Abstract
The final contribution brings together the main findings of the individual articles, draws conclusions and formulates future research challenges in regards to understanding the escalation and de-escalation of irregular war.
Key Words:
Notes
1M.L.R. Smith, ‘Escalation in Irregular War: Using Strategic Theory to Examine from First Principles', Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (Oct. 2012), 618.
2Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia (London: Frank Cass 2005).
3Smith, ‘Escalation in Irregular War', 621.
4Ibid., 630.
5Ibid., 627.
6See also: Peter R. Neumann and M.L.R. Smith, The Strategy of Terrorism: How it Works, and Why it Fails (London: Routledge 2008).
7Smith, ‘Escalation in Irregular War', 633.
8John Stone, ‘Escalation and the War on Terror', Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (Oct. 2012), 649.
9Ibid., 643.
10Jan Angstrom and Jan Willem Honig, ‘Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture, and Escalation in Afghanistan', Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (Oct. 2012), 670.
11Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1995).
12Martha Crenshaw, ‘How Terrorism Declines’, Terrorism and Political Violence 3/1 (1991), 69–87.
13John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (London: Frank Cass 2005). See also: Max Abrahms, ‘What Terrorists Really Want’, International Security 32/4 (2008), 78–105.
14David Betz, ‘Cyberpower in Strategic Affairs: Neither Unthinkable nor Blessed', Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (Oct. 2012), 697.
15Stone, ‘Escalation and the War on Terror', 655.
16Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 379 (London: Routledge for IISS 2006).
17Joseph Nye, ‘Politics in an information age is not only about whose military wins but whose story wins’, Boston Review, Feb./March 2005.