‘It isn’t over until the fuel cell sings’: A reassessment of the US and French pledges of nuclear assistance in the 1970s

ABSTRACT

Based on newly declassified archival documents, the aim of this study is to contribute to an improved understanding of the evolution of the non-proliferation regime through an examination of US and French nuclear cooperation agreements in the latter half of the 1970s. The four pledges of nuclear assistance examined – US assistance to Egypt and Israel, and French assistance to Pakistan and South Korea – failed to materialise by the end of the decade. Why did that happen? What caused the four pledges to fail? We find that the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion and the emergence of opposing domestic factions on the nuclear front in the supplier states generated major changes in US and French nuclear export policies, and also contributed to the development of a collaborative partnership between the two competing nuclear exporters, on the other.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear proliferation
• the United States
• France
• Middle East
• Asia

Acknowledgements

​​​​The authors contributed equally to this article, and their names appear in alphabetical order. They are grateful to Leopoldo Nuti, James Cameron, Jonas Schneider, participants in the MIT Nuclear Weapons Working Group and the two anonymous reviewers for insightful comments on earlier drafts.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.​​​​

Notes

¹ Pledges of nuclear assistance are made through agreements or contracts signed between the supplier and the recipient. Hence, the terms, ‘nuclear cooperation agreements’, ‘nuclear contracts’, ‘pledges of nuclear assistance’ and ‘nuclear deals’ have been used interchangeably in the text.

² The terms, ‘nuclear supplier’ and ‘nuclear exporter’ have been used interchangeably throughout the text.

³ Jones, Rodney W., Cesare Merlini, Joseph F. Pilat and William C. Potter. The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation: International Policy Choices. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1984), 67.

⁴ Archives accessed for this research include the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA), The Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, MI (GFPL), The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA(JCPL), Israeli State Archive, Jerusalem (ISA), the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), Wilson Center Digital Archive (WCDA) and several additional archives.

⁵ Fuhrmann argues that ‘receiving civilian nuclear assistance over time increases the likelihood that states will begin nuclear weapons programs’, see: Matthew Fuhrmann, ‘Spreading Temptation, Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements’, International Security, 34, (1) (Summer 2009), 7–41. See also: Matthew Fuhrmann, Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace„ Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 2012).

⁶ Kroenig concluded that powerful states are less likely to give nuclear assistance and that ‘states are more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to states with which they share a common enemy’. Matthew Kroenig, ‘Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance,’ American Political Science Review, 103 (1) (February 2009), 113–133. See also: Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 2010).

⁷ Fuhrmann refers to ‘civilian nuclear assistance’ in general and Kroenig refers to ‘sensitive’ nuclear technology.

⁸ For the emphasis on NCA’s, see: Matthew Fuhrmann, ‘Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,’ International Security 34, (1) (2009), 7–41, 28.

⁹ R. Scott Kemp, ‘The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes’, International Security, 38 (4) (Spring 2014), 39–78, 40.

¹⁰ Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer. Unclear Physics: Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2016).

¹¹ Jacques E. C. Hymans, ‘Botching the bomb: Why Nuclear Weapons Programs Often Fail on Their Own – and Why Iran’s Might, Too,’ Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012. Alexander H. Montgomery, ‘Stop Helping Me, When Nuclear Assistance Impedes Nuclear Programs’, Chapter 7. in Adam N. Stulberg and Matthew Fuhrmann (eds.), The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press 2013), 177–201. ​See also: Jacques E. C. Hymans. Achieving Nuclear Ambitions : Scientists, Politicians and Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012).

¹² Francis J. Gavin, ‘Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation’, International Security (2015) 40 (1), 34–5.

¹³ Miller places an emphasis on the importance of American policies in preventing ‘reactive proliferation’; see: Nicholas L. Miller, ‘Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?,’ Security Studies 23, no. 1 (2014) and Nicholas L. Miller, ‘The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions,’ International Organization 68 (4) (Fall 2014), 914–944.

