Indications and warning in Belgium: Brussels is not Delphi

ABSTRACT

The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium of 2015–2016 that occurred while these countries were in a heightened state of alert raise questions about indications and warning methodology as well as effectiveness of the blanket-protection deployment of security services assisted even by the military. Response and perhaps even more anticipation may require strategic rethinking in light of the predatory attacks that target the most vulnerable spots of the public space. This study looks at threat analysis in Belgium as conducted through her intelligence fusion centre Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA)​​​​​​ since its inception in 2006. With a special focus on what is known, at the time of writing, about the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, this study hopes to put into context how the system (mal)functions and will also consider the preventive measures that respond to the threat, and the international aspects which have implications far beyond Belgian borders. Therefore, a case is made for not just a Belgian homeland security framework, but one that fits into an EU-wide security concept.

KEYWORDS:

• Belgium
• terrorist attacks and counterterrorism
• indications and warning
• intelligence and threat analysis
• homeland security strategy

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Erratum

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.​​​​​​

Notes

¹ When, frightened by so many deaths, they found no mortal efforts, nor the arts, to any avail, they sought the aid of heaven. They travelled to the center of the world, Delphi, Apollo’s oracle, so his response might aid their distress and end the city’s pains. While ground, and laurel and the arrows the god hung there quivered, the tripod gave this answer from the deep recesses of the sanctuary, which stirred their trembling hearts: ‘What you seek here, Romans, you should look for nearer you. So seek it nearer, and now, for it is not Apollo who will relieve you’. [author’s translation]

² Cicero, On Old Age. On Friendship. On Divination, trans. W.A. Falconer, Loeb Classical Library 154 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1923). See Rose Mary Sheldon, Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome: Trust in the Gods but Verify (London: Routledge 2005).

³ Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence. From Secrets to Policy, 5th ed. (Washington DC: SAGE 2012), 144.

⁴ Standing Review Committee I of the Intelligence and Security Services, Verslag naar het onderzoek betreffende de opvolging van het radicale islamisme door de inlichtingendiensten [Review report concerning the follow-up of radical Islamism by the intelligence services] (Brussels 2007), 7, 68. Thomas Renard, ‘Bilateral, European and Global: The 3 External Layers of Belgium’s Counterterrorism Policy’, in Thomas Renard (ed.), Counterterrorism in Belgium: Key Challenges and Policy Options, Egmont Paper 89 (Brussels: Egmont Institute 2016), 58–72; Philippe De Baets, ‘Terrorisme en inlichtingendiensten’ [Terrorism and intelligence services] in M. Cools, K. Dassen, R. Libert and P. Ponsaers (eds.), De Staatsveiligheid. Essays over 175 jaar Veiligheid van de Staat [The State Security: Essays on 175 Years of the Security Service] (Brussels: Politeia 2005), 250–256.

⁵ Warren H. Fishbein, and Gregory F. Treverton, ‘Rethinking “Alternative Analysis” to Address Transnational Threats’, Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers 3, nr. 2 (2004), 2–3.

⁶ This study stages a number of Belgian players, whose acronyms are used throughout the article. They are:OCAD: Orgaan voor de Coördinatie van de Analyse van de Dreiging – known in French as OCAM: Organe de Coordination pour l’Analyse de La Menace = Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis: fusion centre;VSSE: Veiligheid van de Staat – Sûreté de l’Etat = State Security: civil security service;ADIV: Algemene Dienst Inlichtingen en Veiligheid – Service Général de Renseignement et de Securité = General Intelligence and Security Service: military intelligence;LIVC: Lokale Integrale Veiligheidscel = Local Integral Security Cell: local level body information exchange platform of local actors (social services, police, municipal authorities) dealing with or encountering radicalisation;FPS: Federal Public Service (= FOD: Federale Overheidsdienst): ministerial department;AGG: Anti-terroristische Gemengde Groep = Anti-Terrorist Mixed Group: OCAD’s predecessor.

⁷ Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Unsecure World (Cambridge: Polity 2012), 74; David Omand, Securing the State (London: Hurst 2010), 41–45; Standing Committee I, Fusion Centres throughout Europe (Antwerp: Intersentia 2010).

⁸ France Lemeunier, ‘Counterterrorism Financing in Belgium: A New Perspective’ in Renard (ed.), Counterterrorism in Belgium, 44.

⁹ If the centre were to act as a collection agency in its own right there would be a great deal of unnecessary duplication and the assessment process would be crippled by turf battles, as the OCAD would be encroaching on the territory of the established intelligence services. They (VSSE and ADIV) are the main partners, along with federal and local police, customs administration, the alien police, the FPS Transportation, and the FPS Foreign Affairs.

¹⁰ Standing Committee I, ‘Activity Report 2007’, 51; ‘Activity Report 2011’, 32.

¹¹ Evaluations are issued as not urgent, routine, urgent, and flash which implies their dissemination within respectively 30 days, 10 days, 3 days, or 24 h.

