Expanding the Dragon’s Reach:The Rise of China’s Anti-access Naval Doctrine and Forces

ABSTRACT

Among the multiple dimensions of the tous azimuths modernisation of Chinese naval forces, the development of China’s anti-access capacity has recently elicited considerable interest. The important link between this capacity and an overarching vision of the use of force – i.e. a naval doctrine – has, however, often been left implicit. This article shows that the particular development of China’s naval anti-access forces – more precisely, forces with an impact on the naval balance – can be explained by a shift of China’s naval doctrine towards a distinctly pre-emptive posture, which, itself, stems from the set of constraints imposed by the framework of ‘local war under informationised conditions’.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• People’s Liberation Army Navy
• Anti-access
• Pre-emption
• Naval Doctrine
• Informationisation

Notes

¹ ‘Zhongguo San Chuan 093G Xing Heqianting Yisi Fuyi’ [Three Type 093G SSN suspected to be in service], 27 March 2015, <http://dailynews.sina.com/bg/chn/chnmilitary/sinacn/20150327/18406554560.html>.

² Stephen Saunders, Jane’s Fighting Ships (London: Jane’s Information Group, 2011); Eric Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press 2013); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2015 (London: Routledge 2015).

³ Andrew S. Erickson, ‘Rising Tide, Dispersing Waves: Opportunities and Challenges for Chinese Seapower Development’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/3 (2014), 372–402.

⁴ For diverging interpretations of China’s naval rise, see James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan (London: Routledge 2008); Robert Scott Ross, ‘China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects and the US Response’, International Security 34/2 (2009), 46–81; Michael A. Glosny, Phillip C. Saunders and Robert S. Ross, ‘Correspondence: Debating China’s Naval Nationalism’, International Security 35/2 (2010), 161–75; Daniel M. Hartnett and Frederic Vellucci, ‘Toward a Maritime Security Strategy: An Analysis of Chinese Views since the Early 1990s’, in Philip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew N. Yang (eds), The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington: National Defense University Press 2011), 81–10; see Nan Li, ‘The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From “Near Coast” and “Near Seas” to “Far Seas”’, in Philip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew N. Yang (eds), The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington: National Defense University Press 2011), 109–40.

⁵ M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey, ‘Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-Intervention’, Washington Quarterly 37/4 (2015), 171–87; Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: W.W. Norton 2015), 65.

⁶ Glosny et al., ‘Correspondence’, 172.

⁷ The China’s 2015 military strategy white paper does contain some interesting statements about the need to expand what Liu Huaqing termed China’s ‘oceanic outlook’, as it argues that ‘the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests’ (Information Office of the State Council, ‘China’s Military Strategy’, May 2015, <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/>). However, sections dealing with strategic and operational issues remain at the level of general principles with as few details as in preceding editions.

⁸ I use here the terms ‘strategy’ and ‘doctrine’ in a traditional sense: strategy defines how political goals are translated into military objectives; operational doctrine defines how forces would be used during campaigns to fulfil strategic objective. For analyses of Chinese definitions of the levels of strategy and of the possible divergences between Western and Chinese concepts, see notably David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press 2004); David M. Finkelstein, ‘Thinking about the PLA’s “Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs”’, in James C. Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein (eds), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs (Alexandria, VA: CNA 2005), 1–28.

⁹ Aside from books published by the National Defense University, this paper relies on articles published in Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [China Military Science] a journal edited by the Academy of Military Science, ‘the premier military research organization in the PLA’ (Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, ‘Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutions’, China Quarterly 171 [2002], 623). All translations are made by the author except for article titles, which are reproduced as provided by the journal.

¹⁰ Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu [The memoirs of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: Press of the PLA 2007), 435–38.

¹¹ Holmes and Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century.

¹² Liu, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu, 434.

¹³ Wang Wenrong, Zhanluexue [Science of military strategy] (Beijing: National Defense University Press 1999), 78.

¹⁴ Liu, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu, 434.

