Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case

ABSTRACT

Russia, as many contemporary states, takes public diplomacy seriously. Since the inception of its English language TV network Russia Today in 2005 (now ‘RT’), the Russian government has broadened its operations to include Sputnik news websites in several languages and social media activities. Moscow, however, has also been accused of engaging in covert influence activities – behaviour historically referred to as ‘active measures’ in the Soviet KGB lexicon on political warfare. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on how Russia since 2014 has moved towards a preference for active measures towards Sweden, a small country in a geopolitically important European region. We analyse the blurring of boundaries between public diplomacy and active measures; document phenomena such as forgeries, disinformation, military threats and agents of influence and define Russian foreign policy strategy. In summary, we conclude that the overarching goal of Russian policy towards Sweden and the wider Baltic Sea is to preserve the geostrategic status quo, which is identified with a security order minimising NATO presence in the region.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• Soviet
• Sweden
• Baltic Sea
• active measures

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

¹ Steve Abrams, ‘Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin’s Russia’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 15/1 (2016) 5–31; Ilya Yablokov, ‘Conspiracy Theories as a Russian Public Diplomacy Tool: The Case of Russia Today (RT), Politics, 35/3–4 (2015) 301–15; Jessikka Aro,’ The Cyberspace War: Propaganda and Trolling as Warfare Tools’, European View, 15/1 (2016) 121–32; Peter Pomerantsev, ‘The Kremlin’s Information War’, Journal of Democracy, 26/4 (2015) 40–50.

² Harold D. Laswell, ‘The Strategy of Soviet Propaganda’, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 24/2 (1951) 66–78; Mikhail Agursky, ‘Soviet Disinformation and Forgeries’, International Journal of World Peace, 6/1 (1889) 13–30; George H. Bolsover, ‘Soviet Ideology and Propaganda’, International Affairs, 24/2 (1948) 170–80; Zygmunt Nagorski, ‘Soviet International Propaganda: Its Role, Effectiveness, and Future’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 398 (1971) 130–39; Frederick C. Barghoorn, ‘The Soviet Image of the United States: A Deliberately Distorted Image’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 295 (1954), 42–51; David Wedgwood Benn, ‘New Thinking in Soviet Propaganda’, Soviet Studies, 21/1 (1969) 52–63; Myron Rush, ‘The War Danger in Soviet Policy and Propaganda’, Comparative Strategy, 8/1 (1989) 1–9.

³ For more information on the EEAS, see James Panichi, ‘EU Declares Information War on Russia,’ Politico, 27 Aug. 2006, <http://www.politico.eu/article/russia-propaganda-ukraine-eu-response-disinformation/>.

⁴ Max Holland, ‘The Propagation and Power of Communist Security Services Dezinformatsiya’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 19/1 (2006) 1–31; Herbert Romerstein, ‘Disinformation as a KGB Weapon in the Cold War’, Journal of Intelligence History, 1/1 (2001) 54–67; Ladislav Bittman, ‘The Use of Disinformation by Democracies’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 4/2 (1990) 243–61.

⁵ On Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, see Rod Thornton and Manos Karagiannis, ‘The Russian Threat to the Baltic States: The Problems of Shaping Local Defense Mechanisms’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 29/3 (2016) 331–351.

⁶ Before 2014, scholars and observers sometimes distinguished between post-Soviet states (targets of active measures) and Western states (targets of primarily public diplomacy). See: Saari Sinikukka, ‘Russia’s Post-Orange Revolution Strategies to Increase its Influence in Former Soviet Republics: Public Diplomacy po Russkii’, Europe-Asia Studies, 66/1 (2014) 50–66.

⁷ Timothy Thomas, ‘Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 27/1 (2014) 101–130; Bettina Renz, ‘Russia and ‘Hybrid Warfare’’, Contemporary Politics, 22/3 (2016) 283–300; Mark Galeotti, ‘Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear? How New is Russia’s ’New Way of War‘?’ Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27/2 (2016) 282–301; Alexander Lanoszka, ‘Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Ukraine’, International Affairs, 92/1 (2016) 175–195.