¹² Kingdom of Belgium, Koninklijk Besluit van 28 November 2006 tot uitvoering van de wet van 10 juli 2006 betreffende de analyse van de dreiging [Royal Decree of 28 November 2006 Pertaining to the Execution of the Law of 10 July 2006 Concerning Threat Analysis], arts. 2, 8, 11. Standing Committee I, ‘Activity Report 2007’ (Antwerp: Intersentia 2008), 46. Lionel Delval, ‘Société du risque et gestion des crises: Les pouvoirs publics belges sont-ils organises pour faire face à un risque majeur? Type de risque: Menace terroriste’ [Risk society and crisis management: Are the Belgian authorities able to meet a major risk? Risk type: Terrorism] in M. Cools, P. Leroy, R. Libert, V. Pashley, D. Stans, E. Testelmans and K. Van Acker (eds.), 1915–2015: Het verhaal van de Belgische militaire inlichtingen – en veiligheidsdienst [The story of the Belgian military intelligence and security service] (Antwerp: Maklu 2015), 426–427; Wauter Van Laethem, ‘Het Coördinatieorgaan voor de dreigingsanalyse: Een punctuele analyse’ [The Coordination Organ for Threat Analysis: A punctual analysis], Vigiles XIII, 2007, 115–116.

¹³ Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for Justice, 52nd Session, 2009, H. Doc. CRIV52/COM490, 1–3; Commission for the Interior, 52nd Session, 2009, H. Doc. CRIV52/COM491, 7–8; Crisis Centre of the Federal Public Service Interior, ‘Activity Report 2015’, 9. ‘“Early Warning System” verspreidde 19 berichten over terrorismedreiging in 2010’ [‘Early Warning System’ spread 19 terror threat bulletins in 2010], Het Laatste Nieuws, 31 May 2011. Since 2015 a separate EWS is being designed by the Centre for Cyber Security in Belgium to detect threats, vulnerabilities and incidents in the cyber realm: Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for the Interior, 54th Session, 2015, H. Doc. CRIV54/274, 8–12. See for the practice in the UK Frank Gregory, ‘Private Sector Roles in Counter-terrorism’ in Paul Wilkinson (ed.), Homeland Security in the UK. Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attack since 9/11 (London: Routledge 2007), 321–330.

¹⁴ Herman Matthijs, ‘Intelligence Services in Belgium’ Intelligence and National Security 23 (2008), 572–573; Danny Stevens, ‘Van Antiterroristische Gemengde Groep naar Coördinatie-orgaan voor dreigingsanalyse’ [From Antiterrorist Mixed Group to Coordination Organ for Threat Analysis] in Herman Matthijs (ed.), Geheime diensten in België, de Verenigde Staten en over de wereld [Secret Services in Belgium, the United States and across the world] (Bruges: Die Keure 2006), 39–48.

¹⁵ Kingdom of Belgium, Wet van 10 juli 2006 betreffende de analyse van de dreiging [Law of 10 July 2006 concerning threat analysis], art. 6: ‘Without prejudice towards binding international obligations, the supporting services are obligated to communicate, officially or on demand by the OCAD director, within the timeframes and along the modalities determined by the King, all intelligence of which they dispose as part of their legal missions and which is relevant to fulfil the tasks determined by article 8’ (translated by the author).

¹⁶ Standing Committee I, Activity Report 2007, 6–9, 46. Lars Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid. Onderzoek naar een schimmige overheidsdienst [The secrets of the State Security. Investigation into a shady government service] (Tielt: Lannoo 2015), 224; Matthijs, ‘Intelligence Services’, 573–574; Van Laethem, ‘Coördinatieorgaan’, 121–123. See on liaison and ORCON Lowenthal, Intelligence, 105–106, 167.

¹⁷ Standing Committee I, ‘Activity Report 2011’ (Antwerp: Intersentia 2012), 29. Van Laethem, ‘Coördinatieorgaan’, 127. Envy: Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, 274. Gunthram F.A. Werther, ‘Fusion Centers and Beyond: The Future of Intelligence Assessment in an Information-Deluged Era’ in Gregory K. Logan (ed.), Homeland Security and Intelligence (Oxford: Praeger 2010), 208–209; Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence, 52.

¹⁸ See 'For Belgian Eyes Only: Intelligence Cooperation in Belgium', International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30 (2017); and ‘Intelligence and Security in Belgium: A Normative Approach from the Historical Perspective’ (forthcoming).

¹⁹ Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, 223; Herman Matthijs, ‘Het jaar van de Veiligheid van de Staat’, [The Year of the State Security], in Matthijs (eds.), Geheime diensten in België, 19–20.

²⁰ Belgian Senate and Chamber of Representatives, Session 52, S Doc. 4–872/1 – H Doc. 1385/1, 2008, Gemeenschappelijk toezichtsverslag van het Vast Comité P en het Vast Comité I betreffende het coördinatieorgaan voor de dreigingsanalyse (OCAD) [Joint Review of the Standing Committee P and the Standing Committee I pertaining to the Coordination Organ for Threat Analysis (OCAD)]; Standing Committee I, ‘Activity Report 2008’ (Antwerp: Intersentia 2009), 9–22. ‘Terreurdreiging na ontsnappingspoging Trabelsi’ [Terror threat after Trabelsi escape attempt], De Morgen, 21 December 2007; Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, 226.

²¹ Senate and Chamber, Joint Review OCAD, pp. 8, 17, 32–34, 38, 43–44, 51, 57 (quoting from pp. 43–44 in translation by the author). About validation, see Omand, Securing the State, 140–146.

²² Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence, 32–35, 57.

²³ Standing Committee I, ‘Activity Report 2008’, 39.

²⁴ See Christoph Meyer, ‘International Terrorism as a Force of Homogenization? A Constructivist Approach to Understanding Cross-National Threat Perceptions and Responses’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22 (2009), 648–650.

²⁵ Senate and Chamber, Joint Review OCAD, 21, 52–53. Observation on secrecy: Georges Timmerman, ‘Pers en inlichtingendiensten: Een onmogelijke relatie?’ [The press and the intelligence services: An impossible relationship?] in Herman Matthijs (ed.), Geheime diensten. Tomorrow never Dies (Bruges: Die Keure 2008), 38. See the statements made by the then minister of Justice on the showmanship criticism: Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for Justice, 52nd Session, 2008, H. Doc. CRIV52/COM402, 45–46.

²⁶ Standing Committee I, ‘Activity Report 2008’, 14.

²⁷ ‘Intelligence success in the short and long terms may be simply in contriving that nothing happens:’ Michael Herman, ‘Counter-Terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change’, Intelligence and National Security 18 (2003), 42.

²⁸ Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence, 50.

²⁹ Standing Committee I, ‘Activity Report 2015’ (Antwerp: Intersentia 2016), 34–37; Activity Report 2011, 25–33; ‘Activity Report 2012’, 37. An example of a commission of an OCAD evaluation by VSSE: ‘Activity Report 2014’ (Antwerp: Intersentia 2015), 54–56.

³⁰ Standing Committee I, ‘Activity Report 2015’, 47. ‘OCAD-topman André Vandoren stapt op’ [OCAD chief André Vandoren resigns], De Standaard, 29 September 2015. Bové, De geheimen van de Staatsveiligheid, 225.

³¹ William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 4, Scene v, 79.

³² Standing Committee I, ‘Activity Report 2015’, 21–22; Standing Commitee I, Verslag opvolging van het radicale islamisme 54–56, 63, 67; Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for the Interior, 53rd Session, 2014, H. Doc. CRIV53/COM925, 16–17. See Edwin Bakker and Roel de Bont, ‘Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012–2015): Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Syria and Iraq’ in Small Wars & Insurgencies 27 (2016), 837–851.

³³ Veiligheid van de Staat, Jaarverslag 2010 [Activity report] (Brussels 2011), 46.

³⁴ Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for Justice, 53rd Session, 2013, H. Doc. CRIV53/COM703, 7–8; Belgian Senate, Commission for the Interior, Session 2013, S. Doc. 5-216COM, 22–28; Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Proceedings, 53rd Session, 2013, H. Doc. CRIV53/PLEN703, 19–22 Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for Justice, 53rd Session, 2013, H. Doc. CRIV53/COM795, 26. Delval, ‘Société du risque et gestion des crises’ 439; Kristof Clerix, ‘Hoe de overheid teruggekeerde Syriëstrijders opvolgt’ [How authorities follow up on returned Syrian fighters] at, <http://www.mo.be/analyse/hoe-de-overheid-teruggekeerde-syri-strijders-opvolgt>, consulted on 18 September 2015.

³⁵ Lars Bové, ‘We hebben in België zes aanslagen verijdeld’ [We foiled six attacks in Belgium] De Tijd, 27 December 2016. The security service VSSE generated thousands of intelligence reports: Lars Bové, ‘Hoe goed werken onze geheime diensten?’ [How well do our secret services function?], De Tijd, 21 November 2015. On 15 June 2016 the Minister of Justice provided these numbers about terrorism convictions: in 2011 two, in 2012 13, in 2014 55, in 2015 117 and in 2016 up until that point 79. In these case files around 400 persons warranted attention: Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for Justice, 54th Session, 2016, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM444, 23.

³⁶ ‘Eerste aanslag door Syriëstrijder in Brussel zorgt voor ongerustheid’ [First attack by Syria-fighter in Brussels causes worry], Knack, 2 June 2014; Jill Casters, ‘“Dader aanslag Joods Museum was geen lone wolf”’ [Jewish Museum attacker was no lone wolf], De Morgen, 3 June 2014.

³⁷ Kingdom of Belgium, ‘31 januari 2014. Ministeriële omzendbrief GPI78 betreffende de informatieverwerking ten voordele van een geïntegreerde aanpak van terrorisme en gewelddadige radicalisering door de politie’ [Ministerial circular GPI78 concerning the processing of information to benefit an integrated approach of terrorism and violent radicalisation by the police], Belgian Official Journal 184, 13,028–13,032; Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Joint Commissions for Justice, National Defence and the Interior, 54th Session, 2015, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM066, 9; Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for Justice, 54th Session, 2015, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM159, 2. Union of Flemish Cities and Municipalities (VVSG), ‘Dossier: Organen en maatregelen in de strijd tegen radicalisme’ [Dossier: organs and means in the fight against radicalism], Newsletter 2016/01, 13–14.

³⁸ An overview of the inertia in Belgian security policy at top level, also with reference to the Paris and Brusssels attacks, is given in ‘For Belgian Eyes Only: Intelligence Cooperation in Belgium’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30 (2017).

³⁹ Chamber, Joint Commissions for Justice, National Defence and the Interior, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM066, 4, 6, 56; ‘16 jaar cel voor leiders terreurcel’ [16-year sentence for leaders terror cell], De Standaard, 7 Jul. 2016; Elise Vincent, ‘Dernière conversation de djihadistes avant l’assaut’ [Jihadis’ final conversation before the raid], Le Monde, 15 January 2016, 12.

⁴⁰ Chamber, Joint Commissions for Justice, National Defence and the Interior, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM066, 7–12. Three months later, most of the 12 measures still had to materialise: Chamber, Commission for Justice, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM159, 10. Vincent Seron and Sophie André, ‘30 Measures against Terrorism: Penal Populism between Expected Efficiency and Potential Collateral Damage’ in Renard (ed.), Counterterrorism in Belgium, 10–14.

⁴¹ Chamber, Joint Commissions for Justice, National Defence and the Interior, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM066, 26, 69; Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for Justice, 54th Session, 2015, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM259, 19–22; Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Joint Commissions for Justice and the Interior, 54th Session, 2015, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM285, 6–9, 13–16, 19–22, 28–30, 33–35.

⁴² ‘Exclusif: Voici le SMS qui a plongé Bruxelles dans la terreur!’ [Exclusive: This is the sms that plunged Brussels into fear], La Dernière Heure, 5 December 2015.

⁴³ Crisis Centre, ‘26.11.2015: Dreigingsniveau 3 voor het hele land – Waakzaamheid tegen terrorisme blijft’ [Threat level 3 for the whole nation – increased vigilance against terrorism remains in effect] on, <http://crisiscentrum.be/news/crisisbeheer/dreigingsniveau-3-voor-het-hele-land-waakzaamheid-tegen-terrorisme-blijft>, consulted on 18 September 2016. Joris Truyts, ‘Jambon: “We zijn die zondagavond door het oog van de naald gekropen” [We went through the eye of the needle that Sunday night] on <http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws/binnenland/1.2523500>, consulted on 18 September 2016.

⁴⁴ Crisis Centre, Activity Report 2015, 10 and the threat bulletins on <www.crisiscentrum.be/news?page=5>, consulted on 18 September 2016.

⁴⁵ Crisis Centre, ‘29.12.2015: Verfijning dreigingsanalyse en maatregelen’ [Refinement of threat analysis and measures] on, <http://crisiscentrum.be/news/crisisbeheer/verfijning-dreigingsanalyse-en-maatregelen>, consulted 18 September 2016; French National Assembly, Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015 [Report in the name of the committee of inquiry pertaining to the means used by the State to combat terrorism since 7 January 2015], 40th Session, 2016, Doc. n°3922–1, 134.

⁴⁶ Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for the Interior, 54th Session, 2016, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM358, 8; Commission for Justice, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM335, 31, 36–38.

⁴⁷ Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Joint Commissions for Justice and the Interior, 54th Session, 2016, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM373, 2–5, 16, 48, 52, 59, 62. Foreign Minister Didier Reynders was speaking at the German Marshall Fund Brussels Forum on 20 March when he provided details about the interrogation of Abdeslam. The transcript of his statements is to be found on, <http://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Plenary8DegradeDestroy.pdf> (pages 2–3). Marjan Justaert, ‘“‘Nee, wij hadden geen info die aanslag op 22/3 had kunnen voorkomen”’ [No, we had no information that could have prevented the 22/3 attack], De Standaard, 4 October 2016.

⁴⁸ Peter Hennessy, ‘From Secret State to Protective State’, in Hennessy, Peter (ed.), The New Protective State. Government, Intelligence and Terrorism (Continuum: London 2007), 37.

⁴⁹ Glenn Hastedt, ‘The Politics of Intelligence Accountability’, in Johnson (eds.), Handbook of National Security Intelligence, 727–729; Mark Lowenthal, ‘Towards a Reasonable Standard for Analysis: How Right, How Often on Which Issues?’, Intelligence and National Security 303; Richards J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence 1999), 132, 161–172.

⁵⁰ See Paul Pillar’s critique of the 9/11 Commission staff in ‘Good Literature and Bad History: The 9/11 Commission’s Tale of Strategic Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security 21 (2006), 1024.

⁵¹ Paul R. Pillar, ‘Intelligence’, in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Lendes (eds.), Attacking Terrorism. Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press 2004), 120. More poignant is Mark Lowenthal’s stirring indictment of the concept of “connecting the dots”: ‘Towards a Reasonable Standard for Analysis’, 306.

⁵² National Assembly, commission terrorisme, Doc. 3922–1, 141, 144, 319.

⁵³ Chamber, Joint Commissions for Justice and the Interior, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM373, 52. Mark Eeckhaut and Nikolas Vanhecke, ‘Informatie over Abdeslams verzoop tussen andere dossiers’ [Information about the Abdeslams drowned among other case files], De Standaard, 26 April 2016. Cf. James Sheptycki, ‘Organizational Pathologies in Police Intelligence Systems. Some Contributions to the Lexicon of Intelligence-led Policing’ in European Journal of Criminology 1 (2004), 316–317. See also Thomas E. Copeland, Fool Me Twice. Intelligence Failure and Mass Casualty Terrorism (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2007), 13–14.

⁵⁴ It follows, naturally, that the justice ministry did not even know said person had left for Syria. Chamber, Joint Commissions for Justice and the Interior, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM285, 10, 11, 31; Joint Commissions for Justice and the Interior, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM373, 15–19, 30, 34, 37, 44, 51, 64–65.

⁵⁵ Rebecca Camber and Duncan Gardham, ‘MI5 Missed Chance to Foil Paris and Brussels Terrorists: Undercover Operation was Halted Three Months before Meeting between Ringleader and British Extremists’, The Daily Mail, 4 October 2016.

⁵⁶ Electronic surveillance and signals intelligence have not been discussed in great detail here since very little is known at this time and that little has been imparted to the author under very strict conditions of confidentiality. It remains for the official inquiries to lift the veil, maybe.

⁵⁷ Joris Van der Aa, ‘Waarom de Mechelse korpschef belangrijke informatie over terrorist Salah Abdeslam tegenhield’ [Why the Mechlin chief of police held back important information about Salah Abdeslam], De Standaard, 15 May 2016. Sheptycki, ‘Organizational Pathologies in Police Intelligence Systems’, 318, 321.

⁵⁸ Standing Commitee I, Verslag opvolging van het radicale islamisme 67.

⁵⁹ Michael Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence. An International Security History (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press 2014), 286.

⁶⁰ Frederic F. Manget, ‘Intelligence and Law Enforcement’, in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2010), 189–209; Bruce Berkowitz, ‘Homeland Security Intelligence: Rationale, Requirements, and Current Status’, in Roger George and James Bruce (eds.), Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations (Georgetown University Press: Washington DC: 2008), 286.

⁶¹ Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for Justice, 53rd Session, 2012, H. Doc. CRIV52/COM418, 39–4; Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for the Interior, 54th Session, 2016, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM441, 1. Commission for Justice (preliminary version), 54th Session, 2016, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM497, 15–16. The legal framework has been adjusted to lift professional secrecy in terrorism cases with the ‘Wet van 27 April 2016 inzake aanvullende maatregelen ter bestrijding van terrorisme’ [Law of 27 April 2016 on additional measures to fight terrorism] Belgian Official Journal 186, 30,567–30,573.

⁶² Valentina Pop and Mark Maremont, ‘Secret Report Shows Just How Badly Belgium Mishandled Hunt for ISIS Operatives’, The Wall Street Journal, 6 January 2017; Lars Bové, ‘13 blunders leidden tot 13 November’ [13 gaffes led to 13 November], De Tijd, 8 October 2016.

⁶³ See a comprehensive sum-up of what is involved in Herman, ‘Counter-Terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change’, 43–44.

⁶⁴ Treverton, ‘“Complexities” in Homeland Security’ 345. Salience: Arad, ‘Intelligence as Risk Management’ 58.

⁶⁵ Jack Davis, ‘Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?’, Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers 2, nr. 1 (2003), 12.

⁶⁶ United Kingdom, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th Jul. 2005 (London: Stationary Office 2006), 13. John R. Schindler, ‘Intelligence and Strategy in the War on Islamist Terrorism’, in Christopher Andrew, Richard Aldrich and Wesley K. Wark (eds.), Secret Intelligence. A Reader (London – New York 2009), 249.

⁶⁷ Paul R. Pillar, ‘Intelligence’, in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (eds.), Attacking Terrorism. Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press 2004), 124.

⁶⁸ “If one target ceases to be viable, they quickly turn to another which promises to yield substantial casualties. If the operation is threatened, they are as likely to speed it up as to abandon it.” Hennessy, ‘Secret State to Protective State’, 38. On sense-making, see David Moore, Sensemaking. A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution (Washington DC: National Defense Intelligence College 2011); Fishbein, Warren H., ‘Prospective Sense-making: A Realistic Approach to “Foresight for Prevention” in an Age of Complex Threats’, in de Franco and Meyer (eds.), Forecasting, Warning and Responding, 230–240; Fishbein, Warren H. and Treverton, Gregory F., ‘Making Sense of Transnational Threats’, Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers 3, nr. 1 (2004).

⁶⁹ Herman, ‘Counter-Terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change’, 47, 57.

⁷⁰ Chamber, Annual Report Commitee P, H. Doc. 0827/001, 10. Wirtz, ‘Indications and Warning’ 559. On the importance of the local level, see David Omand, ‘The Coastline of the Future: Some Limits on Forecasting and Prediction’, in Chiara de Franco and Christoph O. Meyer (eds.), Forecasting, Warning and Responding to Transnational Risks (London: Palgrave MacMillan 2011), 21–24; James J. Wirtz, ‘The Sources and Methods of Intelligence Studies’, in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2010), 60–61; Jennifer Sims, ‘Intelligence to Counter Terror. The Importance of All-Source Fusion’, in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), Strategic Intelligence IV: Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism. Defending the Nation against Hostile Forces (London: Praeger 2007), 144–146; Annette Sobel, ‘Actionable Intelligence in Support of Homeland Security Operations’, in Countering Terrorism and WMD, 213–215.

⁷¹ Lowenthal, Intelligence, 287; Peter Jackson, ‘On Uncertainty and the Limits of Intelligence’, in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2010), 464; Grabo, Warning Intelligence, 21; Frank Gregory, ‘An Assessment of the Contribution of Intelligence-led Counter-terrorism to UK Homeland Security Post-9/11 within the ’Contest‘ Strategy’ in Homeland Security in the UK 184; Sims, ‘Intelligence to Counter Terror’, 150; Pillar, ‘Intelligence’ 131.

⁷² FPS Interior, ‘LIVC’s krijgen vorm’ [LIVCs are taking shape], BeSafe 39: Themanummer radicalisering (2016), 1. Frank Strickland and Chris Whitlock, ‘Designing for Intelligence Integration. Understanding and Creating Colocated, Cross-Functional Teams’, CIA Studies in Intelligence 60 (2016), 56; Treverton, ‘Complexities in Homeland Security’ 352; Moore, Sensemaking, 54–64; Allyson MacVean, ‘The Governance of Intelligence’, in Harfield (ed.), Handbook of Intelligent Policing, 65–67; Arad, ‘Intelligence as Risk Management’ 53.

⁷³ See Kenneth Lasoen, ‘185 Years of Belgian Security Service’, Journal of Intelligence History 15 (2016), 114–117.

⁷⁴ Meyer, ‘International Terrorism as a Force of Homogenization?’, 652, 663.

⁷⁵ Stephen Sloan, ‘The New Terrorist Threat Environment. Continuity and Change in Counter-Terrorism Intelligence’, in P. Katona, M. Intriligator and J. Sullivan (eds.), Countering Terrorism and WMD. Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (London: Routledge 2006), 199.

⁷⁶ Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Commission for National Defence, 54th Session, 2015, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM277, 40–50; Joint Commissions for Justice and the Interior, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM285, 18; Commission for National Defence, 54th Session, 2016, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM388, 23–32; Commission for National Defence, 54th Session, 2016, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM457, 5–6; Bulletin Questions and Answers, 54th Session, 2016, QRVA54/075, 241–243; Commission for National Defence, 54th Session, 2016, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM475, 1–4.

⁷⁷ ‘Premier Michel: “Nieuw veiligheidskorps moet militairen op straat vervangen”’ [Prime Minister Michel: New security corps to replace soldiers in the streets], De Standaard, 27 August 2016. In January 2017, it is still the army performing protection duties.

⁷⁸ Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence. Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New York: Columbia University Press 2007), 35.

⁷⁹ Wirtz, ‘Indications and Warning’, 560; Id. ‘Sources and Methods of Intelligence Studies’, 66; Bracken, ‘How to Build a Warning System’ 16.

⁸⁰ Emanuel Adler, ‘Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era’ in T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, James J. Wirtz (eds.), Complex Deterrence. Strategy in the Global Age (Chicago – London: University of Chicago Press 2009), 87.

⁸¹ Bibi Van Ginkel, ‘The (in-)effectiveness of “deterrence” as an instrument’ at, <https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/effectiveness-deterrence-instrument-against-jihadist-terrorist-threats>, consulted on 18 January 2016; Lowenthal, Intelligence, 282–283; Omand, Securing the State, 223; Adler, ‘Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era’, 94–99; O’Hayon and Morris, ‘Warning in the Age of WMD Terrorism’ in Countering Terrorism and WMD 61.

⁸² Omand, ‘Coastline of the Future’, 25–26; Bracken, ‘How to Build a Warning System’, 39; Robert J. Bunker, ‘Suicide Bombers, Soft Targets, and Appropriate Countermeasures’, in Katona (ed.), Countering Terrorism and WMD, 104.

⁸³ Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World (Knopf: New York 2007), 8.

⁸⁴ Lowenthal, Intelligence, 144–145; Treverton, ‘Complexities in Homeland Security’, 356; Grabo, Handbook of Warning Intelligence, 89; Timothy J. Smith, ‘Predicitive Warning: Teams, Networks, and Scientific Method’, in Roger George and James Bruce (eds.), Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 266–280; Arad, ‘Intelligence Management as Risk Assessment’, 71–74.

⁸⁵ Treverton, ‘Changing Threats, Evolving Methods’, 28.

⁸⁶ Smith, The Utility of Force, 27, 292, 385.

⁸⁷ Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-access Warfare. Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 2013), 33–34, 75–106.

⁸⁸ Spielmann, Karl, ‘Strengthening Intelligence Threat Analysis’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 25 (2012), 19–43; Moore, Sensemaking, 114–123; Gouré, ‘Homeland Security’, 279. Davis, ‘Strategic Warning’, 12.

⁸⁹ Schindler, ‘Intelligence and the War on Islamist Terrorism’, 256; Sloan, ‘The New Terrorist Threat Environment’, 209; Sims, ‘Intelligence to Counter Terror’, 150.

⁹⁰ Chamber, Q&A H. Doc. QRVA54/075, 243. Forst, Terrorism, Crime, and Public Policy, 340–342, 349, 437; Bracken, ‘How to Build a Warning System’, 35. John A. Gentry, ‘Assessing Intelligence Performance’, in Johnson, Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, 93.

⁹¹ Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Proceedings, 52nd Session, 2012, H. Doc. CRIV52/PLEN119, 20–21; Chamber, Commission for Defence, 53rd Session, 2013, H. Doc. CRIV53/COM826, 9–12. Treverton, ‘Changing Threats, Evolving Methods’, 37; Morag, Comparative Homeland Security, 314–315; Brian Forst, Terrorism, Crime, and Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009), 334–337; Richard Mottram, ‘Protecting the Citizen in the Twenty-first Century: Issues and Challenges’, in Hennessy (ed.), The New Protective State, 61–65; Anthony Richards, ‘Terrorism and Public Information’, in Paul Wilkinson (ed.), Homeland Security in the UK. Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attack since 9/11 (London: Routledge 2007), 288–295.

⁹² Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence, 299–300; Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes, ‘The Future of Intelligence: Seeking Perfection in an Imperfect World?’, in Scott, Len, Gerald Hughes, R. and Alexander, Martin S. (eds.), Intelligence and International Security. New Perspectives and Agendas (London: Routledge 2011), 12.

⁹³ Mottram, ‘Protecting the Citizen’, 50; Smith, The Utility of Force, 284, 375–376.

⁹⁴ David Omand, ‘The Future of Intelligence. What are the Threats, the Challenges and the Opportunities?’, in Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Ben de Jong and Joop van Reijn (eds.), The Future of Intelligence. Challenges in the 21^st Century (London: Routledge 2014), 20–25; Patrick D. Ellis, ‘Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Examination of Capabilities and Countermeasures’, Terrorism and Political Violence 26 (2014), 216–221; Wirtz, ‘Sources and Methods of Intelligence Studies’, 62; Omand, Securing the State, 289–291; Omand, ‘Limits of Avowal’, 240; Lowenthal, Intelligence, 285; Davis, ‘Strategic Warning’, 4, 13.

⁹⁵ Daniel Gouré, ‘Homeland Security’, in Cronin and Lendes (eds.), Attacking Terrorism, 265.

⁹⁶ Kenneth Lasoen, ‘Les secrets du département de la guerre. Militaire inlichtingen 1830–1914’ [The secrets of the war department: military intelligence 1830–1914] in Cools (ed.), Het verhaal van de Belgische militaire inlichtingen – en veiligheidsdienst, 121. On the media see Forst, Terrorism, Crime and Public Policy, 321–323.

⁹⁷ Nadav Morag, Comparative Homeland Security. Global Lessons (Hoboken: Wiley 2011), 192–205.

⁹⁸ Belgian Senate, Proceedings, Session 2012–13, S. Doc. 5–96, 30. Omand, ‘Coastline of the Future’, 26.

⁹⁹ Javier Argomaniz, Oldrich Bures and Christian Kaunert, ‘A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical Assessment’, Intelligence and National Security 30 (2015), 191–206; Alex MacKenzie and Kamil Zwolski, ‘European Security, Terrorism and Intelligence: Assessing the Path of Development’, in Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard (eds.), European Security, Terrorism and Intelligence. Tackling New Security Challenges in Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2013), 229–240; Adam Svendsen, ‘On a Continuum with Expansion’? Intelligence Co-operation in Europe in the Early Twenty-first Century’, Journal of Contemporary European Research 7 (2011), 535–538; Martin Scheren, ‘Vernetzte Sicherheit. Zusammenarbeit der Inlandsnachrichten – und Sicherheitsdienste in Europa’, in Thomas Jäger and Anna Daun (eds.), Geheimdienste in Europa. Transformation, Kooperation und Kontrolle (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag 2009), 168–179; Meyer, ‘International Terrorism as a Force of Homogenization?’, 661–663; Nick Ridley, ‘Pan-European Law Enforcement Strategic Analysis: Trends and Concerns’, in Harfield (ed.), Handbook of Intelligent Policing, 133; Hennessy, ‘Secret State to Protective State’, 46–48; Paul Wilkinson, ‘International Dimensions of Homeland Security’, in Wilkinson, Homeland Security in the UK, 377–378; Pillar, ‘Intelligence’, 131.

