The Use and Abuse of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counter-Insurgency

Abstract

This article argues that there is little evidence supporting the existence of the often praised, and allegedly subtle and successful ‘Dutch approach’ to stabilisation and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. It denounces the uncritical use of the term and refutes suggestions of historical and cultural roots to such an approach, for instance in Dutch colonial warfare in the Indonesian archipelago. It concludes by explaining the true conditions that gave rise to this notion, which seems to feed into a gratifying national self-image of the Dutch as non-martial, conflict averse and tolerant, rather than offering an original and successful formula for countering insurgencies.

Key Words:

• Netherlands Armed Forces
• Counter-Insurgency
• Strategic Culture
• Afghanistan
• Iraq

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Petra Groen, Richard van Gils, Joseph Jockel, Gijs Rommelse, Jan Hoffenaar, Piet Kamphuis, Arthur ten Cate and Stella Kaburis for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article and Beatrice de Graaf for her input on Dutch counter-terrorism. Particular thanks are due to Brian Linn, who not only provided various valuable suggestions for the text, but who also stimulated me to rework my paper as presented at the Society for Military History Conference in April 2012 into this article in the first place.

Notes

  ¹‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Balkenende of the Netherlands after meeting’, 14 July 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-balkenende-netherlands-after-meeting>. Quoted in for instance: Mark Magnier, ‘Dutch troops’ method offers lesson: in an Afghan province, they've long followed practices at the heart of a new U.S. mantra’, Los Angeles Times, 13 Nov. 2009.

  ²Prominent TV journalist Frits Wester uncritically called the Dutch the ‘initiators’ and ‘architects’ of the allegedly successful comprehensive approach in Afghanistan (RTL4 News, 12 Dec. 2009).

  ³Jay Solomon, ‘US takes Dutch military as role model in Afghanistan’, Wall Street Journal, 30 April 2009. Hillary Clinton stated: ‘Dutch soldiers and civilians have done excellent work. […] In fact, the Dutch ‘3D’ approach – defense, diplomacy, and development pursued simultaneously … is a model for our own efforts and the future efforts in Afghanistan.’ This version of events was echoed in René Moelker, ‘The “Dutch Approach” and the Expeditionary Formula’, in Flemming Splidsboel Hansen (ed.), The Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and Prospects (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College 2009), 101. ‘Nederlandse ‘watjes’ hadden succes in Irak’, Trouw, 12 April 2007; ‘Overleven in Uruzgan’, NRC Next, 10 April 2007; ‘Uruzgan, na vier jaar’, NRC Handelsblad, 31 July 2010.

  ⁴Magnier, ‘Dutch troops' method offers lesson’; Solomon, ‘US takes Dutch military as role model’; Damian Grammaticas, ‘Dutch “success” in Afghan conflict’, BBC News, 3 July 2009; ‘The Dutch model: flower strewers partly vindicated’, Economist, 12 March 2009.

  ⁵Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, ‘Srebrenica was een uitzondering’, NRC Handelsblad, 13 July 2005. This op-ed article offers such modification, but in praising other Dutch peace support efforts it also reveals author's tendency at the time to attribute success more directly to certain national ways in peace support and stabilisation efforts.

  ⁶Michael Howard, ‘The Use and Abuse of Military History’, RUSI Journal 107/625 (1962), 4–5. I wish to thank Huw Bennett for reminding me of this element of Howard's seminal article in: Huw Bennett, ‘Minimum Force in British Counterinsurgency’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 21/3 (2010), 460.

  ⁷Frances Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies, 1900–1942 (Amsterdam UP 1996), 42.

  ⁸Wim Klinkert, Van Waterloo to Uruzgan: De Militaire Identiteit van Nederland (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers 2008).

  ⁹Jan Willem Honig, ‘The Netherlands and Military Intervention’, in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Military Intervention in European Conflict (Cambridge: Blackwell 1994), 142. See also: Rem Korteweg, The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally: How Defence Transformation Divided NATO 1991–2008 (Leiden UP 2011), 240–2.

¹⁰Paul Moeyes, De Sterke Arm, de Zachte Hand. Het Nederlandse Leger en de Neutraliteitspolitiek 1839–1939 (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers 2006).

