India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn

Abstract

For six years, India has sought to implement an army doctrine for limited war, ‘Cold Start’, intended to enable a Cold War era force optimised for massive offensives to operate under the nuclear threshold. This article asks whether that is presently feasible, and answers in the negative. Doctrinal change has floundered on five sets of obstacles, many of which are politically rooted and deep-seated, thereby leaving the Army unprepared to respond to challenges in the manner envisioned by the doctrine's architects.

Key Words:

• India
• South Asia
• India-Pakistan
• Indian Army
• Cold Start
• Limited War
• Nuclear Weapons
• Terrorism

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to anonymous reviewers for comments.

Notes

1 Michael Carver, ‘Conventional War in the Nuclear Age’, in Gordon Alexander Craig, Felix Gilbert and Peter Paret (eds), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1986), 798–803.

2 Chris Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy? (Oxford: OUP 1994), 19–21.

3 Amit Gupta, Building an Arsenal: The Evolution of Regional Power Force Structures (Westport, CT: Praeger 1997), 40–2, 53–5, 67; Richard F. Grimmett, US Arms Sales to Pakistan (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service 24 Aug. 2009).

4 V.P Malik, Kargil from Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, a joint venture with the India Today Group 2006).

5 For Pakistani and Indian interpretations see, respectively, ‘Indian military dream’, The Nation, 1 Jan. 2010, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Opinions/Editorials/01-Jan-2010/Indian-military-dream>; Rajat Pandit, ‘Army reworks war doctrine for Pakistan, China’, Times of India, 30 Dec. 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Army-reworks-war-doctrine-for-Pakistan-China/articleshow/5392683.cms>.

6 Bharat Karnad, India's Nuclear Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International 2008), 95.

7 ‘Indian army chief's remarks show hostile intent: FO’, Dawn, 31 Dec. 2009, <www.dawn.com.pk/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/13+indian+army+chiefs+remarks+show+hostile+intent+fo-za-05>.

8 S.P Kapur, ‘India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia is Not Like Cold War Europe’, International Security 30/2 (2005), 152; Shashank Joshi, ‘Permanent Crisis: Iran's Nuclear Trajectory’, Whitehall Paper No. 79 (London: Royal United Services Institute 2012), 29–35.

9 Walter C. Ladwig, ‘The Challenge of Changing Indian Military Doctrine’, Seminar (July 2009), <www.india-seminar.com/2009/599/599_walter_c_ladwig_iii.htm>.

10 P.R Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2007), 149–83; Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, ‘The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’, Security Studies 14/2 (2005), 290.

11 ‘Op Parakram claimed 798 soldiers’, The Times of India, 31 July 2003, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/104948.cms>.

12 Chari et al., Four Crises and a Peace Process, 162.

13 Praveen Swami, ‘Beating the retreat’, Frontline, 26 Nov. 2002, <www.thehindu.com/fline/fl1922/stories/20021108007101200.htm>.

14 Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Univ. of Washington Press 2005), 168, 171.

15 Sumit Ganguly, ‘Nuclear Stability in South Asia’, International Security 33/2 (1 Oct. 2008), 45.

16 Vipin Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability’, International Security 34/3 (1 Jan. 2010), 76.

17 S. Paul Kapur, ‘Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia’, International Security 33/2 (1 Oct. 2008), 77–9; Chari et al., Four Crises and a Peace Process, 170–2.

18 Gupta, Building an Arsenal, 158.

19 S. Kalyanaraman, ‘Operation Parakram: An Indian Exercise in Coercive Diplomacy’, Strategic Analysis 26/4 (2002), 478.

20 Tariq M. Ashraf, ‘Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces’, Military Review 84/6 (Dec. 2004), 53–62; Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Cold Start and Battle Groups for Offensive Operations’, Strategic Trends 4/18 (June 2006); Karnad, India's Nuclear Policy, 115–31; Walter C. Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine’, International Security 32/3 (1 Jan. 2008), 158–90.

21 For a discussion of blitzkrieg as a military strategy, see John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1983), 35–52.

22 Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?’, 164.

23 Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation, Revised ed. (Delhi: OUP 2001), 207.

