Escalation in Irregular War: Using Strategic Theory to Examine from First Principles

Abstract

If all violence is intended to achieve political effects, what is distinctive about escalation in irregular war? Indeed, what is irregular war? To answer such fundamental questions this analysis employs the principles of strategic theory in an attempt to offer a theoretical and practical framework that will facilitate an appreciation of the subsequent contributions to this special issue. The assessment seeks to articulate how the escalation process in conditions of so-called irregular war might be conceptualized and, via examples, illustrate how certain broad observations may be held to be true. Ultimately, though, the argument emphasizes that the process of escalation cannot be distinctive or follow predictable patterns given that all wars are unique to their time and place and will be affected in their conduct by the contingent forces of passion, chance and reason.

Key Words:

• Escalation
• Irregular War
• Strategic Theory

Notes

 ¹Brian Jenkins, Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict (Los Angeles: Crescent Publications 1975), 1.

 ²Thomas Schelling, Choice and Consequence: Perspectives of an Errant Economist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1984), 268–90.

 ³Lawrence Freedman, ‘Terrorism and Strategy’, in Lawrence Freedman et al., Terrorism and International Order (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1986), 61.

 ⁴See R.D. Crelinsten, ‘Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship between the Controller and Controlled’, in Paul Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (eds), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen UP 1987), 6–7.

 ⁵Carl von Clausewitz, On War (trans. and ed. Peter Paret and Michael Howard) (Princeton UP 1984), 87.

 ⁶See Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: OUP 2010), 1–9.

 ⁷Christopher Bassford, ‘John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A Polemic’, War in History 1/3 (Nov. 1994), 329.

 ⁸Clausewitz, On War, 75.

 ⁹Ibid., 87.

¹⁰Ibid., 88.

¹¹Ibid., 87.

¹²See C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press 1996), 21–2.

¹³John Shy and Thomas Collier, ‘Revolutionary War’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986), 817.

¹⁴Ian Beckett, ‘The Tradition’, in John Pimlott (ed.), Guerrilla Warfare (London: Bison 1985), 8.

¹⁵Francis Toase, ‘Introduction’, in Robin Corbett (ed.), Guerrilla Warfare: From 1939 to the Present Day (London: Guild Publishing 1986), 6.

¹⁶K.J. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War (Cambridge: CUP 1996), Tables 2.1 and 2.2, pp. 22–4. See also, Table 1 in Barbara F. Walter, ‘Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization and Commitments to Peace’, International Security 28/1 (Summer 1999), 128.

¹⁷See Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (London: Macmillan 1988), 71 and J. David Singer and Melvin Small, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 1982).

¹⁸See Peter Janke, Guerrilla and Terrorist Organisations: A World Directory and Bibliography (Brighton: Harvester 1983). Janke identified the existence of 569 violent non-substate groupings.

¹⁹For an extended discussion on the problems of classification in war see Colin S. Gray, Categorical Confusion? The Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges Either as Irregular or Traditional (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2012).

²⁰Richard Betts, ‘Should Strategic Studies Survive?’, World Politics 50/1 (Oct. 1997), 7.

²¹Harry Summers, ‘A War is a War is a War is a War’, in Loren B. Thompson (ed.), Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1989), 27–49.

²²M.L.R. Smith, ‘Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare’, Review of International Studies. 29/1 (2003), 20–3.

²³Ibid., 30.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Clausewitz, On War, 77.

²⁶Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1980), 5.

²⁷Clausewitz, On War, 77.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., 75.

³⁰Ibid., 119–21.

³¹See Ibid., 90–9.

³²Ernest Evans, Calling a Truce to Terror (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1979), 29.

³³J. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla (New York: Knopf 1971), 51–2.

³⁴Charles Russell, Leon Banker and Bowman Miller, ‘Out-Inventing the Terrorist’, in Yonah Alexander et al. (eds), Terrorism: Theory and Practice (Boulder, CO: Westview 1979), 12–13.

³⁵N.O. Berry, ‘Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism’, in Paul Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (eds), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen UP 1987), 293–304.

³⁶Peter Neumann and M.L.R. Smith, The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works and Why It Fails (London: Routledge 2008), 39–46.

³⁷Ibid., 82–3.

³⁸Donald C. Hodges, Argentina's Dirty War: An Intellectual History (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press 1981), 182.

³⁹Gen. Roberto Viola and Brig. Gen. L. A. Jáuregui press conference, April 1977, cited in Daniel Frontalini and María Cristana Caiati, El Mito de la Guerra Sucia (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales 1984), 75.

⁴⁰M.L.R. Smith and Sophie Roberts, ‘War in the Gray: Exploring the Concept of Dirty War’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31/5 (May 2008), 385–7.

⁴¹Paul H. Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals: Dirty War in Argentina (Greenwood, CT: Praeger 2002), 147–57; Richard Gillespie, ‘A Critique of the Urban Guerrilla: Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil’, Conflict Quarterly, No. 1 (1980), 39–53.

⁴²Patricia Marchak, God's Assassins: State Terrorism in Argentina in the 1970s (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP 1999), 112.

⁴³Quoted in Richard Gillespie, Soldiers of Peron: Argentina's Montoneros (Oxford: OUP 1983), 250.

⁴⁴Smith and Roberts, ‘War in the Gray’, 389.

⁴⁵Quoted in David Pion-Berlin and George A. Lopez, ‘Of Victims and Executioners: Argentine State Terror, 1975–1979’, International Studies Quarterly, No. 35 (1991), 70.

⁴⁶Myles Shevlin, quoted in Gerard McKnight, The Mind of the Terrorist (London: Michael Joseph 1974), 74.

⁴⁷A power sharing arrangement as the long term solution had been the British government's policy position since early 1972. See Peter Neumann, Britain's Long War: The British Government's Strategy in Northern Ireland, 1969–1998 (London: Palgrave 2003), 43–69.

⁴⁸See R.D. Crelinsten, ‘Analysing Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Communication Model’, Terrorism and Political Violence 14/2 (2002), 77–122.

⁴⁹A phrase derived from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw who stated that the objective of the government was to reduce the violence to an ‘acceptable level’. Quoted in J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army (Dublin: Poolbeg 1989), 384.

⁵⁰See James Salt and M.L.R. Smith, ‘Reassessing Military Assistance to the Civil Powers: Are Traditional British Anti-Terrorist Responses Still Effective?’ Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 13/3 (Winter 2005), 227–49.

⁵¹Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (New York UP 1986), 3–22.

⁵²Ibid., 125–6.

⁵³Walter Laqueur, ‘Terrorism – A Balance Sheet’, in Walter Laqueur (ed.), The Terrorism Reader (Philadelphia: Temple UP 1978), 264.

⁵⁴Quote from the then Chief of Staff of the IRA, see Séan McStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary (Edinburgh: Cremonesi 1975), 295.

⁵⁵See M.L.R. Smith and Peter R. Neumann, ‘Motorman's Long Journey: Changing the Strategic Setting in Northern Ireland’, Contemporary British History 19/4 (2005), 413–14.

⁵⁶Peter Chippindale, ‘Motorman's Slow Drive’, Guardian, 26 Aug. 1972.

⁵⁷See Crelinsten, ‘Terrorism as Political Communication’, 427–41.

⁵⁸See Stephan Aust, The Baader-Meinhof Complex (London: Bodley Head 2008), 305–431.

⁵⁹Clausewitz, On War, 99.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ibid., 89.