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Abstract
The analyses of smart and soft power have developed little beyond what their critics would refer to as ‘soft theory’, and in both cases the theoretical development is less than ‘smart’. This article attempts to address these deficiencies in the theoretical development of smart power by: (1) articulating a more rigorous and systematic understanding of the processes of smart power; (2) explaining how changes in world politics have raised the value of smart power relative to hard power; (3) analyzing smart power in the context of recent US foreign policy, and (4) proposing several prescriptions that will encourage decision-makers to value and effectively use smart power strategies in their foreign policies.
Acknowledgements
A version of this paper was presented at a conference on ‘Smart Power: Transforming Militaries for 21st Century Missions’, at Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College, Singapore from 18–19 October 2012. The article draws on analyses in: Giulio Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power in International Politics: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism and Constructivism (New York: Cambridge UP 2010); Giulio Gallarotti, The Power Curse (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press 2010), and Giulio Gallarotti, ‘Soft Power: What it is, Why it’s Important, and the Conditions Under Which it Can Be Effectively Used’, Journal of Political Power 4/1 (2011), 25–47.
The author would like to thank David Baldwin, the participants of the conference (especially the editor of this special issue Alan Chong), and referees of the Journal of Strategic Studies for suggestions on revisions.
Notes
1 ‘Obama’s Speech on the Middle East and North Africa,’ Council on Foreign Relations, 19 May 2011, <www.cfr.org/middle-east/obamas-speech-middle-east-north-africa-may-2011/p25049>; and Hillary Clinton, ‘Transcript of Confirmation Hearing,’ New York Times, 13 Jan. 2009.
2 See, Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘Soft Power,’ Foreign Policy 80 (Fall 1990), 53–71; Joseph S. Nye Jr, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books 1990); Joseph S. Nye, Jr, The Paradoxes of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (New York: OUP 2002); Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘The Velvet Hegemon: How Soft Power Can Help Defeat Terrorism,’ Foreign Policy (May/June 2003), 74–5; Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization (London: Routledge 2004); Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs 2004); Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘Notes for a Soft-Power Research Agenda,’ in Felix Berenkoetter and M.J. Williams (eds), Power in World Politics (London: Routledge 2007), 162–72. Also see: David A. Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations,’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations, 2nd Edition (London: Sage 2013), 273–97; Felix Berenkoetter, ‘Thinking About Power,’ in Felix Berenkoetter and M.J. Williams (eds), Power in World Politics (London: Routledge 2007), 1–22; Alan Chong, Foreign Policy in Global Information Space: Actualizing Soft Power (New York: Palgrave 2007); Niall Ferguson, ‘Power,’ Foreign Policy (Jan./Feb. 2003), 18–27; Matthew Fraser, Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire (New York: St Martin’s Press 2003); Giulio Gallaroti, ‘Nice Guys Finish First: American Unilateralism and Power Illusion,’ in Graham F. Walker (ed.), Independence in an Age of Empires: Multilateralism and Unilateralism in the Post 9/11 World (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie Univ. 2004), 225–36; Giulio Gallarotti, The Power Curse: Influence and Illusion in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2010); Giulio Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power in International Politics: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism and Constructivism (New York: Cambridge UP 2010); Giulio Gallarotti, ‘Soft Power: What it is, Why it’s Important, and the Conditions Under Which it Can Be Effectively Used,’ Journal of Political Power 4/1 (2011), 25–47; Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2007); Alexander T. J. Lennon (ed.), The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2003); Walter Russell Meade, ‘America’s Sticky Power,’ Foreign Policy (March/April 2004), 46–53.
3 Ulrich Beck, Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy (Malden, MA: Polity Press 2005).
4 Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations’; Berenkoetter and Williams, Power in World Politics.
5 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics,’ International Organization 59 (Winter 2005), 39–75; Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power.
6 Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in International Relations,’. 40: Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Realist Conceptions of Power,’ in Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams (eds), Power in World Politics (London: Routledge 2007), 43–63. The analysis here is state-centric: it is concerned with how a state can influence another state. While the components of hard and soft power reveal extensive elements of civil society (i.e., industry lobbyists, development NGOs), each category is conceptualized as manifesting itself in influence at the level of the state.