¹⁵ Andrew S. Erickson, ‘Can China Become a Maritime Power?’, in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes (eds), Asia Looks Seaward (Westport CT: Praeger 2007), 70–111.

¹⁶ Bernard Cole, Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press 2013), 98.

¹⁷ Liu, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu, 437.

¹⁸ Jiang Shiliang, ‘Zai Lun Zhi Jiaotong Quan’ [On mastery of traffic (II)], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2002/5 (2002), 106–14.

¹⁹ Zhang Shiping, ‘Heping Fazhan de Zhongguo Huhuan Haiquan’ [Peacefully developing China appeals for sea power], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2010/3 (2010), 112.

²⁰ Information Office of the State Council, ‘China’s Military Strategy’. ‘Open sea protection’ is the official translation of yuanhai huwei in the Chinese version of the document, which can also be literally translated as ‘distant ocean convoy’, which gives perhaps a more precise picture of what the authors of the document have in mid.

²¹ Ibid. ‘Offshore waters defence’ is the translation of jinhai fangyu, which is more clearly translated as ‘near seas defence’ so as to distinguish it from ‘coastal defense’, jinan fangyu, which was rejected by Liu Huaqing (see Nan Li, ‘The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities’).

²² Hu Dongxia, ‘Hu Jintao Guanyu Haifang Jianshe Zhongyao Lunshu Yanxi’ [An analysis of Hu Jintao’s important expositions on maritime defence building], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2012/3 (2012), 62–67.

²³ Feng Liang and Duan Tingzhi, ‘Zhongguo Hauyang Diyuan Anquan Tezheng Yu Xin Shiji Haishang Anquan Zhanlue’ [Characteristics of China’s sea geostrategic security and sea security strategy in the new century], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2007/1 (2007), 23–24.

²⁴ Tang Fuquan and Wu Yi, ‘Zhongguo Haifang Zhamlue Tanyao’ [A study of China’s coastal defence strategy], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2007/5 (2007), 86–97.

²⁵ Fravel and Twomey, ‘Projecting Strategy’.

²⁶ Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing Junshi Wenxuan I [Selected military works of Liu Huaqing, vol. I] (Beijing: Press of the PLA 2008), 291–94.

²⁷ ONI, ‘The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics’, August 2009, <http://fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf>, 8.

²⁸ China’s ‘local war’ concept was engineered in the mid-1980s as Beijing dropped the last remnants of Mao’s ‘people’s war’ strategy (see notably Paul H.B. Godwin, ‘Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine, 1949–1999’, in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein and Michael A. McDevitt [eds], Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949 [New York: M.E. Sharpe 2003], 23–55; Ellis Joffe, ‘“People’s War under Modern Conditions”: A Doctrine for Modern War’, China Quarterly 112 [1987], 555–71; Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military). The concept was remodelled after the end of the Cold War when ‘the outbreak of the Gulf War, as well as a series of military strikes that occurred afterwards and presented high-tech characteristics, shed light on the specificities and developing trends of high-tech local warfare’ (Wang, Zhanluexue, 273).

²⁹ The white paper states, ‘[a] revolution in military affairs is developing in depth worldwide [and] [m]ilitary competition based on informationization is intensifying’ (Information Office of the State Council, ‘China’s National Defense in 2006‘, December 2006, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm>).

³⁰ Zhang Yuliang, Yu Shusheng and Zhou Xiaopeng, Zhanlüexue [Military campaign studies] (Beijing: National Defense University Press 2006), 73; Fan Zhenjiang and Ma Baoan, Junshi Zhanlüelun [On military strategy] (Beijing: National Defense University Press 2007), 304; Dong Xuezhen and Ren Desheng, ‘Lun Xinxihua Tiaojianxia Jubu Zhanzheng de Zhuyao Zuozhan Xingshi’ [On main operational forms of local warfare under informationized conditions], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2010/2 (2010), 19.

³¹ Zhang et al., Zhanlüexue, 24; Dong and Ren, ‘On Main Operational Forms’, 20; Zhang Yu, Liu Sihai and Xia Chengxiao, ‘Lun Xinxihua Zhanzheng de Zhanju Kongzhi Yishu’ [On the art of controlling war situations in informationized warfare], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2010/2 (2010), 24–31.

