Regional Support for Afghan Insurgents: Challenges for Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine

ABSTRACT

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, several thousand Afghan Taliban forces fled across the border to Pakistan, and the area became a safe haven for Afghan insurgents. In 2014, the transnational dimension of the insurgency is still highly prominent. Although regional support for insurgents is not uncommon, how to counter this aspect is mostly ignored in counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and doctrines. In this article, a regional counterinsurgency framework is developed, using the regional counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan as an example. The framework will facilitate the systematic inclusion of regional COIN measures in theory and doctrine.

KEY WORDS:

• Afghanistan
• counterinsurgency
• ISAF
• military intervention
• transnational

Since the beginning of the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, counterinsurgency (COIN) has become an important task of Western armed forces. As a consequence, several new counterinsurgency doctrines have been developed in the last decade, focusing on counterinsurgency warfare, for example, the US joint doctrine, JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, the NATO doctrine, AJP-3.3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN), and the British Army Field Manual, Countering Insurgency.¹ These doctrines are distinctly different from traditional warfare doctrines because of the emphasis given to the political nature of counterinsurgency operations. According to, for example, the US Joint doctrine on counterinsurgency: ‘COIN is comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. COIN is primarily political and incorporates a wide range of activities, of which security is one.’²

These doctrinal developments are important, since they reflect the differences between regular and counterinsurgency warfare. The characterisation of insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations in these doctrines, however, lacks one essential aspect: the regional dimension of insurgencies and civil wars. This is highly problematic. The transnational character of insurgencies and civil wars is considered a major obstacle to peace. According to Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, the risk of civil war onset in a state increases when neighbouring states are engaged in civil wars.³ Other scholars argue that civil wars are more likely to last and that belligerents are less willing to stop fighting if either of the belligerents receives external support.⁴ External support has also been found to correlate with a lower success rate of peacekeeping operations.⁵

Although the problem of external support for insurgents is discussed in doctrines on counterinsurgency,⁶ how counterinsurgency forces ought to address this aspect is not discussed. This is also true for counterinsurgency theory. Since cross-border movement and external support for insurgents are common in contemporary insurgencies,⁷ the state centric focus of contemporary counterinsurgency theory and doctrines makes them unsuitable for understanding these conflicts. This, in turn, makes it more difficult to develop a successful counterinsurgency strategy and tactics.

In order to increase our understanding of the regional dimension of insurgencies, the aim of this article is to problematise contemporary counterinsurgency theory and to develop a framework for a regional understanding of counterinsurgency using the war in Afghanistan as an example. The framework is developed in order to assist researchers and practitioners to analytically consider the logic and consequences of the transnational aspects of insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations. In this way, the regional dimension of insurgencies can be approached more systematically.

I have several points of departure for the framework. First, although the development of the framework is to highlight the regional dimension of insurgencies, I am still using the state as my point of departure, and I consider the aim of counterinsurgency practice to create a strong state without internal contenders. Another way to develop contemporary counterinsurgency theory could be to dismiss the very idea of a state in these kinds of regional wars. Second, although contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns often are conducted by a third party, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, I am not making any distinctions between the host state and the third party in this framework. This is to make the argument as stringent as possible. Further development of the framework could, however, also include the relation between the host state and the third party. Third, although all conflict actors can benefit from external support, I am only including the support for the insurgents in the discussion here, again in order to make the argument as stringent as possible. Finally, the focus of this article on the logic of the regional dimension excludes a discussion of the highly relevant legal consequences of cross-border activities. This is not to suggest that the legal consequences of cross-border activities are not important.

In the next section of the article, I present a framework for the main dimensions of contemporary counterinsurgency theories, and how this framework can be supplemented with additional categories to include the regional aspects of counterinsurgency operations. This is followed by an introduction of the war in Afghanistan and the transnational aspects of the Afghan insurgency. In section three, I demonstrate how the regional counterinsurgency framework can be useful when analysing the different counterinsurgency efforts against Afghan insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The chapter is concluded by a short discussion about the wider implications of a regional counterinsurgency framework.

A Regional Counterinsurgency Framework

One way to categorise the different logics found in theories of counterinsurgency strategy and tactics is along two aspects: the main audience of the operations (i.e. the population or the enemy); and the level of negative or positive incentives. Different combinations of these aspects are argued to create the most successful counterinsurgency strategy and tactics.

The ‘main audience aspect’ reveals two different logics of insurgencies: a population-centric logic and an enemy-centric logic.⁸ According to Mark Moyar, these ‘two schools of thought have dominated the study of counterinsurgency warfare in the English-speaking world’ since ‘the Vietnam War’.⁹ Following the population-centric logic, insurgencies are mainly seen as a struggle between the insurgents and the counterinsurgents for the support of the local population, and the main aim of the counterinsurgents is to win their support. This is also the most commonly found understanding of counterinsurgency in contemporary theory. Instead of focusing on defeating the insurgents, the population is considered the main audience. By establishing security and order for the population, their support will be turned towards the counterinsurgents and the insurgents will lose the war.

According to the enemy-centric logic, insurgencies are instead mainly seen as a military struggle between the insurgents and the counterinsurgents, and the main aim of the counterinsurgents is to defeat the enemy. Although enemy-centric measures at the strategic level are uncommon in contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns, enemy centric measures at the tactical and operational level are quite common. The operations conducted by the ‘Ready First’ Combat Team (RFCT 1) in Ramadi, Iraq, between July 2006 and March 2007, is one example. The tactical aim of the operations in Ramadi was to seize the physical terrain and disrupt insurgent operations. The counterinsurgency forces isolated the contested area and established combat outposts in order to ensure constant presence in the area and to provide a base from which to conduct patrols against the insurgents. In order to increase the control over the terrain, the counterinsurgents conducted clearing operations and ambushes against the insurgents. According to James A. Russell, the unit conducted around 3,200 combat patrols and mounted 275 company-level operations during its deployment in Ramadi, killing almost 500 insurgents.¹⁰

The second aspect, the use of positive or negative incentives, is little more complicated. Two common ways of understanding counterinsurgency – the ‘hearts and minds’ approach and the ‘coercion’ or ‘cost/benefit’ approach – are not always separated in the literature and the different logics are sometimes confused or deliberately intermingled.¹¹ Both approaches do, however, discuss the utility of positive or negative incentives.

