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ABSTRACT
Over the last two decades, a number of countries (most notably China, Russia and Iran) have been developing so-called anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, offensive cyber-weapons, electronic warfare, etc. The development of A2/AD capabilities by non-Western countries undermines the foundations of US power projection and global military-technological supremacy. In order to overcome, or at least mitigate, the impending A2/AD challenge, the US Department of Defense (DoD) began to roll out its so-called ‘third’ offset strategy in late 2014. The strategy aims to bring about innovative operational concepts and technologies and spur new doctrinal and organisational debates. This article assesses which of the operational concepts and capabilities informing current US discussions on offset may be relevant in the context of the A2/AD challenges Europeans face on their eastern ‘flank‘ and in their ‘extended southern neighbourhood‘, and which may not. Europeans must grapple with the same conceptual puzzle as the US: how to strike the right balance between defeating A2/AD capabilities and hedging against them, i.e. through alternative strategies that are less dependent on unhindered access and resort to asymmetric forms of warfare. However, they must take into account the geographical features of their eastern flank and extended southern neighbourhood, the level of technological maturity of their challengers, and their own military-technological prowess and political limitations. This suggests a somewhat different approach to offsetting A2/AD than that adopted by the US.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Jordan Becker, Daniel Fiott, Ben Fitzgerald, Thomas Mahnken, Alexander Mattelaer, Iskander Rehman, Diego Ruiz Palmer, Toshi Yoshihara, David Yost and two anonymous reviewers for their input on this research, and their excellent comments on previous drafts of this article.
Notes
1 Chuck Hagel, ‘Opening keynote at “Defense Innovation Days” Conference, organized by the Southeastern New England Defense Industry Alliance’, Newport RI, 3 September 2014,
2 See Barry Watts, ‘The Evolution of Precision Strike’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013.
3 See Thomas Mahnken, ‘Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime’, Daedalus 140/3 (2011), 45–57.
4 Hagel, ‘Defense Innovation Days’.
5 DoD, The Defense Innovation Initiative (Washington, 2014).
6 Robert O. Work, ‘The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and Its Implications for Partners and Allies’, speech at the Willard Hotel, Washington, 28 January 2015. See also Robert Martinage, ‘Toward a New Offset Strategy’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014.
7 Ashton Carter, ‘Building the First Link to the Force of the Future’, George Washington Elliott School of International Affairs, 18 November 2015, Washington.
8 See, e.g., Charles Barry and Hans Binnendijk, ‘Widening Gaps in U.S. and European Defense Capabilities and Cooperation’, Transatlantic Current 6 (July 2012), 1–11; David S. Yost, ‘The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union,’ Survival 42/2 (2001), 97–128.
9 See Diego Ruiz Palmer, ‘The NATO–Warsaw Pact Competition in the 1970s and 1980s: A Revolution in Military Affairs in the Making or the End of a Strategic Edge?’, Cold War History 14/4 (2014), 533–73.
10 I have conducted 23 semi-structured in-depth interviews with senior US defence officials, US defence experts and NATO officials over multiple field trips to the US (between October 2014 and October 2015) and in Brussels. I have interviewed officials from the DoD, the US Permanent Representation to NATO, and NATO Headquarters, as well as defence experts from the (US) National Defense University (NDU), the US Naval War College, the US Army War College, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). All of the DoD officials interviewed hold or have held responsibilities in the areas of capability planning, force structure and/or military transformation, and have therefore been directly involved in some of the key matters relating to the third offset strategy. All of the NATO officials interviewed hold responsibilities related to capability planning and/or defence transformation, either at Allied Command Operations (Mons, Belgium) or Allied Command Transformation (Norfolk, Virginia). In turn, most of the experts interviewed at the NDU, the US Navy and Army War Colleges, CSBA, CNAS and CSIS have held senior positions in the DoD in the past, and have dealt with questions relating to capability planning, force structure and/or force transformation. Using a relatively large sample of officials working on the same issues has allowed me to compare the information provided by individual interviewees. In addition to that, the information extracted from the interviews has been triangulated with data from official US government documents and secondary literature.