¹¹Joseph Soeters, Tom Bijlsma and Jan van den Heuvel, ‘Trust thy Ally: Multinational Military Cooperation in Uruzgan’, in Robert Beeres et al. (eds), Mission Uruzgan: Collaborating in Multiple Coalitions for Afghanistan (Amsterdam UP 2012), 173.

¹²Joseph Soeters, ‘Odysseus Prevails over Achilles: A Warrior Model Suited to Post 9/11 Conflicts’ (The author wishes to thank Joseph Soeters for allowing him to refer to this forthcoming book chapter). See also: Soeters et al., ‘Epilogue’ in Jan van der Meulen, Ad Vogelaar, Robert Beeres and Joseph Soeters (eds), Mission Uruzgan. Collaborating in Multiple Coalitions for Afghanistan (Amsterdam UP 2012), 329–30.

¹³Constitution of the Netherlands, article 90. See also: Klinkert, Van Waterloo tot Uruzgan.

¹⁴See for example: Henk van Nierop, Het Verraad van het Noorderkwartier: Oorlog, Terreur en Recht in de Nederlandse Opstand (Amsterdam: Prometheus 1999).

¹⁵Julia van Ittersum, Profit and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies, 1595–1615 (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers 2006).

¹⁶Ian F.W. Beckett, The Roots of Counter-Insurgency: Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900–1945 (Poole, UK: Blandford Press 1988), 153.

¹⁷Joseph L. Soeters, ‘Afghanistan Talks: Experiential Isomorphism in Afghanistan’, in G. Caforio, G. Kümmel and B. Purkayastha (eds), Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution: Sociological Perspectives (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing 2008), 142; Joseph L. Soeters, Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics of Civil Wars (Abingdon and New York: Routledge 2005), 62.

¹⁸Moelker, ‘The “Dutch Approach” and the Expeditionary Formula’, 95, 101.

¹⁹Rob de Wijk, ‘International Crises’, in E.R. Muller et al., Crisis: Studies over Crisis en Crisisbeheersing (Deventer: Kluwer 2009), 294–5; Rob de Wijk et al., Counterinsurgency and Contraterrorisme (HCSS Report, July 2009), 20–1.

²⁰Douglas Porch, ‘Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1986), 382, 394; Petra Groen, ‘Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics in the Netherlands East Indies’, Journal of Genocide Research 14/3–4 (2012), 277–297; Jaap de Moor, ‘Afscheid van Indië’, Militaire Spectator 177/3 (2008), 135–43.

²¹Charles Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practise (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press 1996), xii.

²²For such confusion see: Moelker, ‘The “Dutch Approach”’, 101.

²³Groen, ‘Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics’, 277–97. For ‘cunning David’ see title to chapter two in Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas, 39–74.

²⁴Henk Schulte Nordholt, ‘Een Staat van Geweld’ (Inaugural address Erasmus University Rotterdam: 2000). Pramoedya Ananta Toer, House of Glass (Sydney: Penguin Books Australia 1992); Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas, 74.

²⁵Groen, ‘Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics’, 294.

²⁶Petra Groen, Marsroutes en Dwaalsporen: Het Nederlands Militair-Strategische Beleid in Indonesië (The Hague: Sdu Publishing 1991). Jaap de Moor, Generaal Spoor: Triomf en Tragiek van een Legercommandant (Amsterdam: Boom 2011).

²⁷See for instance: J.A.A. van Doorn and W.J. Hendrix, Het Nederlands-Indonesisch conflict: Ontsporing van Geweld (Amsterdam: De Bataafse Leeuw 1985), 125.

²⁸Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia (Amsterdam UP 2002), chapters 9 and 10.

²⁹Quotes from Soeters, ‘Afghanistan Talks: Experiential Isomorphism in Afghanistan’. For an alternative view of the Dutch and their strategic and military culture see: Klinkert, Van Waterloo to Uruzgan and the contributions by Hans Blom, Martin Bossenbroek, Ben Schoenmaker and Arthur ten Cate in Jan Hoffenaar (ed.), Nederland en zijn Militaire Traditie (The Hague: Instituut voor Military Geschiedenis 2003).