According to the hearts and minds approach, as it was originally understood by counterinsurgency scholars in the 1950s and 1960s, the government needs to convince the population that it represents a better alternative than the insurgents. The government has to win their attitudes of identification and allegiance. This is primarily achieved by increasing the security of the population (i.e. protection against repressive measures primarily by the insurgents but sometimes also by the government) and by increasing the state’s capacity to govern (i.e. economic and social development as well as promoting good governance).¹² Different forms of reconstruction, such as building schools, roads or health clinics, are a common form of positive incentives in contemporary counterinsurgency. In Iraq, for example, the US commanders could initiate small-scale reconstruction projects in order to meet the needs of the local population.¹³ In this way, the counterinsurgents would win the hearts and minds of the population. According to this approach, repressive measures taken by the government in response to an insurgency stimulate insurgent activity, and violent repression makes the insurgency stronger. According to Constantin Melnik, ‘it is necessary to eliminate the negative feelings on which the insurgency is based. However, the use of force and violence runs the risk of increasing these same negative feelings.’¹⁴

According to the coercion approach, it is not the hearts and minds of the local population that matters, it is their actions. Actors are considered to be rational, making decisions depending on a cost-benefit calculation of the costs in relation to the gains of continued fighting. The population represents rational actors that respond, more or less predictably, to certain incentives and sanctions from both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. According to this approach, people’s preferences are not important. The side that provides better incentives for the population will win their support.¹⁵

On the one hand, this implies that the possible negative feelings of the population created by the use of repression are not important. If they consider the costs of supporting the insurgents too high, because of repression from the government, they will support the government regardless of their negative feelings towards the government. On the other hand, this also implies that increasing the standard of living of the population through development measures might not reduce the insurgency. Instead, development makes resources available for the local population which can be acquired by the insurgents ‘through persuasion, coercion or a combination of the two’. According to Charles Wolf, in order for development to be efficient in hampering an insurgency, it ‘must be accompanied by efforts to extract something in return for whatever benefits and improvements are provided’, for example, cooperating with the government and depriving the insurgency of their support.¹⁶

Hence, the main difference between these approaches is to what extent coercion can be used in order to make the population support the government. According to the hearts and minds approach, the use of coercion will make the people turn to the insurgent in order to obtain protection from the counterinsurgency forces and the government, whilst according to the coercion approach, the population can be coerced to cooperate with the government, especially if combined with certain kinds of positive incentives.

Following the two aspects of main audience and incentives, counterinsurgency strategy and tactics can be divided into four categories: enemy-centric/negative incentives; enemy-centric/positive incentives; population-centric/negative incentives; and population-centric/positive incentives. Positive and negative incentives are indeed not usually discussed in relation to an enemy centric logic in theories on counterinsurgency.¹⁷ Here, strategy and tactics are instead mostly focused on negative incentives. Nevertheless, positive incentives are not logically excluded. The framework shown in Figure 1 can be used in order to understand different forms of counterinsurgency strategy and tactics.

Figure 1. Traditional Framework for Counterinsurgency Measures

But, when insurgents are receiving external support and have access to safe havens in neighbouring states, the dynamics of insurgencies change. External support for the insurgents can take many forms, for example, fighters, training, weapons, safe havens, financial resources, political support and propaganda.¹⁸

If including the regional dimension of insurgencies in the traditional counterinsurgency framework outlined above, several new categories can be added to the framework. Enemy-centric measures can, for example, be used against insurgents operating on the other side of the border.¹⁹ One kind of enemy-centric/negative incentives measure, which has not been an uncommon practice in counterinsurgency campaigns, is military operations against insurgents beyond the borders of the host state. Operation ‘Lightning Thunder’, conducted by the Ugandan Armed Forces against the Ugandan rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the neighbouring states of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic and South Sudan in 2008 and 2009, is one example. The operation included air assaults by Ugandan Mi-24 helicopter gunships and the deployment of Ugandan Special Forces.²⁰

Figure 2. Framework for Regional Counterinsurgency Measures

Another kind of enemy centric/negative incentives measure that is often used against transnational insurgents is the closing of borders. By closing the borders of a state, counterinsurgency forces tries to prevent border crossing by insurgents, weapons and other supplies. In South West Africa/Namibia,²¹ for example, the South African Defence Forces created a so-called free-fire zone along the border between Namibia and Angola. They cleared out vegetation and systematically forced people who lived along the border to move about one kilometre from the border. Fences were erected, one on the border itself and one about one kilometre south of the border inside Namibia. In these free-fire zones, anyone could be shot on sight. They also installed a sophisticated electronic warning system in the border zone, and according to some sources, planted a deadly plant, the Mexican Sisal, in the zone.²²

Another example of the closing of borders is the different forms of border surveillance and barriers used during the US bombing campaign against North Vietnam between 1965 and 1968, which was a programme that was aiming to ‘contribute to the defeat of the insurgents by denying them the external logistical support deemed essential to their survival and growth’,²³ or the so-called barrages created by the French forces in the Algerian War (1954–62). The barrages was ‘a network of electrified fences, minefields, and free-fire zones, manned by rapid-reaction forces that could be brought to bear upon any ALN [National Liberation Army, the armed wing of National Liberation Front, FLN] units trying to cross’ – built along the borders with Morocco and Tunisia.²⁴

Two other kinds of measures which can be utilised in the fight against transnational insurgents, but which are not discussed in research on counterinsurgency, are population-centric measures directed at the population in neighbouring states and measures directed at the governments of neighbouring states. Measures directed at the population in neighbouring states who are supporting the insurgents could be similar to the population-centric measures taken against the local population within the host state, discussed above. Both negative and positive incentives could be used. Measures directed at governments in neighbouring states who support insurgents would, however, be somewhat different. Here, regular diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions and large-scale development aid programmes could be some examples of counterinsurgency measures.

If including the regional dimension of insurgencies in the traditional counterinsurgency framework outlined above, we get ten categories of counterinsurgency measures. Enemy-centric and population-centric measures can be used in both the host state and in neighbouring states. Measures can also be taken against the government in neighbouring states. In all instances, both negative and positive incentives can be utilised (see Figure 2).