7 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley 1979), 113.
8 Ibid., 131. See also, Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge UP 1981), 13; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton 2001), 55. Realists accept that power can also derive from some intangible sources – such as competence (i.e., leadership, policy, decision-making) – and also embrace the utility of threat or other types of coercive posturing. However, these intangibles ultimately rely on actual material capabilities to be effective.
9 While tangibility is generally a defining difference between hard and soft power, it is not always so. See discussion below.
10 Nye, Soft Power, 56–7.
11 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1971).
12 Nye, Paradoxes of American Power, 113, 114, 119, 141.
13 Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh, ‘The Homogenization of Global Culture,’ in Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds), The Case Against the Global Economy and for a Turn Toward the Local (San Francisco: Sierra Club 1996), 71–7; Naomi Klein, No Logo (New York: Picador 1999); Walter LeFeber, Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism (New York: Norton 1999); Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP 1995).
14 This draws on Dahl’s classic definition of power. See Robert A. Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’, Behavioral Science 2/3 (July 1957), 201–15.
15 Gallarotti, The Power Curse; Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power.
16 See for example, Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power; Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive; Chong, Soft Power in Global Information Space; and Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military (Washington DC: Georgetown UP 2010).
17 Robert Jervis, ‘International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?’, International Security 17/4 (Spring 1993), 52–67; Robert Jervis, ‘The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment,’ International Security 13/2 (Autumn 1988), 80–90; Robert Jervis, ‘Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Peace Power,’ American Political Science Review 96/1 (March 2002), 1–14.
18 John Mueller, ‘The Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,’ International Security 13/2 (Autumn 1988), 55–79.
19 Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: Norton 1997); James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Politics: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press 1995); Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization (New York: Norton 2001).
20 John Herz, ‘Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,’ World Politics 9/4 (April 1957), 473–93; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, Power and Interdependence (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Co. 1989); Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, Force, Order and Justice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1967).
21 Barbara G. Haskel, ‘Access to Society: A Neglected Dimension of Power,’ International Organization 34/1 (Winter 1980), 89–120; Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton UP 1988).
22 Jervis, ‘Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Peace Power’; Nye, Paradoxes of American Power, 19.
23 Nye, Paradoxes of American Power, 75.
24 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century (New York: Basic Books 1999).
25 Giulio M. Gallarotti, ‘The Advent of the Prosperous Society: The Rise of the Guardian State and Structural Change in the World Economy,’ Review of International Political Economy 7/1 (Spring 2000), 1–52; John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,’ in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1983), 195–232.
26 Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1983); Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.
27 Robert Gilpin, ‘The Rise of American Hegemony,’ in Patrick Karl O’Brien and Armand Clesse (eds), Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846–1914 and the United States 1941–2001 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate 2002), 165–82.
28 Waltz, Theory of International Relations. There are a number of historical cases where economic hard power was also an important source of emulation, see Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power.
29 Reveron, Exporting Security demonstrates how the US military has undertaken a number of foreign initiatives to address the underlying conditions that generate violence abroad. Many of these initiatives, which are undertaken jointly with NGOs and other civilian agencies, represent soft power strategies designed to enhance America’s image abroad.
30 Sklair, Sociology of the Global System and LeFeber, Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism.
31 Nye, Paradoxes of American Power, 9–10; Nye, Soft Power, 25–7.
32 Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations,’ and Meade, ‘America’s Sticky Power.’
33 Nye, Paradoxes of American Power, 8; Nye, Soft Power, 5.
34 Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations.’
35 Nye, Soft Power, 26.
36 Note, for instance, the goodwill generated by American civil-military functions abroad: education, political stabilization, provision of public goods. See, for example, Reveron, Exporting Security.
37 It is no coincidence that we have seen far more references to the ideas of soft and smart power from Obama administration personnel than we have from previous administrations. See Gallarotti, ‘Soft Power.’
38 Quoted from White House, National Security Strategy 2002 (Washington DC: Sept. 2002), 1 and White House, National Security Strategy 2006 (Washington DC: Sept. 2006), i.
