‘Second-Class’: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces

Abstract

The defection of a significant number of Sunni officers amidst the ongoing turmoil in Syria created a unique opportunity to get access to original data on the Syrian armed forces. This study draws on extensive fieldwork to probe the sectarian question in the Syrian officer corps. On the basis of a series of interviews conducted throughout the summer of 2014, I investigate the politics and consequences of sectarian stacking in the Syrian military as well as the root causes of Sunni officers’ grievances and alienation. My conclusions draw on an original database that compiles the sectarian affiliations of 81 prominent officers who occupied the most senior military positions under Bashar al-Asad.

Key Words:

• Arab Spring
• Syrian Military
• Sunni Officers
• Grievances
• Sectarian Stacking
• Defection

Annex

Table 1. Ministers of Defense and Chiefs of Staff of the Syrian Armed Forces under Bashar al-Asad by Sectarian Affiliation⁵⁹

Table 2. Commanders of The Syrian Armed Forces on the Eve of the 2011 Uprising by Sectarian Affiliation⁶⁰

Table 3. Directors of Syrian Intelligence Agencies in Charge of Controlling the Armed Forces under Bashar al-Asad by Sectarian Affiliation⁶¹

Table 4. Commanders of the Republican Guard and the Fourth Armored Division under Bashar al-Asad, by Sectarian Affiliation⁶²

Table 5. Commanders of the Special Forces and the Airborne Special Forces under Bashar al-Asad by Sectarian Affiliation⁶³

Table 6. Commanders of the Air Force and the Air Defense under Bashar al-Asad by Sectarian Affiliation⁶⁴

Table 7. Subcommanders of the Special Forces on the Eve of the 2011 Uprising by Sectarian Affiliation⁶⁵

Table 8. Subcommanders of the Airborne Special Forces on the Eve of the 2011 Uprising by Sectarian Affiliation⁶⁶

Notes

¹ See Risa Brooks, “Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the Ben ʿAli Regime in January 2011”, Journal of Strategic Studies 36 (April 2013), 205–20; Hillel Frisch, ‘The Egyptian Army and Egypt’s ‘‘Spring’”, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/2 (April 2013), 180–204”; Florence Gaub ‘The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-Proofing and Repression’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/2 (2013), 221–44; Hicham Bou Nassif, ‘Generals and Autocrats: How Coup-Proofing Pre-determined the Military Elite’s Behavior in the Arab Spring’, Political Science Quarterly 130/2 (2015), 245–75; Joshua Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria (Redwood City, CA: Stanford UP 2012); Hazem Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt’s Road to Revolt (London: Verso, 2012); Yezid Sayigh, ‘Agencies of Coercion: Armies and Internal Security Forces’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 43 (2011), 403–5; Zoltan Barany, ‘Comparing Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military”, Journal of Democracy 22 (2011), 28–39; Holger Albrecht, and Dina Bishara, ‘Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt’, Middle East Law and Governance, 3 (2011), 13–23.

² An exception is Yezid Sayigh, Above the State: The Officers’ Republic in Egypt (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Aug. 2012), 1–38.

³ Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria. Politics and Society Under Asad and The Ba’th Party (New York: I.B.Tauris 1996).

⁴ Hanna Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables and Their Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1999), 215–26.

⁵ Eyal Zisser, ‘The Syrian Army Between the Domestic and External Fronts’, The Middle East Review for International Affairs 5/1 (March 2001), accessed on 7 June 2014 at: <www.gloria-center.org/2001/03/zisser-2001-03-01>; James T. Quinlivan, ‘Coup Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East’, International Security 24/2 (Autumn 1999), 131–65; Michael Eisenstaedt, ‘Syria’s defense companies: Profile of a Praetorian Unit’, unpublished paper, 1989. See also N.E.Bou-Nacklie, “Les Troupes Speciales: Religious and Ethnic Recruitment, 1916–46”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 25/4 (Nov. 1993), 645–60; Patrick Seale, Asad. The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkley: Univ.of California Press, 1988); Alasdair Drysdale, ‘Ethnicity in the Syrian Officer Corps’, Civilizations 29/. 3/4 (1979), 359–74; Itamar Rabinovitch, Syria Under the Baʿath 1963–1966. The Army-Party Symbiosis (Jerusalem: Israel UP. 1972); and Gordon Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military. 1945–1958 (Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1964).

