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ABSTRACT
The 1981 Defence Review undertaken by John Nott as Secretary of State for Defence controversially and dramatically cut the capabilities of the Royal Navy’s surface fleet. Many of those involved in these decisions have emphasised the budgetary and politico-strategic drivers for these reductions in capability, and the first generation of academic analysis has broadly followed this position. However, recently released government and private archival sources demonstrate that Nott’s review was initially much more severe than thought, and that this was due as much to the presumptions and assumptions of the key decision makers as to any strategic or budgetary factors.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful for the help of the late Lord Howe of Aberavon, and would like to thank the Western Manuscripts department of the Bodleian Library; Andrew Riley and his colleagues at the Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge; the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London; The Naval Historical Branch, Portsmouth; The National Archives, Kew as well as Tim Benbow and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on drafts of this article.
The views expressed here are personal and should not be taken as representing the policy or views of the British government, the Ministry of Defence or the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.
Notes
1 D. Boren, ‘Britain’s 1981 Defence Review’ (PhD dissertation, King’s College London, 1991); A. Dorman, ‘The Nott Review’, Defence Studies i (2001), 113–21; A. Dorman, ‘John Nott and the Royal Navy: The 1981 Defence Review Re-visited’, Contemporary British History xv (2001), 98–120; Andrew Dorman, Defence Under Thatcher (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2002), Ch. 4; John Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow (London: Politicos 2002), Ch. 8.
2 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins 1993), 249–51; John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, Volume 2: The Iron Lady (London: Penguin 2008), 128; Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher, the Authorised Biography (London: Penguin 2013), 660–61; Andrew Beckett, Promised you a Miracle (London: Penguin 2015), 235–38; Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident (Annapolis: Naval Institute 1986), 345–57; E.W. Jackson and E. Bramall, The Chiefs, The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brasseys 1992), Ch.12.
3 These include recently opened government records and the private papers of John Nott, Frank Cooper, Margaret Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe. These new sources add much additional material, which in some important cases present a different picture to that which is set out in the existing accounts.
4 Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, ‘Breaking the Mould, the United Kingdom Strategic Defence Review 2010’, International Affairs 86/2 (2010) 395–410.
5 Philip Dyson, ‘The Limits of Influence: The Treasury, the MoD and the 1975 Defence Review’ (MA dissertation, Kings College London, 2012).
6 [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives, Public Record Office], CAB[inet Office records] 164/1577, Pym to Thatcher, 9 May 1979.
7 Statement on Defence Estimates 1975, Cmnd. 5976 (London: HMSO 1975) 9–10.
8 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Pimlico 1989) 629. Between 1975/76 and 1980/81 spending on defence equipment as a percentage of the defence budget increased from 33.5 per cent (£1.792bn out of £5.346bn) to 40.2 per cent (£4.336bn out of £10.785bn); during the same period spending on personnel decreased from 47.3 per cent (£2.530bn) to 42.0 per cent (£4.527bn) whilst total service manpower had reduced by only 4.7 per cent (346,400 to 330,200). In 1980/81 defence spending in real terms was close to that in 1975/76 (£5.457bn compared to £5.346bn in 1975/76 prices), Statement on Defence Estimates 1980, Cmnd. 7826 (London: HMSO 1980), Vol. 2, 18–19.
9 [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives, Ministry of] DEFE[nce] 4/286, Minutes, Chiefs of Staff, 29th mtg., item 3, 16 October 1979.
10 E. Hampshire, ‘Margaret Thatcher’s First U-Turn, Francis Pym and the Control of Defence Spending 1979-81’ Contemporary British History, 29/3 (September 2015) 359–79.
11 Ibid.
12 [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives] PREM [Prime Minister’s Office] 19/163, Wiggins to Whitmore, 16 Jul. 1980; CAB 164/1555, meeting note 29 September 1980.
13 Oxford, Bodleian Library, Department of Western Manuscripts, Papers of Lord Howe of Aberavon: MS Howe dep. 140, PG/11/76/40, ‘First Draft Report, Public Sector Policy Group’.
