From the editors

Recent years have seen increasing attention given to the topic of Russian military doctrine, innovation by the Russian armed forces, as well as Moscow’s use of influence operations and active measures in the United States and Europe.¹ In ‘Russia’s Strategy for Influence through Public Diplomacy and Active Measures: The Swedish Case’, Martin Kragh of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and Uppsala University and researcher Sebasian Åsberg provide empirical evidence on how since Russia has moved toward a preference for active measures towards Sweden, to include the use of forgeries, disinformation, military threats and agents of influence, in an effort to minimise Swedish support for NATO.

The availability of newly declassified sources from the United States and Great Britain has allowed scholars to reappraise nuclear strategy during the early Cold War.² In ‘Enhancing Political Cohesion in NATO during the 1950s or: How it Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Tactical) Bomb’, Simon J. Moody of King’s College London argues that the perceived need by NATO to nurture political cohesion within the Alliance during the 1950s resulted in the adoption of tactical nuclear capabilities at the expense of conventional war-fighting, resulting in a strategic concept that enhanced political cohesion but was militarily unviable.

North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal has brought renewed attention to the topic of nuclear non-proliferation.³ In ‘Eight Lost Years?  Nixon, Ford, Kissinger and the Non-Proliferation Regime, 1969-1977’, James Cameron of Yale University and Or Rabinowitz of Hebrew University argue that a broad range of factors constrained the US ability and willingness to build an effective coalition in support of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Newly available archival materials have shed new light on British defence policy.⁴ In the final essay of this issue, ‘A Foregone Conclusion?  The United States, Britain and the Trident D5 Agreement’, Suzanne Doyle of the University of East Anglia draws upon previously declassified documents to explore the dynamics of the Anglo-American negotiations that culminated in the sale of the Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile to Great Britain in the 1980s.

Notes

¹ See, for example, Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, ‘Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 37/1 (Feb. 2014), 91–134; Tor Bukkvoll, ‘Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government: The Case of Russian Special Operations Forces’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (Aug. 2015), 602–25; Luigi Scazzieri, ‘Europe, Russia, and the Ukraine Crisis: The Dynamics of Coercion’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/3 (Apr. 2017), 392–416; Tomas Smid and Miroslav Mares, ‘‘Kadyrovtsy’: Russia’s Counterinsurgency Strategy and the Wars of Paramilitary Clans’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (Aug. 2015), 650–77.

² See, for example, Huw Dylan, ‘Super-Weapons and Subversion: British Deterrence by Deception Operations in the Early Cold War’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (Aug. 2015), 704–28.

³ See, for example, Matthew Kroenig, ‘The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does it Have a Future?’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1–2 (Feb. 2015), 98–125; Liviu Horovitz, ‘Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1–2 (Feb. 2015), 126–58.

⁴ See, for example, Justin Bronk, ‘Britain’s ‘Independent’ V-Bomber Force and US Nuclear Weapons, 1957–1962’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 37/6–7 (Dec. 2014), 974–97; Edward Hampshire, ‘Strategy and Budgetary Necessity, or Decision-Making ‘Along the Grain’? The Royal Navy and the 1981 Defence Review’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/7 (Dec. 2016), 956–78.