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ABSTRACT
States employ extended deterrence to shield third parties from aggression. The concept is traditionally applied to interstate relations, collective security arrangements, and strategic considerations. The protective relationship that exists between a state sponsor of terrorism and its non-state militant proxy is rarely considered. This article will introduce and explore the sponsor–proxy relationship in the context of extended deterrence, and relate it to Iran’s support and sponsorship of political violence, militancy, and terrorism in Europe. The article reviews the rationale states have for sponsoring terrorism, and illustrates the promises and pitfalls associated with extending deterrence to non-state militants.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to Professors Stefanie von Hlatky and Andreas Wenger for providing feedback on drafts of this article, and to the anonymous reviewers for their comments and recommendations.
Disclosure statement
The author will not benefit in any way (financial or otherwise) from the review and publication of this article.
Notes
1 Bruno Tertrais, ‘The Future of Extended Deterrence: A Brainstorming Paper,’ in Perspectives on Extended Deterrence (Paris: Fondation pour La Recherche Stratégique 2010), 7–8.
2 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Malden: Political Press 2004), 34–7.
3 Patrick Morgan, ‘The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today,’ Contemporary Security Policy 33/1 (April 2012), 92–4.
4 Stefanie von Hlatky and Andreas Wenger (eds.) The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown UP 2015); Nuti, L., and C. Ostermann, ‘Special Issue: Extended Deterrence in Europe and East Asia during the Cold War,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 39/4 (April 2016).
5 Meghan O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and States Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington: Brookings Institute Press 2003); Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2005); Daniel Byman, ‘Passive Sponsors of Terrorism,’ Survival 47/2 (Spring 2005); Daniel Byman, ‘Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31/3 (Feb. 2008); Daniel Byman and Sarah Kreps, ‘Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism,’ International Studies Perspectives 11/1 (Feb. 2010); Zeev Maoz and Belgin San-Akca, ‘Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946–2001,’ International Studies Quarterly 56/4 (Oct. 2012).
6 Deterrence involves persuading an adversary not to act in a certain way. Compellence, a related concept, is meant to persuade an adversary to act in a certain way. The former seeks to protect a given status quo, the latter to alter it. The sponsorship of terrorism can be understood as a challenge to a specific status quo, and hence, a compellent threat. But the relationship between a sponsor and a militant proxy can be interpreted as another, secondary status quo environment, one in which the sponsor hopes to protect its protégé. If so, the logic of deterrence, not compellence, is informative: sponsors seek to deter adversary actions that weaken their proxies, notwithstanding the fact that these same proxies are meant to compel change to another political status quo. I thank an anonymous reviewer for detailing these finer points.
7 Morgan, ‘State of Deterrence,’ 93.
8 Paul Huth, ‘Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,’ Annual Review of Political Science 2 (June 1999), 31–42; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale UP 1988).
9 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale UP 1966), 36.
10 Vesna Danilovic, ‘The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 45/3 (June 2001), 342–3.
11 Elaine Bunn, ‘The Future of US Extended Deterrence,’ in Perspectives on Extended Deterrence (Paris: Fondation pour La Recherche Stratégique 2010), 39.
12 Leopoldo Nuti and Christian Ostermann, ‘Introduction – Special Issue: Extended Deterrence in Europe and East Asia during the Cold War,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 39/4 (April 2016), 477–483.
13 Israel first asked Bulgaria to tighten security around Israeli tourist sites in January 2012. Yaakov Katz, ‘Bulgaria Foils Terror Attack against Israeli,’ Jerusalem Post, 8 January 2012; Nicholas Kulish and Eric Schmitt, ‘Hezbollah is blamed for attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria,’ New York Times, 19 July 2012.
14 Nicholas Kulish, Eric Schmitt, and Matthew Brunwasser, ‘Bulgaria Implicates Hezbollah in July Attacks on Israelis,’ New York Times, 5 February 2013. The US Department of State, ‘Terrorist Designations of Hizballah Operatives Meliad Farah, Hassan el-Hajj Hassan, and Hussein Atris,’ 28 April 2015; European Union, ‘Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton Following the Foreign Affairs Council’ 22 July 2013; Council of the European Union, ‘List of persons, groups, and entities subject to freezing of financial assets and enhanced measure in police and judicial cooperation,’ Dec 2015.
