Do Distinct (National) Operational Styles of Conflict Resolution Exist?

Abstract

This article contains a reply to a previously published paper on the use and abuse of the so-called Dutch approach to counterinsurgency. In addition to commenting on this paper, the article constitutes an argument to initiate more comparative studies in the field of military and strategic studies. Only comparative studies will help to better understand the effectiveness of military force in preventing, containing and solving violent conflicts.

Key Words:

• Conflict Resolution
• Operational Styles
• Comparative Method

Notes

1 ¹Thijs Brocades Zaalberg and Arthur ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna: De Nederlandse krijgsmacht in Irak, 2003–2005 (Amsterdam: Boom 2010), particularly page 325. Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, ‘The Use and Abuse of the “Dutch Approach” to Counter-Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.743463>.

2 ²Joseph Soeters, ‘Odysseus Prevails over Achilles: A Warrior Model Suited to Post-9/11 Conflicts’, in James Burk (ed.), How 9/11 Changed Our Way of War (Stanford University Press 2013). I argue that the comparison of both cases is an example of a most similar research design, only varying in political/military approach and general outcome in terms of length of the conflict and number of casualties (i.e. the independent and the dependent variable). In fact there is one more difference, of a contextual nature, which is the size of the protesting population group being about 40 per cent versus less than 1 per cent. This situation made the Northern Ireland case more difficult to deal with. But, clearly, every rational person would expect a political approach to be more conducive to prevent or solve a conflict with a sizable population group, whereas a conflict with a small population group could – theoretically – be dealt with in a coercive and military manner. In fact, in both cases the opposite happened.

3 ³John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Univ. of Chicago Press 2002).

4 ⁴This listing is based on a wealth of research, methodologies and theories in the social, behavioural, economic and administrative sciences. The limited character of this reply most unfortunately precludes extensive referencing here and elsewhere in the article.

5 ⁵Brocades Zaalberg, ‘The Use and Abuse of the “Dutch Approach”’, note 1. The contested arguments can be found on pages 6–8, 12–15, and 15–25.

6 ⁶See for example Jonathan Fletcher, Violence and Civilization: An Introduction to the Work of Norbert Elias (Cambridge: Polity Press 1997); Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and its Causes (London: Allen Lane 2011).

7 ⁷See the references in Soeters, ‘Odysseus Prevails over Achilles’, note 2. Also Andrew Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare (London/New York: Routledge 2012), particularly chapter 2.

8 ⁸Martijn Kitzen, ‘Close Encounters of the Tribal Kind: The Implementation of Co-option as a Tool for De-escalation of Conflict – The Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan's Uruzgan Province’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (Oct. 2012), 713–34.

9 ⁹Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail – but Some Don't (New York: Penguin Press 2012). I crafted my summary from Silver, pages 53–73, particularly pages 53–4.

11 ¹¹The latter point is a cornerstone in game-theoretical approaches to conflict and cooperation. In reality one has seen this phenomenon occurring for instance in Rwanda and in Srebrenica (unfortunately, one other black page in Dutch military history).

10 ¹⁰Martin Nowak, SuperCooperators. Evolution, Altruism and Human Behaviour or Why We Need each Other to Succeed (Edinburgh: Cannongate 2011); see also note 2.