Arming China: Major powers’ arms transfers to the People’s Republic of China

ABSTRACT

The rise of China has been fuelled by a massive military modernisation programme relying, in large part, on the acquisition of foreign military equipment. The question of how the world’s major powers define their arms transfer policies towards China is therefore crucially important. This article makes two original contributions. First, drawing on neoclassical realism, it proposes an explanatory framework integrating international and domestic factors to explain variations in major powers’ arms transfers. Second, based on a large body of elite interviews and diplomatic cables, it offers the first comprehensive comparison of American, British, French and Russian arms transfer policies towards China since the end of the Cold War.

KEYWORDS:

• Major powers
• China
• United States
• Britain
• France
• Russia
• arms transfers
• military modernisation

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

¹ Richard Bitzinger and Ken Boutin, ‘China’s Defence Industries: Change and Continuity,’ in Ron Huisken (ed.), Rising China: Power and Reassurance (Canberra, The Australian National University: ANU E Press 2009); Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2013).

² Tai Ming Cheung, ‘Innovation in China’s Defense Technology Base: Foreign Technology and Military Capabilities’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/5–6 (2016), 728.

³ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ‘Top List TIV tables,’ http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php.

⁴ In this article, ‘arms transfers’ and ‘arms exports’ are used interchangeably. The article focuses on the export of military equipment and articles, i.e., specifically designed, developed or modified for a military application. Exports of dual-use items fall outside the scope of this article. Dual-use refers to commodities, software or technologies that have both commercial and military applications.

⁵ Between 1990 and 2015, the United States accounted for 38.3% of the global arms trade, Russia for 18.8%, France for 6.7%, and Britain for 5.3% (Germany was also in the top 5 arms exporters with 7.2% of market shares) (SIPRI, 'Top List TIV tables'). 

⁶ Besides the P5 states, other countries have also transferred defence equipment to China since the end of the Cold War, notably Ukraine and Israel, but they fall outside the scope of this article. Between 1990 and 2015, Ukraine accounted for 4% of total Chinese arms imports, and Israel for 1% (Israel ceased its deliveries of major conventional arms transfers to China in 2001, which means that over the whole post-Cold war period, its share is lower) (SIPRI, ‘Top List TIV tables’).

⁷ The European Union embargo is a non-binding political declaration, which leaves it open to national interpretation. The British and French interpretations of the arms embargo can be found at SIPRI, Arms Embargoes Database, ‘E.U. arms embargo on China,’ http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/china.

⁸ See among others: Tai Ming Cheung (ed.), Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2014); Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘Reforming China’s Defense Industry: Progress in Spite of Itself?’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (Fall 2007); Richard Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2010).

⁹ James Char and Richard A. Bitzinger (eds.), ‘Reshaping the People’s Liberation Army Since the 18th Party Congress: Politics, Policymaking and Professionalism’, Journal of Strategic Studies Special Issue 39/5–6 (2016). See notably: Tai Ming Cheung, ‘Innovation in China’s Defense Technology Base: Foreign Technology and Military Capabilities’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/5–6 (2016) 728–761; and Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘Reforming China’s Defense Industry’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/5–6 (2016) 762–789.

¹⁰ Hugo Meijer, Trading with the Enemy: The Making of U.S. Export Control Policy toward the People’s Republic of China (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016); Rajiv Nayan, ‘U.S. Policy on Dual-Use Technology Transfers to China’, Strategic Analysis 31/4 (2007) 553–581; Jing-Dong Yuan, ‘United States Technology Transfer Policy toward China: Post-Cold War Objectives and Strategies’, International Journal 51/2 (1996) 314–328.

¹¹ Nicola Casarini, Remaking Global Order: The Evolution of Europe-China Relations and its Implications for East Asia and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009), chapter 6; Jennifer Erickson, ‘Market Imperative Meets Normative Power: Human Rights European Arms Transfer Policy’, European Journal of International Relations 19/2 (2013) 209–234; Hugo Meijer, ‘Transatlantic Perspectives on China’s Military Modernization: The Case of Europe’s Arms Embargo against the People’s Republic of China’, Institute for Strategic Research of the French Military Academy, No. 12 (2014); May-Britt Stumbaum, The European Union and China: Decision-making in E.U. Foreign and Security Policy towards the People’s Republic of China (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2009); Oliver Bräuner, Mark Bromley, and Mathieu Duchâtel, Western Arms Exports to China (Stockholm: SIPRI Policy Paper No. 43 (2015) 55–56.

