China’s ‘Three Warfares’: Origins, Applications, and Organizations

Abstract

Entering the twenty-first century, China has demonstrated an assertive foreign policy, not only in employing various types of economic and military leverage but also in conducting the Three Warfares (三战) – psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. This article attempts to identify the motives and methods of China’s Three Warfares by analyzing its history, logic, and agents. Based on this analysis, the author also presents the position of the Three Warfares in China’s foreign policy and the warfares’ impact on the international security environment involving other major powers and China’s neighbors.

Key Words:

• China
• Three Warfares
• Political Work
• PLA
• Foreign Policy

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful and constructive comments.

Notes

¹ See Taylor M. Fravel, ‘China’s Strategy in the South China Sea’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 33/3 (Dec. 2011), 292--319; Suisheng Zhao, ‘Understanding China’s Assertive Foreign Policy Behavior during the Global Financial Meltdown’, The European Financial Review (Dec. 2010/Jan. 2011), 40-3; Michael D. Swaine, ‘Perceptions of an Assertive China’, China Leadership Monitor 32 (2010).

² See Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and Cheng-Yi Lin, Rise of China: Beijing’s Strategies and Implications for the Asia-Pacific (Abingdon/New York: Routledge 2009), 295; Chunjuan Nancy Wei, ‘China’s Anti-Secession Law and Hu Jintao’s Taiwan Policy’, Yale Journal of International Affairs 5/1 (Winter 2010), 112--27; Raul Pedrozo, ‘Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident’, Naval War College Review 62/3 (2009), 102.

³ International Security Advisory Board, China’s Strategic Modernization (2008), 2, <www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ISAB2008.pdf>

⁴ ‘Taiwan’s National Defense Report: PLA’s Soft Power Gets More Threatening (台‘国防报告’：解放军软实力更具威胁性),’ Fenghuang Net, 20 Oct. 2009.

⁵ Guo Dafang and Zhang Jichun, The Eternal Elements of Combat Power: A Study for the Function of Military Political Work Operations (战斗力的永恒要素: 军队政治工作作战功能研究) (Beijing: Jiefangjun 2005), 7-8 ; Wang Xingsheng (ed.), The Science of Military Political Work (军队政治工作学) (Beijing: Junshi Kexue 2011), 157.

⁶ Yaun Shibin, Sun Tzu’s Art of War (孙子兵法) (Beijing: Waiyu Jiaoxue yu Yanjiu 2007), 13.

⁷ ‘Three Main Principles of Political Work (政治工作三大原则)’, Fu Chuanyou (ed.), Dictionary of Chinese Encyclopedia: Military Affairs (中国大百科词典: 军事), 2nd ed. (Beijing: Zhongguo Da Baike Quan Shu 2007), 890-1; Wang Xingsheng, The Science of Military Political Work, 28--33, 55.

⁸ See Andrew Scobell, David Lai and Roy Kamphausen (eds), Chinese Lessons from Other People’s Wars (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2011), 33--73, 153--99.

⁹ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (超限战), 2nd ed. (Wuhan: Chongwen 2011), 41.

¹⁰ Ibid., 46--7.

¹¹ Ibid., 131.

¹² Sun Yue，‘New War Theory’s Impact on China and US (新戰爭理論衝擊中美)’, Asia Weekly (亞洲周刊), 357 (2000), 18.

¹³ Dean Cheng, ‘Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay II’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 11/1 (2000), 122.

¹⁴ Tony Corn, ‘Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with Chinese Characteristics’, Small Wars Journal, 27 June 2010, 5.

¹⁵ Hao Weixue and Jiang Jie，’The History and Characteristics of PLA’s Psychological Warfare Theory (中国人民解放军心理战理论的历史发展及特点),’ Military Historical Research (军事历史研究) 4 (2008)，67.

¹⁶ Chen Hui, ‘China’s Military Studies and Exercises Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare and Legal Warfare (中国军队开展舆论战、心理战、法律战研究和训练)’, Xinhua Net, 21 June 2004.

¹⁷ Cheng Baoshan (ed.)，The Fundamental Issues of Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare and Legal Warfare (舆论战心理战法律战基本问题) (Beijing: Junshi Kexue 2004), 2--3, 205.

¹⁸ ‘The Revised Version of PLA Political Work Regulations Promulgated (新修订的《中国人民解放军政治工作条例》颁行), Sina Net, 15 Dec. 2003.