³⁰Jan Hoffenaar, ‘The Cold War, Western Europe and the Netherlands: The Dutch Military Contribution to NATO Seen from an International Perspective’, in Thean Potgieter (ed.), Regions, Regional Organisations and Military Power: Acta of the XXXIIIth International Congress of Military History (Capetown: CMH 2007), 247–52.

³¹In 1989, the term ‘Dutch approach’ was first used in relation to counter-terrorism by terrorism-expert Peter Klerks in Terreurbestrijding in Nederland, 1970–1988 (Amsterdam: Ravijn 1989). On the ‘myth’ see for example: Beatrice de Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance: A Comparative Study (Oxford and New York: Routledge 2011), chapter 2.

³²Moelker, ‘The “Dutch Approach” and the Expeditionary Formula’, 89, 101.

³³De Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorist Performance; René Roelofs, Dutch Approach (NPS Documentary 2000). See also: Peter Bootsma, De Molukse Acties. Treinkapingen en Gijzelingen 1970–1978 (Amsterdam: Boom 2000), 381–2; Christiaan van der Spek, Wapen tegen Terreur. De Geschiedenis van de Bijzondere Bijstandseenheid Krijgsmacht 1972–2006 (Amsterdam: Boom 2009), 81–93.

³⁴Soeters, ‘Odysseus Prevails over Achilles’.

³⁵Norimitsu Onoshi, ‘Dutch soldiers find smiles are more effective protection’, New York Times, 24 Oct. 2004; idem, ‘Dutch soldiers find smiles protect as well as armor’, International Herald Tribune, 24 Oct. 2004. ‘Nederlanders in Irak Tonen Respect’, NRC Handelsblad, 25 Oct. 2004.

³⁶In an interview with Arthur ten Cate and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, Colonel Nico van der Zee, who had been the leading army information officer preparing the New York Times interview with Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen, confirmed drawing the term directly from the René Roelofs' documentary on Dutch counter-terrorism in the 1970s. He had seen this four-part documentary ‘Dutch Approach’ (2000) in the preceding weeks. Interview with Colonel Nico van der Zee (21 Dec. 2010).

³⁷Beatrice de Graaf, Theater van de Angst: De Strijd tegen Terrorisme in Nederland, Duitsland, Italië and Amerika (Amsterdam: Boom 2010), 43–47.

³⁸Thijs Brocades Zaalberg and Arthur ten Cate, ‘A Gentle Occupation: Unravelling the Dutch Approach in Iraq, 2003–2005’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 23/1 (March 2012), 119–20; Interview with Colonel Nico van der Zee (22 Dec. 2010).

³⁹Geert Mak, ‘Een Kleine Geschiedenis van een Novembermaand’, NRC Handelsblad 27 Nov. 2004, 34; Cor Lammers, Vreemde Overheersing: Bezetten en Bezetting in Sociologisch Perspectief (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker 2005). For criticism on the Dutch Iraq policy, but appraisal for the tactical level operations see: H.J.A. Hofland, ‘Nederland in Irak’, NRC Handelsblad, 17 Jan. 2005; Nelleke Noordervliet, ‘Loyaliteit Houdt een Keer op’, NRC Handelsblad, 29 May 2004.

⁴⁰Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen, Netwerk TV, 28 June 2004. In the New York Times the lieutenant colonel was quoted saying: ‘Of course, an American is a different type of human than a Dutchman […] We have our own culture. But I think the Americans could have a way of operating with more respect and more understanding toward the population.’ For a similar view: Interview Colonel Nico van der Zee (22 Dec. 2010).

⁴¹Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate, ‘A Gentle Occupation’, 117–43.

⁴²Thijs Brocades Zaalberg and Arthur ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna: De Nederlandse Krijgsmacht in Irak, 2003–2005 (Amsterdam: Boom 2010).

⁴³Ibid., 257–8, 322. Michel Rentenaar, the first political adviser to the Dutch contingent, was the driving-force behind the so-called ‘Al Muthanna model’, a caucus procedure for selecting the provincial council and governor that the Coalition Provisional Authority tried to replicate elsewhere in Iraq. However, the model proved extremely hard to implement under more difficult circumstances.

⁴⁴Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, chapter 1.