11 Author’s interviews with multiple US defence officials and experts in Washington, January–November 2015.
12 See, e.g. Martinage, Toward a New Offset Strategy.
13 Author’s interviews with multiple US defence officials and experts in Washington, January to November 2015.
14 Author’s interview with former US defence official, Washington, 28 January 2015.
15 William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982).
16 See Gordon Barrass, The Great Cold War: A Journey through the Hall of Mirrors (Stanford CA: Stanford UP 2009).
17 Author’s interviews with multiple US defence officials and experts, October 2014 to November 2015.
18 Ibid.
19 See Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War since 1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 81.
20 Author’s interviews with multiple US defence officials and experts, October 2014 to October 2015. See also, e.g., Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich and Jim Thomas, ‘Air–Sea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010; Thomas Scheber and Kurt Guthe, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike: A Fresh Perspective’, Comparative Strategy 32/1 (2013), 18–34.
21 See Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘China’s Anti Access Strategy in Historical and Technological Perspective’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (2011), 299–323.
22 Work, ‘The Third U.S. Offset Strategy’.
23 Eliot A. Cohen, ‘Change and Transformation in Military Affairs’, Journal of Strategic Studies 27/3 (2004), 395–407.
24 See Stephen P. Rosen, ‘The Impact of the Office of Net Assessment on the American Military in the Matter of the Revolution in Military Affairs’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (2010), 460–482.
25 Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War, 220.
26 Ruiz Palmer, ‘The NATO–Warsaw Pact’.
27 Ibid., 537.
28 Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy (New York: Perseus Books 2015), 220.
29 Author’s interviews with multiple US defence officials and experts in Washington, January–February 2015.
30 Ashton Carter, ‘Submitted Statement to the Senate Armed Forces Committee (Budget Request)’, Washington, 3 March 2015.
31 Ibid.
32 See Andrew J. Pierre, ‘Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France, and America’, Foreign Affairs 49/2 (1971), 283–301.
33 See Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957–1962 (Oxford: Oxford UP 1994).
34 See Richard H. Ullman, ‘The Covert French Connection’, Foreign Policy 75 (1979), 3–33.
35 See, e.g., Simon J. Moody, ‘Enhancing Political Cohesion in NATO during the 1950s or: How It Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Tactical) Bomb’, Journal of Strategic Studies (June 2015), 1–23.
36 Martinage, ‘Toward a New Offset Strategy’.
37 William Perry, ‘Technology and National Security: Risks and Responsibilities’, speech at France–Stanford Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, 7–8 April 2003.
38 Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War, 124–25.
39 Jim Thomas, ‘Protraction: a 21st century flavor of deterrence’, Small Wars Journal, 11 September 2015. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/protraction-a-21st-century-flavor-of-deterrence
40 See Robert A. Gessert, ‘The AirLand Battle and NATO’s New Doctrinal Debate’, RUSI Journal 129/2 (1984), 52–60.
41 Author’s interviews with several US and NATO officials in Washington and Brussels, January–November 2015.
42 See Barry R. Posen, ‘Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony’, International Security 28/1 (2003), 5–46.
43 See, e.g., Stephen Biddle, ‘Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict’, International Security 21/2 (1996), 139–79.
44 See Eliot A. Cohen. ‘A Revolution in Warfare’, Foreign Affairs 75/2 (1996), 37–54; Andrew F. Krepinevich, ‘Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions’, National Interest 37 (1994), 31–36.
45 See, e.g., Barry Watts, ‘The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011.
46 See, e.g., Tom Dyson, ‘Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy: Convergence and Divergence in post-Cold War British, French and German Military Reform’, Security Studies 17/4 (2004), 725–74.
47 See Jolyon Howorth, ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative’, Survival 42/2 (2000), 33–55.
48 On the impact of sequestration upon the US defence budget see Todd Harrison, ‘Chaos and Uncertainty: The FY 14 Defense Budget and Beyond’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013.
