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ABSTRACT
Since the end of World War II, classical geopolitics as a particular form of realism has been disengaged from the development of mainstream realist theories. This disengagement has not only concealed the value of classical geopolitics as a framework of analysis for policy and strategy, but also created an increasing rift between theory and policy in contemporary realist theories. This paper seeks to reengage classical geopolitics with mainstream realist theories by clarifying its realist traits and analytical characteristics, (re)stating its core propositions and probing into its potential contribution to the development of mainstream realist theories. This paper contends that classical geopolitics, while having a distinctive pedigree, can arguably be considered an integral part of the family of realist theories in view of its basic theoretical assumptions concerning international anarchy, the unit of analysis and power politics. As a framework of analysis, classical geopolitics incorporates three interrelated strategic propositions. Those three propositions not only constitute the theoretical core of classical geopolitics, but also manifest a peculiar balance-of-power conception that is essentially distinct from those proposed by mainstream realist theories. This paper argues that those three propositions combined promise to fill in prominent lacuna in the balance-of-power research programme, and also have significant implications for contemporary world politics.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Mr Toshi Yoshihara, a senior fellow at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Professor Andrew Erickson from US Naval War College for their kindly help with the original draft. The author also likes to express his sincere gratitude to Professor Peter Dutton, Director of China Maritime Studies Institute at US Naval War College, for his long-time friendly encouragement and help.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Mark Bassin, ‘The Two Faces of Contemporary Geopolitics’, Progress in Human Geography 28/5 (2004), 620, 621. For classical geopolitics, see: Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations (London: Rowman & Littlefield 2015); Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (eds.), Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy (London: Frank Cass Publishers 1999); Geoffrey Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century (London: St. Martin’s Press 1985). For critical geopolitics, see: Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge (eds.), The Geopolitics Reader (London: Routledge 1998); Gearoid O’Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (London: Routledge 1996); John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy (London: Routledge 1995).
2 Geoffrey Sloan, Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History (London: Routledge 2017), 7. For many years, geopolitics has been suffering from abuse without rigorous definition or clarification. This situation has obstructed the progress of the study of geopolitics. For an excellent discussion of the definitions of geopolitics, see: Sloan, Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History 1–2. Also see: Mackubin T. Owens, ‘In Defense of Classical Geopolitics’, Orbis 59/4 (2015), 469–73; Oyvind Osterud, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Geopolitics’, Journal of Peace Research 25/2 (1988), 191–2. For the evolution of classical realist thought including classical geopolitics, see: Jonathan Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli (New Haven: Yale University Press 2013).
3 Ashworth, ‘Realism and the Spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics and the Reality of the League of Nations’, 295. For the congruence between classical geopolitics and mainstream realist, especially classical realist, theories in International Relations, also see: Owens, ‘In Defense of Classical Geopolitics’, 463–78; Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Mapping a New World: Geography and the Interwar Study of International Relations’, International Studies Quarterly 57/1 (2013), 138–49; Colin S. Gray, ‘In Defense of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On’, Comparative Strategy 23/1 (2004), 9–25; Leslie W. Hepple, ‘The Revival of Geopolitics’, Political Geography Quarterly Supplement to 5/4 (1986), S21–36.
4 Jakub J. Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 2011), 3.
5 Ladis Kristof, ‘The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 4/1 (1960), 19. For German geopolitik and its association with Nazi’s expansionist foreign policies before 1945, see: David T Murphy, The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918–1933 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press 1997); Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Farrar & Rinehart 1942).
6 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, Journal of International Affairs 44/1 (1990), 33. For social scientific approaches to international relations, see: Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1994); Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (London: Clarendon Press 1991).
7 Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, 15.
8 For the efforts to bring geography back into theories, see: John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company 2001); Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1987); Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 30/ 2 (1978), 167–214.
9 For the negative impact on geopolitics, see: Owens’, In Defense of Classical Geopolitics’, 463–78; Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 2011); Colin S. Gray, ‘Inescapable Geography’, Journal of Strategic Studies 22/2 (1999), 161–77.
10 Owens, ‘In Defense of Classical Geopolitics’, 469. For the origins of modern geopolitics, see: Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson (eds.), Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought (London: Routledge 2000); Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century; Ladis Kristof, ‘The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 4/1 (1960), 15–51.
11 Leslie W. Hepple, ‘The Revival of Geopolitics’, S23. For German geopolitik and French geopolitique, see: Herman van der Wusten and Gertjan Dijkink, ‘German, British and French Geopolitics: The Enduring Differences’, Geopolitics 7/3 (2000), 19–38; Geoffrey Parker, Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future (London: Pinter 1998); Gertjian Dijkink, National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain (London: Routledge 1996).