¹⁴ Gerzhoy places an emphasis on American willingness to use conditional threats of military abandonment, see: Gene Gerzhoy, 'Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions', International Security 39(4) (Spring 2015), 91–129.

¹⁵ Thomas P. Cavanna, ‘Geopolitics over Proliferation: The Origins of US Grand Strategy and Their Implications for the Spread of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 1–28, published online: 10 June 2016.

¹⁶ See: Rabinowitz, Or and Miller, Nicholas L. ‘Keeping the Bombs in the Basement’, International Security (2015), 40(1), 47–86, and Cameron, James and Rabinowitz, Or ‘Eight Lost Years? Nixon, Ford, Kissinger and the Non-Proliferation Regime, 1969–1977’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 1-28. published on-line on 5 January 2016.

¹⁷ Burr, William. ‘A Scheme of “Control”: The United States and the Origins of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, 1974–1976’, The International History Review 36 (2) (2014), 252–76.

¹⁸ Relevant overviews of this period are: Michael J. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The remaking of U.S. policy (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1981). Peter A. Clausen, Nonproliferation and the national interest, (NY, NY: Harper Collins 1993). Peter Tzeng, ‘Nuclear Leverage: U.S. Interventions in Sensitive Technology Transfers in the 1970s’, Nonproliferation Review, 20(3), 473–92; J. Samuel Walker, ‘Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The controversy over nuclear exports, 1974–1980’, Diplomatic History, 25(2) (2001), 215–49. Dane Swango, ‘The United States and the Role of Nuclear Co-operation and Assistance in the Design of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’, International History Review, 36(2) (2014), 210–29.

¹⁹ On the Cairo declaration: Henry Tanner, ‘Nixon and Sadat Sign Sweeping Accord on Cooperation’ New York Times 15 June 1974. On the Jerusalem declaration: Terence Smith ‘Nixon promises long term help for the Israelis’ New York Times 18 June 1974.

²⁰ ‘“Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Egypt and Israel”, memo from Lewis and Atherton to Secretary, 7 June 1974 (attached to notes and draft agreements),’ in RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–1977, box 344, NARA, MD [hereafter ‘Winston Lord Papers’].

²¹ ‘Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Egypt and Israel’, 7 June 1974.

²² Ibid.

²³ ‘Future International Position of the United States in Civil Uses of Nuclear Power’, memo From Atherton to the Secretary, 12 August 1974,’ in Winston Lord Papers, Box 349.

²⁴ ‘Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Egypt and Israel’, 7 June 1974.

²⁵ The guarantee that ‘Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East’ was first pronounced in 1963 and later put into writing in an Israeli–American MOU from 10 March 1965. See: Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press 1998), 207.

²⁶ ‘Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Egypt and Israel’, 7 June 1974.

²⁷ George Springsteen, ‘Transcript, Under Secretary Sisco’s Principals’ and Regionals’ Staff Meeting, Friday, 21 June 1974,’ in Document 3, Electronic Briefing Book 467 (Washington DC: National Security Archive), 16. ‘“[Response to Inquiry about the Proposed Sale of Nuclear Reactors to Egypt and Israel], Letter, 27 June 1974”,’ in Collection: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Item Number: NP01364 (Washington DC: National Security Archive).

²⁸ James Cameron and Or Rabinowitz, ‘Eight Lost Years? Nixon, Ford, Kissinger and the Non-Proliferation Regime, 1969–1977’. Journal of Strategic Studies, 1-28. Published online on 5 January 2016.

²⁹ Annex E: Israel and Egypt”, (attached to the draft memo Analytical Staff Meeting on Non-Proliferation Strategy), Draft for Analytical Staff Meeting on Non-Proliferation Strategy, from Fred Ikle and Winston Lord to Kissinger, 31 July 1974’, in Winston Lord Papers, Box 344.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² ‘“Your Luncheon with Fred Ikle, ACDA”, from Winston Lord to Joseph Sisco, 16 August 1974,’ in Winston Lord Papers, Box 349.