15 BBC News, ‘Hezbollah Denies Argentinian Bomb,’ 11 November 2005; BBC News, ‘Hezbollah hits out after Bulgaria bus bomb report,’ 6 February 2013; Jonathan Gilbert and Simon Romero, ‘Puzzling Death of a Prosecutor Grips Argentina,’ New York Times, 19 January 2015; Jonathan Gilbert, ‘Twisting Inquiry into Buenos Aires Bombing Takes New Turn,’ New York Times, 31 January 2016.
16 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, (NY: Random House 2006), 51.
17 Libya was implicated in the Munich Olympic massacre (1972), the assassination of a US Ambassador in Sudan (1973), the hostage taking at the OPEC gathering in Vienna (1975), the attacks on the Achille Lauro and Vienna, and Rome airports (1985), the bombing of La Bell Discotheque in Berlin (1986), and the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 (1988) and UTA Flight 772 (1989).
18 Oriana Fallaci, ‘Gheddafi Told Oriana “You Massacre Us”,’ Corriere della Sera, 2 December 1979.
19 Alex Wilner, Deterring Rational Fanatics, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2015), 7–11.
20 Bruce Russett, ‘The Calculus of Deterrence,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 7/2 (June 1963), 100–06.
21 BBC News, ‘Hezbollah Chief Nasrallah Meets Ahmadinejad in Syria,’ 26 February 2010.
22 See Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God, (Washington, DC: Georgetown UP 2013) Ch. 3, 12.
23 Byman and Kreps, ‘Agents of Destruction?’ 6–8.
24 Fares Akram, ‘Hamas Leader Abandons Longtime Base in Damascus,’ New York Times, 27 January 2012; Fares Akram, ‘In Break, Hamas Supports Syrian Opposition,’ New York Times, 24 February 2012.
25 Jodi Rudorenmay, ‘Islamic Jihad Gains New Traction in Gaza,’ New York Times, 3 May 2014; Zvi Bar’el, ‘Shunned and Isolated, Hamas Reaches Unprecedented low in Gaza,’ Haaretz, 29 October 2013; Elhanan Miller, ‘Iran Slashed Hamas Funding, Senior Official Admits,’ Times of Israel, 16 October 2013.
26 Paul Huth, ‘Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment,’ Security Studies 7/1 (Dec. 1997); Anne Sartori, Deterrence by Diplomacy, (NJ: Princeton UP 2005), Chapter 3; Alex Weisiger and Karen Yarhi-Milo, ‘Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics’ International Organization 69/2 (April 2015).
27 Danilovic, ‘Sources of Threat Credibility,’ 342.
28 D. Marc Kilgour and Frank C. Zagare, ‘Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence,’ American Journal of Political Science 35/2 (May 1991).
29 See Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (NY: Free Press 2006), 220–57; Martha Crenshaw, ‘Coercive Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism,’ in R. J. Art and P. M. Cronin (eds.), The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, (Washington: USIP 2003), 329–39.
30 Bergen, Osama bin Laden, 231.
31 Elaine Sciolino, ‘An Embodiment of Iran’s long shadow: Missiles for Hezbollah,’ New York Times, 19 July 2006.
32 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran, April 2010.
33 BBC News, ‘Syria “to name Mughniyeh killer”,’ 15 February 2008.
34 Levitt, Hezbollah, 1–8.
35 Ibid., 360.
36 Byman, Deadly Connections, Ch. 2.
37 Alex Wilner, ‘Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Terrorist Proxies,’ Comparative Strategy 31/1 (Feb. 2012), 22–3.
38 Rick Gladstone, ‘Iranian Oil Minister Concedes Sanctions have Hurt Exports,’ New York Times, 7 January 2013; Anthony Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf (Westport, CT: Praeger 2007), 30; O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, 76–9.