24 The following four paragraphs rely heavily on Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?’; Kanwal, ‘Cold Start and Battle Groups for Offensive Operations’; Ashraf, ‘Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces’; Ladwig, ‘The Challenge of Changing Indian Military Doctrine’; A. Vinod Kumar, ‘A Cold Start: India's Response to Pakistan-Aided Low-Intensity Conflict’, Strategic Analysis 33/3 (2009), 324; Subhash Kapila, India's New ‘Cold Start’ War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed (South Asia Analysis Group, 4 May 2004), <www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html>; Subhash Kapila, Indian Army's New ‘Cold Start’ Doctrine Strategically Reviewed – Part II (Additional Imperatives) (South Asia Analysis Group, 1 June 2004), <www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers11/paper1013.html>; Subhash Kapila, Indian Army Validates its Cold Start Doctrine (South Asia Analysis Group, 7 June 2005), <www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers15%5Cpaper1408.html>.

25 ‘Indian Army Doctrine’ (Headquarters Army Training Command, Oct. 2004), Foreword, <http://ids.nic.in/Indian%20Army%20Doctrine/indianarmydoctrine_1.doc>.

26 Bharat Karnad writes that ‘the Indian military is heartily sick of not being allowed to carry out its operations to the planned objective, which falls short of sundering Pakistan, instead of having to engage in periodic and truncated conflicts which, time and again, have ended up, as the Indian military sees it, putting the game back on the same start-line’, India's Nuclear Policy, 123; for evidence of the military's anger at not being allowed to prosecute an offensive, see V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (New Delhi: Sage Publications 2003).

27 Y.I. Patel, ‘Dig Vijay to Divya Astra – a Paradigm Shift in the Indian Army's Doctrine’, Bharat Rakshak Monitor 6/6 (July 2004), <www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE6-6/patel.html>.

28 Karnad, India's Nuclear Policy, 117, 121.

29 Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace?,’ 59, 67; Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan; a Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Karachi: National Pub. House 1971), 7.

30 Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, 96.

31 See Gupta, Building an Arsenal, 58–60.

32 For a discussion of close air support in the Indian context, see J. A. Khan, Air Power and Challenges to IAF (APH Publishing 2004), 155–67.

33 Chandar S. Sundaram and Daniel P. Marston (eds), A Military History of India and South Asia: From the East India Company to the Nuclear Era (Bloomington: Indiana UP 2008), chap. 10–11; Sukhwant Singh, India's Wars Since Independence (New Delhi: Vikas 1980), pt. 3.

34 Robert D. Cox, India and the Operational Art of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College 1991).

35 Chari et al., Four Crises and a Peace Process, 198.

36 Rajesh M. Basrur, ‘Kargil, Terrorism, and India's Strategic Shift’, India Review 1/4 (2002), 40.

37 On audience costs, see James D. Fearon, ‘Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes’, American Political Science Review 88/3 (Sept. 1994), 577–92. There is little written on the subject of path dependent audience costs.

38 Ahmad Faruqui, ‘Beyond Mumbai: Prospects for Indo-Pakistani relations’, RUSI.org, 2009, <www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C496A403CE6D75/>.

39 Gurmeet Kanwal, Indian Army, Vision 2020 (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers and the India Today Group 2008), 81.

40 George Tanham, in one of the only substantive descriptions of Indian strategic thought, judges that ‘India has developed a predominantly defensive strategic orientation’ with its armed forces largely ‘defensive and protective’, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. 1992), vii. Stephen P. Cohen has referred to ‘India's … cautious strategic style’ and its ‘essentially conservative foreign policy’, Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2001), 127, 301. See also Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India: a Strategic History of the Nehru Years (New Delhi: Permanent Black 2010), 318–20; George K. Tanham, Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice, Kanti P. Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo (eds) (New Delhi: Manohar 1996).

41 Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 2010), 1.

42 The Indian response to the Mumbai attacks was more restrained than in 2001–02. This may indicate either that Indian strategic culture is more durable than suggested here; or that in the face of an enduring lack of retaliatory options, India decided that another failed mobilisation would carry excessive costs; or something else entirely.

43 Elisabeth Bumiller, ‘Gates warns of militant threat in South Asia’ New York Times, 21 Jan. 2010, sec. International/Asia Pacific, <www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/world/asia/21gates.html>.