³³ Robert J. Einhorn, 'Chapter 4. Egypt’, in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, Mitchell B. Reiss (eds.), The nuclear tipping point, why states reconsider their nuclear choices (Washington DC: The Brookings institution 2004), 51.

³⁴ In the 1960s, Egypt demonstrated interest in developing a nuclear option, but Sadat’s strategic choices ended that endeavour. See: Robert J. Einhorn, 'Chapter 4. Egypt’, in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, Mitchell B. Reiss (eds.), ​The nuclear tipping point, why states reconsider their nuclear choices (Washington DC: The Brookings institution 2004). Barbara M. Gregory, ‘Egypt’s Nuclear Program: Assessing Supplier-Based And Other Developmental Constraints,’ Nonproliferation Review 3(1), (Fall 1995), 20–27. And: Maria Rost Rublee (2006) ‘Egypt’s nuclear weapons program’, The Nonproliferation Review, 13(3), 555–67.​​​​

³⁵ For the deliberation over nuclear desalination in the late 1960s, see: Levey, Zach. 2014. ‘The United States, Israel, and Nuclear Desalination: 1964–1968.’ Diplomatic History 39 (5), 904–25.

³⁶ David Moshayof, ‘Matay Tukam Tahant Koach Garinit’ (From Hebrew: ‘When will a nuclear power plant be established’, Davar, 27 February 1974.

³⁷ Urgent cable, 23 October 1974, from Yehoshua Trigor consul in Bombay to Foreign Office, In: File: Israel-India government level relations, 7 March 1974–31 March 1974, archive identifier number: 93.42.1.32, Foreign Office files, ISA.

³⁸ The American–Egyptian negotiations were reported on in the Arab press, but the Israelis were not aware of it, and the State Department did not inform the Israeli Foreign Ministry on the deal’s completion prior to Nixon’s visit. See: Ze’ev Schiff, ‘Israel Huftea al af yedioth al mum amerikai mitsri beinyan hakur’ [From Hebrew: ‘Israel was surprised by news of American Egyptian negotiations on the reactor], 19 June 1974, Ha’aretz.

³⁹ ‘Working Meeting’ [Between Nixon, Rabin, and respective delegations], 16 June 1974, King David Hotel, Jerusalem. File: Talks with US [From Hebrew: ‘Sihot with Arhab’], archive identifier: 7038/18, ISA. The discussion was also mentioned briefly in Rabin’s memoir. See: Rabin, Yitzhak and Goldstein, Dov. ‘Pinkas Sherut’ (From Hebrew: Record of Service), Ma’ariv: Tel-Aviv, 1979, 426.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Y. Tirah, ‘Hamemshala sham’a du’ach al masa Nixon’ (From Hebrew: ‘The government has heard a report on Nixon’s journey), Ha’aretz, 19 June 1974. Matti Golan, ‘The secret conversations of Henry Kissinger’, (NY, Quadrangle 1976), 214–16.

⁴³ Dalia Schori ‘Arhab todia le Israel ma yihiyu sidrey ha-pikuac h al hakur be-Mitsrayim’ (From Hebrew: The US will inform Israel on future safeguards arrangements on the Egypt reactor), Al Hamishmar, 20 June 1974.

⁴⁴ ‘[Meeting with Israeli Officials], Secret, Memorandum of Conversation, 31 July 1974,’ in Collection: Kissinger Transcripts, Item Number: KT01267 (DNSA).

⁴⁵ ‘Cable 2, untitled, 1 August 1974, from Washington embassy to Foreign office in Jerusalem, [Allon-Kissinger meeting],’ in File: Foreign Minister visits to US, July 1974-June 1975, Serial number: 130.20/2–35 ISA.