⁸ The focus of our paper is not contemporary Russian military doctrines or thinking on security as such, but rather the practices which flow from Russian strategic thinking and established behavioural patterns. For a more detailed description of Soviet military doctrine, see John Dziak, Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice (New York: National Strategy Information Center 1981). For an English language overview of contemporary Russian military doctrine, see Keir Giles, ‘Russia’s’ New ‘Tools’. See also Olga Oliker, ‘Unpacking’.

⁹ N.J. Cull, Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press 2009), 12.

¹⁰ At a seminar at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in May 2016, the head of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Federation Council of the Russia Federation, Konstantin Kosachev, emphasised that European Union policy towards Russia was based on ‘misunderstandings in Western media’.

¹¹ Thomas Just, ‘Promoting Russia Abroad: Russia’s Post-Cold War National Identity and Public Diplomacy’, Journal of International Communication, 22/1 (2016) 82–95.

¹² Russian public diplomacy is similar in its approach to that of other countries such as China, Iran and Venezuela, whose ranking in terms of democracy, press freedom and human rights is lower than or similar to that of Russia’s. They all tend to centralise public diplomacy, even when they create TV networks and news sites in different languages and regions. In the United States or the European Union, where there is more diversity of various mass media, public diplomacy of governments regularly competes with actors such as private business groups and NGOs, whose agendas and views are not necessarily identical. Russian and Chinese TV networks such as RT and CCTV, in contrast, were created with the explicit aim of projecting globally the opinions of their owners, and face no strong competition from alternative domestic broadcasters. See: Christopher Walker, ‘The Hijacking of “Soft Power”’, Journal of Democracy, 27/1 (2016), 49–63.

¹³ Scott Gehlbach, ‘Reflections on Putin and the Media’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 26/1 (2010), 77–87;Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, ‘Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia’, American Economic Review, 101/7 (2011), 3253–85; Miguel Vázquez Liñan, ‘Putin’s Propaganda Legacy’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 25/2 (2009), 137–159.

¹⁴ Olga Oliker, ‘Unpacking Russia’s New National Security Strategy’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 Jan. 2016, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy>.

¹⁵ Sputnik News, ‘Russia at War with Anglo-Saxon Media’ – Putin Spokesman’, 27 Mar. 2016, <https://www.rt.com/news/337335-russia-anglo-saxon-media-war/>.

¹⁶ Stephen Blank, ‘Russian Information Warfare as Domestic Counterinsurgency’, American Foreign Policy Interests, 35/1 (2013) 31–44.

¹⁷ In China, the corresponding military concept is referred to as ‘Three Warfares.’ See Michael Raska, ‘China and the “Three Warfares”’, The Diplomat, 18 Dec. 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/hybrid-warfare-with-chinese-characteristics-2/>.

¹⁸ Romerstein, ‘Disinformation’, 56-67.

¹⁹ Another related concept is reflexive control (upravlenie refleksivnoe). Reflexive control occurs when the controlling organ is able to convey to a target group motives and reasons that cause it to make decisions in a desired direction, the nature of which is maintained in strict secrecy. Reflexion, in this context, is a ‘psychological term that denotes that each opponent bases his decision on a “model” of both himself and his adversary.’ See Clifford Reid, ‘Reflexive Control in Soviet Military Planning’, in Brian Dailey and Patrick Parker, (eds.), Soviet Strategic Deception (Massachusetts: Hoover Institution Press 1987), 294.

²⁰ Keir Giles, ‘Russia’s ’New‘ Tools for Confronting the West. Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power’, Chatham House. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Mar. 2016, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russias-new-tools-confronting-west>.

²¹ ‘The President Signs into Law a New Version of the Military Doctrine 26.12.2014’ (Prezident utverdil novuiu redaktsiiu Boennoi doktrini), <http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/47334>.

²² ‘A New Strategy of National Security of Russia’ (Utverzhdena Strategiia national’noi bezopasnosti Rossii),http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/51129.

