Impediments to Fighting the Islamic State: Private Contractors and US Strategy

ABSTRACT

The United States has returned to Iraq, this time to combat the Islamic State. President Barack Obama’s strategy to ‘degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist group’ faces serious problems due to political obstacles in obtaining Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) and more importantly because of neglect of the crucial role of private contractors. Although the narrative has changed, and there is no public mention of contractors, they remain central to all that the Department of Defense does in the US and abroad. Suggestions are offered on how their performance can be improved to support President Obama’s strategy.

KEYWORDS:

• Strategy. Islamic State
• Private Contractors
• Inherently Governmental Functions
• Contracting Officers
• Incentives

Notes

¹ I wrote a book on contracting out using official US government sources and interviews I personally conducted with 40 key actors in the government and contractors during six week-long research trips to Washington DC. I undertook this onerous task as I found that most books on the topic of contracting out were based on sources of dubious accuracy, and many of the authors did not seem to realize that contracting out is not only legal but strongly encouraged in US law and policy. In writing this paper I have again turned to official sources, including government - sponsored websites listing solicitations for contracts. I have also drawn heavily on my contacts that include current and retired US government civilians and officers, contracting officers, instructors in contracting, and lawyers who have defended the largest firms in the industry. Then too, following a long academic career, the last three decades of which were in the Department of Defense where I often employed contractors, I established my own contracting firm and now bid on solicitations from the Department of Defense and other government agencies. The opinions expressed here are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Navy or Department of Defense.

² ‘Obama on ISIS in Syria: “We don’t have a strategy yet”’ Available at <www.cnn.com/2014/08/28/world/meast/isis-iraq-syria/>.

³ Available at www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we-will-degrade-and-ultimately-destroy-isil.

⁴ J. Dana Stuster and Bill French, Confronting the Islamic State: An Assessment of US Strategic Options (Washington DC: National Security Network Feb. 2015) available at <www.nsnetwork.org>, 4.

⁵ CSIS, Commentary, 13 Feb. 2015; available at <http://csis.org> See also the frequent commentary at the Institute for the Study of War at <www.understandingwar.org/>.

⁶ Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘Strategic Theory’ in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin Grey (eds.), Strategy in the Contemporary World, 3rd ed. (Oxford: OUP 2010), 80.

⁷ Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: CUP 2013), 12.

⁸ Mahnken, ‘Strategic Theory’, 69.

⁹ Mahnken, ‘Strategic Theory’, 71.

¹⁰ Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo, Strategic Studies: A Reader (London: Routledge 2008), 1–2.

¹¹ Strachan, The Direction of War, 27.

¹² Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York:. Knopf 2014), 144.

¹³ See Richard F. Grimmett, ‘War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance,’ Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 23 Sept. 2009.

¹⁴ On the use of military force by the US, see Barbara Salazar Torreon, ‘Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2015’, CRS Report for Congress 15 Jan. 2015.

¹⁵ Richard F. Grimmett, ‘War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance,’ 1. For an update see Matthew C. Weed, ‘The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice,’ CRS Report for Congress 3 April 2015.

¹⁶ For information on President Obama’s letter and the general issue of AUMF see Matthew C. Weed, ‘2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force: Issues Concerning Its Continued Application’, CRS Report for Congress 14 April 2015, 8, 19.

¹⁷ Stuster and French, Confronting the Islamic State.

¹⁸ Congressional Budget Office (CBO) ‘Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq’ (Washington DC: CBO, Aug. 2008), 12.

¹⁹ Moshe Schwartz and Jennifer Church, ‘Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress 17 May 2013, 25.

²⁰ There was a political party dimension to the hearings. Representative Henry Waxman, who assumed the chairmanship of the committee after the 2006 elections gave the Democratic Party a majority in both houses of Congress, immediately ramped up the committee’s activities on the conduct of post-combat operations, an area his Republican predecessor had neglected. In mid 2009 there were 25,500 PSCs in Iraq.

²¹ See the committee website: <http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1509>; also, author interviews with committee staff members, Washington DC, 7 Jan. 2009.

²² The SIGIR Final Report, Learning from Iraq, March, 2013, notes that there were 90,000 contracting actions, and ‘Although US government agencies managed the reconstruction program in Iraq, contractors performed the bulk of the work on the ground.’ 37 for the 90,000 and 51 for the quote. During the period of its operation it produced 35 Quarterly Reports to the US Congress, 220 audits, 170 inspections, 82 convictions, 9 lessons-learned reports, 3 special reports and 1 evaluation, 35 congressional testimonies, and 34 IG trips to Iraq, 133.