39 Walt commented on the adverse state of world affairs before Bush took office. It is clear that they were worse with respect to US interests when he left office after eight years of employing extensive hard resources to improve them. Stephen M. Walt, ‘Musclebound: The Limits of US Power’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, (March/April 1999), 1–5, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ma99walt>.
40 Bush underscored the principal means of fighting terrorism in NSS (White House-NSS 2002, p. iv) as hard-power resources. ‘To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal – military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.’
41 Interestingly, even the military underscored the need for pacification strategies in Iraq. See ‘US Military Index,’ Foreign Policy (March/April 2008), 71–7.
42 The problems facing the US were compounded by indirect effects with respect to Israel. Pre-emptive operations by the US emboldened Israel to also act pre-emptively against erstwhile threats. Both Sheikh Yassin and Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Ranissi were assassinated in 2004, which in turn compounded the terrorist and Palestinian problems, and set back Bush’s Road Map for Peace in the Middle East. See Hall Gardner, American Global Strategy and the ‘War on Terrorism’ (Aldershot: Ashgate 2005), 149.
43 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2007), 132–46.
44 Ibid., 83.
45 We see path dependence effects in the evolution of the militia problem. While police functions were beefed up with the development of new Iraqi armed units, the prior existence of militias made them difficult to uproot. Hence, dealing with the militia problem was best done pre-emptively (before they came into existence).
46 Ibid., 150–77 and Fred Kaplan, Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 2008), 150, 151.
47 Gardner, American Global Strategy, 12 and Robert Jervis, ‘Understanding the Bush Doctrine,’ Political Science Quarterly 118 (Fall 2003), 365–88.
48 Robert Jervis, ‘Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained,’ Political Science Quarterly,’ 120 (Fall 2005), 351–77 and Richard K. Betts, ‘The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror,’ Political Science Quarterly 117 (2002), 19–36.
49 Richard Betts, ‘The Soft Underbelly’ and Steven Lambakis, James Kiras and Kristen Kolet, ‘Understanding ‘Asymmetric’ Threats to the United States’ (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy 2002). In terms of military strategies, terrorism comprises a fourth generation type of warfare, far removed from the earlier generations oriented around conventional operations. See Charles W. Kegley Jr and Gregory A. Raymond, After Iraq: The Imperiled American Imperium (New York: OUP 2007), 59.
50 The ‘Terrorism Index’, Foreign Policy (Sept./Oct. 2007), 60–67, suggests that policy experts envision a good many nations as being possibilities for future al Qaeda strongholds.
51 Jim Thomas, ‘Sustainable Security: Developing a Security Strategy for the Long Haul’, Center for a New American Security, 3–19 April 2008, <http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?1924> and Alexander T.J. Lennon (ed.), The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks (Cambridge: MIT Press 2003).
52 Betts, ‘The Soft Underbelly’ draws on Kissinger’s famous statement about the war against insurgency in South Vietnam: that the insurgents win simply by surviving.
53 The frustration effect emanates from the fact that primacy raises domestic perceptions of quick and decisive victory, but as this outcome is frustrated and the costs of carrying on the war mount, societies can quickly turn against the war, and hence hamstring the war effort. On the frustration effect and asymmetric warfare, see for example Lambakis et al., Understand Asymmetric Threats; Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of ‘Asymmetric’ Conflict (Cambridge: CUP 2005) and Martin Ewans, Conflict in Afghanistan: Studies in Asymmetric Warfare (London: Routledge 2005).
54 Betts, ‘The Soft Underbelly’ and Thomas, Sustainable Security.
55 Kegley and Raymond, After Iraq, 69.
56 In addition to the extremely poor results from the use of direct force against terrorism, Martha Crenshaw, ‘Coercive Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism,’ in Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (eds), The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press 2003), 305–58, notes that even coercive diplomacy has fared poorly in containing terrorism.
57 Kegley and Raymond, After Iraq; Thomas, ‘Sustainable Security’; ‘US Military Index’; Rob de Wijk, ‘The Limits of Military Power’, in Alexander T.J. Lennon (ed.), The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2003), 3–28 and Lambakis et al., Understanding ‘Asymmetric’ Threats. An extensive survey of military officers has revealed a belief that America’s campaigns against Iraq and Afghanistan have not only debilitated the US military conventionally, but have also served to undermine the development of more effective operations against terrorism (‘US Military Index’).