⁴⁵E.g. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, ‘Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations’, Military Review 84/6 (Nov.-Dec. 2005), 2–15. For a similar argument that also involved Dutch superior performance see: Rob de Wijk, ‘Fighting Terrorism: A Useful Military Strategy?’, in Gelijn Molier and Eva Nieuwenhuys, Peace, Security and Development in an Era of Globalization (Dordrecht, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing 2009), 143–4.

⁴⁶Alex Alderson, ‘The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine after the War in Iraq’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cranfield Univ. 2009), 150–1; Michael Knights and Ed Williams, ‘The Calm before the Storm: The British Experience in Southern Iraq’, Policy Focus 66 (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Feb. 2007).

⁴⁷Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, 311.

⁴⁸Emiel de Bont, Onder Taliban en Krijgsheren: Nederland en de Oorlog in Afghanistan (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam Uitgevers 2011), 261.

⁴⁹See for instance: Huw Bennett, ‘The Other Side of the COIN: Minimum Force and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 18/4 (2007), 638–64; Rod Thornton, ‘“Minimum Force”: a Reply to Huw Bennett’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 20/1 (2009), 215–26; Bruno C. Reis, ‘British Minimum Force in Counterinsurgency during Decolonisation (1945–1970)’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/2 (April 2011), 245–79.

⁵⁰The forthcoming English-language dissertations of Netherlands Defence Academy researchers Martijn Kitzen and Mirjam Grandia will be welcome contributions to this debate. For a general treatment see: George Dimitriu and Beatrice de Graaf, ‘The Dutch COIN approach’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 21/3 (Sept. 2010) and Christ Klep, Uruzgan. De Nederlandse Militairen op Missie, 2006–2010 (Amsterdam: Boom 2011). A more detailed study dealing specifically with Special Forces has been recently published by Arthur ten Cate and Martijn van der Vorm, Callsign Nassau: Het Moderne Korps Commandotroepen, 1989–2012 (Amsterdam: Boom 2012).

⁵¹Chief of Defence General Dick Berlijn, Speech at the departure of F-16 detachment to Afghanistan, 9 Jan. 2006; Steven Derix, ‘“Zonder troepen blijft de nodige hulp uit”: hoogste militair pleit voor missie Uruzgan’, NRC Handelsblad, 10 Jan. 2006; Korteweg, The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally, 290–4. See also: Robert H.E Gooren, ‘Soldiering in Unfamiliar Places: The Dutch Approach’, Military Review (March – April 2006) and Th. A. van Baarda and D.E.M. Verweij (eds), Military Ethics: The Dutch Approach: A Practical Guide (Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic Publishers 2006) 5. See also footnote 4.

⁵²Eric Vrijsen, ‘Dick Berlijn: “Soms Moet je Meeveren”’, Elsevier, 18 Jan. 2006; Minutes of the Second Chamber of Dutch Parliament, 2005–2006, 27925, no. 193. See also Linda Polman, ‘Dutch Approach’, Militaire Spectator 174/6 (2006), 300.

⁵³Vrijsen, ‘Dick Berlijn’.

⁵⁴As cited in Korteweg, The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally, 293.

⁵⁵Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands in Uruzgan (Dec. 2006), 14–15.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Interview by Ko Colijn with Gen. Dick Berlijn in Vrij Nederland, 18 Aug. 2006. Director of Operations Major General Jouke Eikelboom had stated earlier that ‘[a]ll security operation will be in support of reconstruction. … Our approach will be totally different.’ Stieven Ramdharie, ‘We gaan geen dorpen met Taliban platgooien’, de Volkskrant, 18 Jan. 2006.

⁵⁸Minutes of the House of Representatives, 2005–2006, 27925, no. 193.

⁵⁹Canadian Brigadier David Fraser, Commander of ISAF Regional Command South in 2006, in Raymond van den Boogaard, ‘Generaal Voorziet Strijd in Uruzgan’, NRC Handelsblad, 7 Feb. 2007. See also C.J. Chivers, ‘Dutch forces stress restraint in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 5 April 2007.

⁶⁰Soeters, ‘Odysseus Prevails over Achilles’.

⁶¹Joeri Boom, Als een Nacht met Duizend Sterren (Amsterdam: Podium 2010), 115–16.

