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ABSTRACT
This article seeks to make sense of North Korean provocations in light of the Sino-US strategic competition in post-Cold War East Asia, where such variables as China’s rise, US’s pivot to Asia, and growing Sino-ROK economic ties are driving the strategic choices of major states in the region. The article examines the main motivations behind Pyongyang’s provocations since the end of the Cold War, discusses their implications for the Sino-US strategic competition in East Asia, and offers predictions about the future of North Korean provocations. The central thesis of the article is that Pyongyang has exploited the Sino-US strategic competition in East Asia for its regime survival. By raising North Korea’s strategic value to China, the intensifying Sino-US competition allows Pyongyang to continue provocations, regardless of Beijing’s explicit opposition.
Notes
1 Christopher Layne, ‘China’s Challenge to US Hegemony’, Current History 107/705 (2008), 13–18.
2 See, for example, Paul French, North Korea: the Paranoid Peninsula (London: Zed Books 2005); Chung Min Lee, ‘Nuclear Sisyphus: the Myth of Denuclearising North Korea’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 61/1 (2007), 15–22; Dingli Shen, ‘Cooperative Denuclearization toward North Korea’, Washington Quarterly 32/4 (2009), 175–88.
3 Denny Roy, ‘North Korea and the ‘Madman’ Theory’, Security Dialogue 25/3 (1994), 307–16.
4 See Dong Sun Lee, ‘Causes of North Korean Belligerence’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 66/2 (2012), 103–20.
5 Victor D. Cha, ‘What Do They Really Want? Obama’s North Korea Conundrum’, Washington Quarterly 32/4 (2009), 119–38; Mun Suk Ahn, ‘What is the Root Cause of the North Korean Nuclear Program?’, Asian Affairs: An American Review 38 (2011), 175–87.
6 Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998); Michael Mazarr, ‘The Long Road to Pyongyang’, Foreign Affairs 86/5 (2007), 75–94; Simon Shen, ‘Have Nuclear Weapons Made the DPRK a Rogue State? Studying the Korean Peninsula Crisis from the Waltzian Theory’, Journal of Comparative Asian Development 10/2 (2011), 199–222.
7 Denny Roy, ‘Parsing Pyongyang’s Strategy’, Survival 52/1 (2010), 111–36 at 114.
8 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton 2001), at 400–1.
9 Layne, ‘China’s Challenge to US Hegemony’, 13.
10 Mark Beeson, ‘Hegemonic Transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power’, Review of International Studies 35 (2009), 95–112, at 100.
11 Joseph M. Grieco, ‘China and America in the World Polity’, in Carolyn W. Pumphrey, The Rise of China in Asia (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute 2002), 24–48, at 24.
12 Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs 90/2 (March/April 2011), 54–67.
13 Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster: the Rise of China and US Policy toward East Asia’, International Security 31/1 (2006), 81–126, at 108.
14 For the discussion of China’s military modernization and American responses to it, see Sean Mirski, ‘Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/3 (June 2013), 385–421. As for China’s nuclear modernization and its implications for Sino-U.S. security relations, see Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (Aug. 2012), 447–87.
15 Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2007).
16 Christensen, ‘Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster’, 98.
17 However, China’s leadership here is weak as Beijing’s main focus has thus far been on hosting the Six-Party Talks and encouraging dialogues rather than actively suggesting a breakthrough.
18 Bonnie S. Glaser, ‘Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences’, CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012, <http://csis.org/publication/pivot-asia-prepare-unintended-consequences>.
19 China’s ADIZ covers most of the East China Sea, including the Japanese controlled Senkaku Islands (the Daioyu Islands in Chinese) and the South Korean-claimed Ieodo (also known as Socotra Rock). Threatening to use its military to enforce the ADIZ, Beijing demanded that foreign aircrafts in the zone report their flight plan to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Civil Aviation Administration. The US position is to ignore the Chinese ADIZ for its military operations in the region. Hence, when Obama traveled from South Korea to Malaysia on 26 April 2014, the US Air Force One disrespected the Chinese ADIZ and flew through it, dispatching two B-52 bombers. See Mark Landler, ‘On a trip that avoids Beijing, Obama keeps his eye on China’, New York Times, 26 April 2014, <www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/world/asia/on-a-trip-that-avoids-beijing-obamas-eye-remains-on-china.html>.
