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ABSTRACT
While terrorist and insurgent groups have often combined anti-state subversion with ‘purely‘ criminal activities in order to obtain the financial means to wage their ideological struggle, little is known about the transformation of such groups into non-ideological organised crime groups (OCG) with close links to authorities. This holds particularly for jihadist groups that have on ideological grounds ruled out collaboration with their archenemies – ‘infidels’ and ‘apostates’. Using unique ethnographic data from Russia’s Dagestan, this article explores the causes and contexts of the gradual transformation of some of Dagestan’s jihadist units – jamaats – into organised crime groups collaborating with local authorities.
Notes
1 The term ‘jihadist’ is widely used to refer to militant adherents to Salafism, a puritanical movement in Sunni Islam aimed at propagating Islamic law (sharia) in the Muslim world with the parallel establishment of an Islamic theocracy – and, according to some interpretations by scholars and practitioners, expanding the borders of the Islamic world at the expense of the non-Islamic world. To this end, emphasis is placed upon cleansing Islam of pre-Islamic practices (jahiliya), as well as non-Islamic practices (bid’a) with which Islam has become imbued in the centuries since it was founded. In practice, ‘infidels’ (kufar), ‘hypocrites’ (munafiqun) and ‘apostates’ (murtaddun) – for instance Sufi Muslims and Shiites – are considered to be the main enemies of ‘true Islam’. Unlike ‘traditional Islam’, proponents of Salafism consider armed struggle or jihad by sword (jihad al-asghar) to be among a Muslim’s main duties. For an overview of Salafi–jihadist ideology, see, for instance, Roel Meijer, Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (New York: Columbia University Press 2011).
2 See Andrew Silke, Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (London: Frank Cass 2004), 1–29; Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, ‘Why Do We Know So Little about Terrorism?’, International Interactions 40/4 (2014), 590–601; Marc Sageman, ‘The Stagnation in Terrorism Research’, Terrorism and Political Violence 26/4 (2014), 565–80.
3 Emil Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev, The Individual Disengagement of Avengers, Nationalists, and Jihadists: Why Ex-militants Choose to Abandon Violence in the North Caucasus (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2014), 15.
4 Silke, Research on Terrorism, 30–56.
5 Bart Schuurman and Quirine Eijkman, ‘Moving Terrorism Research Forward: The Crucial Role of Primary Sources’, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, Working Paper, June 2013.
6 Jamaat, or ‘community’, is a term commonly used in the North Caucasus in general and in Dagestan in particular in reference to locally operating jihadist groups.
7 William Julius Wilson and Anmol Chaddha, ‘The Role of Theory in Ethnographic Research’, Ethnography 10/4 (2010), 549–64; Edward Schatz, Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago 2009).
8 Jean-François Ratelle, ‘Making Sense of Violence in Civil War: Challenging Academic Narratives Through Political Ethnography’, Critical Studies on Security 1/2 (2013), 159–73.
9 Schuurman and Eijkman, ‘Moving Terrorism Research Forward’.
10 In contrast to the situation in Chechnya, no foreign jihadists have participated in the Dagestan-based insurgency. On the other hand, since the early 2010s, hundreds of Dagestanis have travelled to Syria to participate in the Syrian Civil War on the side of various jihadist groups. For more information, see for instance Emil Souleimanov, ‘Globalizing Jihad? North Caucasians in the Syrian Civil War’, Middle East Policy 21/3 (2014), 154–63.
11 Emil Souleimanov, ‘Dagestan: The Emerging Core of the North Caucasus Insurgency’, CACI Analyst 9/29 (2010).
12 Emil Souleimanov, ‘The Caucasus Emirate: Genealogy of an Islamist Insurgency’, Middle East Policy 18/4 (2011), 155–68.
13 Magomed-Rasul Ibragimov and Kimitaka Matsuzato, ‘Contextualized Violence: Politics and Terror in Dagestan’, Nationalities Papers 42/2 (2014), 286–306; Aurélie Campana and Jean-François Ratelle, ‘A Political Sociology Approach to the Diffusion of Conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan and Ingushetia’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37/2 (2014), 115–34; Ratelle, ‘Making Sense of Violence in Civil War’; John O’Loughlin, Edward C. Holland and Frank D.W. Witmer, ‘The Changing Geography of Violence in Russia’s North Caucasus, 1999–2011: Regional Trends and Local Dynamics in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria’, Eurasian Geography and Economics 52/5 (2011), 596–630; Emil Souleimanov, ‘The Republic of Dagestan: The Epicenter of Islamist Insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus’, Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security, Occasional Paper, December 2011.