Transnational Insurgents and the Afghan War

In October 2001, the United States together with the United Kingdom launched an attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It was the beginning of a long and complex international military engagement in Afghanistan, which has evolved over time. In 2012, a number of insurgent groups, with the aim of overthrowing the government and forcing the international presence out of Afghanistan, still fought the Afghan government and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In addition, several hundred tribal leaders had taken up arms against the government, the international presence and each other.²⁵

According to COMISAF’s assessment in 2009, the main insurgent groups in Afghanistan are the Taliban, the Hezb-i-Islami and the Haqqani Network.²⁶ The Taliban, who are also known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) or the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), emerged as a local defence group outside Kandahar during the civil war in Afghanistan in the early 1990s (1992–96). Their influence grew rapidly, and by 1996 they had seized Kabul and claimed power in Afghanistan. By 1999, they controlled most of Afghanistan, apart from some areas in the north. When the Taliban was overthrown by the Coalition in December 2001, it continued to fight the international presence and, subsequently, the new regime.²⁷ According to Anne Stenersen, the recruitment and mobilisation of the organisation is highly ethnic, and its members are primarily rural Pashtuns from southern and south-eastern Afghanistan.²⁸ The number of Taliban fighters are estimated to be around 20,000–25, 000.²⁹

The two other major insurgent groups in Afghanistan both have considerable war experience. They were created already in the 1970s as part of the same resistance movement. During the Soviet invasion (1979–89), they were fighting the Soviet forces, and they both became armed parties in the following civil war. Hezb-i-Islami (HIG) was established by the Pashtun commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar during his exile in Pakistan. He served as Afghanistan’s prime minister twice during the civil war (in 1993–94 and in 1996), but when the Taliban came to power, he fled to Iran. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Hekmatyar came back to Afghanistan and the HIG joined the insurgency. The organisation is modelled after the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East and revolutionary Islamists in Iran, and their aim is to overthrow the Afghan government and to install Hekmatyar as a leader. They are primarily based in the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan, but they also have relatively strong support in the provinces of Nangarhar, Paktika and Paktia.³⁰ According to Seth G. Jones, the organisation includes several hundred fighters, and they have openly pledged to cooperate with the Taliban forces.³¹

The Haqqani Network was established in northern Waziristan in Pakistan by Jalaluddin Haqqani. It was originally part of the same group as Hekmatyar, the Hezb-i-Islami, but in 1979 the movement split in two, and Haqqani became the key commander of the splinter group, the Hezb-i-Islami Khalis. Haqqani’s area of influence was primarily the provinces of Paktia, Paktika and Khost, and during the Soviet invasion, as well as during the following civil war, the Haqqani network was primarily fighting in south-eastern Afghanistan. When the Taliban seized Paktia in 1995, Jalaluddin Haqqani joined the Taliban, making Hezb-i-Islami (who at the time fought the Taliban in the north together with the Northern Alliance) and the Haqqani Network opposite parties of the war. In 1996 Haqqani became the minister for tribal affairs in the Taliban government. Despite some differences in aims between the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, Haqqani continued to be loyal to the Taliban. After the military intervention in 2001, the leadership of the Haqqani network fled to Pakistan, and during the following years, the network was reconstructed. Today, the Haqqani Network is led by Jalaluddin Haqqani’s son, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The stronghold of the Haqqani Network is still primarily in south-eastern Afghanistan, and the network has confirmed its allegiance to the Taliban publicly.³²

All the major insurgent groups have extensive cross-border interaction with neighbouring states. The main source of support comes from Pakistan. Although the Pakistan government denies any official support for the Afghan insurgents, it is often accused of supporting the insurgents in different ways, and former Pakistani officials have openly admitted their sympathies for them.³³ According to Jones, NATO officials have also uncovered several instances where Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has provided intelligence to insurgents in Afghanistan. In addition, various tribal groups along the border support the Afghan insurgents.³⁴

The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is over 2,000 kilometres long, and is largely inaccessible, with mountainous terrain, narrow valleys and desert plains.³⁵ Because of its geography, the border is highly difficult to secure, and there are a number of border crossings. According to Johnson and Mason, there are only two established border crossings along the border where most of the legal daily traffic passes.³⁶ These are manned by officials. There are also around 20 smaller border-crossing routes which are used quite frequently and which are also manned by officials. However, there are almost 350 unmanned crossing points which are illegal but known, and hundreds of unaccounted foot and goat paths used by insurgents, smugglers, locals and nomads.³⁷

Furthermore, the borders of Afghanistan have never been important for people living in the border areas, making the border area easy to exploit by insurgent groups. The main macro-level organisation and source of identity in Afghanistan is the tribe or ethnic group, rather than the central state.³⁸ Despite the strong position of the tribes and ethnic groups in the Afghan society, the borders of contemporary Afghanistan were drawn right through tribal areas, separating people from the same tribe or ethnic group. The borders were the outcome of a power game between the Russian and the British Empires during the nineteenth century, the so-called Great Game, where Afghanistan became a buffer zone between the two empires.³⁹ This made the borders superficial and unimportant for the population living in the border areas. According to a report from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on cross-border population movements: ‘most people do not actually know where the border is located, separating Afghanistan and Pakistan. Students often leave their homes in the morning to go to school on the other side, as it is for them part of their community, not two different countries.’⁴⁰

In these areas, where the borders divide tribes and ethnic groups, maybe especially along the Durand Line, cross-border affairs are common and the borders are often ignored.⁴¹ Furthermore, ethnic ties and tribe affiliation across the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan are important features in the support for the Afghan insurgents. Due to common ethnicity, the Afghan insurgents have significant support networks in, for example, Baluchistan, the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Waziristan. These networks are based on tribal affiliation on both sides of the border and are very difficult to penetrate.⁴²

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, several thousand Afghan Taliban forces fled across the border to Pakistan, and the area became a safe haven for Afghan insurgents. The border area has since then been used extensively by Afghan insurgents as a safe haven and they have had substantial freedom to operate in Pakistan.⁴³ According to Rubin and Sidique, some tribal areas have even ‘become a small-scale copy of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where Islamist militants can recover and plan fresh operations while gradually imposing their will on the secluded region.’⁴⁴ This is not new. In parts of the FATA and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) provinces along the Pakistan border, the state has had limited influence over time and the area has repeatedly been used as a sanctuary by both Afghan and Pakistan insurgents. During the Soviet invasion, for example, ‘the sanctuary became highly developed and institutionalized, operating with the official blessing of the host government and its major allies’.⁴⁵

