Britain’s ‘Independent’ V-Bomber Force and US Nuclear Weapons, 1957–1962

Abstract

This article examines a secret Anglo-American programme, Project ‘E’, which equipped the RAF’s V-bomber Force with US nuclear weapons for use in wartime. It shows Project ‘E’ was ineffective as a warhead supply programme and, furthermore, that it crippled the operational effectiveness of the V-bomber Force as a whole between 1958 and 1962. This article argues that as a result of Project ‘E’, the V-Force was neither operationally nor politically independent as a nuclear deterrent force. This challenges the traditional view of the V-Force as the benchmark of nuclear independence to assess the Skybolt, Polaris and Trident programmes.

Key Words:

• Anglo-American
• Interdependence
• Nuclear Weapons
• Cold War
• Independence
• Deterrent

Notes

1. E.g. Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957–1962 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994), 108–15.

2. John Baylis, ‘Exchanging Nuclear Secrets’, Diplomatic History 25/1 (Dec. 2001), 45; and Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2002), 153.

3. Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–1964 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2010), 88–91.

4. E.g. John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), 241–77.

5. E.g. Ken Young, ‘A Most Special Relationship: The Origins of Anglo-American Nuclear Strike Planning’, Journal of Cold War Studies 9/2 (Spring 2007), 26–8.

6. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 304.

7. [Kew, United Kingdom, The National Archives], AIR[Records created or inherited by the Air Ministry, the Royal Air Force, and related bodies] 2/13789, R.C. Kent (AUS.(A)) to PUS: ‘Political implications of Project “E”’, 4 March 1958. See also Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952–1959 (Groningen, Neth.: Styx Publications 1993), 63; Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945–1964 (Amsterdam, Harwood Academic Publishers 2000), 109–12.

8. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 258.

9. Ibid., 259.

10. AIR 20/11338 Coordination of RAF/USAF Nuclear Strike Plans; ‘Memo of Understanding between USAF and RAF over supply of Project “E” weapons for global war, 24 July 1957’.

11. AIR 2/13698 Project ‘E’ – V Bomber Policy, 1957–1958; minutes of meeting, 12 Nov. 1957.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 127.

15. AIR 2/13698 Minutes of meeting, 12 Nov. 1957.

16. AIR 2/13698 Notes by VCAS, 17 Feb. 1958.

17. AIR 2/13698 Project ‘E’ – V Bomber Policy, 1957–1958.

18. AIR 2/13698 Notes by VCAS, 17 Feb. 1958.

19. AIR 20/11338 ‘Memo of Understanding between USAF and RAF’, 24 July 1957.

20. Ibid.

21. AIR 2/13698 Project ‘E’ – V Bomber Policy, 1957–1958; minutes of meeting, 6 March 1958.

22. AIR 2/13698 Minutes of meeting, 6 March 1958.

23. AIR 2/13698 VCAS minute to PUS, 7 March 1958.

24. AIR 2/13698 PUS authorisation letter, 17 March 1958.

25. AIR 20/10061 Project ‘E’, 1956–1958; AUS(A) to VCAS, 13 March 1958.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. AIR 8/2201 Coordination of Offensive Air Operations; E.C. Huddleston to Air Chief Marshal Sir Harry Broadhurst, 7 July 1958.

29. Based on extensive search of General W. Blanchard’s papers and correspondence, sent from USAF Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL. Microfilm reels A1827, A1828, A1829, A1830, A1831, and A1832.

30. Ibid.

31. AIR 8/2201 J. H. Searby to CAS, 22 Sept. 1958.

32. AIR 19/939 Supply of Atomic Bombs to the UK by United States of America; PS(A) to Secretary of State (A), 24 Nov. 1960.

33. Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, 70.

34. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, 114.

35. DEFE[Records of the Ministry of Defence] 13/306 State of Readiness of ‘V’ Bomber Force, 1960–1964; Deputy Chief of Defence Staff to Minister of Defence, 24 March 1960.

36. DEFE 13/306 QRA readiness report, 4 April 1960.

37. Ibid.

38. DEFE 13/306 Engine Starting Equipment Report, Solly Zuckerman, 29 June 1961.

39. Ibid.

40. AIR 2/13703 Project ‘E’ – Capability of the RAF to carry US weapons, 1956–1960; USAF issued arming procedure manual.

41. AIR 2/13703 Bomber Command/USAF phasing conference for Project ‘E’, 27 Jan. 1959.

42. Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, 100; Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, 114; Humphrey Wynn, The RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force: Their Origins, Role and Deployments, 1946–1969 (London: The Stationery Office 1994), 267.

43. AIR 2/13698 Project ‘E’ – V Bomber Policy, 1957–1958.

44. AIR 2/13699 Project ‘E’ – V Bomber Policy, 1958–1960; A/ACAS(ops) Wykeham to VCAS Hudleston, ‘Plea for Information on the Future of Project “E”’, 6 July 1959.

45. AIR 2/13699 A/ACAS(ops) Wykeham to VCAS Hudleston, ‘Plea for Information on the Future of Project ‘E’, 6 July 1959.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, 101.

49. AIR 8/2238 Operational Readiness of Bomber Command, 1958–1961; Bomber Command Medium Bomber Force Alert and Readiness Plan issued 5 March 1959.

50. AIR 2/13699 Wykeham to Hudleston, 6 July 1959.

51. AIR 8/2238 Memo from CAS, 30 June 1960.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1972), 184.

55. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, 44.

56. AIR 2/13789 Project ‘E’, 1957–1961; UK Weapon Availability in Relation to Aircraft, 1960–63.

57. AIR 2/13789 UK Weapon Availability in Relation to Aircraft, 1960–63.

58. AIR 2/13789 Air Council note by VCAS on Strategic Bomber Force Weapon Policy, 20 Oct. 1959.

59. AIR 2/13699 Wykeham to Hudleston, 6 July 1959.

60. AIR 19/999 British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group; minutes of meeting, 16 March 1963

61. Project ‘E’ is not once mentioned in the PREM collection held at the National Archives or in Cabinet minutes from the period 1958–62.

62. Wynn, The RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force, 267.

63. AIR 2/13789 AUS(A) to PUS minute on ‘Political Implications of Project “E”’, 4 March 1958.

64. AIR 2/13789 VCAS memo to AUS(A), 8 April 1958.

65. Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, 127.

66. DEFE 13/336 Anglo/American Discussions – Review of Global Strategy; David Ormsby-Gore to Peter Thorneycroft, 27 July 1962. See also, Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 349.

67. Ibid.

68. DEFE 13/336 David Ormsby-Gore to Peter Thorneycroft, 27 July 1962 (not mentioned by Baylis).

69. DEFE 13/306 State of Readiness of the V-bomber Force; memo from Secretary of State for Air to Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, 31 March 1960.

70. DEFE 13/336; David Ormsby-Gore to Peter Thorneycroft, 27 July 1962.

71. AIR 2/17333 E Weapons ‘V’ Force Policy, 1958–59; D of Ops to VCAS, 8 May 1959.

72. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 274.

73. AIR 2/17333 D of Ops to VCAS, 8 May 1959.

74. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, 88–91.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Justin Bronk

Following a lifelong passion for military history, Justin Bronk studied History at the University of York, graduating with a 1st in July 2011. An interest in military aviation was already evident in his undergraduate dissertation on the development of the fighter-bomber and modern close air support doctrine by the RAF in the Western Desert from 1940 to 1942. He then studied for an MSc in History of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, graduating with Distinction in December 2012. This paper is based on his MSc dissertation. Justin is currently pursuing a career in the defence industry.