²³ ‘Decree of the President of the Russian Federation 05.12.2016 No 646’ (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 05.12.2016 No 646), <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41460>.

²⁴ Geoffrey R. Weller, ‘Scandinavian Security and Intelligence: The European Union, the WEU, and NATO’, Scandinavian Studies, 70/1 (1998) 69–86.

²⁵ J. J. Widen, ‘The Wennerström Spy Case: A Western Perspective’, Intelligence and National Security, 21/6 (2006) 931–958; Petter Wulff, ‘The Impact of a High-Tech Spy’, Intelligence and National Security, 28/2 (2013) 159–180; Weller, ‘Scandinavian’, 69–86.

²⁶ Lars Björlin and Morten Thing, Guldet fra Moskva: Finansieringen af de nordiske kommunistpartier 1917–1990 (Copenhagen: Informations forl 2012).

²⁷ Johan Matz, ‘Did Raoul Wallenberg Try to Leave Budapest in January 1945 with Jewelry and 15–20 kg of Gold Hidden in the Gasoline Tank of his Car? On Sensationalism in Popular History and Soviet Disinformation’, Journal of Intelligence History, 15/1 (2016) 17–41.

²⁸ Martin Kragh, ‘Media Warfare, a Russian Specialty’ (Medial krigföring en rysk paradgren), Svenska Dagbladet, 14 Apr. 2016, <http://www.svd.se/medial-krigforing-en-rysk-paradgren/av/martin-kragh>.

²⁹ Richard Shultz & Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active measures in Soviet strategy (Washington: Pergamon 1984).

³⁰ By Spring 2016, all Nordic language Sputniks had been terminated. Sputnik International has never provided any explanation for its decision.

³¹ Examples of articles we could not categorize include: ‘Flood in Sochi’, ‘NATO to Send Astronauts to Mars’, ‘Nobel Peace Prize to Tunisia’.

³² The two last categories, ‘clickbait’ and ‘human interest’, have no Soviet equivalent. Such categories of articles were presumably included as Sputnik news in order to attract attention of social media users.

³³ The category labelled ‘clickbait/human interest stories’ concern news items such as ‘Putin has started to practice yoga’, ‘Pamela Anderson invites Putin to a meeting’, ‘New-born white lion cubs sunbathing at a Zoo in Crimea’, and ‘A bear in a swimming pool’.

³⁴ Examples of articles critical of the West include: ‘The Crisis of the American Dream’, ‘Sweden in Flames’, ‘EU Cannot Cope with Refugee Flows’, ‘EU Waiting for Armageddon’.

³⁵ Examples of articles on a Western threat against Russia include: ‘US Actions Provoke Tensions in South China Sea’, ‘NATO Missile Tests an Attempt to Scare Russia’, ‘The US is Placing Attack Jets in Estonia’, ‘NATO Forces Near the Border Threaten Russia’.

³⁶ Lasswell, ‘Soviet Propaganda’, 75.

³⁷ Representative articles include themes such as ‘Europe is a paradise – for immigrants’, ‘Europe is dying due to tobacco, alcohol and obesity’, and ‘Merkel’s migration policy broke the EU’.

³⁸ We have chosen to anonymise names of individuals who are not established public figures or decision makers.

³⁹ Andrew Wilson, ‘Four Types of Russian Propaganda’, Aspen Review, 4 (2015), 77–81.

⁴⁰ Laswell, ‘Soviet Strategy’, 74.

⁴¹ Expressen, ‘Espionage towards Swedish Television in Moscow’, (Avlyssning mot SVT i Moskva – Säpo utreder), 15 Oct. 2014, <http://www.expressen.se/nyheter/avlyssning-mot-svt-i-moskva—sapo-utreder>.

⁴² Aro, Jessikka, ‘The Cyberspace War’.

⁴³ Agursky, ‘Soviet Disinformation’, 13–30.