⁴⁶ For the American protocol see: ‘“Secret, Memorandum of Conversation”, 9 December 1974,’ in Collection: Kissinger Transcripts, KT01442 (DNSA). For the Israeli protocol, see: ‘“Cable 149, 10 December 1974, untitled, discussion over lunch]”,’ in Box: Foreign Minister visits to US, July 1974–June 1975, File: 130.20/2–35, ISA.​​​​

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ On the re-evaluation period, see Rabin’s memoir: Yitzhak Rabin, ‘Pinkas Sherut’, [from Hebrew: ‘Service record’], Ma’ariv publishing, Tel-Aviv, 1979, 465.

⁴⁹ Bishara A. Bahbah, ‘The United States and Israel’s Energy Security,’ Journal of Palestine Studies 11(2) (1982), 115.

⁵⁰ ‘Telegram 8722, 25 June 1976, Embassy in Cairo to Sec State, “Subject: US/Egyptian Nuclear Agreement for Cooperation”, NSC, Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff: Files 1974–1977, Country file: Egypt-military (6), box 4, GFPL.

⁵¹ ‘Telegram to embassy in Cairo, “Subject: US/Egyptian Nuclear Agreement for cooperation”, 2 July 1976,’ NSC, Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff: Files 1974–1977, Country file: Egypt-military (6), box 4, GFPL.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ ‘Cable to Cairo embassy, “Subject: Egypt and Israel Nuclear Power agreements”, 20 July 1976,’ NSC, Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff: Files 1974–1977, Country file: Egypt-military (6), box 4, GFPL

⁵⁴ Author interview with Uzi Eilam, 18 December 2015, Tel-Aviv.

⁵⁵ Dan Margalit, ‘“The initialled agreement for the supply of reactors: US monitoring capabilities augmented to prevent ‘use’ of reprocessed plutonium” (from Hebrew),’ Ha’aretz, 6 August 1976.

⁵⁶ Memo 4773 for the president from Brent Scowcroft, Subject: The Egypt and Israel Nuclear Agreements, [undated, attached to a note dated 23 September 1976] NSC, Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff: Files 1974–1977, Country file: Egypt-military (6), box 4, GFPL.

⁵⁷ Robert Zarate, ‘The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the Cases of North Korea and Iran,’ Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1195&tid=4.

⁵⁸ ‘The Egypt and Israel Nuclear Agreements’, 23 September 1976.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ President Gerald Ford, Statement on Nuclear Policy, 28 October 1976, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6561>.

⁶¹ ‘The Egypt and Israel Nuclear Agreements’, 23 September 1976.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Secret Memo from Cyrus Vance to the President, 3 March 1977, ‘Subject: official working visit by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin’, Plains File- Box 11- Folder 17, JCPL.

⁶⁴ ‘Subject: US/Egyptian nuclear cooperation agreement, REF Cairo 7029, From Cairo embassy to Washington, 31 May 1977’, (AAD: NARA).

⁶⁵ The first understanding in this context would be the deal on Israel’s nuclear ambiguity as reflected in the Nixon–Meir understanding of September 1969.

⁶⁶ ‘29 October 1976, Secret Cable from Washington Embassy to Uzi Eilam, [President Ford’s non-proliferation policy speech]’, in File: USA – Minister Yigal Allon, correspondence, 6861/3, ISA.

⁶⁷ Secret Memo from Cyrus Vance to the President, 3 March 1977, ‘Subject: official working visit by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin’, Plains File- Box 11- Folder 17, JCPL.

⁶⁸ Clausen, Nonproliferation and the national interest, 127–154.

⁶⁹ ‘Memo for Zbig, NSC Middle East Evening Report, 17 February 1978‘, In: Brzezinski Material, Staff Evening Reports File, Box 9, Folder 1, JCPL.

⁷⁰ ‘US economic assistance to Israel’ [undated, circa 1978], in: Counsel’s Office, Box 4, Folder 16, JCPL

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Judith Miller, ‘U.S. pact allows Egyptians to buy 2 atom reactors’, New York Times, 30 June 1981.

⁷³ Memo from Bob Hunter for Stu Eizenstat, ‘Subject: Your meeting with Minister Modai today’, 27 March 1980, [attached intelligence report] in: White House Central Files, CO 34–2, JCPL.