12 For Mahan, Mackinder and Spykman, see: Francis P. Sempa, Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers 2002). Also see: R. Gerald Hughes and Jesse Heley, ‘Between Man and Nature: The Enduring Wisdom of Sir Halford J. Mackinder’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/6 (2015), 898–935; Colin S. Gray, ‘Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/6 (2015), 873–97; Jon Sumida, ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician’, Journal of Strategic Studies 22/2 (1999), 39–62.
13 For the realist credentials of Mahan, Mackinder and Spykman’s geopolitical theories, see: Gray, ‘Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order’, 873–97; Ashworth, ‘Realism and the Spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics and the Reality of the League of Nations’, 279–301; Greg Russell, ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan and American Geopolitics: The Conservatism and Realism of an Imperialist’, Geopolitics 11/1 (2006), 119–40.
14 Ashworth, ‘Realism and the Spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics and the Reality of the League of Nations’, 295. Realism is not a theory, but a school of theories that share a few common theoretical assumptions. For a summary of the canonical definitions of realism in IR, see: Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), 6–9. For the evolution of contemporary realist theories, see: Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy (London: Routledge 1998).
15 Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, 10. For the centrality of international anarchy in realist theories, see: Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979).
16 Helen Milner, ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique’, Review of International Studies 17/1 (1991), 69. Also see: Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Palgrave 2002); Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
17 Gearoid O Tuathail, ‘At the End of Geopolitics? Reflections on a Plural Problematic at the Century’s End’, Alternatives 22/1 (1997), 36. Also see: Robert D. Kaplan, ‘The Revenge of Geography’, Orbis 59/4 (2015), 479–90; Christopher J. Fettweis, ‘On Heartlands and Chessboards: Classical Geopolitics, Then and Now’, Orbis 59/2 (2015), 233–48.
18 Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century, 2.
19 Geoffrey Parker, ‘Continuity and change in Western geopolitical thoughts during the 20th century’, International Social Science Journal 43/127 (1991), 22. Also see: Parker, Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future.
20 Michael P. Gerace, ‘Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and after’, Comparative Strategy 10/4 (1991), 350. Also see: Owens, ‘In Defense of Classical Geopolitics’, 463–78.
21 Owens, ‘In Defense of Classical Geopolitics’, 468. Also see: C. Dale Walton, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge 2007); Sempa, Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century.
22 Owens, ‘In Defense of Classical Geopolitics’, 468. Also see: Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change; Gray and Sloan (eds.), Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy.
23 For the level of analysis, see: Barry Buzan, ‘The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered’, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press 1995), 198–216.
24 Parker, ‘Continuity and change in Western geopolitical thoughts during the 20th century’, 22.
25 For this point, see: John Gerald Ruggie, ‘Continuity and Transformation in World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis’, in Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbian University Press, 1986), 131–57.
26 Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, 22.
27 For an excellent discussion of the interdisciplinary nature of (classical) geopolitics, see: Sloan, Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History, 7–16.
28 Sloan, Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History, 2.
29 For balance-of-power realism, see: Jack S. Levy, ‘Interstate War and Peace’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE Publications Ltd 2012), 581–606. Also see: Jack S. Levy, ‘What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?’, in T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (eds.), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2004), 29–51; Jack S. Levy, ‘Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design’, in John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (eds.), Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 2003), 128–53.
30 For the linkage between the British predominance and the European balance of power, see: Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle (New York: Random House/Vintage 1962). Also see: Levy, ‘What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?’, 29–51; Levy, ‘Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design’, 128–53.
31 For Mahan’s ‘philosophy of sea power’, see: Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown 1890); Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1783–1812, 2 Volumes (Boston: Little, Brown 1892); Alfred T. Mahan, The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain, 2 Volumes (Boston: Little, Brown 1897); Alfred T. Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, 2 Volumes (Boston: Little, Brown 1905). For Mackidner’s major works, see: Halford J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1902); Halford J. Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, The Geographical Journal 23/4 (1904), 421–37; Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York: W. W. Norton 1962); Halford J. Mackinder, ‘The Round World and the Winning of Peace’, Foreign Affairs 21/4 (1943), 595–605. For Spykman’s major works, see: Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co. 1944); Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1942).
32 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1939), 203. For Mahan’s life, works and strategic thought, see: Jon Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1999); John B. Hattendorf (eds), The Influence of History on Mahan (Newport: Naval War College Press 1991).