14 PREM 19/161, Pym to Thatcher, 10 May 1979.
15 CAB 128/66, CC (79) 17, minute 5; PREM 19/161, Howe to Thatcher, 30 October 1979.
16 PREM 19/163, Lankester to Thatcher, 30 July 1980; note appended to Wiggins to Whitmore, 16 July 1980.
17 CAB 148/183, OD 29 (79), 5 October 1979.
18 DEFE 13/1418, Mottram to PS/Pattie, 9 October 1980; CAB 128/68, CC (80) 38, 4 November 1980.
19 PREM 19/414, Lankester to Omand, 2 January 1981.
20 Boren, ‘Defence Review’, 238–39.
21 [Cambridge: Churchill College Archives Centre, Nott papers, Interview transcript, 1985] NOTT 4/8 file 1 ‘Start of the defence review’ and ‘Defence policy and programmes’; see also PREM 19/415, Nott to Thatcher 16 March 1981.
22 NOTT 4/8 file 1 ‘First weeks [and months at defence]’ 12–14; Boren, ‘Defence Review’ 267.
23 Boren, ‘Defence Review’ 271; [National Archives] FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office] 46/2571, Brief for Carrington, 28 April 1981.
24 Boren, ‘Defence Review’ 272-286, NOTT 4/8 file 1, ‘Defence policy and programmes’ 10; NOTT 4/8 file 4, ‘Discussion, US strategy’ 11–12.
25 FCO 64/2571, Gillmore to Acland, 21 April 1981.
26 FCO 46/2571, Brief for Carrington, 28 April 1981; the 1975 Defence Review had confirmed that the amphibious ships would not be replaced but that they would stay in service through the 1980s, Statement on Defence Estimates 1975, 11.
27 PREM 19/415, Nott to Thatcher, Annex G, 14 May 1981.
28 Ibid, and Annex I of same document.
29 PREM 19/415, Nott to Thatcher, 16 March 1981; DEFE 69/660, Moland to D/DNOR, 23 July 1981.
30 PREM 19/415, Nott to Thatcher, 14 May 1981.
31 PREM 19/415, Whitmore to Norbury, 18 March 1981.
32 NOTT 4/8 file 1, ‘The Invincible story’ 15–16.
33 Nott, Recollections, 231–32.
34 [Portsmouth,] N[aval] H[istorical] B[ranch,] VCNS Papers, box 62, file 10/1/19, Admiralty Board meeting 16 July 1981, item 2. In 1980/81 naval forces (including Polaris) cost £1.461bn, army forces £1.851bn, and RAF forces £1.865bn. These figures exclude reserves, research and development, training and repair facilities; Statement on Defence Estimates 1980, Vol. 2, 21.
35 PREM 19/415, Norbury to Whitmore, 17 March 1981.
36 PREM 19/414, Note for record, 10 February 1981.
37 Boren, ‘Defence Review’, 267; Nott, Recollections, 210–12.
38 Boren, ‘Defence Review’, 144; Nott, Recollections, 222–24.
39 George Baer, One Hundred Years of Seapower (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994), 435; Norman Friedman, US Destroyers, 2nd ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 2004), 369–77.
40 PREM 19/414, Lord Carrington, note for the record, 10 February 1981; see also Richard Hill, Lewin of Greenwich (London: Cassell, 2000), 332.
41 John Nott, ‘The 1981 Nott Review’, Witness Seminar, Institute for Contemporary British History, 2002, 61–62.
42 Boren, ‘Defence Review’, 146–49.
43 Boren, ‘Defence Review’, 153.
44 FCO 46/2572, telegram Henderson to Carrington, 4 June 1981; Baer, One Hundred Years of Seapower, ch. 17.
45 Boren, ‘Defence Review’, 261.
46 Dorman, ‘Defence under Thatcher’ 70–71.
47 Boren, ‘Defence Review’, 252–53.
48 Boren, ‘Defence Review’, 283.
49 Nott, Recollections, 211.
50 PREM 19/414, Note for record, 10 February 1981.
51 ‘The 1981 Nott Review’ 63 and 80; Henry Leach, Endure no Makeshifts (London: Leo Cooper 1993) 198.