³² Shen Genhua, ‘Lun Xinxihua Shidai de Hexin Junshi Nengli’ [On the core military capabilities in the information age], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2011/2 (2011), 47.

³³ Zhang et al., Zhanlüexue, 96.

³⁴ M. Taylor Fravel, ‘The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy: Comparing the 1987 and 1999 Editions of Zhanlüexue’, in James C. Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein (eds), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs (Alexandria, VA: CNA 2005), 79–100.

³⁵ Zhang et al., ‘Lun Xinxihua Zhanzheng de Zhanju Kongzhi Yishu’, 50.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Zhang et al., Zhanlüexue, 97–98 (my italics).

³⁸ Ibid.; Deng Feng, ‘Bianzheng Renshi Gaojishu Zhanzheng zhong Yilieshengyou de Wenti’ [Dialectical understanding of the issues of defeating a powerful enemy with a weak force in the high-tech wars], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2004/3 (2004), 107–11; Peng Hongqi, ‘Qiantan Xinxihua Jiaotianxia de Yilieshengyou’ [On the weak defeating the strong under information conditions], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2008/1 (2008), 42–148.

³⁹ Peng, ‘Qiantan Xinxihua Jiaotianxia de Yilieshengyou’, 146 (my italics).

⁴⁰ Tang and Wu, ‘Zhongguo Haifang Zhamlue Tanyao’.

⁴¹ Huo Xiaoyong, Junzhong Zhanlüexue [Science of armed services strategy] (Beijing: National Defense University 2006), 242.

⁴² Tang Fuquan, Wang Qikui and Wang Yudong, ‘Zhongguo Gongchangdang Lingdao Renmin Haijun Jianshe Fazhan Qiben Jingyan’ [Basic experience in building the people’s navy led by the Communist Party of China], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2011/3 (2011), 36.

⁴³ Zhang et al., Zhanlüexue, 507 (my italics).

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 506.

⁴⁶ Liu Yijian, ‘Zhihaiquan Lilun jin Fazhan Qushi’ [Theory of the command of the sea and its trends of development], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2005/1 (2005), 44.

⁴⁷ Zhang et al., Zhanlüexue, 48.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 113–14; Kevin Pollpetter, ‘The Chinese Vision of Space Military Operations’, in James C. Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein (eds), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs (Alexandria, VA: CNA 2005), 340; Huang Jiang, ‘Lun Xiandai Zhihaiquan’ [On modern mastery of the seas], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2003/2 (2003), 26.

⁴⁹ Huang Jian, ‘Lun Xiadai Zhi Haiquan’, 24–29.

⁵⁰ Zhang et al., Zhanlüexue, 526.

⁵¹ Ibid., 509.

⁵² DoD, ‘Joint Operational Access Concept’, n.d., <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf>; Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas, ‘AirSea Battle A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept’, 2010, <http://csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/>; Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press 2013); Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘China’s Anti-access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (2011), 299–323.

⁵³ DoD, ‘Joint Operational Access Concept’, 8.

⁵⁴ On this point, I strongly disagree with the conclusion reached by Taylor Fravel and Christopher Twomey that ‘China’s military strategists appear to accept that intervention would have already occurred, implying that denying access in the first place is not a key focus’ (Fravel and Twomey, ‘Projecting Strategy’, 179; for a thorough critique, see James R. Holmes, ‘China’s Muhammad Ali military strategy’, Real Clear Defense, 18 February 2015, <http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/02/18/chinas_muhammad_ali_military_strategy__107631.html>).

⁵⁵ DoD, ‘Joint Operational Access Concept’, 8.

