Feb. 2011. Confirmed also in author interview with Maj. Olli Kingsbury, Officer Commanding, C Company, 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment, Colchester, 27 April 2011.

⁸⁶Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 582.

⁸⁷See, Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 18–25.

⁸⁸King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign’, 315.

⁸⁹See, Claudia Harvey and Mark Wilkinson ‘The Value of Doctrine: Assessing British Officers’ Perspectives’, The RUSI Journal 154/6 (Dec. 2009), 26–31.

⁹⁰Farrell, ‘“Appraising Moshtarak”’; Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 567–94; ‘Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 18–25; Foley et al., ‘Transformation in Contact’, 253–70.

⁹¹See, Patrick Little, ‘Lessons Unlearned’, The RUSI Journal 154/3 (June 2009), 10–16.