14 Traditionally, Chechnya has been the primary focus of scholars and practitioners interested in the North Caucasus.
15 Tamara Makarenko, ‘The Crime–Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism’, Global Crime 6/1 (2004), 129–45; Louise I. Shelley and John T. Picarelli, ‘Methods Not Motives: Implications of the Convergence of International Organized Crime and Terrorism’, Police Practice and Research 3/4 (2002), 305–18; Marinko Bobic, ‘Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism: Nexus Needing a Human Security Framework’, Global Crime 15/3–4 (2014), 241–58.
16 Michael Freeman, ‘The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34/6 (2011), 461–75.
17 The definitions of OCG are notoriously diverse. Following Jim Finckenauer, this article uses the term ‘OCG’ in the generic sense of a group that is (a) permanently organised; (b) lacks ideology, its only motivation being financial enrichment; (c) possesses some form of hierarchical organisation, distinct members being in charge of particular tasks; (d) is involved in illegal activities; (e) uses violence or the threat of violence to advance its goals; (f) corrupts authorities to ensure impunity and enter legal businesses; and (g) has restricted membership. Jim Finckenauer, ‘Problems of Definition: What Is Organized Crime?’, Trends in Organized Crime 8/3 (2005), 63–83. According to Hagan’s typology, most Dagestani jamaat-based OCG would fit the intermediate category of semi-organised groups that fulfil the above criteria partially, as there is no convincing evidence that distinct members are in charge of particular tasks in all local OCG. Frank Hagan, ‘“Organized” Crime and “Organized Crime”: Interdeterminate Problems of Definition’, Trends in Organized Crime 9/4 (2006), 127–37.
18 Akşam, 8 November 2004.
19 Omar Waraich, ‘Why Pakistan Won’t Fight the Afghan Taliban’, Time, 20 November 2009.
20 In the particular case of the Gimry jamaat, led by Ibragim Gajidadayev (until early 2013), secondary sources have also been available in Dagestani media since his murder.
21 For an analysis of the history of resistance in Dagestan, see Robert Bruce Ware and Enver Kisriev, Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance in the North Caucasus (London: Routledge 2010). See also Akhmet Yarlykapov, ‘Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Caucasus: Towards a Formulation of the Problem’, Caucasian Regional Studies 4/1 (1999), <http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0401-02.htm>.
22 Basayev’s true intent, however, was to instigate a popular anti-Russian rebellion in Dagestan. Emil Souleimanov, ‘Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan’, Middle East Review of International Affairs 9/4 (2005), 63–64. For an analysis of Islamic radicalisation in the post-Soviet space, including in Dagestan, see Galina Yemelianova (ed.), Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union (London: Routledge 2011).
23 ‘Dagestan: Human Rights’ Work is a Basis for Detention’, Memorial Report, 8 July 2013.
24 US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2010 Human Rights Report: Russia’, 8 April 2011; International Crisis Group, ‘The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (III), Governance, Elections, Rule of Law’, Europe Report 226 (2013), 20–24.
25 Interview with Sapiyat Magomedova, Prague, March 2014.
26 Steffany A. Trofino, ‘Dagestan: Moscow’s Risk Versus Gain’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 24/2 (2011), 1521–61.
27 Interview with Magomedova.
28 Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat (New Haven: Yale University Press 2007); Sergey Markedonov, Radical Islam in the North Caucasus. Evolving Threats, Challenges (Washington: CSIS 2010); Robert W. Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International 2010); Lorenzo Vidino, ‘How Chechnya Became a Breeding Ground for Terror’, Middle East Quarterly 12/3 (2005), 57–66.
29 Emil Souleimanov, ‘The Upsurge of Islamic Violence in the North Caucasus: Exploring the Case Studies of Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria’, Connections 10/3 (2011), 117–26; Alissa De Carbonnel, ‘Insight: Brutality, Anger Fuel Jihad in Russia’s Caucasus’, Reuters, 31 August 2012.
30 Prostitution, gambling, alcoholism, female emancipation (in the form of ‘frivolous behaviour of women’), drug consumption, and the erosion of respect towards the elderly and ‘traditional Islamic values’ have all been considered as such.
