The Reluctant Peacekeeper: France and the Use of Force in Peace Operations

Abstract

The French doctrine towards peace operations has, over the last two decades, reflected the ambivalence of France’s position, stretched between on the one hand a military culture that places the use of force at the centre of strategy and on the other hand multidimensional operations that by their nature integrate a large range of activities. As a consequence France has evolved as a ‘reluctant peacekeeper’: while it has been significantly involved in peace operations since the end of the Cold War, the military has never felt comfortable with the peacekeeping concept, seen as a dilution of their primary function of fighting wars. This tension has shaped both doctrinal development and operations. Twenty years after the French engagement in former Yugoslavia, lessons have been learnt, and policy-makers have become aware of the evolution of conflict management and the subsequent necessity to integrate the military dimension into a broader framework. Yet France’s policy is still shaped by a certain aversion towards the concept of long-term multinational peace operations, and a parallel preference for more focused and reactive operations. The merits of the use of force are central to these debates. While these policy preferences are responses to legitimate concerns about both the efficiency of foreign interventions and the soldier’s identity, they also raise questions as to their compatibility with the long term and multidimensional requirements of bringing sustainable peace in fragile states.

Key Words:

• France
• Peace Operations
• Use of Force
• United Nations

Notes

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, De la guerre (Paris: Perrin 1999), 31.

² See Dag Hammarskjöld, United Nations Emergency Force: Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force, Report of the Secretary-General, A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, paras. 154–93; and Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egee, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future (London: Yale UP 1974).

³ See Alan Doss’s article in this issue - Alan Doss, ‘In the Footsteps of Dr Bunche: The Congo, UN Peacekeeping and the Use of Force’, Journal of Strategic Studies, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.908284>; see also Doss, ‘Great Expectations: UN Peacekeeping, Protection and the Use of Force’, Geneva Paper – Research Series No.4, GCSP, Geneva, Dec. 2011.

⁴ See ‘Galliéni à Madagascar et Lyautey au Maroc, deux œuvres de “pacification” complémentaires’, Cahier de la recherche doctrinale, French Ministry of Defence, Paris, June 2011. The document talks about the ‘continuity of problems and the relevance of responses’, 5.

⁵ See ‘Doctrine d’emploi des forces terrestres en stabilisation’, Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, French Ministry of Defence, Paris, 2006, 3–4.

⁶ See Marshal Lyautey, Le rôle social de l’officier [1891] (Paris: Bartillat 2003)

⁷ See Pascal Vennesson, ‘Force armée et politique étrangère: soldats et diplomates aujourd’hui’, in Frédéric Charillon (ed.), Politique étrangère: Nouveaux regards (Paris: Presses de Science Po 2002), 311–12.

⁸ See Thierry Tardy, ‘France’, in Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (eds), Providing Peacekeepers: the Politics, Challenges and Future of UN Peacekeeping Contributions (Oxford: OUP 2013).

⁹ See Rachel Utley, The French Defence Debate: Consensus and Continuity in the Mitterrand Era (London: Macmillan Press 2000), 187.

¹⁰ See Trevor Findlay (ed.), ‘Challenges for the New Peacekeepers’, SIPRI Research Report No. 12 (Oxford: OUP 1996), 153–4; and Joseph P. Grégoire, The Bases of French Peace Operations Doctrine: Problematical Scope of France’s Military Engagements within the UN or NATO Framework (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Sept. 2002).

¹¹ On the ambiguity of the French position in the early 1990s, see Rachel Utley, ‘A Means to Wider Ends? France, Germany and Peacekeeping’, in Rachel Utley (ed.), Major Powers and Peacekeeping. Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention (Aldershot: Ashgate 2006), 63–7.

¹² Within NATO, the first document defining peace operations was issued by the Military Committee in 1993 (NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations, MC-327, Aug. 1993), but was only adopted by the North Atlantic Council in 1995. In the United States, the Field Manual on Peace Operations was released in December 1994, a few months after the release of the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), ‘Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations’, US Department of State, Washington DC, May 1994.

¹³ Pierre Hassner, ‘On ne badine pas avec la force’, in Pierre Hassner (ed.), La terreur et l’Empire: La violence et la paix II (Paris: Seuil 2003).

¹⁴ Kofi Annan, The Fall of Srebrenica, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35, 15 Nov. 1999, para. 482.

¹⁵ Ibid., para. 505.

¹⁶ ‘Srebrenica: rapport sur un massacre’, Vol. 1 – Report and Annexes, Joint Information Mission, French National Assembly, report No. 3413 (2001), 62.

¹⁷ Internal Note, Delegation of Strategic Affairs, French Ministry of Defence, 5 Sept. 1994, quoted in ‘Srebrenica: rapport sur un massacre’, Vol. 1 – Report and Annexes, Joint Information Mission, French National Assembly, report No. 3413 (2001), 76.

¹⁸ Testimony of François Léotard, ‘Srebrenica: rapport sur un massacre’, Vol. 2 – Hearings, Joint Information Mission, French National Assembly, report No. 3413 (2001), 260.

¹⁹ French White Paper on Defence and National Security, Direction de l’information légale et administrative (Paris 2013), 31.