⁷⁴ Frédéric Bozo, La Politique Étrangère de La France Depuis 1945, Champs Histoire (Paris: Flammarion, 2012). Florent Pouponneau, ‘Les Changements De La Polique Française D’exportation Nucléaires (1974–1976): Un Triple Double Jeu,’ Critique Internationale 58, no. 1 (2013)., 112.

⁷⁵ For an overview of the evolution of French non-proliferation policy, see Bruno Tertrais, ‘France and nuclear non-proliferation: From benign neglect to active promotion,’ in Olav Njolstad (ed.), Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York: Routledge 2011), 217–226.

⁷⁶ Brenner, ‘Nuclear power and Non-proliferation’, 91–92.

⁷⁷ Georges Le Guelte, Histoire de La menace nucléaire (Paris: Hachette 1997), 213.

⁷⁸ Text of Safeguards Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan, INFCIRC/239, IAEA, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1976/infcirc239.pdf>

⁷⁹ Tzeng, Nuclear leverage, p. 476. Tzeng quotes the Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘South Korea Nuclear Chronology’, September 2004, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/south_korea_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, 269.

⁸⁰ ‘Second Alert Report’ from Winston Lord, Martin Packman, to Henry Kissinger, 20 November 1974, in: Winston Lord Papers, Box 348.

⁸¹ White House Memo, ‘Meeting with French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud’ from Brent Scowcroft, 1 October 1976, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 3, Folder France (9), GFPL.

⁸² State Department telegram 048673 to the U.S. Embassy Seoul, ‘ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,’ 4 March 1975, Secret, RG 58, AAD: MDR release by State Department from P- reels, DNSA collection. See: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 582, edited by William Burr, 22 March 2017.

⁸³ Tzeng, Nuclear leverage, 478. See also ‘M. Jacques Chirac rejette la proposition américaine d’une négociation tripartite sur l’accord franco-pakistanais’, le Monde 12 August 1976, p.1–4. Cited in Florent Pouponneau, ‘Les changements de la politique française d’exportations nucléaires (1974–1976): Un triple double jeu,’ Critique internationale n°58, 2013, 112.

⁸⁴ ‘Memoranda of Conversations between James R. Schlesinger and Park Chung Hee and Suh Jyong-chul,’ 26 August 1975, WCDA, National Security Adviser Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (11). Obtained by Charles Kraus. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114633.

⁸⁵ Tzeng, Nuclear leverage, 478.

⁸⁶ State Department Briefing Paper, ‘Bilateral Talks During UNGA, France – Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues,’ circa September 1975, NSA, NSC Europe, Canada and Ocean Affairs Country Files 1974–1977, Box 8, Folder France, 1975 WH (5), GFPL.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ State Department telegram 240692 to the U.S. Embassy Seoul, ‘Deputy Secretary Ingersoll’s Meeting with Ambassador Hahm of Korea,’ 9 October 1975, Secret, RG 59, AAD. See: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 582, edited by William Burr, 22 March 2017.

⁸⁹ ‘Korean Reprocessing – The Next Step’, memo for the secretary, 18 November 1975, Winston Lord papers, Box 359.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ ‘US Department of State Cable, ROK Nuclear Reprocessing,’ 10 December 1975, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 11, Korea – State Department Telegrams, to SecState – NODIS (8). Obtained by Charles Kraus. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114611.

⁹² ‘ROK Nuclear Reprocessing’, United States Embassy. Korea (South). Secret, Cable. 23 January 1976: 5 pp. DNSA collection: Korea, 1969–2000.

⁹³ ‘U.S.-ROK Discussions on Nuclear Cooperation’, United States. Department of State. Limited Official Use, Cable. 16 June 1976: 7 pp. DNSA collection: Korea, 1969–2000.