20 Layne, ‘China’s Challenge to US Hegemony’, 18.
21 Moreover, during his trip to four East Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines) in April 2014, which was often portrayed as a ‘containment tour’ as it excluded China, President Obama made it clear that the US would protect Japan in the event of a confrontation with China over the Senkaku Islands. See Landler, ‘On a Trip That Avoids Beijing, Obama Keeps His Eye on China.’ In addition, the US and the Philippines agreed on a new 10-year defense pact that will allow increased presence of US troops in the Philippines, which is ‘a significant step in the Obama administration’s pivot toward Asia.’ See Thomas Maresca, ‘Obama Visits Philippines: US Announces Defense Pact’, USA TODAY, 27 April 2014, <www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/04/27/us-philippines-defense-pact/8299491/>.
22 Glaser, ‘Pivot to Asia’, 22.
23 The 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance obliges China to defend North Korea against an aggression by a third party. Despite some doubts about its effectiveness –see, for example, Jaewoo Choo, ‘Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependence on China: Political Ramifications’, Asian Survey 48/2 (2008), 343—72 –it has not been abolished and still defines military cooperation between the two states.
24 Since the launch of the Nye Initiative in 1994, Washington has encouraged Japan to take on greater responsibilities in its bilateral security alliance with the US. See Christensen, ‘Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster’, 88. In the same vein, during his visit to Japan in April 2014, Obama agreed to revise the US-Japan defense cooperation guidelines by the end of 2014 and even gave support to the Abe administration’s move toward exercising the right to collective self-defense. See ‘Obama backs Abe’s push for collective self-defense,’ Kyodo International News, 24 April 2014, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/140424/obama-backs-abes-push-collective-self-defense>.
25 People’s Daily, 9 Oct. 2006.
26 Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, ‘China-North Korea Relations’, Congressional Research Service Report, 7-5700 (2010), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41043.pdf>.
27 Jayshree Bajoria and Beina Xu, ‘The China-North Korea Relationship’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097>.
28 Keith Bradsher and Nick Cumming-Bruce, ‘China cuts ties with key North Korean bank’, New York Times, 7 May 2013, </www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/world/asia/china-cuts-ties-with-north-korean-bank.html?_r=0>.
29 Jane Perlez, ‘China bluntly tells North Korea to enter nuclear talks’, New Times, 24 May 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/05/25/world/asia/china-tells-north-korea-to-return-to-nuclear-talks.html>.
30 You Ji, ‘China and North Korea: a Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience’, Journal of Contemporary China 10/28 (2001), 387–98, at 396.
31 Perlez, ‘China bluntly tells North Korea to enter nuclear talks.’
32 Barack Obama, ‘Renewing American leadership’, Foreign Affairs 86/4 (2007), 2–16, at 7–11.
33 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, ‘North Korea: US Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation’, Congressional Research Service Report, 7-5700, 15 Jan. 2014, < /www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf>.
34 Nanto and Manyin, ‘China-North Korea Relations’, 1.
35 John Delury, ‘Triple-pronged Engagement: China’s Approach to North Korea’, American Foreign Policy Interests 34 (2012), 69–73, at 73.
36 Heungkyu Kim, ‘From a Buffer Zone to a Strategic Burden: Evolving Sino-North Korea Relations during the Hu Jintao Era’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 22/1 (2010), 57–74 at 58.
37 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea’, International Security 35/1 (2010), 44–74, at 72–3.
38 Sang-hun Choe, ‘North Korea vows to keep nuclear arms and fix economy’, New York Times, 31 March 2013, < www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/world/asia/north-korea-vows-to-keep-nuclear-arms-and-fix-economy.html?_r=0>.