⁵⁶ A century ago, Julian Corbett’s ‘methods of disputing command’ – which include ‘fleet-in-being strategy’ and ‘minor counter-attacks’ – envisioned such harassing/degradative operations as the best option for an inferior fleet (Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy [Mineola, NY: Dover 2004], 211–34; see also Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age [New York: St Martin’s Press 1984], 15–16). Focusing on land warfare, Sam Tangredi also argues that it is difficult to distinguish area denial from ‘techniques that are historically common to all ground combat’ (Tangredi, Anti-access Warfare, 69).

⁵⁷ This seems to be implied in the Joint Operational Access Concept (Department of Defense, ‘Joint Operational Access Concept’, 8).

⁵⁸ Tangredi, Anti-access Warfare, 69.

⁵⁹ Holmes and Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century; Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press 2010); Lyle J. Goldstein, ‘China’s strange fascination with the Soviet Navy’, National Interest, 23 December 2014, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-strange-fascination-the-soviet-navy-11913>.

⁶⁰ Sergei G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press 1979).

⁶¹ Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, 91.

⁶² Owen R. Coté, Jr, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines (Newport RI: Naval War College 2003), 1.

⁶³ Roger Cliff, ‘Anti-access Measures in Chinese Defense Strategy, Testimony Presented before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission’, 27 January 2011, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT354.pdf>.

⁶⁴ The naval domain should be considered to encompass surface, subsurface, air/space and land-based assets that might have an impact on the command of the sea. As put half a century ago by Laurence Martin: ‘command of the surface increasingly becomes a prize that must be sought elsewhere. Control of both the air and the subsurface is necessary to ensure secure use of the surface’ (Laurence W. Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy (New York: Praeger 1967), 94.

⁶⁵ To state it even more obviously, F-18E/F have a combat radius of 700 nautical miles (approximately 1300 km) and if carriers are stopped beyond this distance from a given theatre they simply become a non-factor in the local equation.

⁶⁶ For more details see Cole, The Great Wall at Sea; William S. Murray, ‘An Overview of the PLAN Submarine Force’, in Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray and Andrew S. Wilson (eds), China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press 2007), 59–77.

⁶⁷ The typical submerged range for a Kilo is 400 miles (700 km) at low speed (3–4 knots), which means that the submarine has to snorkel after a couple of days submerged, making it vulnerable to detection.

⁶⁸ As of 2014, 12 Yuan have been commissioned; analysts anticipate a class of at least 20 units (Saunders, Jane’s Fighting Ships; IISS, The Military Balance 2015).

⁶⁹ ONI, ‘The People’s Liberation Army Navy’, 22.

⁷⁰ DoD, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013‘, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf>.

⁷¹ Murray, ‘An Overview of the PLAN Submarine Force’.

⁷² Konstantinos Psallidas, Clifford A. Whitcomb and John C. Hootman, ‘Design of Conventional Submarines with Advanced Air Independent Propulsion Systems and Determination of Corresponding Theater-Level Impacts’, Naval Engineers Journal 122/1 (2010), 113.

⁷³ ONI, ‘The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions’.

⁷⁴ Andrew S. Erickson, ‘Navy Intel Charts Chinese Sea Change: Office of Naval Intelligence Releases First Unclassified PLAN Report in Six Years’, 9 April 2015, <http://www.andrewerickson.com/2015/04/navy-intel-charts-chinese-sea-change-office-of-naval-intelligence-releases-first-unclassified-plan-report-in-six-years/#disqus_thread>.

⁷⁵ Lyle J. Goldstein, ‘China’s YJ-18 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile: America’s nightmare?’, National Interest, 1 June 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-yj-18-supersonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-americas-13010?page=2>; Michael Pilger, ‘China’s New YJ-18 Antiship Cruise Missile: Capabilities and Implications for U.S. Forces in the Western Pacific’, US–China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, 28 October 2015, <http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%E2%80%99s%20New%20YJ-18%20Antiship%20Cruise%20Missile.pdf>.