⁶ See Philip Roessler, ‘The Enemy Within. Personal Rule, Coups and Civil War in Africa’”, World Politics 63/2 (April 2011), 300– 46; Theodore McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategy and Military Defection in Rebellion”, Comparative Politics 42/3 (April 2010),333–50); Quinlivan, Ibid; Donald Horowitz. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press1985); Cynthia H Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers, State Security in Divided Societies (Athens: the Univ. of Georgia Press. 1980).

⁷ McLauchlin, Ibid., 339.

⁸ Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1979); Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers In Politics. Military Coups And Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1977); Roman Kolkowitz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton UP 1967).

⁹ Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style (New Haven, CT: Yale UP1976).

¹⁰ William Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications 1973).

¹¹ Interview with retired Brigadier Mohammad Shamel (army), 7 May, 2014. Antakya, Turkey.

¹² Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmad Hakim (Asad Academy for Military Engineering), 8 May, 2014, Antakya, Turkey.

¹³ This figure was given to me by all of my interviewees; I asked each of them about the sectarian distribution in his cohort.

¹⁴ The other departments include the schools of administration; military technology; electronic warfare; mining engineering; air defense; military transportation; armament; and signal corps.

¹⁵ Interview with Second-Lieutenant Mamoun Nassar (Signal Corps), 12 May 2014, Antakya, Turkey

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ The 4th Armored Division has gained a fearsome reputation in the ongoing conflict in Syria as the spearhead of the regime’s repressive machine. The Division was known as unit 562 in the 1970s. The name was later changed into the Defense Companies (Saraya al-Difaʿ) when Rifʿat al-Asad, Hafiz al-Asad’s brother, led it the 1980s. After Rifaʿat fall from grace in 1984 the name was changed again during the 1990s into the 4th Armored Division. I owe these information to retired Brigadier Mohammad Shamel. Ibid.

¹⁸ Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Yasser Nasser (Asad Academy for Military Engineering), 13 June, 2014, Antakya, Turkey.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Interview with Captain Hussam Sabbagh (Air Force), 11 May 2014, Antakya, Turkey.

²² Mahir al-Asad is the younger brother of Bashar al-Asad.

²³ Interview with Captain Hussam Sabbagh, ibid.

²⁴ Mahir al-Asad is the younger brother of Bashar al-Asad.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Interview with Major Mahmoud Abboud (Asad Academy for Military Engineering), 15 May 2014. Antakya, Turkey.

²⁸ Interview with Second-Lieutenant Mamoun Nassar, ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ The informal network of Alawi military barons surrounding Bashar al-Asad, whose members are blamed for the increased sectarian bias against Sunni officers in the Syrian armed forces, includes: Mahir al-Asad (4th^h Armored Division); Asef Shawkat (Deputy Minister of Defense until his death in 2012); General ʿAdli Habib (Special Forces); Major-General ʿIzz al-Din Ismael (Air Force Intelligence); Major-General Jamil Hassan (Air Force Intelligence); Major-General Rafiq Shehade, (Military Security); Major-General Hisham Ikhtiyar, (National Security Bureau); Brigadier Zoul al-Himma Shalish (General Intelligence). Interview with a Colonel in the Special Forces who wished to remain anonymous. 26 May 2014, Antakya, Turkey.

³² Interview with Brigadier-General Yahiya Hajal (Air Force). 6 June 2014, Antakya, Turkey.

³³ Interview with Colonel in the army who did not wish to be named, 7 May 2014, Al Rihanle, Turkey.

³⁴ Interview with Major ʿIssam Kallas (Air Defense),. 14 May 2014, Antakya, Turkey.