⁶²Interview with Rashid in Dirk Vlasblom, ‘Gids in Talibanstan’, NRC Handelsblad, 15 Nov. 2008; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (Allen Lane: London 2008), 354. For a corresponding view of a Dutch army officer see Major Bert Wijnhoud, ‘Mobiliteit voor de inktvlek’, Infanterie 3 (Sept. 2008), 21.

⁶³Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia UP 2008), 198–200. For shrinking ‘ink spots’ see: Cate and van der Vorm, Callsign Nassau, 276–7.

⁶⁴See for instance remarks by Dutch Major General Mart de Kruif in Hanneke Chin-A-Fo, ‘“We vechten hier ook tegen de narco-industrie”’, NRC Handelsblad, 25 March 2009; ‘Topmilitair Schamper over Prestaties Oeroezgan’, De Telegraaf, 29 Oct. 2003.

⁶⁵Soeters et al., ‘Epilogue’, 329–30. See also: de Wijk, ‘Fighting Terrorism’, 138.

⁶⁶For British self-criticism see for instance: Stephan Grey, ‘Cracking on in Helmand’, Prospect 162 (27 Aug. 2009); Anthony King, ‘Operation Herrick: The British Campaign in Helmand’, in Nik Hynek and Péter Marston (eds), Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational Contributions to Reconstruction (London and New York: Routledge 2012), 27–41; Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, ‘COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan’, RUSI Journal 153/3 (2009), 18–25; Sherard Cowper-Coles, Cables from Kabul: The Inside Story of the West's Afghanistan Campaign (London: Harper Press 2011).

⁶⁷Interview with Rietdijk in Mirjam Grandia, ‘The 3D Approach and Counter Insurgency: A Mix of Defence, Diplomacy and Development, The Case of Uruzgan’ (MA Thesis, Univ. of Leiden 2009), 19, <www.cimic-coe.org/download/3DandCOIN.pdf>.

⁶⁸Joseph Soeters, ‘Odysseus Prevails over Achilles’.

⁶⁹Correspondence with Commodore Frans Osinga, professor in military operational sciences at the Netherlands Defence Academy (5 June 2012); N.U. Stam, ‘Gevechtservaring: Van Splijtzwam tot Verbindende Factor’, Militaire Spectator 181/2 (2011), 75–84. The author got the same impression during his deployment as Operational War Diarist with Task Force Uruzgan in autumn 2008 and spring 2010.

⁷⁰Dimitriu and De Graaf, ‘The Dutch COIN Approach’, 429–58.

⁷¹Stam, ‘Gevechtservaring’, 79.

⁷²For instance, Captain Lenny Hazelbag, company commander in the tribally complex Deh Rawod area during winter 2006–07 only became aware of the presence of a tribal adviser at the end of his tour. In the meantime, he received little to no advice on tribal relations and local politics. Correspondence between author and Hazelbag, 6 July 2012.

⁷³Cate and van der Vorm, Callsign Nassau, 275.

⁷⁴Martijn Kitzen, ‘Close Encounters of the Tribal Kind: the Implementation of Co-Option as a Tool for De-escalation of Conflict – The Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan's Uruzgan Province’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (Oct. 2012), 713–34. See also the interview with PRT's cultural advisor Willem Vogelsang in Hans Ariëns, ‘Dutch Approach Klinkt nogal Zelfvoldaan’, Internationale Samenwerking Online (Feb. 2010).

⁷⁵When addressing military personnel shortly after the Battle for Chora, General Berlijn expressed his irritation about the tendency in the Netherlands to label the mission as a reconstruction mission. Remarks by General Berlijn quoted in ‘Moeilijk om de kerels in de ogen te kijken nadat ze keihard hebben gevochten’, Bizon, No 9, Nov. 2007, 15. The term continued to resonate, but the last official use of the ‘Dutch approach’ was in: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands in Afghanistan (Dec. 2006), 15, 17. This brochure was drafted in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence.

⁷⁶Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Bot, ‘The Dutch Approach: Preserving the Trinity of Politics, Security and Development’, Speech presented at the SID and NCDO Conference on Security and Development, The Hague (7 April 2006). The term ‘3D-approach’ was first used by Canadians in 2004. See: ‘Address By Prime Minister Paul Martin on Occasion of His Visit to Washington DC’, 29 April 2004.