58 Jervis, ‘Why the Bush Doctrine’ and John Newhouse, ‘The Threats America Faces’, World Policy Journal 19 (Summer 2003), 21–37, underscore the difficulty of effective intelligence when acting unilaterally to solve the terrorist problem. It has become evident that the kind of information requirements to confront terrorism can never be delivered with the US acting independently of target states. Reliable information can only be consistently generated from indigenous sources, hence the need for cooperation.
59 Gardner, American Global Strategy, 80; Jervis, ‘Why the Bush Doctrine’; Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq; and Kaplan, Daydream Believers.
60 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone – The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: CUP 2004), 279–82 and Gardner, American Global Strategy, 3.
61 Lennon, The Battle for Hearts and Minds and de Wijk, ‘The Limits of Military Power,’ 20.
62 Kegley and Raymond, After Iraq, 102; Gardner, American Global Strategy, 12; and Robert Jervis, ‘The Compulsive Empire,’ Foreign Policy (July/Aug. 2003), 82–7. Jervis (p.86) argues that attempts to force disarmament will actually speed up proliferation. In fact, a Pew Survey, ‘Views of a Changing World 2003’ (Pew Research Center 2003), <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=185>, shows that a great many people in Muslim nations feared a US invasion at the time.
63 Gardner, American Global Strategy, 12 and Jervis, ‘The Compulsive Empire’; François Heisbourg, ‘A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences,’ in Alexander T.J. Lennon and Camille Eiss (eds), Reshaping Rogue States (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2004), 16 (of 3–18), refers to this process as ‘precautionary proliferation.’
64 The Six Party talks have proved valuable in addressing the Korean problem because of the involvement of China and because of the multilateral legitimacy it brings. It may in fact be the case that these talks carried greater potential than the Security Council, which has been turned toward a more confrontational direction on issues of WMD by the US.
65 Kim Jong Il became more sensitized to the utility of WMD against American threats by his growing perception that in fact Iraq was invaded because it had failed to build a nuclear device. Gardner, American Global Strategy, 153 and Kaplan, Daydream Believers, 74.
66 Gardner, American Global Strategy, 154 and Kaplan, Daydream Believers, 68–76.
67 The ‘Terrorism Index’ shows that policy experts envision numerous nations as possible sources of nuclear technology.
68 Response time to such attacks must be rapid in order to avoid extreme consequences, but many biological and chemical agents are not even detectable (Lambakis et al., ‘Understanding ‘Asymmetric’ Threats,’ 32).
69 Lambakis et al., ‘Understanding ‘Asymmetric’ Threats’ and Jason D. Ellis, ‘The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and US National Security,’ in Alexander T.J. Lennon and Camille Eiss (eds), Reshaping Rogue States (Cambridge: MIT Press 2004), 50–72.
70 The problem of WMD, as an asymmetric phenomenon, is manifest at the undercurrents of world politics (terrorist activities, concealed activities in so-called rogue states), hence effective intelligence is the very lynchpin determining the success of counter-WMD operations. Unilateral intelligence operations lack the effectiveness to derive dependable information on such activities. Indigenous sources of information are required for effective intelligence, and this requires cooperation from target and partner states. See Jervis, ‘Why the Bush Doctrine’ and Newhouse, ‘The Threats America Faces.’
71 Gardner, American Global Strategy, 160; Lambakis et al., ‘Understanding “Asymmetric” Threats’; Thomas, ‘Sustainable Security’; and John Newhouse, ‘The Threats America Faces.’
72 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 281.
73 Heisbourg, ‘A Work in Progress,’ 17 and Gu Guoliang, ‘Redefine Cooperative Security Not Preemption,’ in Alexander T.J. Lennon and Camille Eiss (eds), Reshaping Rogue States (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2004), 79–83.
74 Tony Smith, A Pact with the Devil (New York: Routledge 2007).
75 In this respect, the aggressive American crusade to spread democracy backfired also because it equated indigenous democratic movements with American interference.