¹² Robert H. Donaldson, John A. Donaldson, ‘The Arms Trade in Russian–Chinese Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics and Geopolitical Positioning’, International Studies Quarterly 47/4 (2003) 709–732; You Ji, ‘Friends in Need or Comrades in Arms: The Dilemma in the Sino–Russian Weapons Business’, in The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook, ed. Andrew H. Tan (London: Routledge 2009) 52–64; Paradorn Rangsimaporn, ‘Russia’s Debate on Military-Technological Cooperation with China: From Yeltsin to Putin’, Asian Survey, 46/3 (2006) 477–495; Elizabeth Wishnick, ‘Russia and China: Brothers Again’, Asian Survey 41/5 (2001) 797–821; Christina Yeung and Nebojsa Bjelakovic, ‘The Sino–Russian Strategic Partnership: Views from Beijing and Moscow’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 23/2 (2010) 243–281.

¹³ Thomas W. Zarzecki, Arms Diffusion: The Spread of Military Innovations in the International System (London: Routledge 2002), 34.

¹⁴ David Kinsella, ‘The Arms Trade’, in Christopher Coyne, Rachel Mathers (eds.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar Publishing 2011), 220.

¹⁵ Jonathan Caverley, Ethan B. Kapstein, ‘Arms Away. How Washington Squandered Its Monopoly on Weapons Sales’, Foreign Affairs 91/5 (2012) 125–132; Stephanie G. Neuman, ‘Power, Influence, and Hierarchy: Defense Industries in a Unipolar World’, Defense and Peace Economics 21/1 (2010) 105–134; Richard Bitzinger, ‘The Global Arms Trade and the “Hyundaization” Threat’, The Diplomat, 15 April 2015.

¹⁶ Keith Krause, Arms and the State. Patterns of Military Production and Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995). Other exceptions include Neuman, ‘Power, Influence, and Hierarchy: Defense Industries in a Unipolar World’; Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, ‘To Arm or to Ally? The Patron’s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances’, International Security 41/2 (2016) 90–139. See also the 1971 SIPRI typology of arms suppliers. SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1971).

¹⁷ Krause, Arms and the State, 31 and 97–98.

¹⁸ Krause, Arms and the State, 12–18.

¹⁹ Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Modern Realist Theory and the Study of International Politics in the 21st Century’, in Michael Brecher, Frank P. Harvey (eds.), Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2002); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Maryland: Addison-Wesley 1979).

²⁰ On the features of a unipolar international system, see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century. China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position’, International Security 40/3 (2016) 7–53; John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, William Wohlforth (eds.), International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011); Ethan B. Kapstein, Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Unipolar Politics (New York: Columbia University Press 1999); Nuno P. Monteiro, ‘Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful’, International Security 36/3 (2012) 9–40; Nuno P. Munteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014); William Wohlforth, ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’, International Security 24/1 (1999) 5–41.

²¹ Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, International Organization 51/4 (1997) 519–520. See also Michael Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, The American Political Science Review 80/4 (1986) 1151–1169, and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment,’ in Colin Elman and Miriam Elman (eds.), Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2003).

²² Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization 52/4 (1998) 887–917; Ewan Harrison, ‘State Socialization, International Norm Dynamics and the Liberal Peace’, International Politics 41/4 (2004) 521–542; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999).

²³ See Erickson, ‘Market Imperative Meets Normative Power’; Jennifer Erickson, Dangerous Trade Arms Exports, Human Rights, and International Reputation (Columbia: Columbia University Press 2015); Shannon Lindsey Blanton, ‘Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports’, International Studies Quarterly 49/4 (2005) 647–668.

²⁴ On the establishment of Tiananmen sanctions, see Hugo Meijer, ‘Balancing Conflicting Security Interests: US Defense Exports to China in the Last Decade of the Cold War,’ Journal of Cold War Studies, 17/1 (2015), 4–40.

²⁵ Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009); Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics 51/1 (1998) 144–172.

²⁶ Norrin Ripsman, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups’, in Neoclassical Realism, 178.

²⁷ Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, ‘Introduction’, 4.

²⁸ Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996); Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000).

²⁹ Colin Dueck, ‘Neoclassical Realism and the National Interest: Presidents, Domestic Politics, and Major Military Interventions’, in Neoclassical Realism.

³⁰ Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006).

³¹ Eugenio Cusumano, ‘Bridging the Gap: Mobilisation Constraints and Contractor Support to US and UK Military Operations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/1 (2015) 94–119.

³² On Neoclassical realism and threat assessment, see Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2016); Steven E. Lobell, ‘Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model’, in Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, 42–74; Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing’, International Security 29/2 (2004) 159–201.