⁹⁴ ‘South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decision-making’, Central Intelligence Agency. National Foreign Assessment Center. Secret, Intelligence Report. June, 1978: 23 pp. DNSA collection: Korea, 1969–2000

⁹⁵ Telegram from the US Secretary of State to USDel Secretary entitled, ‘Press Material,’ August 1976, Electronic telegrams 1/1/1976–12/31/1976, Central Foreign Policy Files, RG59, (NARA).

⁹⁶ Secret cable 8167 from the US embassy in Islamabad to the US State Department entitled, ‘Reprocessing Plant,’ 21 August 1978, NSA. See also: Pouponneau, ‘Les Changements De La Polique Française D’exportation Nucléaires (1974–1976): Un Triple Double Jeu.’, 113.

⁹⁷ Telegram from the US embassy in Pakistan to State Department, ‘Bhutto and Ambassador discuss Nuclear Proliferation Issue,’ 8 June 1976, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Country File Pakistan (4), Box 27, GFPL.

⁹⁸ State Department Telegram from Henry Kissinger to the US Ambassador Byroade, 21 September 1976, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Country File Pakistan (4), Box 27, GFPL.

⁹⁹ Memorandum for the president from Henry Kissinger, ‘Your Meeting with Foreign Minister de Guiringuard on October 1,’ 30 September 1976, NSA, NSC Europe, Canada and Ocean Affairs Country Files 1974–1977, Box 8, Folder France, 1976 (3) WH, GFPL.

¹⁰⁰ Secret NSC Memo from Robert Oakley to Brent Scowcroft, ‘Your meeting with Rogers Morton and LTV President Paul Thayer on A-7s for Pakistan,’ 18 September 1976, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Country File Pakistan (6), Box 27, GFPL.

¹⁰¹ State Department Telegram from Henry Kissinger to the US Ambassador Byroade, 8 September 1976, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Country File Pakistan (5) Folder title: SECSTATE-NODIS (2) Box 27, GFPL.

¹⁰² Rabinowitz and Miller, ‘Keeping the bombs in the basement’, p. 56.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ White House Memorandum of Conversation with President Ford, Louis de Guiringaud, Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft and Jacques Koscuisko-Morizet, 1 October 1976, National Security Adviser’s Memoranda of Conversation, GFPL. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553548.pdf>

¹⁰⁵ Top secret report, [untitled daily report], 21 April 1977, in Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily Report File-2–1-6–1, JCPL.

¹⁰⁶ ‘Memo 7810082 for the President from Cyrus Vance, subject: your dinner with President Giscard d’Estaing, May 26’, 22 May 1978, in: Donated Historical Material – Mondale, Walter F-215–7-33–2, JCPL.

¹⁰⁷ Cable 21073 from the US embassy in Paris to the Secretary of State, 4 October 1979, Subject: Intelligence Discussion on Pakistan Nuclear Program, Brzezinski Material, Cables File-26–6-48–8, JCPL.

¹⁰⁸ ‘Subject: next step on Pakistan reprocessing deal, cable 227260 from State department to embassy in Paris, 12 November 1978’, in Brzezinski Material, Cables File-113-2-32-2, JCPL.

¹⁰⁹ Immediate message 7931, from embassy in Vienna [Gerard Smith] to Secretary of State, 29 December 1978, in Brzezinski Material, Cables File-24-6-22-8, JCPL.

¹¹⁰ Feroz Hassan Khan. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2013), 132

¹¹¹ West Germany also decided to pass on blueprints to Brazil of reactors and reprocessing facilities in 1977. It is not known if Brazil’s parallel nuclear weapons programme launched in 1978 used the blueprints. See William Glenn Gray, ‘Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties: The US-German Feud over Brazil, 1975–7,’ The International History Review 34 (3) (2012), 462, 465.

¹¹² For a history of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, see Khan. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, 132

¹¹³ Secret Telegram 08200 from the US embassy in Vienna to State Department, 13 September 1978, WCDA, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112841>.