The Pakistan safe haven is used by the insurgents for activities, such as, planning operations, recruiting and training fighters, financing operations and logistics. The Taliban leadership, for example, relocated to Quetta in Pakistan under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar shortly after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Apart from the shura based in Quetta, they also have a shura based in Peshawar in NWFP and one in Waziristan in FATA, Pakistan.⁴⁶ The leadership is using Pakistan as a sanctuary from where they plan their offensives and direct their organisation. According to Dressler, the leadership in Pakistan gives general guidance to its commanders in Afghanistan in the beginning of each fighting year, and it moves fighters between the commanders according to its strategic priorities.⁴⁷ The leader of the Haqqani network, Jalaluddin Haqqani, also fled to Pakistan, to his old base in Waziristan. From there, the group joined the insurgency. The stronghold of the group is currently in south-eastern Afghanistan and across the border in Waziristan, Pakistan.⁴⁸

The border areas are important for the recruitment of fighters for the Afghan insurgency. According to NATO, in 2006, around 40 per cent of all fighters in Afghanistan came straight from Pakistan. The Afghan insurgent groups recruit their members, including ‘foreign fighters’,⁴⁹ in Pakistani madrasahs, mosques and refugee camps. Some insurgent groups even run madrasahs and welfare services in refugee camps in Pakistan.⁵⁰

Afghan fighters are trained in a number of training camps in Pakistan. Some of these camps were formed already during the Afghan jihad in the 1980s and used by Al-Qa’eda in the 1990’s. In addition, foreign Taliban fighters, sent by the two shuras in Pakistan, provide military training to field units in Afghanistan, going from village to village. The insurgents also rely on areas in Pakistan for material support. Fighters, weapons, improvised explosive device (IED) components, ammunition and other supplies are often smuggled into Afghanistan across the border from Pakistan. Although much of the supplies are smuggled over the border on small paths to remote towns close to the border, such as Barham Chah in southern Helmand, the insurgents also use bigger roads such as Highway 4 in Kandahar province to smuggle fighters and supplies into Afghanistan. In addition, these paths and roads are used to smuggle out heroin in order to finance the insurgency.⁵¹

The Afghan insurgents are also conducting financing operations in Pakistan, and donor networks in Pakistan raise funds from Pakistani militants sympathetic to the Taliban cause.⁵² According to Anne Stenersen, Arab ‘money teams’ arrive from Pakistan to supply local commanders close to the border in Afghanistan with weapons, money and technical assistance.⁵³ Financial donor networks also exist on a wider scale. For example, the international Al-Qa’eda network is using wealthy international contacts in the Muslim world, especially from the Gulf States, such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in order to raise money for the insurgents in Afghanistan.⁵⁴

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Since 2001, the international community has invested a lot of effort and resources in Afghanistan to create peace and security. In 2012, more than 130,000 armed forces were deployed in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF mission.⁵⁵ The traditional counterinsurgency framework is indeed useful when analysing the different counterinsurgency efforts conducted in Afghanistan. The shift in the British counterinsurgency efforts in Helmand province between 2006 and 2007 can, for example, be identified using this framework.

In the beginning of the UK deployment in Helmand, platoon houses were established all over the province, from which the forces conducted patrols and fought insurgents. This was followed by the establishment of so-called Mobile Operation Groups (MOGs), which were established in order to engage the enemy more directly. The Mobile Operation Groups consisted of around 200–250 troops and they patrolled the countryside weeks at the time, attacking insurgents and raiding compounds. When the third brigade, the 12 Mechanized Brigade, took over the responsibility of the operations in Helmand, the counterinsurgency measures became even more coercive. The 12 Mechanized Brigade launched an attrition campaign against the insurgents, involving large-scale clearing operations, with up to 2,500 troops supported by armour, artillery and attack helicopters.⁵⁶ This approach can be understood as a typical enemy-centric/negative incentives approach.

When the next brigade, the 52 Infantry Brigade, deployed in October 2007, the focus of the British operations changed towards more population-centric efforts including more positive incentives. Not only did the operations have a clear aim of winning the support of the population, non-kinetic efforts also gained a larger role. The military aspect of the operations was focused on protecting the population. Instead of mobile offensive operations, the focus was turned to fixed patrol bases, observation posts and vehicle checkpoints.⁵⁷

In addition, several forms of non-kinetic measures were increasingly emphasised. So-called Non-Kinetic Effects Teams were created, with the aim of winning the hearts and minds of the population, and a new methodology for assessing non-kinetic efforts was developed, the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework. In 2008, stabilisation advisers were deployed at Forward Operation Bases across Helmand, and the number of civilian staff grew from around 25 in 2007 to 80 in 2009.⁵⁸ Furthermore, according to Robert Egnell, a more bottom-up approach, which included local resources, was also increasingly emphasised. Local political stakeholders and their networks, for example, were used in order to create security at the local level.⁵⁹ Since the main focus of these efforts was to increase the security of the population, and not to coerce the insurgents, these efforts can rather be understood as a population- centric/positive incentives approach according to the traditional counterinsurgency framework.

By using the traditional counterinsurgency framework in the analysis of the British counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan, these overall changes in their approach can be identified and categorised. This is highly important for understanding the development and dynamic of the war in Afghanistan. This understanding of counterinsurgency efforts is also prevalent in contemporary analyses of Afghanistan.⁶⁰

But, NATO and US forces are also conducting a range of countermeasures against the external support for the Afghan insurgents which cannot be covered by the traditional framework. Different forms of military operations against the safe haven of the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan have, for example, been conducted by the international forces. One example is the highly criticised ‘drone programme’ by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). According to Brian Glyn Williams, drones for surveillance were used in Pakistan already from 2002, and in 2004 the first drone attack in Pakistan was reported.⁶¹ Since 2008, the number of drone attacks has increased, and in 2010 alone, the CIA carried out more than 70 drone attacks on Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan.⁶² Although the CIA drone programme is primarily used in the fight against Al-Qa’eda in the ‘war against terror’, and not as part of the civil war in Afghanistan, several Afghan Taliban fighters have been attacked by the drones. In addition, according to the New York Times, the US Armed Forces have been conducting helicopter air strikes against targets inside Pakistan, and used so-called reconnaissance blimps, to gather intelligence on the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan.⁶³