¹⁹ ‘The Circular of the CCP Central Committee on Chinese People’s Liberation Army Political Work Regulations (中共中央关于颁布《中国人民解放军政治工作条例》的通知),’ ‘News of the Communist Party of China’ Net, 15 Dec. 2003.

²⁰ Wu Huaitang and Zuo Junzhan (eds), The Practical Knowledge of Psychological Warfare (心理战实用知识) (Beijing: Junshi Kexue 2006), 49.

²¹ Wang Xingsheng, The Science of Military Political Work, 267.

²² Chen Hongzhong, Legal Warfare: the Unusual Perspective for Great Power’s Military Affairs (法律战争：大国军事的另类视角) (Beijing：Zhongguo Fazhan 2012), 82--8; Liu Jinghui and Li Xuefeng, ‘A Study for the Tactics of Legal Warfare (‘法律战’战法研究)’, Journal of Educational Institute of Jilin Province (吉林省教育学院学报) 26/5 (2010), 65.

²³ See Wang Xingsheng, The Science of Military Political Work, 278--9.

²⁴ Wu Huaitang and Zuo Junzhan, The Practical Knowledge of Psychological Warfare, 159--64.

²⁵ Ibid., 173, 180.

²⁶ Ibid., 278.

²⁷ Wang Huaju, ‘Coming up to Information System-based System of Systems Operational Capability (走近基于信息系统体系作战能力)’ PLA Daily (解放军报), 25 Aug. 2011, 10.

²⁸ For example, see Liu Jifeng and Xu Zhenxing, ‘System of Systems Operation and Enforcement of Political Work (体系作战与加强政治工作)’, Theoretical Studies on PLA Political Work (军队政工理论研究) 13/2 (2012), 82--5.

²⁹ See Niu Baocheng, ‘Three Colors of Propaganda: The Secret of the West’s Psychological Warfare (三色宣传：西方的心理战秘诀),’ China National Defense News (中国国防报), 28 June 2000.

³⁰ ‘The National Conference of Propaganda and Ideology Work on 5--7 December 2003 (全国宣传思想工作会议（2003年12月5-7日)’, ‘News of the Communist Party of China’ Net.

³¹ Chen Rinong, The Brief History of China’s International Communication (中国对外传播史略) (Beijing: Waiwen 2010), 208.

³² Ibid., 208--32.

³³ Zhang Haiwen et al.，China’s Ocean Development Report (中国海洋发展报告) 2013 (Beijing：Haiyang 2013), 3–45, 260–81, 369–72.

³⁴ Chen Xiaoqing, ‘Military Representatives Talks about Legal Support of MOOTW (军队代表谈涉外非战争军事行动法律保障)’, PLA Daily (解放军报), 11 March 2009, 5; Justice Bureau of General Political Department, ‘Perfecting the Military Lawyer’s System with Chinese Characteristics to Cater for the Legal Construction of the State and the Military (适应国家和军队法制建设不断完善中国特色的军队律师制度)’, Justice of China (中国司法), 6 (2004), 84--7.

³⁵ Xin Xingzhi, ‘China will Actively Participate in Making International Game Rules (中国要积极参与制定国际游戏规则)’, Globe (环球) 2 (2009), 40--1.

³⁶ Jiang Qingyong et al., Soft Power: Chinese Perspective (软实力：中国视角) (Beijing: Renmin 2009), 135.

³⁷ Zhang Xiuzhi, ‘China Pushes Forward Public Diplomacy (中国力推‘公众外交’)’, Oriental Outlook (瞭望东方周刊) 14 (2004), 14--16.

³⁸ Gao Yongyu, ‘How China will Promote the New Situation of Public Diplomacy (中国如何推动公共外交新局面)’, China Business News (第一财经日报), 11 Oct. 2010.

³⁹ Kang Xiao et al., Annual Report of China’s Public Diplomacy (中国公共外交研究报告) (2011/2012) (Beijing: Shishi 2012), 29--31.

⁴⁰ Zhou Hong (ed.), The 60 Years of China’s Foreign Aid (中国援外60年) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian 2013), 33--43.