³³ Total production = (procurement – imports) + arms exports. Export dependence thus is: Arms exports/total production × 100.

³⁴ On the role of asymmetric (inter)dependence as a source of leverage on other states’ domestic politics and policies, see Albert Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press 1945); Harrison Wagner, ‘Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence’, International Organization 42/3 (1988) 461–483.

³⁵ In this case this variable has little influence on the supplier’s behaviour.

³⁶ The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year (FY) 1990 and FY 1991, H.R. 1487, P.L. 101–246.

³⁷ For an extended analysis, see Meijer, ‘Transatlantic Perspectives on China’s Military Modernization’, and Meijer, Trading with the Enemy.

³⁸ SIPRI, ‘Trade registers’; US State Department, Reports pursuant to Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act 1961, FY 1999-FY 2005 https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/reports/655.

³⁹ Interviewed by Hugo Meijer, Washington D.C., 31 July 2013.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Interviewed by Hugo Meijer, Washington D.C., 12 March 2012.

⁴² Interviewed by Hugo Meijer, Washington D.C., 11 September 2013.

⁴³ U.S. Embassy in Italy, ‘Approach to Italian Government On China Arms Embargo: Daylight Between MFA and Prime Ministry Positions,’ Cable from the U.S. Embassy in Rome, Confidential, October 13, Wikileaks Cablegate, 2004. On the U.S. government policy aimed at keeping the pressure on European governments in the 2000s and the 2010s respectively, see also U.S. Embassy in Belgium, 2004, ‘China Arms Embargo: April 2 PSC Debate and Next Steps for U.S.,’ Cable from the U.S. Embassy in Brussels, Secret, April 7, Wikileaks Cablegate; and U.S. Secretary of State, 2010, ‘The E.U. Arms Embargo on China,’ Cable to the US Embassies in the E.U., Confidential, February 17, Wikileaks Cablegate.

⁴⁴ Kristin Archick, Richard Grimmett, Shirley Kan, European Union’s Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for US Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service 2006) 35.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Interviewed by Hugo Meijer, Washington D.C., 3 October 2013.

⁴⁷ The embargo includes: ‘(i) lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles; (ii) specially designed components of the above, and ammunition; (iii) military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms; (iv) and any equipment which is likely to be used for internal repression’, Hansard, cWA11, 4th April 1995, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199495/ldhansrd/vo950404/text/50404w01.htm.

⁴⁸ SIPRI, Arms Embargoes Database, ‘E.U. arms embargo on China’, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/controlling/research/armaments/transfers/databases/embargoes.

⁴⁹ Bräuner, Bromley and Duchâtel, Western Arms Exports, 34.

⁵⁰ For a list of all British transfers of major conventional weapons to the PRC since 1989, see SIPRI, ‘Trade registers’, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

⁵¹ United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement, 2009; United Kingdom Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2009–2010, Cm. 7844, 2010; United Kingdom Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009. Security for the Next Generation, Cm. 7590, 2009.

⁵² United Kingdom Government, ‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review’ (October 2010), 51, 61, 67; and ‘National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom’ (November 2015) 10, 14, 58, 71.

⁵³ Interviewed by Hugo Meijer, London, 24 November, 2016.

⁵⁴ Leo Michel, James Przystup, ‘The U.S. ‘Rebalance’ and Europe: Convergent Strategies Open Doors to Improved Cooperation’, Strategic Perspectives 16 (2012), International Institute for National Strategic Studies, 10.

⁵⁵ Quoted in Michel, Przystup, ‘The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe’, 10.

⁵⁶ See Michael Yahuda, ‘China and Europe: The Significance of a Secondary Relationship’, in Thomas W. Robinson, David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (NY: Oxford University Press 1995); Michel, Przystup, ‘The U.S. ‘Rebalance’ and Europe’, 10; and Doug Stokes, Richard D. Whitman, ‘Transatlantic triage? European and UK “grand strategy” after the US rebalance to Asia’, International Affairs 89/5 (2013) 1087–1107.

⁵⁷ UK Ministry of Defence, Finance & Economics Annual Bulletin Trade, Industry & Contracts Statistics 2016 (25 August 2015), 8, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/mod-trade-industry-and-contracts-2016.

⁵⁸ Bart van Hezelwijk, ‘Licensed Exports to China’, 3.

⁵⁹ Meijer, Transatlantic Perspectives on China’s Military Modernization, 19.