Other kinds of cross-border measures have been used by the US Armed Forces against the safe haven in Pakistan. According to the Guardian, small teams of US Special Forces have been embedded with Pakistani military forces since 2009, in order to increase their counterinsurgency capabilities.⁶⁴ Pakistan has also supported the Afghan and international efforts against Afghan insurgents by collecting intelligence and conducting military operations against Afghan insurgents in Pakistan.⁶⁵ They have, for example, conducted military operations in the FATA against foreign fighters, especially Central Asians and Arabs, and against Pakistani Taliban in the tribal regions.⁶⁶ This has partly been financed by the US. According to Weinbaum: ‘Some 70 percent of the estimated $15.4 billion in total American aid and military reimbursements between 2002 and 2010 went for security-related purposes, the bulk of it to compensate Pakistan for the cost of military operations in the borderlands with Afghanistan.’⁶⁷

The NATO and the US forces are also conducting some indirect measures to close the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to hinder cross-border movement by insurgents and supplies. They are, for example, training the Afghan Border Police in order to increase border security and large efforts have been invested in the building of Afghan Security Forces of which the Afghan Border Police is part. In October 2009, NATO created a special mission, the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) in order to channel the resources. The European Union (EU) is also part of the building of Afghan Border Police through its EUPOL mission. Apart from training and mentoring the border police, the international security forces are also building border infrastructure and contributing new equipment to the Afghan Border Police.⁶⁸ Canada, which has its own policy for the region, is also focusing on border security.⁶⁹

On the other side of the border, the US has invested in the training of the Pakistan Army and border police. In order to increase Pakistan’s capability to secure the borders, the United States created a Border Security Program (BSP) in Pakistan shortly after the beginning of the intervention. Between 2002 and 2011, Washington has contributed with, for example, aviation support, including 14 helicopters and 3 aircraft stationed in Quetta, Pakistan; built 336 kilometres of border security roads in the FATA province and over 200 outposts along the border; as well as contributed with $65 million in equipment, such as vehicles, and communication and surveillance items.⁷⁰ NATO has also contributed to the Pakistan side of the border. It has, for example, opened up training and education courses to Pakistani officers, and provided guidance to the Pakistan military.⁷¹

Furthermore, several joint military forums have been created, such as the Tripartite Commission, a joint forum on military and security issues including representatives from ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tripartite Commission focuses on four main areas of cooperation: intelligence sharing, border security, countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and initiatives relating to information operations. The Joint Intelligence Operation Centre (JIOC) is also a joint initiative between ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan which was established in Kabul in 2007.⁷²

Apart from cross-border military operations and border security measures, some NATO member states have a more comprehensive approach towards the region. The US is one. In its regional strategy, the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, President Barack Obama declared on 1 December 2009:

Today, it is clearer than ever before that we must expand our relationship with Pakistan beyond security issues, and lead the international community in helping the Pakistani people overcome political, economic, and security challenges that threaten Pakistan’s stability, and in turn undermine regional stability.⁷³

Although enhancing Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities is an important aspect of this strategy, other key areas of the strategy include: energy, agriculture, water, health and education, assistance to displaced Pakistanis, strengthening Pakistan’s democratic institutions and empowering Pakistan’s women.⁷⁴ Since 2001, the US has provided $7.4 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan. Furthermore, according to Paul D. Miller, the trade ties between the two countries have been strengthened since the US-Pakistan Trade and Investment Agreement was signed in 2003, making the US the Pakistan’s number one export destination in 2010.⁷⁵

These measures, directed towards the enemy, population and government in a neighbouring state, cannot easily be included in the traditional counterinsurgency framework. The use of armed drones against the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan, for example, is indeed similar to the use of armed drones against the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan. But, since it targets an enemy on the other side of the border, it is highly different from a host state/enemy-centric/negative incentives operation. The crossing of borders by armed forces is either dependent on explicit consent by the neighbouring power, in this case the Pakistani government, or has to be conducted in breach of international law, risking the escalation of the conflict to an international conflict. If using the regional counterinsurgency framework instead, the use of armed drones against the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan can be understood as a neighbouring state/enemy-centric/negative incentives approach, making these efforts possible to include in the analysis of the counterinsurgency operations conducted against the Afghan insurgents, at the same time allowing for the differences between operations conducted within and outside the borders of Afghanistan to be highlighted.

Concerning the counter efforts conducted against the cross-border movements of insurgents, weapons and other supplies, the NATO and US training programmes of the Afghan Border Police can be included in the traditional counterinsurgency framework as an enemy centric/negative incentives approach. But, the US Border Security Program in Pakistan cannot. Instead, this could be understood as a neighbouring state/government-centric/positive approach, since these measures are directed toward cooperation with a neighbouring state. This is also the case concerning the joint military forums created between ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These efforts are not included in the traditional analysis of counterinsurgency efforts against the insurgency in Afghanistan, but are probably having some influence on the amount of insurgents, weapons and other supplies crossing the borders, maybe even more so than the relatively smaller efforts conducted on the Afghan side. By using the regional counterinsurgency framework, these efforts can be included in the analysis.

Some efforts might be possible to categorise in more than one category. Following the regional counterinsurgency framework, the small US Special Forces team embedded with the Pakistan Armed Forces, for example, can be understood as a neighbouring state/enemy-centric/negative incentives approach since these teams were to target the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan. But, since these teams also support the development of the counterinsurgency capabilities of the Pakistan Armed Forces, they could also be considered as a neighbouring state/government-centric/positive incentives approach. In this sense, it would be similar to the US financial support for the military operations conducted by the Pakistani military in the borderlands with Afghanistan, rather than the drone attacks conducted against the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan. The American support to other areas than military, such as health and education in the FATA region in Pakistan, is another example. This could be understood as a neighbouring state/government-centric/positive incentives approach, since it supports the development of Pakistan state functions. It could, however, also be understood as a neighbouring state/population-centric/positive incentives approach. By building schools and health facilities, the local population in the border areas of Pakistan could be convinced not to support the Afghan insurgents. Nevertheless, these efforts are not possible to categorise according to the traditional counterinsurgency framework, making them invisible in a traditional analysis.

Conclusions

The regional dimension of the Afghan war is prominent, and external support for the insurgents in Afghanistan have been plentiful, especially from Pakistan. In order to counter external support for the insurgents in Afghanistan, both international and host state forces are conducting different kinds of countermeasures. However, in contemporary counterinsurgency theory and doctrines, the regional dimension of insurgencies is overlooked and there are only four categories of counterinsurgency measures: enemy-centric/negative incentives; enemy-centric/positive incentives; population-centric/negative incentives; and population-centric/positive incentives. This makes contemporary counterinsurgency theory and doctrines inadequate in order to understand the Afghan war, and these categories need to be supplemented with six more categories in order to include different counterinsurgency measures conducted in a neighbouring state: enemy-centric, population-centric and state-centric measures, both negative and positive incentives.