⁷⁶ China has also tested a conventionally powered ballistic missile submarine (Type 032), reportedly the largest diesel-electric submarine ever built, which, according to some Chinese sources, will be able to launch the submarine-launched ballistic missile JL-2 and JL-2A, the sea-launched cruise missile YJ-18, the CJ-10A and the future CJ-20A as well as an unnamed anti-air missile (‘Shendu: Jiantan Zhongguo Daodan Shiyan Qianting Fazhan 032 Xing Ke She Fankong Daodan’ [In-depth: discussing the development of China’s submarine missile test, the Type 032 can fire anti-air missile], 30 January 2015, <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2015-01-30/1805820160.html>).

⁷⁷ Bernard Cole joked that Chinese nuclear submarines ‘had in the past … been so noisy that as soon as they left Qingdao, we’d probably hear them in San Diego, relatively speaking’ (US–China Economic and Security Commission, ‘China’s Military and Security Activities Abroad’, 4 March 2009, <http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/3.4.09HearingTranscript.pdf>).

⁷⁸ Saunders, Jane’s Fighting Ships.

⁷⁹ Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, ‘China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force: Insights from Chinese Writings’, in Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray and Andrew R. Wilson (eds), China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press 2007), 195.

⁸⁰ ONI, ‘The People’s Liberation Army Navy’.

⁸¹ Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘China’s “new” carrier killer subs’, The Diplomat, 6 April 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-new-carrier-killer-subs/>.

⁸² People’s Daily, ‘Wo 093G Heqianting Weixie Daxing Zhanjian Ke Jiazhuang dui liu/lu Xunhangdaodan’ [Our 093G can threaten large warship and carry LACM/ASCM], 30 March 2015, <http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0330/c1011-26770075.html>.

⁸³ People’s Daily, ‘Pinglun: 093G Shizhan Keqingqu Chuyun Mingmen’ [Commentary: the 093G could take on [Japanese] Izumo in a real war], 1 April 2015, <http://m2.people.cn/r/MV80XzI1ODA2NTJfMTc4NF8xNDI3ODU1ODEw>; Qiu Yue, ‘China’s 093G SSN threaten large warships and could carry LACM’, China Daily, 30 March 2015, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/micro-reading/mil/2015-03-30/content_13460358.html>; Gady, ‘China’s “new” carrier killer subs’.

⁸⁴ Qiu Yue, ‘China’s 093G SSN threaten large warships and could carry LACM’.

⁸⁵ Some articles speculate on the future addition of a ‘submarine-launched version of the CJ-10’ (Qiu Yue, ‘China’s 093G SSN threaten large warships and could carry LACM’; Gady, ‘China’s “new” carrier killer subs’). Some Chinese sources also mention the possibility of a submarine-launched version of the YJ-62 (‘Shendu: Jiantan Zhongguo Weilai Yuancheng Xunhang Daodan 095 Xing Hejianting Ke Fashe’ [In-depth: discussing China’s future long-range cruise missile operated by the Type 095 SSN], 29 October 2014, <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014-10-29/1615808175.html>).

⁸⁶ ONI, ‘The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions’, <http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/china_media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Interactive.pdf>.

⁸⁷ DoD, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014‘, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf>.

⁸⁸ Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (Washington: National Defense University Press 2014).

⁸⁹ ONI, ‘The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions’.

⁹⁰ Ibid.; D. Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems (London: Jane’s Information Group 2011).

⁹¹ Andrew S. Erikson, ‘Showtime: China reveals two “carrier-killer” missiles’, National Interest, 3 September 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/showtime-china-reveals-two-carrier-killer-missiles-13769>. Ronald O’Rourke points that the maturation of technologies, such as the hypersonic glide vehicle, may add another problematic layer of complexity (Ronald O’Rourke, ‘China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress’, 23 December 2014, 12, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf>).

⁹² ONI, ‘The People’s Liberation Army Navy’, 26.

⁹³ Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, ‘China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile: Developments and Missing Links’, Naval War College Review 62/4 (2009), 87–115.

⁹⁴ DoD, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015’, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf>, 8.

⁹⁵ Gormley et al., A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier.

⁹⁶ ONI, ‘The People’s Liberation Army Navy’, 16.

⁹⁷ Lennox, Jane’s Stragic Weapons Systems, 8.