⁴⁴ In the article, we use the terms ‘information landscape’ or ‘information climate’ to denote information appearing in various sorts of media, including established mass media (news papers, radio, TV), social media (Facebook, Twitter), and online forums on the internet.

⁴⁵ The forgeries can be located on the following websites (accessed 8 Aug. 2016): Savchenko forgery: <http://www.svenskpress.se/papers/pressbladet/articles/view/savtjenko-ar-ban-ki-moons-eftertradare>; Ukraine-Holland forgery: <http://www.svenskpress.se/papers/pressbladet/articles/view/ukraina-struntar-i-nederlandernas-opinion>; Germany-Turkey forgery: <http://www.pressbladet.se/articles/view/tyskland-vacker-kurdiska-fragan-for-att-kontrollera-erdogan>; Kaczyński forgery: <http://www.svenskpress.se/papers/pressbladet/articles/view/arftlig-sjukdom-hos-kaczy-ski>; NATO against UN forgery: <http://www.pressbladet.se/articles/view/toppmote-i-warszawa-nato-motsatter-sig-fn>.

⁴⁶ Karin Thurfjell, ‘Sweden Offers to Sell Weapons to Ukraine in Fake Document’, (Sverige erbjuder sig sälja vapen till Ukraina i förfalskat brev), Svenska Dagbladet, 21 Feb. 2015, <http://www.svd.se/sverige-erbjuder-sig-salja-vapen-till-ukraina-i-forfalskat-brev>.

⁴⁷ Doubtingsteven, ‘Sweden has Refused to Disclose Information on Military Crimes of the Ukrainian Army’, 2 Dec. 2015, <http://doubtingsteven.blogspot.se/2015/09/sweden-has-refused-to-disclose.html>.

⁴⁸ Olle Nygårds, ‘Fake Swedish Letter on Russian TV: “Unknown Author”’, (Falskt svenskt brev i rysk tv: ‘Okänd avsändare’), Svenska Dagbladet, 13 Sept. 2015, <http://www.svd.se/falskt-svenskt-brev-i-rysk-tv-okand-avsandare>.

⁴⁹ ‘Sweden Sells Weapons to IS Forgery’ <http://www.svenskpress.se/papers/pressbladet/articles/view/fredsreglering-genom-skapning-av-terrorceller-islamiska-staten-vantar>. See also Patrik Oksanen, ‘Fake Letter from “Daesh” to the Swedish Government’ (Förfalskat brev från ‘Daesh’ riktat mot svenska regeringen), Hela Hälsingland, 7 Apr. 2016, <http://www.helahalsingland.se/opinion/ledare/forfalskat-brev-fran-daesh-riktat-mot-svenska-regeringen>.

⁵⁰ The forgeries can be found on the following websites (accessed 8 Aug. 2016). ‘Forgery on Ukrainian Farms’: <https://cont.ws/post/99338>. ‘Forgery on Polish-Swedish relations’: <http://doubtingsteven.blogspot.se/2015/02/sweden-is-demanded-that-expiation-of_25.html>. ‘Forgery on Westinghouse’: <http://www.pressbladet.se/articles/view/westinghouse-experimenter-i-ukraina-leder-till-katastrof>.

⁵¹ Dagens Nyheter, ‘Fake DN-webpage Used in anti-EU Propaganda’, (Falsk DN-sida använd för anti-EU-propaganda), 30 May 2016, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/falsk-dn-sida-anvand-for-anti-eu-propaganda/>.

⁵² Diana Janse has previously worked for Bildt. In 2010 she was installed as the Swedish Ambassador to Georgia. Since September 2015, she serves as Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Moderaterna, the main opposition party in Sweden, and its party leader, Ms. Anna Kinberg Batra.

⁵³ The Diana Janse forgery has appeared in Swedish, English and Russian (accessed 8 Aug. 2016). Diana Janse Forgery in Russian: <https://cont.ws/post/223633>; Diana Janse Forgery in Swedish: <http://www.pressbladet.se/articles/view/karl-bildt-mellan-fangelse-och-ukrainas-statsministerpost1>; Diana Janse Forgery in English: <https://www.cyberguerrilla.org/blog/e-mail-correspondence-of-odessa-politician-david-chantladze/>.