This new framework can be used both as an academic and a practical tool. Academically, it can be used to analyse the transnational interaction between conflict actors or to explain why some counterinsurgency campaigns succeed while others fail. Common explanations why counterinsurgency operations fail concern, for example, the number of troops, or the quality of the intelligence.⁷⁶ If not including the counterinsurgency measures conducted against a neighbouring state in these investigations, these conclusions might be wrong.

In practice, this framework can be used for planning counterinsurgency operations, since it facilitates a systematic analysis of viable options concerning the regional dimension of an insurgency. During the initial phase of the military intervention in Afghanistan, for example, tens of thousands of people in Pakistan took part in violent protests against the intervention in Afghanistan, and thousands of Pakistani fighters threatened to cross the border into Afghanistan in order to fight alongside the Taliban. Several researchers have suggested that without the safe haven in Pakistan, the Afghan insurgents might not have been able to return to Afghanistan to fight. Although the US cooperated with the Pakistani government already from the beginning of the intervention, measures directed towards the population in eastern Pakistan might have made the resurgence of the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan less likely.⁷⁷ If using the regional counterinsurgency framework in the planning of these operations, this dimension could have been highlighted.

Although all six categories of counterinsurgency measures against a neighbouring state logically can be combined in any way, there are several factors that influence which of the categories one can combine when planning counterinsurgency operations. One of the most important factors is whether the neighbouring state is friendly or not. If a neighbouring state is friendly towards the counterinsurgency forces, cooperation with the government as well as the population becomes a highly viable option. Enemy-centric/negative incentives measures in the neighbouring state, such as military operations against the insurgents, might also become possible. If, however, the neighbouring state is reluctant to cooperate, or even hostile against the counterinsurgency forces, cooperation becomes more difficult. In these cases, cross-border measures run the risk of escalating the conflict to an interstate conflict. Furthermore, it involves the breaching of international law.

According to Idean Salehyan, more than half of the 291 rebel groups listed in the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset have access to neighbouring territory. A regional framework should therefore be relevant in a number of cases.⁷⁸ It might, however, be argued that the Afghanistan case is an extreme case concerning the regional dimension of insurgent groups and that this framework is less valuable for insurgencies outside Afghanistan. The border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan has always been difficult to control, making it a natural safe haven and support base for Afghan insurgents. Ethnic ties and tribe affiliation across the border is also an important feature of support for the Afghan insurgents.

But, difficult borders and cross-border ethnic groups are not confined to Afghanistan. It can be found in other insurgencies as well. The different rebel groups which have found a safe haven in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is one example. Here, the Ugandan rebel group the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Rwandan rebel group the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and the Burundian rebel group the National Liberation Forces (FNL) are using the difficult terrain, distance from the state power, porous borders and close ethnic ties to groups in the DRC to their advantage.⁷⁹

By including the regional dimension in the traditional counterinsurgency framework, contemporary counterinsurgency theory and doctrines can be systematically developed to include countermeasures for the regional dimension of insurgencies, making counterinsurgency theory and doctrine more relevant for this kind of insurgencies.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kersti Larsdotter

Kersti Larsdotter is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden. She was previously a postdoctoral fellow at the Security Studies Program at the Political Science Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA. Her current research interests include the role of state borders in counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations.

Notes

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency Operations (2009); NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN): AJP-3.4.4 (2011); Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 10: Countering Insurgency (London: Ministry of Defence 2009).

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-24, I-2.

³ Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ‘Transnational Dimensions of Civil War, Journal of Peace Research 44/3 (2007), 295.

⁴ David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International 1964), 25; Jason Lyall, ‘Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration’, International Organizations 64 (2010), 186; Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, ‘Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars’, International Organization 63/1 (2009), 87, 90; Idean Salehyan, Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2010); Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ‘Refugees and the Spread of Civil War’, International Organization 60/2 (2006); Barbara F. Walter, ‘Bargaining Failures and Civil Wars’, Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009), 255.

⁵ Paul F. Diehl, ‘Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace’, Political Science Quarterly 103/3 (1988), 500; Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press 1993), 81–5; Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton UP 2008), 105, 107; Darya Pushkina, ‘A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission’, International Peacekeeping 13/2 (2006), 140.

⁶ In the US Joint doctrine on counterinsurgency, for example, it is included as one of the eight dynamics of an insurgency. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-24, II-11 – II-12.

⁷ Idean Salehyan, ‘Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups’, World Politics 59 (Jan. 2007), 239.

⁸ See, for example, Eric Jardine and Simon Palamar, ‘From Medusa Past Kantalo: Testing the Effeectiveness of Canada’s Enemy-Centric and Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Operational Strategies’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36/7 (2013).

⁹ Mark Moyar, ‘Leadership in Counterinsurgency’, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 34/1 (2010), 135.

¹⁰ James A. Russell, ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (Aug. 2010), 603–6. For some examples at the operational level, see Christopher Griffin, ‘Major Combat Operations and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Plan Challe in Algeria, 1959–1960’, Security Studies 19/3 (2010), 555–89; Niccolò Petrelli, ‘Deterring Insurgents: Culture, Adaptation and the Evolution of Israel Counterinsurgency, 1987–2005’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/5 (Oct. 2013), 666—91.

¹¹ See, for example, Eric Jardine, ‘Population-Centric Counterinsurgency and the Movement of Peoples’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 23/2 (2012), 268; Andrew Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare (London and New York: Routledge 2012), 8. For a discussion on different interpretations, see Paul Dixon, ‘“Hearts and Minds”? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 32/3 (June 2009), 363–66.

¹² Dixon, ‘“Hearts and Minds?”’, 362; Michael Fitzsimmons, ‘Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies 31/3 (June 2008), 337–65; Austin Long, On ‘Other War’: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2006), 21–30; Michael Shafer, ‘The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency’, Political Science Quarterly 103/1 (1988), 57–80; Richard Shultz, ‘Breaking the Will of the Enemy during the Vietnam War: The Operationalization of the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare’, Journal of Peace Research 15/2 (1978), 109–29.