²⁰ The Joint Concept on the Employment of Armed Force defines five principles of military action: freedom of action, concentration of effort, economy of resources, surprise, controlled use of force; see Joint Concept on the Employment of Armed Force, Centre Interarmées de Concepts, de Doctrines et d’Expérimentations, French Ministry of Defence, Jan. 2010, 28–30.

²¹ See hearings by Generals Cot, Morillon, or De La Presle before the Parliamentary Mission (‘Srebrenica: rapport sur un massacre’, Vol. 2 – Hearings, Joint Information Mission, French National Assembly, report No. 3413, 2001). See also ‘Enseignements Tactiques. Les opérations terrestres de l’armée de terre des années 90 – Témoignages’, Cahier de la réflexion doctrinale, Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, French Ministry of Defence, Paris, 2005, 37–8.

²² See Sten Rynning, ‘French Military Doctrine in the 1990s’, in Sten Rynning, Changing Military Doctrine: Presidents and Military Power in Fifth Republic France, 1958–2000 (Westport, CT: Praeger 2001), 39–40.

²³ French Government, White Paper on Defence (Paris: 10/18 1994), 115.

²⁴ Ibid., 76.

²⁵ ‘Orientations pour la conception, la préparation, la planification, le commandement et l’emploi des forces françaises dans les opérations militaires fondées sur une résolution du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU’, French Chief of Staff, Ministry of Defence, Paris, March 1995.

²⁶ See also ‘Aide-memoire’ established in response to the UN Secretary-General’s Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, Letter dated 18 Jan. 1996 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, A/50/869-S/1996/71, United Nations, 30 Jan. 1996.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ See Charles Dobbie, ‘A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping’, Survival 36/3 (1994), 122–3.

³⁰ Letter dated 18 Jan. 1996 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, A/50/869-S/1996/71, United Nations, 30 Jan. 1996, 2.

³¹ ‘Rapport d’information sur les opérations militaires menées par la France, d’autres pays et l’ONU au Rwanda entre 1990 et 1994’, French National Assembly, No. 1271, Paris 1998.

³² See French White Paper on Defence and National Security, Direction de l’information légale et administrative, Paris, 2013, 81.

³³ Alain Juppé and Louis Schweitzer, ‘La France et l’Europe dans le monde’, White Paper on France’s Foreign and European Policy – 2008–2020 (2008), 20.

³⁴ ‘Winning the Battle. Building Peace. Land forces in Present and Future Conflicts’, FT-01, Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, Jan. 2007, 5.

³⁵ Ibid., 20.

³⁶ See ‘Counter-Insurgency’, Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations (CICDE), No.253/DEF/CICDE/NP, Joint Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, 5 Nov. 2010.

³⁷ ‘Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces’, Joint Concept JC-01, Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation (CICDE), Joint Headquarters, Paris, 2010, 17.

³⁸ Ibid., 32.

³⁹ White Paper on National Defence and Security (Paris: Odile Jacob 2008), 129–30.

⁴⁰ White Paper, 2013, 81.

⁴¹ ‘Capstone Concept of Military Operations’, CICDE, Joint Headquarters, Paris, 2013, 14.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ ‘Comprehensive Approach to External Crisis Management (Military Contribution)’, Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation (CICDE), Joint Headquarters, Paris, 2011, 23.

⁴⁴ ‘Winning the Battle’, 10–13. See also ‘Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces Terrestres en Stabilisation’, Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, French Ministry of Defence, Paris, 2006, 3–5.

⁴⁵ ‘Winning the Battle’, 10.

⁴⁶ White Paper, 2008, 130.

⁴⁷ White Paper, 2013, 82.

⁴⁸ Following the reinforcement of UNIFIL in Aug. 2006, the French contribution was increased from 400 to 1,500 troops in Sept. 2006.

⁴⁹ See UN Security Council Resolution 1701, 11 Aug. 2006.

⁵⁰ See Alain Pellégrini, Un été de feu au Liban 2006, les coulisses d’un conflit annoncé (Paris: Economica 2010), 131–4.

⁵¹ The French-led (and UN-mandated) Operation ‘Licorne’ was deployed to help stabilize the country following the signature of the Linas–Marcoussis Agreement and to protect French citizens in Côte d’Ivoire.

⁵² As of 30 September 2011, the top ten troop and police contributors to UN operations were: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Nepal, Ethiopia, Egypt, Jordan, Rwanda, and Ghana; see <www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/sept11_2.pdf>.

⁵³ Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations (Washington DC: Stimson Center 2006), 106.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 123.

⁵⁵ See ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’ (so-called ‘Capstone Doctrine’), DPKO/DFS, United Nations, New York, 2008; and ‘A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping’, DPKO/DFS, United Nations, New York, 2009.

⁵⁶ See Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Knopf 2007). Also see on this distinction Mats Berdal, ‘Lessons Not Learned: The Use of Force in “Peace Operations” in the 1990s’, in Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram (eds), Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21^st Century(London: Routledge 2001), 55–74.

⁵⁷ The Joint Defence College had been created in 1993.

⁵⁸ Speech by Admiral Guillaud at the Collège interarmées de Défense, Paris, 15 Sept. 2010.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Thierry Tardy

Thierry Tardy is Senior Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris. He has researched and published on conflict management with a particular focus on the United Nations and the European Union, inter-institutional cooperation in security governance, security regionalism, and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. He is currently co-editing the Oxford Handbook on UN Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford: OUP).