49 Mahnken, ‘Weapons’, 51.
50 Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: Norton 2011), p. 218.
51 Mahnken, ‘Weapons’, 52.
52 See Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, ‘A Competitive Strategy with Chinese Characteristics? The Second Artillery’s Growing Conventional Forces and Missions’, in Thomas G. Mahnken (ed.), Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History and Practice(Stanford CA: Stanford UP 2012), 206–18.
53 See Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, ‘On the Verge of a Game Changer’, Proceedings 135/5 (2009), 26–32.
54 Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, 222–23.
55 Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War, 124–25.
56 See, e.g., Marcel de Haas, ‘Russia’s Military Reforms: Victory after Twenty Years of Failure’, Clingendael Report No. 5, November 2011.
57 See, e.g., Diego Ruiz Palmer, ‘Back to the Future? Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, Revolutions in Military Affairs, and Cold War Comparisons’, NATO Defence College Research Paper No. 120, October 2015; Margarete Klein and Kristian Pester, ‘Russia’s Armed Forces on Modernisation Course’, SWP Comments 9 (January 2014), 1–7.
58 Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘The Cruise Missile Challenge’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2005.
59 Mahnken, ‘Weapons’, 51.
60 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this important observation.
61 On the importance of offensive capabilities to counter A2/AD systems see Jakub Grygiel, ‘Arming Our Allies: The Case for Offensive Capabilities’, Parameters 45/3 (2015), 39–49.
62 DoD, Citation2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington: 2001), 30.
63 Author’s interviews with several US defence officials, January–November 2015
64 See, e.g., Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy; van Tol et al., ‘Air–Sea Battle’.
65 Author’s interviews with multiple US defence officials and experts, January–October 2015.
66 Van Tol et al., ‘Air–Sea Battle’.
67 See, e.g., Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, ‘Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy Weapons’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2012.
68 Author’s interviews with multiple US defence officials and experts, October 2014 to October 2015.
69 See, e.g. T.X. Hammes, ‘Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict’, Strategic Forum 278 (June 2012), 1–16.
70 Author’s interview with former US defence official in Washington, 28 January 2015.
71 Mark Gunzinger, ‘The Future of Air Force Long-Range Strike, Statement before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces’, 9 September 2015.
72 Author’s interviews with multiple US defence officials and experts, October 2014 to October 2015.
73 Martinage, Offset Strategy, vi.
74 See, e.g., van Tol et al., ‘Air–Sea Battle’.
75 Gunzinger and Dougherty, ‘Changing the Game’.
76 Author’s interviews with multiple US defence officials and experts, October 2014 to October 2015. See also, e.g., Andrew F. Krepinevich, ‘How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense’, Foreign Affairs 94/2 (2015), 78–86.
77 Author’s interviews with multiple US defence officials and experts, October 2014 to October 2015. See, e.g., Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, ‘Asymmetric Warfare, American Style’, Proceedings 138/4 (2012), 24–29.
78 Krepinevich, ‘How to Deter China’.
79 Ruiz Palmer, ‘Back to the Future?’, 7.
80 Author’s interviews with multiple US and NATO officials, October 2014 to November 2015.
81 General Frank Gorenc, ‘USAFE-AFAFRICA Update’, Air & Space Conference and Technology Exposition, 15 September 2014, 2.
82 Author’s interview with US defence official, 20 October 2015.
83 ‘Top NATO general: Russians starting to build air defense bubble over Syria’, Washington Post, 29 September 2015.
84 Author’s interview with NATO official, 20 October 2015.
85 Alexander Vershbow, ‘NATO Needs Defense Strategy to Address Threats from the South and the East’, Defense Matters, 5 Nov. 2015.
86 Thomas, ‘Protraction’.
87 For a good description of Russian hybrid warfare see, e.g., Dave Johnson, Russia’s Approach to Conflict – Implications for NATO’s Defense and Deterrence’, NATO Defense College Research Paper No. 111, April 2015.