31 Jean-Francois Ratelle and Emil A. Souleimanov, ‘Retaliation in Rebellion: The Missing Link to Explaining Insurgent Violence in Dagestan’, Terrorism and Political Violence, forthcoming. doi:10.1080/09546553.2015.1005076
32 Aurélie Campana and Benjamin Ducol, ‘Voices of the “Caucasus Emirate”: Mapping and Analyzing North Caucasus Insurgency Websites’, Terrorism and Political Violence 27/4 (2015), 679–700.
33 Ratelle and Souleimanov, ‘Retaliation in Rebellion’.
34 In fact, due to the immense superiority of the incumbent over the insurgent in Dagestan, the lifespan of jihadists in local jamaats is very short, averaging around five years, based upon the author’s observations and on interviews with ex-insurgents and officers of the Dagestani Ministry of Interior, 2007–14.
35 For a more detailed analysis of the radicalisation of Dagestani and other North Caucasian jamaats, see, for instance, Domitilla Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, Europe–Asia Studies, 3 May 2012.
36 Author’s estimate based on discussions with Dagestani scholars, journalists, and former jihadists.
37 The exact number of these jamaats is impossible to establish due to the lack of reliable data and the jamaats’ fluid character; when some jamaats terminate, new branches are formed on the basis of older and established ones.
38 Souleimanov, ‘The Caucasus Emirate’.
39 Islam Tekushev, ‘Triumph of the Caucasus Emirate: The Caucasus Emirate as a Special Ethno-fundamentalist Model’, Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report 57 (2012), 9–20.
40 Interviews with former jihadis.
41 Interview with an officer in the Ministry of the Interior of Dagestan, September 2012.
42 Alikhan Amrakhov, ‘Yuzhniy sektor Dagestanskogo fronta: Rol’ liderov dagestanskogo podpolya oficial’nymi vlastyami sil’no preuvelichena’, Kavkazskaya politika, 5 April 2012, <http://kavpolit.com/yuzhnyj-sektor-dagestanskogo-fronta>.
43 As a rule, the lifespan of members of such jamaats is considerably shorter than that of strong, established jamaats based in large urban centres.
44 Interviews with former jihadis.
45 According to some proponents of the jihadist insurgency, under current circumstances jamaats are entitled to extort zakat from any local business – including non-Islamic businesses – to wage holy war. Others among the ‘hard-core’ Salafis claim that money extorted from such businesses is ‘impure’ and should therefore be abandoned.
46 Prostitution is illegal in Dagestan, as it is elsewhere in Russia. Sexual services are usually provided in bathhouses or ‘saunas’, as they are widely referred to in the North Caucasian republic.
47 Jamaats’ geographical organisation contributes to their determination to ‘tax’ such businesses, as individual jamaats operate in their own defined areas. Due to their autonomy, they have to take care of their own financing and recruitment.
48 ‘V Dagestane rasprostranayutsa listovki v adres torgovtsev alkogolem i narkotikami’, Kavkazskiy Uzel, 18 May 2010. For more on the practice of haram targeting in Dagestan, see, for instance, Emil Souleimanov, ‘Dagestan’s Jihadists and Haram Targeting’, CACI Analyst 2/18 (2015).
49 Ibid.
50 According to former jihadists and one current jihadist, money extorted from such businesses makes up close to half, and in some instances even more, of jamaats’ overall financing. The rest comes from individual donations or Salafi funds from both within and without Dagestan.
51 ‘Kafe v Khasavyurte, veroyatno, vzorvano za otkaz platit’ “dan’”, utverzhdayut pravookhraniteli’, Kavkazskiy Uzel, 27 January 2011.
52 For a more detailed analysis of why and how Dagestan’s jamaats have targeted haram targets, see, for instance, Emil Souleimanov, ‘Dschihadisten in Dagestan: Clans, Kompromisse und krumme Geschäfte’, Osteuropa 4 (2015).
53 Interview with Zakir Magomedov, December 2014.
54 Interviews with former jihadists.
55 Gajimurad Kamalov, ‘Prezident i organy’, Chernovik 28 (2010).
56 In 2009, the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, referred to the extent of Dagestani corruption as ‘monstrous’. Tom Parfitt, ‘Trouble in the North Caucasus’, The Guardian, 22 June 2009.