¹³ Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter, ‘Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq’, Journal of Political Economy 119/4 (2011), 766–819.

¹⁴ Constantin Melnik quoted in Long, On ‘Other War’, 27 (emphasis in original).

¹⁵ Long, On ‘Other War’, 24–6; Shafer, ‘The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency’, 72–3; Shultz, ‘Breaking the Will of the Enemy during the Vietnam War’, 110–11.

¹⁶ Charles Wolf quoted in Long, On ‘Other War’, 25 (emphasis in original). See also Shafer ‘The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency’, 72.

¹⁷ For an exception, see Bruno C. Reis, ‘The Myth of British Minimum Force in Counterinsurgency Campaigns during Decolonisation (1945–1970)’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/2 (April 2011), 245–79.

¹⁸ For a discussion on different forms of external support, see Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001), 84–100; Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 25–8; Gleditsch, ‘Transnational Dimensions of Civil War’, 296; Lyall and Wilson, ‘Rage Against the Machines’, 82.

¹⁹ Although there are some detailed descriptions of different forms of enemy centric strategies and tactics against transnational insurgents in the counterinsurgency literature, these studies do not develop a more general theory or framework. Yoav Gortzak, ‘Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: The French in Algeria, 1954–1962’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32/2 (April 2009), 307–33; Angel Rabasa, Lesley Anne Warner, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko and Paraag Shukla, Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2007); Shultz, ‘Breaking the Will of the Enemy during the Vietnam War’.

²⁰ ICG, LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony, Africa Report No. 157 (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group 2010).

²¹ At the time, Namibia was called South West Africa and was annexed by South Africa.

²² Kenneth W. Grundy, Soldiers without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1983), 253–4; Francis Toase, ‘The South African Army: The Campaign in South West Africa/Namibia since 1966‘, in Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott (eds), Armed Forces of Modern Counter-Insurgency (Beckenham, UK: Croom Helm 1985), 210; Lieneke Eloff de Visser, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds in the Namibian Border War’, Scientia Militaria 39/1 (2011), 93–4; Tony Weaver, ‘The South African Defence Force in Namibia’, in Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan (eds), War and Society: The Militarization of South Africa (New York: St Martin’s Press 1989), 97.

²³ Richard Shultz, ‘Coercive Force and Military Strategy: Deterrence Logic and the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare’, Western Political Quarterly 32/4 (1979), 455. For a discussion on different technical approaches to borders surveillance, see James Igoe Walsh, ‘Intelligence Sharing for Counter-Insurgency’, Defense and Security Analysis 24/3 (2008), 282.

²⁴ Gortzak, ‘Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations’, 313–14.

²⁵ Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca, NY/ London: Cornell UP 2008), 255.

²⁶ Stanley A. McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters International Security Assistance Force 2009), 2–6.

²⁷ Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat (New York: Columbia UP 2006), 180–2; Tim Youngs, Paul Bowers and Mark Oakes, The Campaign against International Terrorism: Prospects after the Fall of the Taliban, Research Paper 01/112 (London: House of Commons Library 2001), 9.

²⁸ Anne Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan: Organization, Leadership and Worldview, FFI-report 2010/00359 (Oslo: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 2010), 30.

²⁹ Rod Nordland, ‘Study Finds Sharp Rise in Attacks by Taliban’, New York Times, 19 April 2013; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 18.

³⁰ Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2008), 41; Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond, 261; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 20.

³¹ Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 41.

³² Jefferey A. Dressler, The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan, Afghanistan Report 6 (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War 2010), 7–11; Thomas Ruttig, ‘Loya Paktia’s Insurgency: (I) The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity’, in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (London: Hurst 2009), 62–72; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 19.

³³ BBC, ‘In Quotes: Excerpts from NATO Report on Taliban’, 1 Feb. 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16829368> Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 54–61; Austin Long, ‘Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan’, Orbis 54/2 (2010), 200; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency, 40; Marvin G. Weinbaum, ‘Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier’, Journal of International Affairs 63/1 (2009), 76.

³⁴ Seth G. Jones, ‘Pakistan’s Dangerous Game’, Survival 49/1 (2007), 18–21. See also Ruttig, Loya Paktia’s Insurgency, 75–7.

³⁵ Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, ‘No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier’, International Security 32/4 (2008), 43–6; Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 54.

³⁶ Johnson and Mason, ‘No Sign until the Burst of Fire’, 44.

³⁷ Jeffery A. Dressler, Securing Helmand: Understanding and Responding to the Enemy, Afghanistan Report 2 (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War 2009), 10; Johnson and Mason, ‘No Sign until the Burst of Fire’, 44; Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 58; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 38.

³⁸ Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, 152–3.

³⁹ Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban (Seattle/ London: Univ. of Washington Press 2001), 31–2.

⁴⁰ Nassim Majidi and Eric Davin, Study on Cross Border Population Movements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Commissioned by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kabul, June 2009, 19.

⁴¹ Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 29.

⁴² Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 58, 46; Gretchen Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban, Peaceworks 62 (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace 2009), 26–7; Qandeel Siddique, Teherik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for its Growth in Pakistan’s North-East, DIIS-Report 2010:12 (Copehagen: Danish Institute for International Studies 2010), 7.

⁴³ Ashok Behuria, ‘Fighting the Taliban: Pakistan at War with Itself’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 61/4 (2007), 531–2; Jones, ‘Pakistan’s Dangerous Game’, 18–21; Weinbaum, ‘Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier’; Youngs, Bowers and Oakes, The Campaign against International Terrorism, 9.

⁴⁴ Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate, Special Report 176 (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace 2006), 3. See also Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency, 38.

⁴⁵ Astri Suhrke, ‘A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping 15/2 (2008), 220–1. See also: Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 41; Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond, 261; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 20; Weinbaum, ‘Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier’, 74.

⁴⁶ Dressler, Securing Helmand, 7; Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004–2012’, International Affairs 89/4 (2012), 855; Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 59. For a detailed discussion on the Quetta leadership, see Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 41–7.

⁴⁷ Dressler, Securing Helmand, 8–9.

⁴⁸ Dressler, The Haqqani Network, 7–11; Ruttig, ‘Loya Paktia’s Insurgency’, 62–72; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 19.