⁴¹ Zheng Yuanyuan and Liu Yongming, ‘Minister of Culture, Sun Jiazheng Talks about China’s Cultural Exchange in This Year (文化部长孙家正谈今年我国对外文化交流)’, People’s Daily (人民日报), 20 Dec. 2004, 7; Zhao Qizheng, ‘Thriving of Culture is a Requisite for Realizing the Dream of a Strong China (文化振兴是实现强国之梦的必需)’, Foreign Affairs Review (外交评论) 2 (2006), 11.

⁴² For details, see footnote 2; Niu Jun (ed.), An Analysis for China’s Foreign Policy: Theory, History and Prospect (中国对外政策分析：理论、历史与前景) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi 2013), 45--6; He Zhongxun, China’s Economic Policy in the New Era: Theory and Practice (新时期中国经济外交：理论和实践) (Beijing: Shishi 2007), 290--310; Yan Liang, ‘China’s Foreign Economic Sanctions’ (中国对外经济制裁), Foreign Affairs Review (外交评论) 6 (2012), 16--29; James Reilly, ‘China’s Unilateral Sanctions’, Washington Quarterly 35/4 (2012), 121--33; Michael Richardson, ‘China’s Gunboat Diplomacy’, Japan Times, 30 July 2012.

⁴³ As for agents, strategic Three Warfares involve China’s leaders of all ranks. Especially, China’s top leaders including the president, premier, and defense minister conduct the warfares by speeches and remarks, talks and interviews. See Chen Hongzhong, Legal Warfare: the Unusual Perspective for Great Power’s Military Affairs, 135--6.

⁴⁴ Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship (Plymouth, MA: Rowman & Littlefield 2010), 15.

⁴⁵ Sun Xiaoqing, ‘The Front of Peacetime Ideology and Propaganda Work is the Platform of Wartime Public Opinion Warfare and Psychological Warfare (平时是思想宣传工作的阵地 战时是舆论战心理战的平台)’, Science Technology for China’s Mass Media (中国传媒科技) 5 (2005), 5--9.

⁴⁶ For details, see Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform, 2nd ed. (New York/ London: W. W. Norton 2004), 173--6; Zhou Wang, Leading Small Groups in Chinese Politics (中国小组机制机制) (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin 2010).

⁴⁷ Zhou Wang, Leading Small Groups in Chinese Politics, 53--4.

⁴⁸ ‘The Circular of the State Council on Organizational Establishment (No.8 (2003) of the General Office of the State Council) (国务院关于机构设置的通知, 国发[2003]8号)’, Xinhua Net, 9 Sept. 2003；Guo Ruihua (ed.), An Introduction to PRC’s Taiwan Affair Organization System (中共對台工作組織體系概論) (Taipei: Fawubu Diaochaju 1996), 127--8.

⁴⁹ ‘The Vitae of General Liu Yongzhi (刘永治上将简介),’ People’s Daily, 6 Jan. 2010; ‘Li Changchun Chaired the Conference of Central Propaganda and Ideological Work Leading Small Group (李长春主持召开中央宣传思想工作领导小组会议)’, Xinhua Net, 23 Oct. 2012.

⁵⁰ Chen Rinong, The Brief History of China’s International Communication, 208.

⁵¹ Ibid., 209; ‘Setup of Organization (机构设置),’ ‘The Sate Council Information Office’s Website.

⁵² ‘The General Office of State Council Circularizes the Establishment of the State Internet Information Office (国办通知设立国家互联网信息办公室)’, Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 4 May 2011.

⁵³ For details, see Zhang Xiang (ed.), ‘China sets up Office for Internet Information Management’, Xinhua Net, 4 May 2011.

⁵⁴ See David Shambaugh, ‘China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy’, The China Journal 57 (2007), 48; ‘The State Internet Information Office Answers Questions regarding the Establishment and Responsibility of the State Internet Information Office (国家互联网信息办公室就办公室设立及其职责答问)’, Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 5 May 2011.

⁵⁵ Shambaugh, ‘China’s Propaganda System’, 48; Zeng Jianhui, Melting the Ice, Building a Bridge and Breaking Through (融冰 · 架桥· 突围), (Beijing: Wuzhou 2006), 44--5.

⁵⁶ ‘The State Internet Information Office Answers Questions regarding the Establishment and Responsibility of the State Internet Information Office’, Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal (2011)；Zhang Xiang (ed.), ‘China Sets Up Office for Internet Information Management’.

⁵⁷ Zeng Jianhui, Melting the Ice, Building a Bridge and Breaking Through, 45.