44 Kapur, ‘Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia’; S. Paul Kapur, ‘Revisionist Ambitions, Conventional Capabilities, and Nuclear Instability: Why Nuclear South Asia is Not Like Cold War Europe’, in Scott Douglas Sagan (ed.), Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford Security Studies 2009).

45 For a dissenting view, one which places greater emphasis on the strategic culture of Pakistan's military than on nuclear factors, see Feroz Hassan Khan, Peter R. Lavoy and Christopher Clary, ‘Pakistan's Motivations and Calculations for the Kargil Conflict’, in Peter R. Lavoy (ed.), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge: CUP 2009), 89–90, passim.

46 B. Raman, Hit, But Stealthily (South Asia Analysis Group, 23 Feb. 2010), <www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3687.html>.

47 Lydia Polgreen and Souad Mekhennet, ‘Militant network is intact long after Mumbai siege’, New York Times, 30 Sept. 2009, sec. International/Asia Pacific, <www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/world/asia/30mumbai.html?_r=1&ref=lashkaretaiba>.

48 Ali Ahmed, ‘Ongoing Revision of Indian Army Doctrine’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 6 Jan. 2010, <www.idsa.in/idsacomments/OngoingRevisionofIndianArmyDoctrine_aahmed_060110>.

49 Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?’, 176, 190.

50 Anit Mukherjee, ‘The Absent Dialogue,’ Seminar (July 2009), <www.india-seminar.com/2009/599/599_anit_mukherjee.htm>.

51 Khan et al., ‘Pakistan's Motivations and Calculations for the Kargil Conflict.’

52 Ganguly and Kraig, ‘The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis’; Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989).

53 Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace?’, 44, 56–7; Timothy D. Hoyt, ‘Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine and the Dangers of Strategic Myopia’, Asian Survey 41/6 (2001), 966; Scott Douglas Sagan, ‘The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine’, in Scott Douglas Sagan (ed.), Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford Security Studies 2009), 235; David O. Smith, ‘The US Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia’, Stimson Center, 4 March 2013, 2–3, 31–40.

54 Christopher Clary, ‘Presentation: India's Military Modernization (Nuclear trends)’ (presented at the Shifting the Balance in Asia: Indian Military Modernization, American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, 8 June 2010), <www.aei.org/event/100250>.

55 Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace?,’ 64.

56 Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear Threshold and India's Options’, Air Power: Journal of Air Power and Space Studies 1/1 (2004), 111; Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?,’ 169. For the clearest statement of Pakistan's red-lines, by Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, see Sagan, ‘The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine’, 234.

57 Ibid.,250.

58 Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace?’, 74–5; Kanwal, Indian Army, Vision 2020, 74–6; Chari et al., Four Crises and a Peace Process, 202–3.

59 Kier A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent’, Foreign Affairs (Dec. 2009), 40.

60 Cohen, India, 187.

61 E.g. ‘there is a legalistic or diplomatic, perhaps a casuistic, propensity to keep things connected, to keep the threat and the demand [or provocation] in the same currency, to do what seems reasonable’, Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966), 87, cf. also 56–9.

62 Shashank Joshi, ‘New year, new problem? Pakistan's tactical nukes’, The Diplomat, 2 January 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/02/pakistans-new-nuclear-problem/>; George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb (Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press 2002), 483.

63 India's Nuclear Policy, 123.

64 For a discussion of India's postural constraints in this regard, see Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace?’, 46–7, 63, 75–5; Sagan, ‘The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine’, 250; Rajesh M. Basrur, ‘India's Nuclear Policy’, in Chandar S. Sundaram and Daniel P. Marston (eds), A Military History of India and South Asia: From the East India Company to the Nuclear Era (Bloomington: Indiana UP 2008), 190; Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Does India Need Tactical Nuclear Weapons?’, Strategic Analysis 24/2 (2000), 247; Kanwal, Indian Army, Vision 2020, 78.

65 Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2001), 501–6. For a more up-to-date version of these arguments from a former practicioner, see Verghese Koithara, Managing India's Nuclear Forces (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2012), 105.

66 Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996), 251–2.

67 Karnad, India's Nuclear Policy, 92–105. Karnad does suggest, without adequate evidence, that India's posture after 2002 has been ‘modified nuclear de-mated’ under pressure from the military. But he also emphasises the extent to which the armed forces are excluded in planning and operational terms. See also Cohen, The Indian Army, 219, 233.

