From the editors

This issue of The Journal of Strategic Studies looks at evolving threats in the international system, critical alliance relationships, and the linkage between the theory and practice of strategy in the twenty-first century.¹ Our first two articles comprise a vigorous critique and defense of strategic studies as a subfield of international relations. Isabelle Duyvesteyn of Leiden University and James R. Worrall of Leeds University begin the debate in their article ‘Global strategic studies: a manifesto.’² Duyvesteyn and Worrall argue that the field of strategic studies needs to adapt to the challenge of a broader security studies subdiscipline that appears more relevant to current policy problems. They argue that the field must move away from a purely state-centered focus, broaden beyond the rational actor model, consider the experience of the non-Western world, broaden perspectives to include more than just the realist paradigm, make better use of history, and balance more effectively between theory and practice.

Pascal Vennesson of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies responds in ‘Is strategic studies narrow? Critical security and the misunderstood scope of strategy’, pointing out that the critical security studies frustrations with the focus on military affairs, on the state, and on the West are actually overstated.³ Based on a careful reading of Clausewitz and Schelling, Vennesson demonstrates that the critical security studies approach ignores the significant expansion of the field of strategy during the cold war. In addition, critics fail to recognize the inclusion of a wide range of actors (beyond the nation-state) in both classical and modern strategic thought. The value of traditional strategic studies, the author concludes, lies in its ability to analyze both Western and non-Western actors and institutions from a common framework.

The next two articles examine European security concerns, the ability of European states to manage conflict within the region, and the looming gap in military capabilities between Europe and the U.S. Luigi Scazzieri of King’s College London examines Europe’s response to the Ukraine crisis in ‘Europe, Russia and the Ukraine crisis: the dynamics of coercion’.⁴ The author examines the nonmilitary response of the European Union from February 2014 to December 2015. He assesses that European states had conflicting objectives: coercing Russia into leaving Ukraine, while simultaneously avoiding both escalation and damaging relations with Russia. Because of the asymmetry of relative interests, he argues that economic and diplomatic coercion failed. European efforts resulted in a failure to impose economic costs high enough to change Russian policy, but had the unintended consequence of strengthening Putin’s domestic position and deepening confrontation between Europe and Russia.

Daniel Fiott of the Institute for European Studies examines a different asymmetry in ‘A revolution too far? U.S. defence innovation, Europe and NATO’s military-technological gap.’⁵ The author assesses the drivers behind the U.S. Third Offset Strategy, which seeks advanced new military capabilities not only to counter emerging threats in China, Europe, and the Middle East but also to address rising personnel and procurement costs.⁶ He argues that this will prove complicated for Europe, and may endanger NATO. New U.S. technology will require new doctrine and comparable technologies to maintain NATO interoperability. NATO’s requirements and strategy, however, may be more narrowly focused on Europe and Russia, while the US must prepare for global power projection. The widening military–technological gap between the U.S. and Europe, therefore, will be affected not only by the Third Offset but also by European domestic politics and divergence among the strategic priorities of the various partners.

The third set of articles in this issue comprise a review roundtable on Christopher Daase and James W. Davis, editors, Clausewitz on Small War (Oxford University Press, 2015). The book provides translations and commentaries of four key writings by Carl von Clausewitz, dating from 1810 to 1830. Each deals with different aspects of kleinkrieg, and the role of irregular units in national defense in wartime.⁷ Timothy D. Hoyt of the U.S. Naval War College, in “Clausewitz and small wars: the conceptual origins of the ‘remarkable trinity’”, notes that the book captures the evolution and maturation of Clausewitz’s thoughts on the relationship between the citizen, the state, and the changing character of warfare in his time.⁸ The essays also serve as a metaphor for his concept of the remarkable trinity – they show Clausewitz writing first as a military officer and tactician, then as an angry and passionate patriot, and finally as a more mature and sober analyst. Antulio Echevaria II of the U.S. Army War College notes in ‘Hostility and war, small or otherwise’ how Clausewitz’s writing on small wars emphasized the expanding impact of citizen soldiers in his time.⁹ This fundamental change in armies and societies helps explain not only Clausewitz’s belief in the superiority of the defense but also his emphasis on hatred and enmity – the part of the remarkable trinity that receives the least emphasis, in the author’s view, from both policy makers and military strategists. Jack S. Levy of Rutgers University concludes the roundtable with ‘Clausewitz and people’s war’.¹⁰ He also notes Clausewitz’s maturing thoughts on the remarkable trinity, the role of the citizen soldier, and the increasing focus on the factors of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity. He emphasizes the ongoing relevance of Clausewitz’s theory of war to contemporary conflict, precisely because it is so adaptable to different societies, regime types, and both regular and irregular forces.

The issue concludes with a book review section.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ See also M.L.R. Smith, ‘Escalation in Irregular War: Using Strategic Theory to Examine from First Principles’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (October 2012), 613–38; John Stone, ‘Escalation and the War on Terror’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (October 2012), 639–62; Jan Angstrom and Jan Willem Honig, ‘Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture, and Escalation in Afghanistan’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (October 2012), 664–88; and Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘The “War on Terrorism”: What Does It Mean to Win?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/2 (April 2014), 174–97.

² Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James E. Worrall, ‘Global Strategic Studies: A Manifesto’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/3 (April 2017), 347–57.

³ Pascal Vennesson, ‘Is Strategic Studies Narrow? Critical Security and the Misunderstood Scope of Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/3 (April 2017), 358–91.

⁴ Luigi Scazzieri, ‘Europe, Russia and the Ukraine Crisis: The Dynamics of Coercion’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/3 (April 2017), 392–16.

⁵ Daniel Fiott, ‘A Revolution Too Far? U.S. Defence Innovation, Europe and NATO’s Military-Technological Gap’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/3 (April 2017), 417–37.

⁶ See also Luis Simon, ‘The “Third” US Offset Strategy and Europe’s “Anti-Access” Challenge’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/3 (June 2016), 417–45.

⁷ See also Eugenio Diaz and Dominicio Proença Jr., ‘A Criterion for Settling Inconsistencies in Clausewitz’s On War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/6–7 (December 2014), 879–902; Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ‘Clausewitz’s Concept of Strategy – Balancing Purpose, Aims and Means’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/6–7 (December 2014), 903–25; and Paul Schuurman, ‘War as a System: A Three-Stage Model for the Development of Clausewitz’s Thinking on Military Conflict and Its Constraints’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/6–7 (December 2014), 926–48.

⁸ Timothy D. Hoyt, ‘Clausewitz and Small Wars: The Conceptual Origins of the “Remarkable Trinity”’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/3 (April 2017), 438–42.

⁹ Antulio Ecchevarria II, ‘Hostility and War, Small or Otherwise’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/3 (April 2017), 443–49.

¹⁰ Jack S. Levy, ‘Clausewitz and People’s War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/3 (April 2017), 450–56.