⁵⁸ For the Information Department’s main functions, see ‘Foreign Affairs Ministry’ Website.

⁵⁹ MFA’s Public Diplomacy Office, A Selection of Speeches by Chinese Ambassadors (Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press 2013), Author introduction; Tan Youzhi, ‘Struggle for International Discourse Power: Top-level Design for China’s Public Diplomacy (国际话语权竞争: 中国公共外交的顶层设计)’, Teaching and Research (教学与研究) 4 (2013), 67.

⁶⁰ Yang Shilong, ‘Opening up a New Situation of Public Diplomacy (开拓公共外交新局面)’, Outlook Weekly (瞭望新闻周刊) 22 (2010), 32-3; Yang Jiechi, ‘Efforts to Open up a New Situation of Public Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics (努力开拓中国特色公共外交新局面)’, Seeking Truth (求是) 4 (2011), 46.

⁶¹ Zeng Jianhui, Melting the Ice, Building a Bridge and Breaking Through, 45.

⁶² Chen Rinong, The Brief History of China’s International Communication, 239.

⁶³ Wang Xie, ‘A Preliminary Analysis for the Shaping of Military Image by Military TV’s Variety Shows (军事电视综艺节目中的军队形象塑造探析)’, Military Reporters (军事记者) 3 (2013), 51--2.

⁶⁴ Luo Erwen, ‘How Does PLA Express PLA? (解放军如何表达解放军?)’, Southern Weekly (南方周末), 12 Nov. 2009.

⁶⁵ See ‘The Conference of Army-wide Foreign Propaganda Work Held in Beijing (全军对外宣传工作会议在京召开)’, Xinhua Net, 15 Nov. 2010; Tian Yiwei and Luo Ji, ‘The Conference of Army-wide Foreign Propaganda Work Theory Held in Beijing (全军外宣工作理论研讨会在京举行)’, PLA Daily (解放军报), 1 Dec. 2011.

⁶⁶ Yang Dingyu, ‘The Establishment of General Political Department’s Foreign Propaganda Bureau was Personally on the Scene (亲历总政对外宣传局的组建成立),’ The Way for a Strong Army 8 (强军之路 8) (Beijing: Jiefangjun 2009)，55--61; ‘Chinese Military’s Efforts for Foreign Public Relations and Propaganda (中国军队对外公关宣传发力)’, Fenghuang Net, 1 May 2009.

⁶⁷ ‘Chinese Military’s Efforts for Foreign Public Relations and Propaganda’; Zhao Zhigang, Zhang Fengfei, and Wang Feifei, ‘Our Military Foreign Propaganda’s Leapfrog Development (我国军事对外宣传的跨越发展), International Communication (对外传播) 8 (2009), 8–9; Yang Dingyu, ‘The Establishment of General Political Department’s Foreign Propaganda Bureau Was Personally on the Scene’, 61.

⁶⁸ For GPD’s agencies, see ‘The General Political Department of The People’s Liberation Army (中国人民解放军总政治部)’, Xinhua Net, 24 Nov. 2007.

⁶⁹ J. Michael Cole and Shelley Shan, ‘PRC Steps Up Psychological Warfare Targeted at Taiwan’, Taipei Times, 26 Aug. 2011; ‘The Vitae of 13 Members of The New Session of Anhui Provincial Party Standing Committee (新一届安徽省委13名常委简历)’, People’s Daily, 4 Nov. 2011.

⁷⁰ For the definition of China’s military soft power, see Li Zhufa, The Strategic Planning of Military Soft Power (军事软实力方略) (Beijing: Jiefangjun 2012), 105--11, 131--3.

⁷¹ Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress’, Xinhua Net, 17 Nov. 2012; Xi Jinping, ‘A Speech at a Meeting of the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress (在第十二届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上的讲话)’, Xinhua Net, 17 March 2013.

⁷² Wang Chen, ‘Fully Implementing the Spirit of the 18th Party Congress: Promoting Foreign Propaganda to a New Level at a New Start Point (全面贯彻落实十八大精神 在新起点上推动外宣工作再上新台阶)’, International Communications (对外传播), 1 (2013), 4–6.

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Sangkuk Lee

Sangkuk Lee is an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) in Seoul, South Korea. He is also a visiting scholar at the Center for Chinese Studies (CCS) of California University, Berkeley. His current research interests include China’s politics, foreign policy, and national security.