52 FCO 46/2571, Logan to Weston, 3 June 1981.
53 Norman Friedman, British Destroyers and Frigates (London: Chatham publishing 2006), 330 and 339.
54 NOTT 4/8 file 1 ‘First weeks’ 17–18.
55 CAB 148/189, OD (80) 9, item 1, 20 March 1980; Defence in the 1980s, Statement on Defence Estimates 1980 Volume I, Cmnd 7826-I, (London: HMSO 1980).
56 PREM 19/162, Armstrong to Thatcher, 18 January 1980.
57 CAB 164/1506, Quinlan to Hastie-Smith, 27 June 1980.
58 PREM 19/415, Nott to Thatcher, 14 May 1981.
59 FCO 46/2575, Jenkin to Nott, 25 November 1981.
60 DEFE 13/1325, Mason to Mulley, 4 January 1979.
61 Nott, Recollections, 223-224; NOTT 4/8 file 4, ‘Air Force in Germany’ 2–10.
62 Dorman, Defence under Thatcher, 39.
63 PREM 19/415, Nott to Thatcher, 14 May 1981.
64 PREM 19/161, Howe to Thatcher, 30 October 1979.
65 Nott, Recollections, 219–20.
66 PREM 19/415, Nott to Thatcher, 14 May 1981.
67 CAB 148/189, OD(80)9, item 1, 20 March 1980; DEFE 4/287, CoS(80)29 item 1, 16 December 1980.
68 NHB ACNS(P) papers, box 61, file 10/1/13/17, Woodward to various, 3 March 1981; ibid. Gretton to PS/ACNS(P), 23 February 1981; ibid. ‘1SL – notes on size and shape’ early March 1981.
69 NOTT 4/8 file 2, 12.
70 Beckett, Promised you a Miracle, 235–36.
71 NOTT 4/8 file 1 ‘First weeks’, 12.
72 NOTT 4/8 file 2 ‘Talk with David Omand’, 3.
73 Nott, Recollections, 233-234; John Nott, ‘1981 Nott Review’, 75.
74 NOTT 4/8 file 1, ‘First weeks’ 15–17.
75 NOTT 4/8 file 3, 12; Nott, Recollections, 213–14.
76 Boren, 257.
77 The Hugo Young Papers, ed. Ion Trewin (London: Penguin 2008), 280.
78 NOTT 4/8 file 1 ‘First weeks’, 13–14; see also, NOTT 4/8 file 1 ‘The Invincible story’.
79 Edward Hampshire, From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic (Farnham: Ashgate 2013) 55, 217.
80 [King’s College London, Liddell Hart Military Archives] COOPER 3/6/15, de la Billiere to Cooper, 11 January 1996.
81 COOPER 3/6/19, Cecil to Cooper, 11 July 1998.
82 Hampshire, From East of Suez, 43.
83 For Cooper and Quinlan as Nott’s most important advisers see John Nott, ‘The 1981 Nott Review’, 35, 50, 66.
84 DEFE 13/1404, Rayner to Permanent Under-Secretaries, 4 June 1979.
85 PREM 19/335, Rayner to Thatcher, 21 December 1979.
86 PREM 19/335, Laughlin to Pattinson, 21 December 1979.
87 PREM 19/161, Note covered by Lankester to Wiggins, December 1979.
88 [Cambridge: Churchill College Archives Centre, Thatcher papers,] THCR 3/3/4, Thatcher to Nott, 19 October 1982; THCR 2/6/2/46, Moore: ‘Aspects of the British defence problem’ 15 June 1981.
89 PREM 19/162, Armstrong to Thatcher, 18 January 1980.
90 Dyson, ‘The Limits of Influence’ 32.
91 The UK Defence Review: The Way Forward, Cmnd. 8288 (London: HMSO 1981).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Edward Hampshire
Edward Hampshire is currently a post-doctoral researcher at the Strategy and Defence Policy Centre of the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London. He specialises in British naval and defence policy since 1945. His first single-authored book was From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic, British Naval Policy 1964-70 (Ashgate, 2013).