68 See footnote 40.

69 Rosen, Societies and Military Power, 249, 251–2, 262; Srinath Raghavan, ‘Civil–Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32/1 (Feb. 2009): 149; Harsh V. Pant, ‘India's Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: Implications for Civil-Military Relations in India’, Armed Forces & Society 33/2 (1 Jan. 2007), 238–64.

70 Stephen Van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War’, in Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Stephen Van Evera (eds), Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War, Revised and expanded edition (Princeton: Princeton UP 1991), 59–109.

71 A.J.P. Taylor, The First World War: An Illustrated History (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books 1963), 20.

72 Chari et al., Four Crises and a Peace Process, 175.

73 Ibid., 177.

74 Khan et al., ‘Pakistan's motivations and calculations for the Kargil conflict’.

75 Mukherjee, ‘The Absent Dialogue’.

76 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1960), 187.

77 Cohen and Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming, 66.

78 R. Sukumaran, ‘The 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on the Use of Air Power’, Strategic Analysis 27/3 (2003), 341.

79 The limited amount of close air support furnished by the IAF was disastrous. It was characterised by ‘dismal conduct’, including the infliction of casualties on Indian personnel. See Pradeep Barua, The State at War in South Asia, Studies in War, Society, and the Military (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press 2005), 193.

80 James R. Holmes, Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge 2009), 6–36, 61–79, 170–7.

81 Ibid., 63.

82 Cohen, The Indian Army, 220.

83 Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2006), 28–57; Ian Horwood, Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press 2006), chap. 1.

84 Alex Barker, Sylvia Pfeiffer and Jeremy Lemer, ‘Forces battle for dwindling resources’, Financial Times, 2 Feb. 2010, <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/140a6adc-1040-11df-841f-00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=bc5ebee8-713c-11de-877c-00144feabdc0.html>.

85 For an argument that relates force structure to military effectiveness, see Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, ‘Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars’, International Organization 63/1 (2009), 67–106.

86 ‘Organisational essence’ refers to the views held by dominant groups within an organisation as to what its core mission ought to be, and what kinds of people should be members. See Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 28.

87 Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?,’ 186.

88 Mukherjee, ‘The Absent Dialogue’.

89 Pinaki Bhattacharya, ‘Army and IAF face off over new war plan’, India Today, 14 Dec. 2009, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/74898/India/Army+and+IAF+face+off+over+new+war+plan.html>.

90 Shashank Joshi, ‘Defence Transformation in India’, RUSI Newsbrief 30/2 (17 March 2010), <www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/ref:A4BA0C7C9B0A51/>; Brian Kenneth Hedrick, India's Strategic Defense Transformation: Expanding Global Relationships (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College 2009), <www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB950.pdf>.

91 Mukherjee, ‘The Absent Dialogue’.

92 Timothy D. Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defence Policy: India, Iraq, and Israel, Cass Military Studies (New York: Routledge 2006), 23.

93 Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?,’ 183.

94 Cohen and Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming, 53.

95 Anit Mukherjee, Failing to Deliver: Post-crises Defence Reforms in India, 1998–-2010, IDSA Occasional Paper (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) March 2011).

96 The figures in this paragraph are obtained from Manoj Joshi, ‘We lack the military that can deter terrorism’, Mail Today, 26 Nov. 2009, <http://mjoshi.blogspot.com/2009/12/we-lack-military-that-can-deter.html>.

97 Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?,’ 187–9.

98 Siddharth Srivastava, ‘Indian army “backed out” of Pakistan attack’, Asia Times, 21 Jan. 2009, <www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KA21Df02.html>.

99 Karnad, India's Nuclear Policy, 120.

100 Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?’, 189; Saurabh Joshi, ‘Army's officer intake hits new low’, StratPost, 16 Feb. 2010, <www.stratpost.com/armys-officer-intake-hits-new-low>.

101 Ajai Shukla, ‘Soldier, heal thyself,’ Business Standard, 6 April 2010, <www.business-standard.com/india/news/ajai-shukla-soldier-heal-thyself/390930/>.

102 Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?,’ 185, 187–8.