57 Interviews with ordinary Dagestanis.
58 Ibid.
59 Author’s estimates based on sources cited by the Kavkazskiy Uzel (Caucasian Knot), a web portal specializing in coverage of the North and South Caucasus regions.
60 Interview with Irina Gordienko from Novaya gazeta, a leading Russian liberal daily, June 2014.
61 Interviews with former jihadists.
62 A segment of the local population has disapproved of jamaat activities on ideological grounds. The tradition of Sufi Islam is, after all, strongest in such rural areas, where the majority of the population still adhere to it. Despite this, jamaat violence in rural areas has usually been directed at local authorities, police, and Sufi clerics who often happen to be related by blood to the local population.
63 Interview with former jihadists.
64 Interview with a former jihadist.
65 Interview with Akhmet Yarlykapov, a professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, January 2015.
66 Interview with Irina Gordienko, a journalist with the Russian liberal daily Novaya gazeta, who specializes in Dagestan, June 2014.
67 Another option for local law enforcement is to murder defiant businessmen and declare them insurgents killed during counterinsurgency operations. Given the impunity and incompetence prevailing among Dagestan’s police force, this could even benefit the careers of the police officers responsible.
68 Interviews with former jihadists and ordinary Dagestanis.
69 Interview with a former jihadist.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 ‘FSB proveryaet v Dagestane organy vlasti raznogo urovnya na svyazi s boevikami, Newsru.com, 4 July 2013, <http://www.newsru.com/russia/04jul2013/money.html>.
73 ‘Abdulatipov grozit uvolit’ glav rayonov, gde oruduyut OPG’, BBC Russian Service, 15 July 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2013/07/130715_dagestan_criminal_officials>.
74 I am thankful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
75 Interview with ‘Rizvan’, Istanbul 2011.
76 Interview with ‘Ali’, Istanbul 2011.
77 According to ex-insurgents and a number of Dagestani experts who preferred that their identities not be revealed in this article, jamaats striking non-aggression pacts or collaborating with authorities have usually been a feature in the republic’s rural areas and small towns, while OCG have thrived in the cities.
78 Interviews with former jihadists.
79 Interviews with ex-insurgents, Istanbul, 2011.
80 First-hand data on the circumstances of Gajidadayev’s ‘mysterious’ escapes are lacking. Yet many in Dagestan have attributed these escapes to the amir’s close ties to the Mayor of Makhachkala, Said Amirov, as well as to Gajidadayev’s links with the Dagestani political establishment.
81 However, local media hesitated to publicise this due to fears of punishment at the hands of the local authorities, a likely outcome given the unexplained assassinations of a number of prominent Dagestani investigative journalists who dealt with such topics.
82 Emil Souleimanov, ‘What Does Amirov’s Arrest Imply for Dagestan?’, CACI Analyst 6/26 (2013).
83 Gajidadayev himself was killed during a special operation in March 2013, in a house owned by Magomedaliyev.
84 Despite ongoing investigation, no names of other high-ranking members of Dagestan’s executive or legislative authorities involved in illegal activities with the Gimry jamaat have been made public by the republican or federal authorities.
85 Interview with Zakir Magomedov, December 2014.
86 Interview with former jihadists.
87 Ibid.
88 Interview with ‘Ali’.
89 Valery Dzutsev, ‘Support for Salafists among Dagestani Youth Reaches Record Level’, Eurasia Daily Monitor 8/227 (2011).
90 On the other hand, however, the lifespans of ‘true’ jihadists, and especially jihadist leaders, have become increasingly brief, because the practice of targeting law enforcement, government officials, and federal troops has resulted in large-scale reprisals against jihadist groups.
91 Interviews with former jihadists.
92 Interview with ‘Ali’.
93 Moreover, non-jihadist (organised) crime in Dagestan has been weak, as is the pool of prospective recruits into such criminal groups. Many Dagestanis willing to devote themselves to a criminal career have traditionally travelled to the rich cities of ‘inner’ Russia, where control over economic enterprise by local authorities is weak or absent. This, too, explains OCG’s motivation to continue to play the jihadist card.
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Notes on contributors
Emil Aslan Souleimanov
Emil Aslan Souleimanov is an Associate Professor of political science at the Institute of Political Science, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic. His recent focus is on the Political Ethnography of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Russia's North Caucasus.