³⁵ ‘Go visit the Alawi hinterland and you will find castles built all over the place in Kafroun, Beit Yashout, Kadmous, and other towns. In very Alawi village you will find fancy villas built on the best plots of land available. Ask about the owners and you will hear the names of officers from the Shalish, Makhlouf, Ismael, Douba and Haidar clans. How did these officers get the money to build these castles? Even a General in the Syrian armed forces does not make more than 800 dollars per month. They make the money, and we get the deficient equipment’. Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmad Hakim, ibid.

³⁶ Interview with Major Iyad Jabra (Air Defense), 7 May 2014, Al Rihanle, Turkey.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Interview with Major ʿIssam Kallas, Ibid.

⁴⁰ Interview with Major Mahmoud Abboud,. ibid.

⁴¹ Interview with a Brigadier from the Air Force who did not wish to reveal his name, 28 May 2014, Al Rihanle, Turkey.

⁴² Interview with Major Iyad Jabra, ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Interview with Brigadier Yahiya Hajal, ibid.

⁴⁵ Interview with Colonel Maher Nawwar (Air Force), 15 May 2014, Antakya, Turkey.

⁴⁶ Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmad Abboud, ibid.

⁴⁷ See James Quinlivan, ibid.

⁴⁸ See Hazem Saghieh, Al-Baʿath al-Souri. Tarikh Moujaz (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi 2011); and Sobhi Hadidi, “Halakat al-Asad al-Amniya, Hatmyat al-Tafakouk… Baʿd Ikhtibar al-Nar”, Jadaliya, 31 July 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2280/%D8%B5%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%8A.

⁴⁹ In the words of one of my interviewees: ‘Until 1963, the Syrian armed forces were a national institution. The Ba’athi coup that year transformed the military into a party militia. Asad’s so-called “corrective movement” in 1970 then changed the militia into family business’. Interview with a Brigadier (army) who did not wish to be named, 28 June 2014,. Antakya, Turkey.

⁵⁰ Interview with Second-Lieutenant Mamoun Nassar.Ibid.

⁵¹ Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmed Abdel-Qader (Asad Academy for Military Engineering). 8 May, 2014. Antakya, Turkey.

⁵² Interview with Major Iyad Shamsy (Air Defense). Al Rihanle, Turkey, 7 May 2014.

⁵³ Interview with Colonel Maher Nawwar, ibid.

⁵⁴ Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Yasser Nasser, ibid.

⁵⁵ Interview with Captain Issam Kallas, ibid.

⁵⁶ The other two main intelligence agencies in Syria are the General Intelligence (al-Moukhabarat al-ʿAmma), and the Political Security (al-Amn al-Siassi). Both handle non-military intelligence; the latter also is in charge of the Syrian Police.

⁵⁷ Security Officers answer to regional intelligence headquarters, which report in turn to central directorates in Damascus.

⁵⁸ Interview with Captain Hussam Sabbagh, Ibid.

⁵⁹ I asked every one of my interviewees to help me collect the data in tables 1 to 8. Particularly helpful in that regard was Colonel ʿAbdel ʿAziz Kanʿan to whom I owe a debt of gratitude. Lieutenant-Colonel Yasser Jaber, Brigadier-General Mohammad Shahima, Lieutenant-Colonel Nasha’at Haj Ahmad, and two other Brigadier-Generals who did not wish to be named also helped me collect data that appear in tables 1 to 8, and asked their colleagues to do the same. Note that the place of origin is the fundamental identity-related marker that officers’ use to identify each other’s sectarian affiliation. Officers hailing from, say, al-Rastan, are likely to be Sunnis; their colleagues from Latakia likely to be Alawis, whereas officers from Suweida, or the “Valley of the Christians” region, likely to be Druze and Christians respectively. Names also matter: An officer called “Georges” or “Elias” is clearly Christian, whereas “Omar” is Sunni, and “Ali” or “Hussein” likely to be Alawi. Family names are an additional indicator: A “Makhlouf” is Alawi whereas a “Qabbani” can only be Sunni. For officers to identity each other’s’ sectarian affiliation is a relatively easy task.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.