39 Speaking of Western forces then stationed in Iraq, an Iranian official warned that ‘we have 140,000 potential hostages.’ International Crisis Group, ‘Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?,’ Middle East Report 38 (2005), 11. Ali Alfoneh, ‘Iran’s Suicide Brigades: Terrorism Resurgent,’ Middle East Quarterly 14/1 (Winter 2007).
40 Levitt, Hezbollah, Ch. 1, 12; Haaretz, ‘Report: Istanbul attack was attempted Hezbollah strike on Israeli envoy,’ 18 July 2011; Amos Harel and Saviona Mane, ‘Istanbul bombing preceded by unusual warnings by Israeli intelligence,’ Haaretz, 19 July 2011; Barak Ravid, ‘Thailand hunting Hezbollah operatives planning terror attacks against Jews, Israelis’, Haaretz, 15 January 2012; Thomas Fuller, ‘In Twisting Terror Case, Thai Police Seize Chemicals,’ New York Times, 16 January 2012; Thomas Fuller and Rick Gladstone, ‘Blasts in Bangkok Add to Suspicions About Iran,’ New York Times, 13 February 2012; Barak Ravid, ‘Man detained in Cyprus was planning attack on Israeli targets for Hezbollah,’ Haaretz, 14 July 2012; Kulish and Schmitt, ‘Hezbollah is blamed,’ 2012; Ely Karmon, ‘Analysis: Iran and Hezbollah’s terror escalation against Israel,’ Haaretz, 22 July 2012; Neeraj Chauhan, ‘Cops name Iran military arm for attack on Israeli diplomat,’ Times of India, 30 July 2012; Joshua Davidovich, ‘Indian police say Revolutionary Guards behind Delhi attack,’ Times of Israel, 30 July 2012; Nicholas Kulish and Jodi Rudoren, ‘Plots are Tied to Shadow War of Israel and Iran,’ New York Times, 8 August 2012; Barak Ravid ‘Report: Israel finds unusually high number of Lebanon, Burgas phone calls made before attack,’ Haaretz, 9 August 2012; Veselin Toshkov, ‘Bulgaria: Investigator of Bomb Attack is Dismissed,’ Associated Press, 7 January 2013; Nicholas Kulish, ‘Hezbollah Courier Found Guilty in Plot to Attack Israeli Tourists in Cyprus,’ New York Times, 21 March 2013; AFP, ‘Cyprus sentences Hezbollah man to six years for anti-Israel bomb Plot,’ 29 June 2015; Matt Levitt, ‘Inside Hezbollah’s European Plots,’ Daily Beast, 20 July 2015.
41 Neeraj Chauhan, ‘Cops name Iran Military Arm for Attack on Israeli Diplomat,’ Times of India, 30 July 2012.
42 American Foreign Policy Council, World Almanac of Islamism, ‘Hezbollah,’ 2013, 7; Levitt, ‘Inside Hezbollah’s European Plots,’ 2015; Yedioth Ahronot, ‘Greece: Police Fear Burgas Style attack ahead of Peres Visit,’ 5 August 2013.
43 Gregory Giles, ‘A Framework for Assessing the Threat of Iranian WMD Terrorism against the United States,’ Testimony, U.S. House of Representatives (Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack), 8 September 2005.
44 Jennifer Knepper, ‘Nuclear Weapons and Iranian Strategic Culture,’ Comparative Strategy 27/5 (Nov. 2008), 452.
45 Frank Harvey and Alex Wilner, ‘Counter-Coercion, the Power of Failure and the Practical Limits of Deterring Terrorism’ in Wenger and Wilner (eds.), Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice, (Stanford: Stanford UP 2012), 95.
46 Anthony Cordesman (with Georg Sullivan and William Sullivan), Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, (Washington: CSIS 2007) Ch. 2, 4.
47 The bus driver, Mustafa Kyosev, was a Muslim Bulgarian, a member of the country’s ethnically Turkish minority. Ilan Ben Zion, ‘Muslim bus driver killed in Burgas bombing Laid to Rest,’ Times of Israel, 21 July 2012.