76 Gardner, American Global Strategy, 164, 165; Kaplan, Daydream Believers, 62; Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 262; and Nye, ‘The Velvet Hegemon.’Indeed, the ‘Terrorism Index’ poll shows that only 3 per cent of respondents believe that Iraq will become a beacon of democracy among autocratic states. Moreover, 35 per cent of respondents believe that the war will actually discourage Arab dictators from promoting liberal reforms.
77 Interestingly, it is clear in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases that America is more intent on building pluralistic political regimes (with competing political interests) than democratic regimes per se (i.e., popular determination of the political regime). Indeed, democracy may produce outcomes that cut against US interests if radical groups (e.g., Hamas) win competitive elections. The difficulty here is that pluralistic systems work well where competition is channeled into political institutions. But in these fractured societies, in which competing groups have relied on violence, pluralism is a recipe for civil war. See Gardner, American Global Strategy, 164, 165, 189.
78 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton UP 1976).
79 Pew Survey, ‘Views of a Changing World’ and Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, ‘The True Clash of Civilizations,’ Foreign Policy (March/April 2003), 62–70.
80 Smith, A Pact with the Devil, 235.
81 There have been a number of empirical studies on the effectiveness of using force to promote liberal democratic regime change. The results across their tests strongly suggest that force consistently fails miserably in bringing about regime change. The studies are well summarized and documented in Kegley and Raymond, After Iraq, 117–19.
82 Smith, A Pact with the Devil, 235 and Alexander T.J. Lennon and Camille Eiss (eds), Reshaping Rogue States (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2004).
83 It is in this respect that analogies to the war-induced political transformation in Japan and German fail. The soft power foundations for such change were far more advanced in Germany and Japan, as compared with Iraq. The Nazi ideology was discredited while in Japan the Emperor supported reforms that had a long legacy in Japan already (from the Meji Restoration). Furthermore, both societies were highly structured and not ethnically or religiously fractured, and their military occupation was brief. In Iraq, however, the occupation has lasted and Western ideas have become targets rather than models for reform. Moreover, sectarian and ethnic divisions make a stable pluralistic political system tenuous at best. See Barry Rubin, ‘Lessons From Iran,’ in Alexander T.J. Lennon and Camille Eiss (eds), Reshaping Rogue States (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2004), 141–53.
84 Lennon and Eiss, Reshaping Rogue States and Ali M. Ansari, ‘Continuous Regime Change From Within,’ in Alexander T.J. Lennon and Camille Eiss (eds), Reshaping Rogue States (Cambridge: MIT Press 2004), 280 of 265–82.
85 Kegley and Raymond, After Iraq, 59 and Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2006), 185.
86 Pew Survey, ‘Views of a Changing World’ and Inglehart and Norris, ‘The True Clash of Civilizations.’
87 The economic need to deliver desirable outcomes (especially employment opportunities to the growing mass of educated young) in a globalized world has forced all modern regimes to make accommodations to political freedom and the market. Moreover, even the most autocratic regimes in the modern era have relied on an urban proletariat and bourgeoisie as important pillars of political support. See Ansari, ‘Continuous Regime Change,’
88 Jon Alterman, ‘Not in My Back Yard: Iraq’s Neighbors’ Interests,’ in Alexander T.J. Lennon and Camille Eiss (eds), Reshaping Rogue States (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2004), 357–71.
89 Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power and Gallarotti, The Power Curse.
90 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton UP 1997).
91 Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power and Gallarotti, The Power Curse.
92 On this point, see especially Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press 1966), 155.
93 Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power and Gallarotti, The Power Curse.
94 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton UP 1976).
95 Morton H. Halperin, and Pricilla A. Claap with Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 2006).
96 Jervis, Perception and Misperception.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power and Gallarotti, The Power Curse.
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Giulio M. Gallarotti
Giulio M. Gallarotti is Professor of Government and Tutor in the College of Social Studies at Wesleyan University. He has also been a Visiting Professor in the Department of Economic Theory at the University of Rome. He is the author of The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime: The Classical Gold Standard 1880–1914 (New York: Oxford University Press 1995), The Power Curse: Influence and Illusion in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2010), and Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism (New York: Cambridge University Press 2010). In addition, he has published numerous articles in leading journals across five disciplines: economics, politics, law, history, and business.