⁵⁴ To their credit, Bildt’s denial was included in the article as well. The broader issue is the problem of conventional news outlets reporting disinformation at all. Robert Hollender and Mattias Carlsson, ‘Russian Media: Bildt May be Minister in Ukraine’ (Ryska medier: Bildt kan bli minister i Ukraina), Dagens Nyheter, 26 Jan. 2016, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/ryska-medier-bildt-kan-bli-minister-i-ukraina/>.

⁵⁵ See: <http://www.pressbladet.se/articles/view/valkampen-borjar-i-ukraina>.

⁵⁶ The Local, ‘Swedish Man Probed over Ukraine “War Crimes”’, 6 Aug. 2015, <http://www.thelocal.se/20150806/swede-probed-over-alleged-war-crimes-in-ukraine>.

⁵⁷ Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider’s View (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s 1985), 50–52.

⁵⁸ Charles Duxbury, ‘Sweden Ratifies NATO Cooperation Agreement,’ Washington Post, 25 May 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-ratifies-nato-cooperation-agreement-1464195502>. On Russia’s position on NATO, see Alton Frye (2000) The new NATO and relations with Russia, Journal of Strategic Studies, 23:3, 92–110.

⁵⁹ Svenska Dagbladet, ‘Hultqvist Rejects Nuclear Concern’ (Hultqvist avfärdar kärnvapenoro), 9 Feb. 2016, <http://www.svd.se/hultqvist-s-sprids-mycket-desinformation>.

⁶⁰ Jabar Amin et al, ’Shall NATO Be Allowed to Place Nuclear Weapons in Sweden?’ (Ska Nato få placera kärnvapen i Sverige?), Aftonbladet, 22 Feb. 2016, <http://www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/article22295859.ab>; Maj Britt Theorin and Pierre Schori, ’It is Better to Talk to Russia than Join NATO’ (Prata hellre med Ryssland än gå med i Nato), Expressen, 13 Apr. 2016, <http://www.expressen.se/debatt/prata-hellre-med-ryssland-an-nato/>; Anna Ek, ‘Tomorrow We May Take the Final Step to Join NATO’ (I morgon kan vi ta sista steget in i Nato), Aftonbladet, 24 May 2016, <http://www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/article22870846.ab>.

⁶¹ The Local, ‘Sweden Votes Yes to Controversial Nato Deal’, 25 May 2016, <http://www.thelocal.se/20160525/sweden-votes-yes-to-controversial-nato-deal>.

⁶² Michael Winiarski, ‘Russia Issues NATO Warning to Sweden’, Dagens Nyheter, 29 Apr. 2016, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/russia-issues-nato-warning-to-sweden/>.

⁶³ Mikael Holmström, ‘Russia Practiced Nuclear Attack Against Sweden’ (Ryssland övade kärnvapenanfall mot Sverige), Dagens Nyheter, 2 Feb. 2016, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/ryssland-ovade-karnvapenanfall-mot-sverige/>.

⁶⁴ Swedish Armed Forces, ‘Beyond All Reasonable Doubt’ (Utom allt rimligt tvivel), 23 Sep. 2015, <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2015/09/utom-allt-rimligt-tvivel/>.

⁶⁵ Telegraph, ‘Sweden Releases Mystery Submarine Evidence,’ 15 Nov. 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/11232820/Sweden-releases-mystery-submarine-evidence.html>.

⁶⁶ BBC News, ‘Sweden Steps up “Mystery Sub” Hunt off Stockholm Waters’, 20 Oct. 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29686756>.

⁶⁷ Mikael Holmström, ‘Search for Damaged Russian Submarine in Archipelago’ (Skadad rysk ubåt söks i skärgården), Svenska Dagbladet, 18 Oct. 2014, <http://www.svd.se/skadad-rysk-ubat-soks-i-skargarden>.