48 Sofia Globe, ‘Bulgarian television viewers vote Bourgas Airport terrorist attack event of 2012,’ 1 January 2013
49 Asher Zeiber, ‘Don’t let terror scare you away, Bulgarians urge Israelis,’ Times of Israel, 19 July 2012.
50 Clive Leviev-Sawyer, ‘Bulgarian government visit to Israel key to investigation into Bourgas Airport terrorist bombing,’ Sofia Globe, 11 September 2012.
51 Senate of the United States, Resolution 613, 112th Congress (Second Session), 21 December 2012, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-resolution/613/text?format = txt
52 Levitt, Hezbollah, 355–6.
53 Nicholas Kulish, ‘Despite Alarm by US, Europe lets Hezbollah Operate Openly,’ New York Times, 15 August 2012; Douglas Murray, ‘What ‘Hezbollah Political Wing’?,’ Wall Street Journal, 11 September 2012; Justyna Pawlak and Adrian Croft, ‘EU Adds Hezbolla’s Military Wing to Terrorism List,’ Reuters, 22 July 2013.
54 United States of America Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, (2012) Ch. 3; United States of America Department of State, ‘Sanctions on Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security,’ Press Statement, 16 February 2012.
55 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, ‘Canada Closes Embassy in Iran, Expels Iranian Diplomats from Canada,’ Press Statement, 7 September 2012.
56 Stewart Bell and Kathryn Blaze Carlson, ‘Tensions rise as Iran slams Canada’s ‘hostile decision’ to shut embassy,’ National Post, 8 September 2012; Doug Saunders, ‘By Cutting Ties with Iran, We just Shot Ourself in the Foot,’ Globe and Mail, 8 September 2012; Jeffrey Simpson, ‘We need Embassies in Countries like Iran,’ Globe and Mail, 14 September 2012; Michael Posner, Severing ties with Iran ‘stupid,’ Canada’s envoy from 1970s says,’ Globe and Mail, 13 September 2012; Andrew Coyne, ‘What does Canada achieve with its Largely Symbolic Snub of Iran?,’ National Post, 10 September 2012.
57 Government of Canada, Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (S.C. 2012); Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, ‘Canada Lists Both Iran and Syria as State Supporters of Terrorism,’ Press Statement, 7 September 2012.
58 European Commission, ‘Statement by EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmström on the terrorist attack in Burgas, Bulgaria,’ 19 July 2012.
59 United Nations, ‘UN and Middle East partners condemn ‘brutal attack’ on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria,’ 19 July 2012.
60 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the attack in Bulgaria,’ 19 July 2012.
61 United Nations Security Council, ‘Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Bulgaria,’ 19 July 2012.
62 Jerry Mark Long and Alex Wilner, ‘Delegitimizing al-Qaida,’ International Security 39/1 (Summer 2014), 127–8.
63 Alex Wilner, ‘Fencing in Warfare: Threats, Punishment, and Intra-War Deterrence in Counterterrorism,’ Security Studies 22/4 (Nov. 2013), 766.
64 Paul Huth, ‘Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,’ American Political Science Review 82/2 (June 1988), 424. See also Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, ‘What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1990 to 1980,’ World Politics 36/4 (July 1984), 496–526.
65 Uzi Rubin, ‘The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War,’ Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 71 (Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies), 2007; Emile El-Hokayem ‘Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy Relationship,’ Washington Quarterly, 30/2 (Spring 2007); Rafael Frankel, ‘Keeping Hamas and Hezbollah Out of a War with Iran,’ Washington Quarterly 35/4 (Fall 2012).
66 Crenshaw, ‘Coercive Diplomacy,’ 329–39.
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Alex Wilner
Dr. Alex S. Wilner is an assistant professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), Carleton University, Canada. He teaches classes on intelligence, terrorism, national security policy, and strategic foresight. His books include Deterring Rational Fanatics (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015) and Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice (eds., Stanford University Press, 2012). In 2016 he received a prestigious research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) to study cyber deterrence. Prior to joining NPSIA, Professor Wilner held a variety of positions at Policy Horizons Canada, the University of Toronto, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, and the ETH Zurich.