²³ The Final Report to Congress of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks Aug. 2011 is available at <www.wartimecontracting.gov.> Accessed 30 Jan. 2015. SIGAR still functions.

²⁴ Among other sources see the article by Andrew A. Hill, Leonard Wong, and Stephen J. Gerras, ‘Self-Interest Well Understood”: The Origins & Lessons of Public Confidence in the Military”’, Daedalus 142/2 (Spring 2013), 49–64.

²⁵ Kenneth Katzman, Christopher M. Blanchard, Carla E. Humud, Rhoda Margesson, and Matthew C. Weed, ‘The “Islamic State” Crisis and US Policy’, CRS Report for Congress, 8 Jan. 2015.

²⁶ See US Senate Committee on Armed Services, ‘Global Challenges and US National Security Strategy’, 27 Jan. 2015 available at <www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/15-01-27-global-challenges-and-us-national-security-strategy>.

²⁷ Stuster and French, Confronting the Islamic State: An Assessment of US Strategic Options.

²⁸ Katzman et al, 8 Jan. 2015. 10. It is worth noting that the UK, Canada, Australia and France have also ruled out deploying ground combat forces in Iraq. See Louisa Brooke-Holland and Claire Mills, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, ‘ISIS: the military response in Iraq and Syria’, 17 Oct. 2014, 3.

²⁹ See at <https://www.fbo.gov>.

³⁰ <https://acquisition.army.mil/asfi/solicitation_view.cfm?psolicitationnbr=W560MY14R0004>.

³¹ Kenneth Katzman, ‘Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights’, CRS Report for Congress 22 Aug.13, 36

³² Wall Street Journal, 4 Feb. 14, A.6. Blogs advertising for ‘shooters’ frequently advertise for personnel to go to Iraq. See <www.shooterjobs.com.>. Protective Security Detail seems to be in great demand.

³³ In Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in US National Security (Stanford UP 110–11, I discuss the legal basis for contracting out.

³⁴ See the Federal Register at <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-09-12/pdf/2011-23165.pdf.> p. 56236 provides the definition of inherently governmental functions.

³⁵ John R. Luckey, Valerie Bailey Grasso, and Kate M. Manuel, ‘Inherently Governmental Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,’ CRS Report for Congress 15 June 2009. The CRS published an update to this report to assist the Congress on this issue. See Luckey et al., “Inherently Governmental Functions,” (same document number), dated 14 Sept.2009.

³⁶ Federal Register at same website as above. Interviews with both Senate and House staffers, and representatives of the industry made clear that the definition of what is inherently governmental was viewed as crucial although from different perspectives. These interviews included Peter Levine, Kathy Garman, of the Senate and House respectively, and Tara Lee and Michael Love of the industry. For an industry perspective see Tara Lee, ‘Redefining Inherently Governmental: The Push to Redefine the Function and Its Consequences’, Journal of International Peace Operations 4/1 (July-Aug.2008), 9–10.

³⁷ There is also a more recent CRS Report on this topic. See Kate M. Manuel, ‘Definitions of ‘Inherently Governmental Function’ in Federal Procurement Law and Guidance’, CRS Report for Congress, 23 Dec, 2014.

³⁸ Moshe Schwartz,’ “Summary” ‘Defense Acquisition Reform: Background, Analysis and Issues for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress 23 May 2014.

³⁹ For data on the overall DOD budget see Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) ‘National Defense Budget Estimated for FY 2013’ available at <http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2013/FY13_Green_Book.pdf>.

⁴⁰ Secretary of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System 2014 Annual Report, 4.

⁴¹ The most recent CRS Report has the figure of services at 45 per cent, goods per cent and R & D at 10 per cent. See Moshe Schwartz, Wendy Ginsberg, and John F. Sargent Jr, ‘Defense Acquisitions: How and Where DOD Spends Its Contracting Dollars’, CRS Report for Congress 30 April 2015, 6.

⁴² Policy Paper Number 4. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, Sept. 2007. See also Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2003)

⁴³ Moshe Schwartz et al., ‘Defense Acquisitions’ 1.

⁴⁴ To get a better sense of the scale and diversity of service contracts valued at almost $200 billion in 2011 see David Berteau et al. ‘US Department of Defense Service Contract spending and the Supporting Industrial Base, 2000–2011’, at <www.acquisitionresearch.net/publications/>.