⁹⁸ Ian Easton, ‘The Assassin under the Radar’, Futuregram 9/5 (2009), 5, <http://project2049.net/documents/assassin_under_radar_china_cruise_missile.pdf>.

⁹⁹ Xu Luming, ‘Zhe jiu shi Changjian-10 Xunhang Daodan Zhenrong?’ [So this is what the CJ-10 really looks like?], Huanqiu, 18 March 2013, <http://mil.huanqiu.com/photo_china/2013-03/2686083.html>. Multiple articles on the People’s Daily website have since confirmed this information.

¹⁰⁰ Lennox, Jane’s Stragic Weapons Systems, 8.

¹⁰¹ Robert Haddick, ‘China’s Offensive Missile Forces: Implications for the United States’, 1 April 2015, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Haddick%20USCC%20Testimony%201%20April%202015.pdf>.

¹⁰² Ian Easton and Mark Stokes, ‘China’s Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments: Implications for Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations’, 23 February 2011, <https://project2049.net/documents/china_electronic_intelligence_elint_satellite_developments_easton_stokes.pdf>, 14.

¹⁰³ Yaogan 9, 16,17, 20 and 25 are in fact triplets of satellites that seem to seem to reproduce the US Naval Ocean Surveillance System (S. Chandrashekar and Soma Perumal, ‘China’s Constellation of Yaogan Satellites & the Anti-ship Ballistic Missile: An Update’, January 2015, <http://isssp.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Yaogan-and-ASBM-January-2015-Report.pdf>).

¹⁰⁴ DoD, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015‘, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf>, 13.

¹⁰⁵ Easton and Stokes, ‘China’s Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments’, 11–12.

¹⁰⁶ On China’s space denial weapons, see Richard D. Fisher, ‘Testimony of Richard D. Fisher Jr before the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Space and Counter-Space Issues’, 18 February 2015, <http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/February%2018%2C%202015_Transcript.pdf>.

¹⁰⁷ Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, ‘Using the Land to Control the Sea: Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile’, Naval War College Review 62/4 (2009), 79.

¹⁰⁸ See ibid. and also, Cliff, ‘Anti-access Measures in Chinese Defense Strategy’, 5.

¹⁰⁹ Erikson, ‘Showtime’.

¹¹⁰ The KD-20 has a reported range of 2500 km, which means that bombers will have to fly (slightly) beyond the range of China’s land-based air defence (Richard D. Fisher, ‘Xi Jinping visit reveals H-6 bomber details’, IHS Jane’s 360, 21 February 2015, <http://www.janes.com/article/49127/xi-jinping-visit-reveals-h-6-bomber-details>). The CJ-20 is the airborne version of the CJ/DH-10 (Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, ‘A Potent Vector: Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments’, Joint Force Quarterly 74/4 [2014], 103).

¹¹¹ Gormley et al., A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier, 103.

¹¹² Shirley A. Kan, ‘Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments’, 26 November 2014, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22570.pdf>.

¹¹³ Information Office of the State Council, ‘The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue’, 21 February 2000, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7956.htm>; John F. Copper, ‘Introduction’, in John F. Copper (ed.), Taiwan in Troubled Times: Essays on the Chen Shui-Bian Presidency (Singapore: World Scientific 2002), 11.

¹¹⁴ James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, ‘China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent’, Joint Force Quarterly 50 (2008), 31–38.

¹¹⁵ Michael Yahuda, ‘China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, Journal of Contemporary China 22/81, 2013, 446–59; Denny Roy, ‘China is playing offense, not defense, in the South China Sea’, The Diplomat, 4 June 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/china-is-playing-offense-not-defense-in-the-south-china-sea/>.

¹¹⁶ Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton 2011).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Yves-Heng Lim

Yves-Heng Lim is an assistant professor in the Department of French Language and Culture, Fujen Catholic University (Taiwan). He is the author of China’s Naval Power: An Offensive Realist Approach (Ashgate, 2014). The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and Dr Thomas Kane for their very helpful comments and critiques on an earlier draft.