⁶⁸ Sveriges Radio, ’Suspected Submarine Sound was Swedish Source’ (Misstänkt ubåtsljud kom från svensk källa), 11 Jun. 2016, <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=6451214>; Sveriges Radio, ‘Probable German Submarine in Swedish Waters’ (Sannolik tysk ubåt i svenska vatten), 8 Jul. 2016, <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=6469624>.

⁶⁹ Radio Sweden, ‘Submarine Seen Last Year Thought to be German’, 8 Jul. 2016, <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=6470131>.

⁷⁰ Within a few days, the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Shoigu, proposed a joint Swedish-Russian expedition to investigate the submarine in more detail. Niklas Wiklund, ‘Something Fishy About the Submarine Story’ (Är något skumt över hela ubåtshistorien), Svenska Dagbladet, 7 Aug. 2015, <http://www.svd.se/ar-nagot-skumt-over-hela-ubatshistorien>.

⁷¹ Sputnik News, ‘West Uses Fake “Russian Submarines” to Justify Its Conflict With Moscow’, 16 Jun. 2016, <http://sputniknews.com/politics/20160616/1041466997/west-russian-submarines-moscow.html>.

⁷² The official Facebook account of the Russian embassy in Sweden, 30 Jun. 2015.

⁷³ Anton Shekhovtsov, ‘Russian Fascists Give Money to Swedish Counterparts’, 19 Sept. 2015, <http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.se/2015/09/russian-fascist-militants-give-money-to.html>.

⁷⁴ Alex Gibney, ‘Can We Trust Julian Assange and WikiLeaks?’, New York Times, 8 Aug. 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/opinion/can-we-trust-julian-assange-and-wikileaks.html>.

⁷⁵ For an in depth argument, see Aino Huxley and Jakob Ljungman, ‘Russian Narratives and the Swedish Debate on Foreign Policy’, in Katri Pynnöniemi and András Rácz, eds, Fog of Falsehood. Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs), 200-202. For a somewhat contrarian view, see Stefan Olson, Vilseledning: [kriget i Ukraina i svenska medier] (Stockholm: Timbro 2016).

⁷⁶ Russia’s foreign policy towards Ukraine is blamed on the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. ‘Putin’s behaviour cannot be defended, but perhaps the situation would have looked differently if Carl Bildt – a hawk also by European standards – would have acted differently.’ Åsa Linderborg, ‘We Are No Friends of Putin’ (Vi är inga Putinvänner), Aftonbladet, 19 Mar. 2014, <http://www.aftonbladet.se/kultur/kronikorer/linderborg/article18571565.ab>.

⁷⁷ In total, the two persons have published three articles in Aftonbladet Kultur, and a separate article in Aftonbladet Kultur has promoted their ‘Ukraine Bulletin’, a publication explicitly critical of the Poroshenko government and the 2014 ‘Maidan Revolution of Dignity’, as the best source on Ukrainian politics in the Swedish language. The Facebook group of the bulletin is one of the sources where forged telegrams and disinformation on Ukraine has appeared in the Swedish information climate. After this article was published online, we received heated criticisms from Aftonbladet Kultur. For a summary, see Karin Olsson, ‘The Secret Names in Study of Kremlin Suck-ups’ (Hemliga namnen i studien om Kremlfjäsk), Expressen, 18 Jan. 2017, <http://www.expressen.se/kultur/hemliga-namnen-i-studien-om-kremlfjask/>.

⁷⁸ The most visible promotor of Borot’ba in Sweden has been “Andrei”, a Russian political refugee living in Sweden. He was previously active in the Russian political party Left Front, created by former Russian Member of Parliament, Ilya Ponomarev. According to an account on Ponomarev’s personal website, the Left Front was originally created with the participation of person related to the GRU. There is no evidence linking “Andrei” to any irregular activity, however, and other members of the Left Front have been targets of Russian political repression. On the other hand, one person from the Left Front was also instrumental in the creation of Borot’ba. See Ponomarev, Ilya, ‘We Continue to Argue if the Left is Pro-Kremlin’ (Prodolzhaem razbiratsya, prokremlevskie li levye), 4 Nov. 2014, <http://ilya-ponomarev.livejournal.com/641358.html>.