⁴⁹ Foreign fighters are mainly individuals from the Caucasus and Central Asia (such as Chechens, Uzbeks, and Tajiks), and Arabs (such as Saudis, Egyptians and Libyans). Their objective is broader than that of the Taliban. Apart from launching jihad against Western forces and eradicating them from the region, their aim is also the return of the Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. They are often better equipped, trained and motivated than Afghan insurgents, and they typically carry out more sophisticated attacks. They also play a key role as trainers, shock troops and surrogate leaders for the Taliban in the field. They take guidance from senior commanders at the strategic level, but they often have autonomy at the tactical level. Dressler, Securing Helmand, 10; Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 43–6; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 21.

⁵⁰ Dressler, Securing Helmand, 10, 13; Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War’, 857–8; Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 59; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 19–20, 30, 38.

⁵¹ Dressler, Securing Helmand, 9–13; Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War’, 866; Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 44, 57; Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 38; Suhrke, ‘A Contradictory Mission?’, 232.

⁵² Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 46, 59; Ruttig, ‘Loya Paktia’s Insurgency’, 77.

⁵³ Stenersen, The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 39–40.

⁵⁴ Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 62.

⁵⁵ NATO, ‘ISAF: Key Facts and Figures’, 6 Jan. 2012, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/2012-01-06%20ISAF%20Placemat.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Warren Chin, ‘Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State: British Military Operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan’, Defence Studies 10/1-2 (2010), 232–5; Robert Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: What Now for British Counterinsurgency?’, International Affairs 87/2 (2011), 303-5; Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, ‘COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan’, Orbis (Fall 2009), 674; Anthony King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan’, International Affairs 86/2 (2010), 315–18.

⁵⁷ Chin, ‘Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State’, 235; Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’, 307.

⁵⁸ Chin, ‘Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State’, 235; Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’, 308; Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’, 675, 682.

⁵⁹ Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’, 311.

⁶⁰ See, for example, Sergio Catignani, ‘”Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (Aug. 2012); Chin, ‘Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State’; Robert Egnell, ‘Winning “Hearts and Minds”? A Critical Analysis of Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan’, Civil Wars 12/3 (2010), 282–303; Egnell, ‘Lessons from Helmand’; Farrell and Gordon, ‘COIN Machine’; Lisa Hultman, ‘COIN and Civilian Collaterals: Patterns of Violence in Afghanistan, 2004–2009’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 23/2 (2012), 245–63; King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign’; Adam Lockyer, ‘Evaluating Civil Development in Counterinsurgency Operations. The Case for a Field Experiment in Afghanistan’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 66/1 (2012), 1–19.

⁶¹ Brian Glyn Williams, ‘The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33/10 (2010), 874.

⁶² Long, ‘Small is Beautiful’, 212; Mark Mazzetti, and Eric Schmitt, ‘CIA Steps Up Drone Attacks on Taliban in Pakistan’, New York Times, 28 Sept. 2010, A1; Weinbaum, ‘Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier’, 85.

⁶³ Mazzetti and Schmitt, ‘CIA. Steps Up Drone Attacks on Taliban in Pakistan’, A1.

⁶⁴ Declan Walsh, ‘WikiLeaks Cables: US Special Forces Working Inside Pakistan’, The Guardian, 30 Nov. 2010.

⁶⁵ Long, ‘Small is Beautiful’, 201; Omar Waraich and Andrew Buncombe, ‘Pakistan Readies for New Assault on Bin Laden Lair’, The Independent (UK), 6 Oct. 2009; Report to Congress, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf>.

⁶⁶ For a detailed discussion on Pakistan military operations in the border areas between 2001 and 2010, see Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2010), 41–75.

⁶⁷ Weinbaum, ‘Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier’, 83.

⁶⁸ EUPOL, ‘EUPOL assists the Afghan Border Police to build a “Rule of Law” police service’, July 2012, <http://www.eupol-afg.eu/?q=node/195> NATO, ‘Training Courses Celebrate Graduates in Afghanistan’, 20 Aug. 2010, <http://aco.nato.int/page27220124.aspx> NATO, ‘NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A)’, 2012, <http://www.aco.nato.int/page2083144846.aspx> Reuters, ‘NATO Races to Secure Violent, Porous Afghanistan-Pakistan Border’, 2 Sept. 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/02/us-afghanistan-pakistan-border-idUSTRE7814QY20110902> UNODC, ‘The Remote Frontier: UNODC Assistance to Afghanistan’s Border Patrol’, 4 Jan. 2010, <http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/frontpage/2009/December/border-control.html> USACE, ‘Afghan Border Police have a new facility at Chah Sangar’, 2 March 2012, <http://www.usace.army.mil/Media/NewsArchive/tabid/204/Article/372/afghan-border-police-have-a-new-facility-at-chah-sangar.aspx> Chris Woods and Declan Walsh, ‘Pakistan Expels British Trainers of Anti-Taliban Soldiers’, The Guardian, 26 June 2011.

⁶⁹ Government of Canada, ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan border’, 2011, <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/priorities-priorites/border-frontiere.aspx?view=d>.

⁷⁰ Department of State, ‘Pakistan Border Security Program: Fact Sheet’, 23 Nov. 2011, <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/177706.htm>.

⁷¹ Report to Congress, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 50–1; NATO, ‘NATO Cooperation with Pakistan’, 2011, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50071.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

⁷² Report to Congress, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 50–1; NATO, ‘NATO Cooperation with Pakistan’.

⁷³ Department of State, Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Updated Feb. 2010, 25.

⁷⁴ Department of the State, Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, 25–30.

⁷⁵ Paul D. Miller, ‘How to Exercise US Leverage Over Pakistan’, Washington Quarterly 35/4 (2012), 40–2.

⁷⁶ Jeffrey A. Friedman, ‘Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine’, Security Studies 20/4 (2010), 556–91; Lyall and Wilson III, ‘Rage Against the Machines’; Carter Malkasian, ‘Did the United States Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar’, Defence Studies 8/1 (2008), 78—104.

⁷⁷ House of Commons, Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ and the Conflict in Afghanistan: An Update, Research Paper 01/81 (London: House of Commons Library 2001), 63–5.

⁷⁸ Salehyan, ‘Transnational Rebels’, 239.

⁷⁹ ICG, Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion, Policy Briefing/Africa briefing No. 93 (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group 2012); Hans Romkema, Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Cases of the FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU (Washington DC: The World Bank 2007); Lindsay Scorgie, ‘Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel? The Allied Democratic Forces and the Uganda/Congo Borderland’, The Round Table 100/412 (2011), 79–93.