39 Rajarm Panda, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Policy: Domestic Determinants, Strategy and Future’, Journal of Comparative Asian Development 10/2 (2011), 223–52, at 232.
40 Nanto and Manyin, ‘China-North Korea Relations’, 2.
41 Victor D. Cha and Nicholas D. Anderson, ‘A North Korean Spring?’, Washington Quarterly 35/1 (2012), 7–24, at 17.
42 Jae Ho Chung and Myung-hae Choi, ‘Uncertain Allies or Uncomfortable Neighbors? Making Sense of China-North Korea Relations, 1949–2010’, Pacific Review 26/3 (2013), 243–64.
43 Panda, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Policy’, 239.
44 Chung and Choi, ‘Uncertain Allies or Uncomfortable Neighbors?’
45 Kim, ‘From a Buffer Zone to a Strategic Burden’, 65.
46 See, for example, Joel S. Wit, ‘Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea’, Washington Quarterly 30/2 (2007), 53–69; Mazarr, ‘The Long Road to Pyongyang’.
47 Victor D. Cha, ‘What Do They Really Want? Obama’s North Korea Conundrum’, Washington Quarterly 32/4 (2009), 119–38, at 123.
48 Andrew Scobell, ‘North Korea End-game or Mid-game? Some Scenarios and Their Implications for US-China Relations’, Journal of Contemporary China 16/51 (2007), 315–23, at 319.
49 Kim, ‘From a Buffer Zone to a Strategic Burden’, 64.
50 Robert O. Keohane, ‘Big Influence of Small Allies’, Foreign Policy 2 (1971), 161–82.
51 Yonhap News Agency, 23 Dec. 2013.
52 The Chosun Ilbo, 16 March 2014.
53 Russell Ong, ‘North Korea’s Enduring Importance to China’s Security Interest in the post-Cold War Era’, Asian Journal of Political Science 8/1 (2000), 47–64, at 58.
54 Byman and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy’, 63.
55 China Daily, 5 March 2014.
56 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (2014), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf>.
57 See ‘DOD Official: Quadrennial Review’s Focus is Homeland Security’, <www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121793>.
58 Jane Perlez, ‘China says it won’t forsake North Korea, despite support for UN sanctions’, New York Times, 9 March 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/asia/china-says-it-will-not-abandon-north-korea.html>.
59 Yonhap News Agency, 10 Feb. 2014.
60 Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart, ‘North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation’, 3–9.
61 The White House, The National Security Strategy, Sept. 2002, <georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>.
62 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (2010), <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.
63 See, for example, Narushige Michishita, ‘Playing the Same Game: North Korea’s Coercive Attempt at US Reconciliation’, Washington Quarterly 32/4 (2009), 139–52.
64 Nonetheless, Washington’s policy of ‘strategic patience’ with North Korea has been grounded on the opposite assumption. See David E. Sanger, ‘US confronts consequences of underestimating North Korean leader’, New York Times, 24 April 2014, < www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/world/asia/wrong-guesses-about-north-korea-leave-us-struggling-to-adjust.html>.
65 Cha and Anderson, ‘A North Korean Spring?’, 17.
66 Nanto and Manyin, ‘China-North Korea Relations’, 11.
67 Choe, ‘North Korea vows to keep nuclear arms and fix economy’.
68 Cha, ‘What Do They Really Want?’, at 126.
69 Dong Sun Lee, ‘Causes of North Korean belligerence’, Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs 66/2 (2012), 103–20, at 107.
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Min-hyung Kim
Min-hyung Kim is associate professor of political science at Illinois Wesleyan University in Bloomington, Illinois, USA. He received his PhD from the University of Washington. His research interests include international relations theory, East Asian security, East Asian regionalism, international political economy, and European integration. He has published, among others, in International Political Science Review, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Pacific Focus, Asian Perspective, Journal of European Public Policy, and Journal of European Integration. He was a Jean Monnet Fellow (2009–2010) in the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy.