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ABSTRACT
What organisational attributes enhance a military’s ability to effectively adapt on the battlefield? Upon the outbreak of war in July 2014 between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) encountered an expansive network of tunnels from which Hamas was launching large-scale assaults into Israel. This article illustrates that the IDF’s ability to successfully adapt ‘under fire’ to this battlefield surprise was facilitated by several important attributes related to its organisational learning capacity: a dynamic, action-oriented organisational culture, a flexible leadership and command style, specialised commando units which acted as ‘incubators’ for learning and innovation, and a formal system to institutionalise and disseminate lessons learned.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Dr. Frank Hoffman for his constructive feedback on an earlier draft of this article, and Dr. Eado Hecht for sharing his invaluable insights and knowledge. Special thanks to Brig. Gen. Meir Finkel for his time and for helping me obtain formal permission from the IDF to conduct our interview.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Quoted in Adam Ciralsky, ‘Did Israel Avert a Hamas Massacre?’ Vanity Fair, 21 October 2014
2 Brig. Gen. Meir Finkel, ‘Operational Learning in the Opening of Combat: The Tunnel Offensive in Operation “Protective Edge”’, Maarachot no. 457 (Oct. 2014), 16–17 [Hebrew]
3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (eds.) Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton UP 1976), 119
4 Finkel, ‘Operational Learning in the Opening of Combat,’ 17
5 Clausewitz, On War, 122
6 Eado Hecht, ‘Hamas Underground Warfare’, Perspectives Paper no. 259, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, 27 Jul. 2014.
7 Maj. Gen. Doron Almog, ‘Tunnel-Vision in Gaza’ Middle East Quarterly 11/3 (Summer 2004), 3–11
8 Avi Bar-Eli, ‘Millions Down the Tunnel: How Israel Botched the Battle Against Hamas’ Haaretz, 21 July 2014; Inbal Orpaz, ‘Israeli High-Tech is Great, but Not Yet for Finding Hamas Tunnels’ Haaretz, 24 July 2014; Yiftah Shapir and Gal Perel, ‘Subterranean Warfare: A New-Old Challenge’ in Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, (eds.), The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, (Tel Aviv: INSS, 2014), 51–57.
9 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Weapons Smuggling Tunnels in Rafah: Operation Rainbow’, 17 May 2004.
10 Amir Oren, ‘How the Israeli Defense Minister Failed to Address the Threat from Below’ Haaretz, 22 July 2014.
11 Michael Howard, ‘Military Science in an Age of Peace’, RUSI Journal 119/1 (1974), 7.
12 Gen. Martin Dempsey, ‘A Dialogue about our Army: A Campaign of Learning to Achieve Institutional Adaptation’ Army Magazine 60/11 (Nov. 2010), 35.
13 Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, ‘Sources of Military Change’, in idem, (eds.), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2002), 6.
14 Theo Farrell, ‘Introduction: Military Adaptation in War’ in Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, James Russell, (eds.), Military Adaptation in Afghanistan(Stanford: Stanford UP 2013), 6–7.
15 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington DC: Department of Defense, Mar. 2014), 22.
16 Ministry of Defence, Future Character of Conflict, Strategic Trends Programme (Shrivenham: DCDC, Feb. 2010), 18–19, 22.
17 Frank G. Hoffman, ‘How We Bridged a Wartime Learning Gap’ US Naval Institute Proceedings 142/5 (May 2016), 22-29.
18 The definition draws from Jeffrey Legro, ‘Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II’, International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994), 109; Theo Farrell, ‘Culture and Military Power’, Review of International Studies 24/3 (July 1998), 410.
19 Theo Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation’, International Affairs 84/4 (July 2008), 777–807; Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation (Stanford: Stanford UP 2010).
20 Robert Foley, ‘Dumb Donkeys or Cunning Foxes? Learning in the British and German Armies in the Great War’, International Affairs 90/2 (Mar. 2014), 279–98.
21 Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation’, 788–9.
22 Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (Aug. 2010), 572–3; For a critical assessment of why learning was inhibited in lower-level tactical units, Sergio Catignani, ‘Getting COIN at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counterinsurgency Adaptation in the British Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (Apr. 2012), 513–39.
23 Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the US, British, and Israeli Armies (Stanford: Stanford UP 2011), 29–41.
24 Hoffman, ‘How we Bridged the Wartime Gap’, 24.
25 Eitan Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari, ‘The Rise of Special Operations: Generalised Specialization, Boundary Spanning, and Military Autonomy’, Journal of Strategic Studies (Aug. 2016), 25.
26 Foley, ‘Dumb Donkeys or Cunning Foxes’, 289.
27 Benjamin Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the US Army (Stanford: Stanford UP 2016).
28 Adam Grissom ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/5 (Oct. 2006), 926–27.
29 Robert Foley ‘A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army 1916–1918’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/6 (Dec. 2012), 799–827; Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 572–3.
30 Robert Foley et al., ‘Transformation in Contact: Learning the Lessons of Modern War’, International Affairs 87/2 (Mar. 2011), 253–70; Catignani, ‘Getting COIN’, 517; James Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq 2005–2007 (Stanford: Stanford UP 2010).
31 Sergio Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army?’ Journal of Strategic Studies 37/1 (2013), 30–64.
32 Brig. Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel, ‘Operation Protective Edge: Strategic and Tactical Asymmetry’, in Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, (eds.), The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge (Tel Aviv: INSS, 2014), 14.
33 Eitan Shamir and Eado Hecht, ‘Gaza 2014: Israel’s Attrition versus Hamas Exhaustion’, Parameters 44/4 (Winter 2014–15), 81–90; Dekel, ‘Operation Protective Edge’, 16.
34 For footage of the strike, Israel Defense Forces, ‘Footage of Hamas Terror Attack Being Thwarted’, 17 July 2014, available on YouTube.
35 Amos Harel and Gili Cohen, ‘Haaretz Probe: IDF Lacked Training, Equipment to Tackle Tunnels in Gaza’, Haaretz, 17 October 2014.
36 Maj. Gen. (ret.) Dekel, ‘Operation Protective Edge’, 14; also, Amos Yadlin, ‘The Strategic Balance of Operation Protective Edge’, in Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, (eds.), The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge (Tel Aviv: INSS, 2014), 203.
37 Eado Hecht, ‘The Tunnels in Gaza’, Testimony to the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict, (Feb. 2015), 9–15.
38 Gen. Klaus Naumann et al., An Assessment of the 2014 Gaza Conflict, (High-Level Military Group, Oct. 2015), 45–7; ‘Hamas Uses Hospitals and Ambulances for Military Purposes’, IDF Official Website, 28 July 2014.
39 Amos Harel, ‘Top General in Gaza War: We Could Have Retaken the Strip’, (Interview with Brig. Gen. Nadav Padan), Haaretz, 10 October 2014.
40 Harel and Cohen, ‘Haaretz Probe’.
41 Harel, Interview with Brig. Gen. Nadav Padan.
42 Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 110–25.
43 Uzi Ben-Shalom and Eitan Shamir, ‘Mission Command between Theory and Practice: The Case of the IDF’, Defense and Security Analysis 27/2 (June 2011), 101–17.
44 Terry Terriff, ‘Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational Culture in the US Marine Corps’, Defence Studies 6/2 (June 2006), 217–18.
45 Raphael D. Marcus, ‘Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel-Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/4 (2015), 504–8.
46 For a critical view on the negative impact of these cultural traits, Gil-li Vardi, ‘Pounding Their Feet: Israeli Military Culture as Reflected in Early IDF Combat History’, Journal of Strategic Studies 31/2 (April 2008), 295–324.
47 Shamir, Transforming Command, 83–85; Dan Horowitz, ‘Flexible Responsiveness and Military Strategy: The Case of the Israeli Army’, Policy Sciences 1/2 (Summer 1970), 191–205.
48 Quoted in Ben-Shalom and Shamir, ‘Mission Command between Theory and Practice’, 105.
49 Gili Cohen, ‘IDF Chief of Staff: Hamas Leaders to Blame for “Devastating” Results of Gaza Fighting’, Haaretz, 6 August 2014.
50 Harel and Cohen, ‘Haaretz Probe’.
51 For more on the IDF’s pre-2006 operational focus, Raphael D. Marcus, ‘The Israeli Revolution in Military Affairs and the Road to the 2006 Lebanon War’, in Jeffrey Collins and Andrew Futter, (eds.), Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs: Transformation, Evolution, and Lessons Learnt (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015), 92–111.
52 Author interview with Brig. Gen. Meir Finkel, (Glilot base, Israel), 2 November 2015.
53 ‘IDF Elite Unit Combats Hamas Smuggling Tunnels’, IDF Official Website, 2 July 2012.
54 Col. (res.) Atai Shelach, ‘The IDF’s New Commando Brigade: Evolution, Not Revolution’, Israel Defense Magazine, 27 October 2015.
55 Hecht, ‘The Tunnels in Gaza’, 24–25.
56 ‘The Subterranean Medium has Become Part of the Future Battlefield’, (Interview with Lt. Col. Roy Nahari), Israel Defense Magazine, 11 February 2015.
57 Author interview with a retired senior IDF officer, 27 May 2016.
58 Yoav Zitun, ‘IDF Unveils New Method for Destroying Terror Tunnels’, Yediot Ahronot, 3 April 2015.
59 Col. (res.) Atai Shelach, ‘Life is What Happens While Making Plans’, Israel Defense Magazine, 8 March 2014.
60 For an appraisal of formal and informal learning processes, Catignani ‘Coping with Knowledge’, 31–2; The term ‘horizontal innovation’ is elucidated in Foley, ‘A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation’, 802–4
61 Harel and Cohen, ‘Haaretz Probe’.
62 Amos Harel, ‘As Bulldozers Destroy Hamas Underground Network, IDF Sees Light at End of the Tunnel’, Haaretz, 1 August 2014.
63 Gili Cohen, ‘IDF Soldiers Tasked with Tunnel Destruction Not Trained for Primary Mission’, Haaretz, 7 August 2014.
64 Harel and Cohen, ‘Haaretz Probe’.
65 Author interview with a retired senior IDF officer.
66 For details, Steven Mains and Gil Ariely, ‘Learning While Fighting: Operational Knowledge Management that Makes a Difference’, Prism 2/3 (June 2011), 169–72; Marcus, ‘Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel-Hizballah Conflict’, 512–23.
67 For case studies illustrating the dynamic interplay between top-down and bottom-up processes of change in the US Army in Iraq and the IDF in Lebanon, Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War, 14–8; Marcus ‘Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel-Hizballah Conflict’, 503.
68 Yossi Yehoshua, ‘IDF to Create Smaller, Better-Trained Reserve Force’, Yediot Ahronot, 22 March 2015.
69 Col. (res.) Atai Shelach, ‘Demolition – From a Specialised “Boutique” Competence to Widespread Availability’, Israel Defense Magazine, 10 June 2015.
70 Author interview with Brig. Gen. Meir Finkel.
71 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning: Army’s Future Land Operating Concept, (Canberra: Army Headquarters, Sept. 2009), 33.
72 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles, (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics 2004), 112.
73 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning, 33–35.
74 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning, 31.
75 For example, ‘Adaptive Campaign’, Tatzpit no.69, (IDF: Training and Doctrine Command, 2011) [Hebrew]; Finkel, ‘Operational Learning in the Opening of Combat’, 18–19.
76 Finkel, ‘Operational Learning in the Opening of Combat’, 19.
77 Author interview with a retired senior IDF officer.
78 Author interview with a retired senior IDF officer.
79 Finkel, ‘Operational Learning in the Opening of Combat’, 19.
80 Matan Tzuri, ‘The Colonel’s Tunnel War’, (Interview with Col. Tomer Ifrach) Yediot Ahronot, 22 October 2016.
81 Frank G. Hoffman ‘Mars Learning and Adapting,’ Powerpoint presentation, Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University, Washington DC, 31 May 2016.
82 Meir Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012), 12; Horowitz, ‘Flexible Responsiveness and Military Strategy’, 191–2.
83 Shamir and Ben-Ari, ‘The Rise of Special Operation Forces’, 21.
84 Col. (res.) Sini Libel, ‘Response to Learning Before Fighting’ Maarachot no.458 (Dec. 2014), 64–5 [Hebrew].
85 Itamar Eichner et al., ‘State Comptroller: PM Withheld Information from Cabinet regarding Gaza Tunnel Threat’, Yediot Ahronot, 18 November 2016.
86 Gili Cohen, ‘IDF Top Brass Failed to Grasp Hamas Tunnel Threat during 2014 Gaza War, Internal Probe Charges’, Haaretz, 18 October 2016.
87 Finkel, ‘Operational Learning in the Opening of Combat’, 19.
88 Hoffman, ‘How We Bridged a Wartime Gap’.
89 Shamir, Transforming Command, 82–95.
90 Finkel, On Flexibility, 2–4.
91 Department of the Army, Techniques for Effective Knowledge Management (ATP 6–01.1) (Washington DC: US Army Headquarters, Mar. 2015).
92 Personal communication with a former analyst in the British Army’s Lessons Exploitation Centre (LXC), 22 June 2016; On lesson-learning in the British army, Foley et al., ‘Transformation in Contact’, 259–65; Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge.’
93 For an Australian example, Paddy O’Toole and Steven Talbot, ‘Fighting for Knowledge: Developing Learning Systems in the Australian Army’ Armed Forces and Society 37/1 (2011), 42–67.
94 Clausewitz, On War, 122.
95 Alan Beyerchen, ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and Unpredictability of War’, International Security 17/3 (Winter 1992/93), 76.
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Raphael D. Marcus
Raphael D. Marcus received his PhD from the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He is the author of a forthcoming book on military innovation and adaptation in the Israel-Hizbullah conflict to be published by Georgetown University Press (2018), based on his doctoral research. He is a non-resident member of the Insurgency Research Group in the Department of War Studies. His research interests include Middle East security issues, military affairs, terrorism, and organisational learning.