⁴⁵ Gates, Duty, 224.

⁴⁶ Mahnken and Maiolo, 1–2.

⁴⁷ At <https://www.fbo.gov> accessed 14 May 2015. On 4 June 2015 there were 30,500.

⁴⁸ Schwartz et al., ‘Defense Acquisitions’, 2–3.

⁴⁹ Available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_10.pdf> accessed 1 May 2015.

⁵⁰ For a proposal to deal with this problem see Cory Yoder, ‘The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimal Planning and Execution of Contingency Contracting’, Acquisition Research Working Paper Series available at <www.acquisitionresearch.net/publications/>.

⁵¹ Available at <www.dod.mil/dodgc/…ethics/…/contractors_in_federal_workplace.pdf>.

⁵² A summary can be found at Alex Haber and Raj Sharma, ‘Finding a Cure for What Ails Defense Acquisition’, Government Executive 8 May 2015 available at <www.govexec.com/defense/2015/05/cure-what-what-ails-defense-acquisition/112278>. The Congressman Thornberry bill builds on an earlier House Armed Services Committee report ‘Challenges to Doing Business with the Department of Defense’ of 19 March 2012 available at <http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=f60b62cb-ce5d-44b7-a2aa-8b693487cd44>

⁵³ Gansler Commission Report ‘Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,’ report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations’, 31 Oct. 2007.

⁵⁴ Gansler Commission Report, 30.

⁵⁵ Gansler Commission Report, 35, Table 9.

⁵⁶ The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, ‘Acquisition Reform: Achieving 21st Century National Security’, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 111st Congress, 1st session, 3 March 2009: table on p. 3. See also the Federal News Service for a transcript of his testimony, 3 Mar. 2009.

⁵⁷ Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Overview. TKO Seminar – DLA Land & Maritime, ND, probably 2013. Available at <www.landandmaritime.dla.mil/Downloads/small_business/presentations/TKO/DCMA.pdf>

⁵⁸ The House Armed Services Committee report ‘Challenges to Doing Business with the Department of Defense’ of 19 March 2012, has a section on ‘The Acquisition Workforce’, 36–45, which is also telling, but will not be included here since the two utilized here are the most recent analyses of the personnel issue in contracting out.

⁵⁹ Staff Report. ‘Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A Compendium of Views by Leading Experts’, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations United States Senate, 2 Oct. 2014. Available at http:www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations. Professional Services Council 2014 Acquisition Policy Survey. Available at <http://issuu.com/professionalservicescouncil/docs/2014_psc_survey_final?e=4503160/11053683>.

⁶⁰ Staff Report, United States Senate, 206.

⁶¹ Taken from summary, Stan Soloway and Phil Kangas, ‘Fixing Acquisition: An Opportunity Lost?’ Government Executive available at <http://issuu.com/professionalservicescouncil/docs/2014_psc_survey_final?e=4503160/11053683>.

⁶² Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System 2014 Annual Report (Washington DC: USD[AT&l], 13 June 2014, 4. Available at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ >, 2–15.

⁶³ The issue of negative, or perverse, incentives is identified in Michael J. Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, GAO, in his ‘Defense Acquisition: Addressing Incentives is Key to Further Reform Efforts’ Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 30 April 2014. (GAO-14-563T).

⁶⁴ I note that Stanger also calls attention to the ‘… government’s human capital crisis follows from the diminished attractiveness of low-paying government positions when comparable work in the private sector is available at higher pay.’ Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2009), 17. The lack of financial incentives in government employ is a key theme in Paul C. Light, A Government Ill Executed: The Decline of the Federal Service and How to Reverse It (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2008)

⁶⁵ Government Accountability Office, ‘Report to Congressional Committees. Defense Contractors. Information on the Impact of Reducing the Cap on Employee Compensation Costs,’ Washington DC: GAO, June 2013 (GAO-13-566), 2

⁶⁶ Executive Order 13686 of 19 Dec. 2014. Available at <www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/>

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Thomas Bruneau

Thomas Bruneau is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of National Security Affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. His more recent publications include, Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in US National Security (2011), Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America edited with Lucía Dammert and Elizabeth Skinner (2011), and The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations edited with Cris Matei (2012). His most recent articles appear in The International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Latin American Research Review, Journal of Politics in Latin America, and Latin American Politics and Society.