⁷⁹ RIA Novosti Ukraina, ‘Novorossiya – An Element in the Disturbance of World Order’ (Novorossiia – eta element razrusheniya miroporyadka), 4 Aug. 2014, <http://rian.com.ua/interview/20140804/355630168.html>.

⁸⁰ Anton Shekhovtsov, ‘Boris Kagarlitsky, a Kremlin’s Mole in the Leftist Movement (updated)’, 9 Sep. 2014, <http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.se/2014/09/boris-kagarlitsky-kremlins-mole-in.html>; Workers’ Liberty, 23 Jul. 2014, ’A Popular Front for Russian Nationalism’, <http://www.workersliberty.org/story/2014/07/23/popular-front-russian-nationalism>

⁸¹ Zavtra, ’Yalta Manifesto’ (Yaltinskii Manifest), 17 Jul. 2014, <http://zavtra.ru/content/view/yaltinskij-manifest/>.

⁸² Copylefter, ’Borot’ba and Surkov: Documentary Evidence of Cooperation’ (Borot’ba i Surkov: Dokumental’nye podtverzhdeniia sotrudnichestva), 5 Nov. 2016, <www.medium.com>.

⁸³ David Leigh and Luke Harding, ‘Holocaust Denier in Charge of Handling Moscow Cables’, The Guardian, 31 Jan. 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/jan/31/wikileaks-holocaust-denier-handled-moscow-cables>.

⁸⁴ Mitchell A. Orenstein, ‘Putin’s Western Allies: Why Europe’s Far Right Is on the Kremlin’s Side’, Foreign Affairs, Mar. 25, 2014.

⁸⁵ Patrik Oksanen, ‘Swedish Friends who Support Russia’ (‘Sverigevänner’ som vurmar för Ryssland), Expressen, 31 Dec. 2016,

⁸⁶ The Left Party has issued a statement, arguing that no irregularities regarding their project has been found. See The Local, ‘Claims Left Sent Money to Pro-Russian Rebels’, 11 Mar. 2015, <http://www.thelocal.se/20150311/claims-swedens-left-sent-cash-to-pro-russian-rebels>;Left Party, ‘Ukraine and the Cooperation with Borot’ba’, 11 Mar. 2015, <https://www.vansterpartiet.se/ukraina-och-samarbetet-med-borotba>.

⁸⁷ Avpixlat, ‘Russian Appeal to People of Europe’ (Rysk vädjan till Europas folk), 20 Nov. 2015, <http://avpixlat.info/2015/11/20/rysk-vadjan-till-europas-folk/>.

⁸⁸ An interesting feature of the company, which conducts public procurement projects in Russia, is its lack of any business activity in Sweden; raising the question of why the company was incorporated with Swedish and not Russian statues (Russian law prohibits foreign companies from participating in public procurement).

⁸⁹ The Guardian, ‘May Must Explain Donor’s Links to Russia, Says Labour MP’, 27 Aug. 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/aug/27/may-must-explain-tory-donors-links-to-russia-says-labour-mp>.

⁹⁰ The most well-known case is that of Finnish journalist Jessikka Aro. See Aro, ‘The Cyberspace War’.

⁹¹ For more information on the fact checking website Stopfake, see <www.stopfake.org>.

⁹² Agursky, ‘Soviet Disinformation’, 13–30.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Martin Kragh

Martin Kragh is head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and Associate Professor at the Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He holds a PhD from the Stockholm School of Economics (2009) and specializes in the economic and political history of Russia.

Sebastian Åsberg

Sebastian Åsberg holds an MA in War Studies from King's College London. His main research interests include European and Russian security as well as hybrid warfare and disinformation.