⁶⁰ Interviewed by Hugo Meijer, Washington D.C., 26 March 2012. The CoC was adopted in 1998 by EU member states and contains 8 criteria, including respect for human rights that states must take into account in their export control licencing processes. The negotiations on the European embargo on China entailed strengthening the existing CoC as a precondition for lifting the arms ban on sales to China. See Meijer, ‘Transatlantic Perspectives’; and European External Action Service, ‘Arms export control’, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_en.htm.

⁶¹ Claire Taylor, UK-US Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty, House of Commons Library, International Affairs and Defence Section (17 February 2009) cited in Meijer, ‘Transatlantic Perspectives’, 33.

⁶² See John Dumbrell, ‘The US–UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st‐Century Temperature’, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 11/1 (2009) 64–78.

⁶³ Interviewed by Hugo Meijer, Washington D.C., 31 July 2013.

⁶⁴ SIPRI, ‘Importer/Exporter TIV tables’.

⁶⁵ Aude Fleurant, Sam Perlo-Freeman, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, ‘Trends in international arms transfers, 2015’ (Stockholm: SIPRI Fact Sheet, February 2016) 2.

⁶⁶ The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database covers all international sales and gifts of weapons, including manufacturing licenses, SIPRI, ‘SIPRI Arms Transfers Database – Methodology,’ http://www.sipri.org/databases/yy_armstransfers/background. The discrepancy between SIPRI and French government data stems mainly from the fact that some items are considered as dual-use according to French export control regulations but are considered as military equipment based on the SIPRI definition of arms transfers.

⁶⁷ David Lague, ‘Chinese military’s secret to success: European engineering’, Reuters, 19 December 2013, http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/us-breakout-submarines-special-report-idINBRE9BI0PD20131219. Today, Eurocopter has become Airbus Helicopters.

⁶⁸ Guillaume Belan, ‘AVIC, Airbus to produce 1,000 AC352s’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 2 April 2014.

⁶⁹ French Government, Ministry of Defence, ‘Rapport au Parlement 2015 sur les exportations de la France’, (June 2015) 88.

⁷⁰ European Union, 16th, 15th, and 14th annual reports on arms exports, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_en.htm.

⁷¹ French Government, Ministry of Defence, ‘Rapport au Parlement sur les exportations de la France’, (August 2011 to June 2015).

⁷² French Government, ‘Défense et sécurité nationale. Le livre blanc’ (Paris: Odile Jacob/La documentation française 2008), 34–35,357; and French government, ‘Livre Blanc. Défense et sécurité nationale 2013’, (Paris: Direction de l’information légale et administrative 2013), 34–45, 58.

⁷³ Interviewed by Hugo Meijer, Paris, 14 November 2013.

⁷⁴ Interviewed by Hugo Meijer, Paris, 14 November 2013.

⁷⁵ May-Britt Stumbaum, The European Union and China: Decision-making in E.U. foreign and security policy towards the People’s Republic of China (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2009).

⁷⁶ Airbus is a trans-European group. However, Airbus’s defence sector that was particularly involved in China was that of helicopters. The majority of Airbus’ defence helicopter manufacturing site are located in France (10 out of 31), so Airbus could use the jobs argument vis-à-vis the French government. Airbus Helicopters, Global Presence, http://www.airbushelicopters.com/website/en/ref/Global-Presence_93.html.

⁷⁷ Eugene Kogan, The European Union Defense Industry and the Appeal of the Chinese Market, Studien und Berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik, No. 1 (Vienna: Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie 2005), 28.

⁷⁸ Thales Group, Annual Reports 2004, 2005, 2006. Figures provided include both civilian and defence exports; Airbus Group (EADS), Annual Reports 2004, 2005 2006. Figures provided include both civilian and defence exports.

⁷⁹ Meijer, ‘Transatlantic Perspectives on China’s Military Modernization’, 34.

⁸⁰ French Ministry of Defence official, interviewed by Hugo Meijer, Paris, 10 September 2013.

⁸¹ Interviewed by Hugo Meijer, Paris, 24 July 2013.

⁸² Interviewed by Hugo Meijer, Paris, 24 July 2013.

⁸³ Linda Jakobson, et al, China’s Energy and Security Relations with Russia: Hopes, Frustrations and Challenges (Stockholm: SIPRI Policy Paper No. 29 October 2011).

⁸⁴ SIPRI, ‘Arms Transfers Database’. The period 1992–2015 is utilised to correspond with Russian as opposed to Soviet arms exports.

⁸⁵ For a list of transfers of major conventional weapons from Russia to China, see: SIPRI, ‘Arms Transfers Database’.

