The final issue of the 2012 volume of The Journal of Strategic Studies comprises an excellent series of articles examining European responses to changing diplomatic and military circumstances in the early twentieth century. These articles examine grand strategy, assessments of naval competitions, offense-defense balances, and various aspects of military innovation. Coping with uncertainty, adapting to changing economic circumstances, and correctly assessing and responding to the capabilities and intentions of rising powers remain challenges in the international security system today.
Steven E. Lobell of the University of Utah examines the success and failure of Britain's policies of balancing in ‘Bringing Balancing Back In: Britain's Targeted Balancing, 1936–1939’. Lobell notes that balancing, particularly under economic constraint, may not allow the matching of all adversary capabilities. Lobell argues that by focusing its resources against the specific elements of enemy capabilities, Britain balanced successfully against the most threatening components of power in its potential adversaries, particularly the emerging threat of Germany's Luftwaffe.
John H. Maurer of the US Naval War College analyzes the difficulties Britain had in managing declining economic position and rising regional threats in ‘“Winston has gone mad”: Churchill, the British Admiralty, and the Rise of Japanese Naval Power’. Maurer argues that responding to a rapid Japanese buildup in modern naval capability in the 1920s required Winston Churchill to balance demands from the Admiralty, diplomatic assessments of the likelihood of war with Japan, and Britain's severely constrained economic circumstances. Churchill and Britain chose to accept risks in naval preparedness based on trends in Anglo-Japanese relations and the assumption that Britain and Japan would not go to war unless Britain was entangled elsewhere – a prescient estimate.
Robert T. Foley of the University of Liverpool contributes both to the historical analysis of the Great War and to the literature on military innovation with ‘A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918’. In contrast with traditional theories of innovation, which focus on vertical links and the creation and dissemination of new ideas up and down the chain of command, Foley argues that the German Army practiced ‘horizontal innovation’ – spreading innovative techniques and concepts laterally from unit to unit to reflect the rapidly changing realities of combat. This disseminated innovation very rapidly, and caused formal military doctrine to lag behind actual practice for much of the war.
Matthew S. Seligmann of the University of Brunel examines British naval planning in the decades before the Great War in ‘Britain's Great Security Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898–1906.’ Seligmann assesses recent scholarship suggesting that the Royal Navy's concern over possible Franco-Russian naval cooperation was a significant factor in planning during the early twentieth century. Seligmann finds a healthy tension between fleet commanders, who might have to fight a combined Entente fleet, and the Admiralty, which weighed competing demands for resources and had access to excellent intelligence on both Russia and France. He concludes that the Admiralty assessed the Franco-Russian threat as modest and focused increasingly on the rise of German naval power as a primary concern.
David Stevenson of the London School of Economics and Political Science assesses the importance of defensive improvements on European security in ‘Fortifications and the European Military Balance before 1914’. Stevenson notes two waves of technical improvement in major fortifications (mid-1880s and 1904–05), the significant resources most great powers poured into new defensive systems, and the rapidity with which new fortifications were conceived and constructed in response to the changing political and military environment. Examining defensive constructions provides insights into debates within national militaries, highlights changes in the strategic environment, and helps explain why relatively fortification-free areas in the West (Belgium, northern France, the Isonzo Valley) became critical geostrategic spaces in pre-war planning and wartime practice.
In addition to our articles, this issue contains a response to Yoram Evron's recent Journal of Strategic Studies article on Chinese military procurementFootnote1by Zhang Yunzhuang of China's National University of Defense Technology. He points out that key elements of Evron's argument – the assumption that China sees a reduced external threat and the assumption that the PLA is committed to an increasing interest in humanitarian interventions, among others – may lead to an exaggerated conclusion regarding China's ability to produce and use indigenous weapons systems in protracted military campaigns. He argues that Chinese actions and statements suggest greater wariness about the external environment, that actual resource commitments to humanitarian aid are very modest, and that China remains committed to maintaining a strong military and industrial mobilization base. He uses Chinese national and military strategies, the procurement decision-making process, and the mobilization system to provide evidence that Chinese procurement may not be as divorced from military requirements as Evron suggests.
David French, Jonathan Boff, Jacqueline L. Hazelton, Eric Sayers, and Bradford Lee all provide incisive reviews of books by George H. Cassar; David Stevenson; Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan; James R. Holmes, Andrew C. Winner, and Toshi Yoshihara; and Colin S. Gray – who also provides a brief response to the review of his book.
Last but not least, we at the Journal of Strategic Studies wish all our readers a peaceful and prosperous holiday season, and look forward to a continued relationship in 2013!
Notes
1Yoram Evron, ‘China's Military Procurement Approach in the Early 21st Century and Its Operational Implications’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/1 (Feb. 2012), 63–93.