103 Manoj Joshi, ‘Was the Indian Army ready for war?’, Mail Today, 17 Jan. 2009, <http://mjoshi.blogspot.com/2009/01/was-indian-army-ready-for-war.html>.

104 John W. Garver, ‘Sino-Indian Security Relations’, in Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell and Joseph Chinyong Liow (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies, (London: Routledge 2010), 127; Harsh Pant, ‘China tightens the screws on India’, Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 2009.

105 Chen Jian, ‘The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union’, Journal of Cold War Studies 8/3 (1 July 2006), 54–101.

106 Ravi Velloor, ‘India feels chill wind from China’, The Straits Times, 7 Nov. 2009, <www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?sec = 2&id=8563>.

107 Jonathan Holslag, ‘The Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32/6 (Dec. 2009), 811.

108 John W. Garver, ‘Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese threat perceptions’, Journal of Strategic Studies 25/4 (Dec. 2002), 109; Jonathan Holslag, ‘Progress, Perceptions and Peace in the Sino-Indian Relationship’, East Asia 26/1 (1 March 2009), 41–56; Holslag, ‘The Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India’; on the latter point of mistrust, see Manjari Chatterjee Miller, ‘Re-collecting Empire: "Victimhood" and the 1962 Sino-Indian War’, Asian Security 5/3 (2009) 216.

109 Rajat Pandit, ‘Army reworks war doctrine for Pakistan, China’, The Times of India, 30 Dec. 2009, <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-12-30/india/28104699_1_war-doctrine-new-doctrine-entire-western-front>.

110 Ahmed, ‘Ongoing Revision of Indian Army Doctrine’.

111 Jack L. Snyder, ‘Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive,’ in Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera (eds), Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War, Revised and expanded edition (Princeton UP 1991), 27–30; Van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War’, 91.

112 Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, 190.

113 From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publications 2000), 244.

114 ‘Armed Conflicts Report: India – Maoist Insurgency’, Ploughshares, Jan. 2009, <www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-IndiaAP.html>; Amit Gupta, ‘The Reformist State: The Indian Security Dilemma’, in Amit Gupta (ed.), Strategic Stability in Asia (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate 2008), 110–14.

115 Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, 147.

116 Cohen, The Indian Army, xii-xiv; see also Sumit Ganguly, ‘From the Defense of the Nation to Aid to the Civil: The Army in Contemporary India’, Journal of Asian and African Studies 26/1-2 (Jan. 1991), 11–26.

117 Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds), India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned (London: Routledge 2009), 12.

118 Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, 269–71, 292–6.

119 Joshi, ‘Who is afraid of Cold Start ?’

120 S. Paul Kapur, ‘Deterrence and Asymmetric Warfare’, Seminar (July 2009), <www.india-seminar.com/2009/599/599_s_paul_kapur.htm>.

121 Daniel Seth Markey, Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation, CPA Contingency Planning Memorandum (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Jan. 2010), <www.cfr.org/publication/21042/terrorist_attack_sparks_indopakistani_crisis.html?breadcrumb =/bios/10682/daniel_markey>.

122 Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton UP 2004), 49.

123 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Cruel Illusions’, Outlook India, 16 March 2010, <www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?264716>; Fair, The US Strategy in Afghanistan: Impacts upon US Interests in Pakistan; Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, ‘CIA outlines Pakistan links with militants’, New York Times, 30 July 2008, sec. International/Asia Pacific, <www.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/world/asia/30pstan.html>.

124 Ashley J. Tellis, Bad Company – Lashkar e-Tayyiba and the Growing Ambition of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan, 2010, 8, <www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa = view&id=40330>.

125 Richard K. Betts, ‘Incentives for Nuclear Weapons: India, Pakistan, Iran’, Asian Survey 19/11 (Nov. 1979), 1071.

126 Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace?’ 59.

127 Eliot A. Cohen, ‘Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance’, International Security 13/1 (Summer 1988), 50.

128 Reshmi Kazi, Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 23 August 2007), <www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo = 2361&cID=12>.

129 Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 20–1, 239; Glenn Herald Snyder, Deterrence and Defense; Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton UP 1961), 226.

130 Biddle, Military Power, 49; Walter Pintner, ‘Russian Military Thought: the Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1986), 371.

131 Kapur, ‘India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace’, 142.