¹⁰⁰ National Assembly, commission terrorisme, Doc. 3922–1, 297, 311, 314. Chamber, Joint Commissions for Justice and the Interior, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM285, 24; Commission for Justice, H. Doc. CRIV54/COM335, 44. Renard, ‘3 External Layers of Belgium’s Counterterrorism Policy’, 65–68.

¹⁰¹ Peter Jackson, ‘Uncertainty and the Limits of Intelligence’, 455; Fredric S. Zuckerman, The Tsarist Secret Police Abroad. Policing Europe in a Modernising World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003), 216–221.

¹⁰² Cicero, De divinatione 1, 2.

¹⁰³ Werther, ‘Fusion Centers’, 205.

¹⁰⁴ Wirtz, ‘Sources and Methods of Intelligence Studies’, 63.

¹⁰⁵ Lasoen, ‘185 Years of Belgian Security Service’, 109–112.

¹⁰⁶ Sheptycki, ‘Organizational Pathologies in Police Intelligence Systems’, 329.

¹⁰⁷ Pillar, ‘Good Literature and Bad History’, 1024; Lowenthal, ‘Towards a Reasonable Standard’, 303.

¹⁰⁸ James J. Wirtz, ‘Indications and Warning in an Age of Uncertainty’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26 (2013), 555. See also, by the same author, ‘Denial, Deception, and the Non-State Actor’, in SAIS Review 28 (2008), 59 and Gregory F. Treverton, ‘Addressing “Complexities” in Homeland Security’, in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 344, 349.

¹⁰⁹ Omand, ‘Coastline of the Future’, 29; Fishbein, ‘Prospective Sense-Making’, 234–235; Stephen Marrin, ‘Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past’, international Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17 (2010), 655–658.

¹¹⁰ Jan Goldman, ‘Epistemology of Forecasting in International Relations: Knowing the Difference between “Intelligence Failure” and “Warning Failure”’, in de Chiara and Meyer (eds.), Forecasting, Warning and Responding, 33–46.

¹¹¹ John Bruce Lockhart, ‘Intelligence: A British View’, in K.G. Robertson (ed.), British and American Approaches to Intelligence (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 1987), 52.

¹¹² Lonsdale, David J., ‘Intelligence Reform: Adapting to the Changing Security Environment’, Comparative Strategy 31 (2012), 433–436; Lowenthal, Intelligence, 283; Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 22–23, 35–37, 105–114; Copeland, Fool Me Twice, 240–264; Pillar, ‘Good Literature and Bad History’, 1032–1037.

¹¹³ Thus the French have pointed the finger at whom they otherwise refer to as ‘les amis belges’, for letting S. Abdeslam and his accomplices pass the border and have joined the Greeks in blaming the Belgians for the escape in Athens of the ringleader of the Paris attacks on the night of the Verviers raid (the Greeks claim the Belgians failed to notify them in time, but Belgian sources say the Greeks reacted too slow: Chris Morris, ‘Paris attacks “ringleader” Abdelhamid Abaaoud evaded Athens police’ at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35044182>, consulted 20 September 2016). In a similar vein it can be asked how the French let slip the Jewish Museum attacker of May 2014, or why the Spanish did not notice the aspiring Thalys terrorist of August 2015.

¹¹⁴ Quoted in Reginald V. Jones, Reflections on Intelligence (London: Heinemann 1989), 24.

¹¹⁵ Wilhelm Agrell, ‘Intelligence Analysis after the Cold War – New Paradigm or Old Anomalies?’, in Treverton and Agrell (eds.), National Intelligence Systems, 111; Wirtz, ‘Indications and Warning’, 561; Werther, ‘Fusion Centers’, 205; Jackson, ‘Uncertainty and the Limits of Intelligence’, 463, 467; Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘Toward and Effective Grand Strategy’, in Cronin and Ludes (eds.), Attacking Terrorism, 292, 296.

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Kenneth L. Lasoen

Kenneth L. Lasoen was born in Bruges in 1985, and got educated at the universities of Ghent and Leuven in history, and at Brunel University London and Pembroke College Cambridge in intelligence and security studies. He is currently completing doctoral research in ancient history at the Ghent University History Department. As a correspondent at the Belgian Intelligence Studies Centre (BISC) he also specialises in the history of the Belgian intelligence services, in addition to studying security and defence matters in general. The views expressed are entirely his and do not necessarily reflect those of any organisation with which he is affiliated.