¹¹⁴ Between the early 1950s and the late 1970s, France had signed nuclear cooperation agreements with 34 countries, and began to successfully compete with the US firms such as Westinghouse and General Electric. For a study on French nuclear cooperation until present times, see Mycle Schneider, Nuclear France Abroad: History, Status and Prospects of French nuclear activities in Foreign countries (Paris: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2009). See also Benoît Pelopidas, ‘French nuclear idiosyncrasy: How it affects French nuclear policies towards the United Arab Emirates and Iran,’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25 (Mar. 2012), 143–69.

¹¹⁵ Se Young Jang, ‘The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 39 (4) (2016), 502–20.

¹¹⁶ Jonathan D. Pollack and Mitchell B. Reiss, ‘South Korea: The Tyranny of Geography and the Vexations of History,’ in ​Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss (eds.), The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2005), 263.

¹¹⁷ ‘South Korea: nuclear development program’ (p.42–5), 1 June 1977, Brzezinski Material, Subject Files-48-1-3-8, JCPL.

¹¹⁸ ‘Koreans Intensify Discussion of Nuclear Option’, United States Embassy. Korea (Republic). Confidential, Cable. 17 June 1977, collection: Nuclear Nonproliferation, DNSA.

¹¹⁹ NSC memo for Brzezinski, evening report from East Asia, 14 April 1978 in: Brzezinski Material, Staff Evening Reports, File-10-6-12-0, JCPL.

¹²⁰ ‘Subject: “Noon notes” from the situation room for Dr. Brzezinski, 1 March 1978’, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily Report, Box 5, Folder 5-3-7, JCPL.

¹²¹ Georges Le Guelte, Histoire de La menace nucleaire, 87–92, 214.

¹²² Pouponneau, 2013.

¹²³ ‘Memo for Brzezinski, subject: Paper on the Iraqi nuclear program, 21 November 1980’, Staff Material, Middle East, 47-1-13-8, JCPL.

¹²⁴ This effort to create a universal approach was also described in: Clausen, ‘Nonproliferation and the national interest’, 127–154.

¹²⁵ For a sociological theory-based explanation of the shift in French position on non-proliferation, see Florent Pouponneau and Frédéric Mérand, ‘Diplomatic Practices, Domestic Fields, and the International System: Explaining France’s Shift on Nuclear Nonproliferation,’ International Studies Quarterly (2017). See also: Benoît Pelopidas, ‘French Nuclear Idiosyncrasy: How It Affects French Nuclear Policies Towards the United Arab Emirates and Iran,’ 143–69.

¹²⁶ As of early 2017, South Korea does not possess any independent means of uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. See: South Korea Country Profile, <http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/south-korea/nuclear/>

Additional information

Funding

Or Rabinowitz thanks the Israel Science Foundation (ISF) for funding this research under Grant Number [599/16]. Jayita Sarkar thanks the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Foundation for their generous support.

Notes on contributors

Or Rabinowitz

Dr. Or (Ori) Rabinowitz, an Israeli Chevening scholar, is a lecturer at the International Relations Department of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her book Bargaining on Nuclear Tests was published in April 2014 by Oxford University Press; a co-authored article with Nicholas L. Miller titled ‘Keeping the Bombs in the Basement’ was published in International Security, summer 2015 (Vol. 40, No. 1). Additional articles were published at the Journal of Strategic Studies and the Bulletin of the atomic scientists. Rabinowitz holds a PhD awarded by the War Studies Department of King’s College London, an MA in Security Studies and an LLB in Law, both from Tel-Aviv University. Before turning to academia, she worked as a news desk editor in several Israeli media outlets.

Jayita Sarkar

Dr. Jayita Sarkar is an assistant professor of International Relations at Boston University’s Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies. Her expertise is in the history of the U.S. foreign policy, nuclear proliferation, export controls, the global Cold War, South Asia and Western Europe. Her research has appeared in Cold War History, International History Review and Critique Internationale, among others. Dr. Sarkar is a former Stanton Nuclear Security fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a former research fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She holds a doctorate in International History from the Graduate Institute Geneva in Switzerland.