From the Editors

As autumn approaches in 2015, the international system continues to be challenged by a variety of threats. This issue of The Journal of Strategic Studies examines internal conflicts in three regions – Africa, South America, and South Asia. In addition, it includes a discussion of the importance of traditional geopolitical theorists and their relevance in the emerging international environment – a timely reminder of the distinction between maritime and continental powers, and of Russia’s traditional and current role as a potential spoiler. Finally, this issue includes a series of book reviews.

The emergence of the so-called “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria is a powerful reminder of the ability of militaries to adapt and become more effective. In “Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure,” Kristen A. Harkness of the University of St. Andrew’s and Michael Hunzeker of Princeton University examine military adaptation and tactical learning in irregular warfare.¹ The authors examine the case of British intervention in the Southern Cameroons from 1960–1961. This case, they argue, provides an ideal environment for tactical, bottom-up adaptation in COIN, and demonstrates multiple factors that would provide incentives for tactical innovation.² Despite ample justification for tactical adaptation, however, the authors find that “…adaptation failed because it was never implemented. And it was never implemented because the military subordinated itself to the political ends of the government.” Larger concerns of strategic overextension, international reputation, and scarce resources trumped the promise of an effective but potentially protracted and expensive operational solution to a complex problem.

In “Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014”, Sergei Boeke and Bart Schuurman of Leiden University analyze French efforts to halt the expansion of an Islamist insurgency in Mali.³ The authors assess France’s efforts as an outside interventionist power in an internal conflict, using Clausewitz’s remarkable trinity of violence, rational objectives, and chance.⁴ They conclude that French political objectives were clear and reasonable, and praise French diplomatic efforts which paved the way for a unilateral intervention with broader regional and international support. The impact of military operations was very positive in the short term, but the authors note the limits of military success in this conflict, concluding that “while Operation ‘Serval’ safeguarded French interests in the short term, its ability to make a long-term contribution to peace and stability in Mali remains doubtful.” This article reminds us not only of the relevance of traditional concepts, but also of Clausewitz’s key insight that in war, the result is rarely ever final.

In “Colombian Military Thinking and the Fight against the FARC-EP Insurgency, 2002–2014”, Jorge E. Delgado of King’s College London examines Colombia’s politico-military success in the most recent stages of the fifty year struggle against the FARC.⁵ Delgado emphasizes the political context of the struggle, which frames not only civil-military relations but also strategic performance, evaluating both continuity and change in the Uribe and Santos governments that dominated the period in question. Colombia has successfully defeated one other small insurgent group on the battlefield, and brought another into the political fold through negotiations. As a result, factions in the military continue to argue over the best approach for combating the FARC-EP. Delgado argues that Uribe’s success was in large part due to his ability to co-opt both of the major military factions through a strategy that incorporated both aggressive military action and state-building – but cautions that the current negotiations which treat the FARC-EP as legitimate may reignite traditional civil-military distrust.

In “Pakistani Political Communication and Public Opinion on U.S. Drone Attacks”, C. Christine Fair of Georgetown University, Karl Kaltenthaler of the University of Akron and William Miller of Flagler College challenge prevailing views on the impact of U.S. drone strikes on Pakistani domestic politics.⁶ They find that a substantial minority of Pakistanis (over one-third) are unaware of the drone strikes, and that the majority of those who are aware form their opinions from face-to-face contacts rather than the national news media – in their words, “Newspapers, radio, magazines, the Internet and texting are all infrequently used to get information about events in Pakistan.“ This suggests that the link between media condemnation of the strikes and mass opinion may be indirect at best. They conclude that pervasive illiteracy and poverty across the country create an environment where most news is acquired from family discussions, community meetings, and religious leaders. This in turn suggests that the U.S. needs to reconsider perception management strategies in Pakistan and in other developing countries, since most American analyses and efforts to influence Pakistani public opinion focus on major newspapers and media outlets.

Our final two articles examine two of the most important 20^th century geopolitical thinkers – Nicholas John Spykman and Halford Mackinder. In “Between Man and Nature: The Enduring Wisdom of Sir Halford J. Mackinder,“ R. Gerald Hughes and Jesse Heley of Aberystwyth University emphasize the enduring nature of much of Mackinder’s work. The importance of the Heartland concept remains relevant today, with the resurgence of Russia as both threat and partner in the international order.⁷ In the companion piece, “Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order”, Colin S. Gray of the University of Reading refocuses readers on the importance of geopolitics and great power relationships, and on the contested legacy of one of America’s first geostrategic thinkers.⁸ Spykman’s contributions to American understanding of the emerging world in the 1940s were substantial and enduring – the concept of the Rimland and its role in the global balance of power remains fundamental to understanding U.S. foreign policy through the Cold War and beyond.⁹

Notes

¹ Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (August 2010), 567–94; James A. Russell, ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33/4 (August 2010), 595–624.

² Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/5 (October 2006), 905–34; Sergio Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (August 2012), 513–39; Lazar Berman, ‘Capturing Contemporary Innovation: Studying IDF Innovation against Hamas and Hizballah’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/1 (February 2012), 121–147; Sergio Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/1 (February 2014), 30–64.

³ Thierry Tardy, ‘The Reluctant Peacekeeper: France and the Use of Force in Peace Operations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/5 (October 2014), 770–792.

⁴ M.L.R. Smith, ‘Escalation in Irregular War: Using Strategic Theory to Examine from First Principles’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (October 2012), 618.); Beatrice Heuser, ‘Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed between Partisan War and People’s War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/1 (February 2010), 139–60; Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ‘Clausewitz’s Concept of Strategy – Balancing Purpose, Aims and Means’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/6–7 (December 2014), 903–925.

⁵ Douglas Porch, ‘The Hunt for Martín Caballero’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/2 (April 2012), 243–270; Raphael S. Cohen, ‘Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/4 (September 2014), 609–636.

⁶ C. Christine Fair, ‘Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/2 (April 2014), 259–290; C. Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz, ‘The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/1 (February 2011), 63–94;. C. Christine Fair, ‘Pakistan’s Relations with Central Asia: Is Past Prologue?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 31/2 (April 2008), 201–227.

⁷ Geoffrey Sloan, ‘Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland theory Then and Now’, Journal of Strategic Studies 22/3 (June 1999), 15–38.

⁸ Patrick Porter, ‘A Matter of Choice: Strategy and Discretion in the Shadow of World War II’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/3 (June 2012), 317–43.

⁹ Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Competitive Strategies against Continental Powers: The Geopolitics of Sino-Indian-American Relations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/1 (February 2013), 76–100.