⁷⁷Minutes of the Second Chamber of Dutch Parliament, 2007–2008, 27925, No. 321 (20 March 2008); ‘Paneldiscussie Counter-Insurgency’, Militaire Spectator 177/3 (2008), 167; Steven Derix, ‘We wisten niet dat we zo vaak moesten knokken’, NRC Handelsblad, 12 April 2008.

⁷⁸Raymond van den Boogaard, ‘De Inktvlekmethode Werkt Uitstekend’, NRC Handelsblad, 16 Sept. 2006.

⁷⁹Jaïr van der Lijn, 3D ‘The Next Generation’: Lessons learned from Uruzgan for Future Operations (Clingendael Institute Report 2011), 57.

⁸⁰Grandia, ‘The 3D Approach and Counter-Insurgency’, 19.

⁸¹PRT Commander Rietdijk in ‘“Trage opbouw verspilt succes in Uruzgan’”, Nederlands Dagblad, 12 Jan. 2008. Remarks by Dutch Ambassor Daan Everts in Juurd Eijsvogel, ‘“VS lopen wel voorop bij effective aanpak Talibaan”’, NRC Handelsblad, 19 Jan. 2008.

⁸²Grandia, ‘The 3D Approach’, 19.

⁸³Notes taken by author of remarks by Director of Security Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Henk Swarttouw, during presentation by Gen. Stanley McCrystal (The Hague 11 Sept. 2009). His successor, Joep Wijnands, made similar statements during a presentation on ‘The Future of the Comprehensive Approach’ (The Hague, 6 March 2012). See also: Minutes of the Second Chamber of Dutch Parliament, 2011–2012, 27925, no. 451. Roundtable on 8 Feb. 2012 on the official evaluation ISAF 2006–2010, 3–4.

⁸⁴See: Jet van de Gaag-Halbertsma et al., ‘Civil-Military Cooperation from a 3D Perspective’, in Sebastiaan Rietjens and Myriame Bollen, Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate 2008) 33; Notes by Van de Gaag-Halbertsma, development advisor to the Ministry of Defence, taken during two RUSI workshops on the comprehensive approach in Afghanistan (London, 24–25 May 2007 and 26–27 June 2007). See also notes of ‘Briefing by the civilian commander of the British PRT in Helmand’ at the Netherlands national delegation to NATO (Brussels, 28 Jan. 2008). Documents are in the author's possession. For British civil-military command relation in Helmand see: Peter Dahl Thruelsen, ‘Counter-insurgency and a Comprehensive Approach’, Small Wars Journal (25 Sept. 2008), 3, <www.smallwarsjournal.com>; Cowper-Coles, Cables from Kabul, 168.

⁸⁵US Embassy The Hague Secret cable to Secretary of State, ‘Subject: Getting to yes post-2010’, 2 Nov. 2009, <www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09THEHAGUE92. html>; US Embassy Kabul to Secretary of State Washington DC, ‘Dutch military and diplomatic officers give the hard sell to remain in Uruzgan’, 9 Dec. 2009, <www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id+09KABUL3963>.

⁸⁶Secretary of State Washington DC confidential cable to U.S. Embassy The Hague, Subject: SecState July 14 conversation with Dutch Foreign Minister Verhagen’, 28 July 2009, <www.nos.nl/artikel/204183-wikileaks-gesprek-clintonverhagen.html>.

⁸⁷‘Topmilitair Schamper over Prestaties Oeroezgan’, De Telegraaf, 29 Oct. 2003.

⁸⁸Dutch NATO Senior Civilian Representative Daan Everts even praised the American for being ahead of most of their European partners in using a truly integrated civil-military approach. For this debate see Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, ‘To COIN or not to COIN’, Militaire Spectator 177/3 (2008). Noël van Bemmel and Deedee Derksen, ‘Dutch Approach helemaal niet zo Dutch’, de Volkskrant, 31 March 2009; Hans de Vreij, ‘NAVO-Generaal: “Dutch Approach” bestaat niet’, Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 12 June 2009.