⁸⁶ ‘Joint Declaration by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation: Adopted at Beijing on 25 April 1996’, 2 May 1996, United Nations General Assembly, A/51/127, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/51/plenary/a51-127.htm>; and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation’, 24 July 2001, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm>.

⁸⁷ ‘China–Russia relations at their best: Ambassador’, Xinhua, 26 September 2010, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-09/26/c_13530762.htm>.

⁸⁸ Articles 79–80 of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 outline Russia’s official aims for the relationship with China. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’, Approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on February 12, 18 February 2013, 2013, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186.

⁸⁹ Jakobson et al, 2011, pp. 11–12.

⁹⁰ Bobo Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder (London: Chatham House and Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 2015) 132–64; Rangsimaporn Paradorn, ‘Russia’s debate on Military-Technological Cooperation with China: From Yeltsin to Putin’, Asian Survey 46 (May/June 2006) 487–8.

⁹¹ Aleksandr Lukin, ‘Russian-Chinese Relations: Keeping up the Pace’, International Affairs (Moscow) 56/1 (January 2011) 25–8

⁹² ‘Наглый Восток’ [The impudent East], Gazeta.ru, 8 July 2010, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2010/07/08_a_3396043.shtml.

⁹³ This case is discussed in Cheung’s ‘Innovation in China’s Defense Technology Base’, 749.

⁹⁴ ‘Russia cancels sale of Su-33 fighters to China to prevent their pirate copies’, Pravda, 10 March 2009.

⁹⁵ Aleksandr Gabuev, ‘[Russian arms took up defensive positions in China]’, Kommersant, 12 December 2008; Zachray Keck, ‘Putin approves sale of S-400 to China’, The Diplomat, 11 April 2014.

⁹⁶ Sergei Ptichkin and Igor Chernyak, ‘[China came close to buying Su-33]’, Rossisskaya gazeta, 13 November 2014.

⁹⁷ Antonio Sánchez-Andrés, ‘Arms exports and restructuring in the Russian defence industry’, Europe-Asia Studies, 56/5 (2004) 687–706.

⁹⁸ Julian Cooper, Russian Military Expenditure: Data, Analysis and Issues (Stockholm, Sweden: FOI Report FOI-R – 3688-SE September 2013).

⁹⁹ Perlo-Freeman, Sam, Wezeman, Pieter D., ‘The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies, 2012’, SIPRI Yearbook 2014: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014) 206–7.

¹⁰⁰ SIPRI, ‘Importer/Exporter TIV tables’, See also: Bettina Renz, Rod Thornton, ‘Russian Military Modernization: Cause, Course, and Consequences’, Problems of Post-Communism 59/1 (2012) 46; Keir Giles, ‘A New Phase in Russian Military Transformation’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27/1 (2014).

¹⁰¹ ‘France suspends Mistral warship delivery to Russia’, France 24, 4 September 2014, <http://www.france24.com/en/20140903-france-suspends-plans-first-mistral-helicopter-carrier-russia>.

¹⁰² European Union, Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, Official Journal of the European Union, L229, 31 July 2014, 13–17; U.S. Department of State, ‘Ukraine and Russia Sanctions’, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/.

¹⁰³ Kashin, Vassily, ‘Industrial cooperation: path to confluence of Russian and Chinese economies’, Russia in Global Affairs, 18 April 2016.

¹⁰⁴ Russia’s draft budget bill for 2017 projected a 27% reduction in the defence budget. Kathrin Hill, ‘Russia prepares for deep budget cuts that may even hit defence’, Financial Times, 30 October 2016.

¹⁰⁵ Wendell Minnick, 'S-400 strengthens China’s hands in the skies', Defence News, April 18, 2015.

¹⁰⁶ Gleb Stolyarov, 'Russia, China sign contract worth over $2 billion for Su-35 fighter jets: source', Reuters, November 19, 2015.

¹⁰⁷ Todd Sandler, Keith Hartley, Handbook of Defense Economics, 2: Defense in a Globalized World (Amsterdam/Oxford: North Holland/Elsevier 2007); Mark R. Devore, ‘Arms Production in the Global Village: Options for Adapting to Defense-Industrial Globalization’, Security Studies 22/3 (2013) 532–572.

¹⁰⁸ Richard A. Bitzinger, Towards a Brave New Arms Industry? (New York: Routledge Adelphi Paper 356, 2003) 74–75.

¹⁰⁹ See footnote 20.

¹¹⁰ Britain has stopped reporting on the value of its actual arms exports since 2007.