88 For two notable exceptions see Thomas, ‘Protraction’ and Ruiz Palmer, ‘Back to the Future?’
89 Author’s interview with NATO official, 8 September 2015.
90 Ibid.
91 Interviews with multiple NATO officials, September to October 2015.
92 Ibid.
93 Author’s interview with NATO official, 8 September 2015.
94 For a good discussion on how military superiority has assisted other means of Russian warfare in Ukraine see Andras Racz, ‘Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine’, FIIA Report No. 43, 2015, esp. 74–83.
95 See, e.g., Rachel A. Dicke, Ryan C. Hendrickson and Steven Kutz, ‘NATO’s Mafia Ally: The Strategic Consequences of Bulgarian Corruption’, Comparative Strategy 33/3 (2014), 287–98; Pavel K. Baev, ‘Greece’s Russian Fantasy; Russia’s European Delusion’, Brookings Institution, 8 July 2015.
96 Jakub Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, ‘A preclusive strategy to defend the NATO frontier’, American Interest (2 December 2014). http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014 /12/02/a-preclusive-strategy-to-defend-the-nato-frontier/
97 Thomas, ‘Protraction’.
98 Grygiel and Mitchell, ‘A Preclusive Strategy’.
99 On the controversy about possibly providing lethal military assistance to Ukraine see David S. Yost, ‘The Budapest Memorandum and Russia’s Intervention in Ukraine’, International Affairs 91/3 (2015), 505–38, esp. 527–28.
100 Author’s interview with NATO official, 27 October 2015.
101 Author’s interviews with multiple US and NATO officials, October 2014 to November 2015
102 Ibid. See also Luis Simón, ‘Understanding US Retrenchment in Europe’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 57/2 (2015), 157–72.
103 Author’s interview with NATO official, 27 October 2015.
104 Admittedly, it is unclear to what extent the NATO allies know how to exert nuclear escalation control. On the need for greater integration between nuclear and conventional capabilities in US strategy see Elbridge Colby, ‘Nuclear Weapons in the Third Offset Strategy,’ Center for a New American Security, February 2015.
105 Author’s interviews with multiple US and NATO officials, October 2014 to November 2015
106 See Martinage, ‘Toward a New Offset Strategy’, vi.
107 I thank Toshi Yoshihara for this excellent observation.
108 A possible (and partial) exception is Poland, but even in that case the defence outlays that would be required to make this a viable option in the absence of a commensurate US- or NATO-level investment in countering the A2/AD menace are financially prohibitive. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this important point.
109 Author’s interview with former US defence official, 19 November 2015.
110 Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, ‘Outside-in: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-access and Area Denial Threats’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011.
111 See Iskander L. Rehman, ‘Tomorrow or Yesterday’s Fleet? The Indian Navy’s Operational Challenges’, in C. Raja Mohan and Anit Mukherje (eds), India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security (Abingdon: Routledge 2016), 37–64.
112 Interviews with multiple NATO officials, September–October 2015.
113 Scott C. Farquar, Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD (Fort Leavenworth KS: Combat Studies Institute Press 2009).
114 Author’s interviews with several US and NATO officials in Washington and Brussels, September–November 2013.
115 Author’s interview with NATO official, 8 September 2015.
116 Interviews with multiple NATO officials, September–October 2015.
117 Author’s interview with US defence official, 20 October 2015.
118 See Luis Simón, ‘Europe, the Rise of Asia and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship’, International Affairs 91/5 (2015), 269–89.
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Luis Simón
Luis Simón is a Research Professor at the Institute for European Studies of the Free University of Brussels. He has been a Visiting Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University in New York, the Royal United Services Institute in London, the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, and the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Johns Hopkins University in Washington D.C. He is the author of Geopolitical Change, Grand Strategy and European Security: The EU-NATO Conundrum in Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Royal Holloway college (University of London) and a Masters in European Politics from Sciences Po (Paris).