33 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, 139.
34 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1783–1812, Vol. II, 276.
35 Mahan, The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain, Vol. 1, 186.
36 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1783–1812, Vol. II, 409.
37 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, 27.
38 Stephen B. Jones, ‘Global Strategic Views’, Geographical Review 45/4 (1955), 494.
39 For Mackinder’s life and thought, see: Gerry Kearns, Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009); Brian W. Blouet, Halford Mackinder: A Biography (College Station, TX: A and M University Press 1987); W. H. Parker, Mackinder: Geography as an aid to statecraft (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982).
40 Sempa, Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 28.
41 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 70. Also see: Colin S. Gray, ‘In Defense of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On’, Comparative Strategy 23/1 (2004), 9–25; Geoffrey Sloan, ‘Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland theory then and now’, Journal of Strategic Studies 22/2 (1999), 15–38.
42 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 150. Also see: Daniel Deudney, ‘Greater Britain or Greater Synthesis’, Review of International Studies 27/2 (2001), 187–208; Gerace, ‘Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and after’, 347–64.
43 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 74. Also see: Sloan, ‘Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland theory then and now’, 15–38; Arthur Butler Dugan, ‘Mackinder and His Critics Reconsidered’, The Journal of Politics 24/2 (1962), 241–57.
44 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality,139.
45 Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, 4. There have been few studies on Spykman in spite of his great reputation. For studies on Spykman’s theory, see: Gray, ‘Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order’, 873–97; Robert Art, ‘The United States, the Balance of Power, and World War II: Was Spykman Right?’ Security Studies 14/3 (2005), 365–406; Gerace, ‘Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and after’, 347–64.
46 Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, 124.
47 Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, 457. Further on this point, also see: Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Harper & Row 1960); George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1954); George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900–1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1951); Walter Lippmann, U. S. War Aims (Boston: Little, Brown & Company 1944); Walter Lippmann, U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown & Company 1943).
48 Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, 183.
49 Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, 34.
50 Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, 24.
51 Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, 60.
52 For discussions of the continental commitment, see: David French, The British Way in Warfare 1688–2000 (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd 1990); Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defense Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars (London: Temple Smith 1972). For the current debate between the offshore balancing and the selective engagement, see: Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2003); Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
53 Sumida, ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician’, 39.
54 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, 76. Also see: Azar Gat, ‘From Sail to Steam: Naval Theory and the Military Parallel 1882–1914’, in The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992); 173–225; Paul Kennedy, ‘Mahan versus Mackinder: Two Interpretations of British Sea Power’, in Strategy and Diplomacy 1870–1945: Eight Studies (London: Fontana 1984), 43–85.
55 Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1965), 636. For the two prongs of British foreign policy throughout modern history, see: Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Penguin Books Ltd 2001); Michael Sheehan, Balance of Power: History and Theory (New York: Routledge 1996); Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle.
56 William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press 1980), 274.
57 French, The British Way in Warfare 1688–2000, xiii.
58 Kennedy, ‘Mahan versus Mackinder: Two Interpretations of British Sea Power’, 57.
59 Jones, ‘Global Strategic Views’, 494.
60 For Mahan’s viewpoints, see: Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, 64–5; Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1783–1812, Vol. II, 118–9. For Mackinder’s position, see: Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, 358; Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 70. Further on this distinction, see: Kennedy, ‘Mahan versus Mackinder: Two Interpretations of British Sea Power’, 43–85.
61 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 149, 150.
62 Sempa, Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 31.
63 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 160, 165. For studies on Mackinder’s middle-tier states, see: Sloan, ‘Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The heartland theory then and now’, 15–38; Blouet, Halford Mackinder: A Biography, Chapter 10; Parker, Mackinder: Geography as an aid to statecraft, Chapter 6; Butler Dugan, ‘Mackinder and His Critics Reconsidered’, 241–57.
64 Dugan, ‘Mackinder and His Critics Reconsidered’, 252–257.
65 Gerace, ‘Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and after’, 350.
66 Gray, ‘Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order’, 884.
67 Art, ‘The United States, the Balance of Power, and World War II: Was Spykman Right?’ 405.
68 Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, 468.
69 For the deficiency of the offshore balancing strategy, see: Hal Brands, ‘Fools Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing’, The Washington Quarterly 38/2 (2015), 7–28; Williamson Murray and Peter Mansoor, ‘U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case for a Continental Commitment’, Orbis 59/1 (2014), 19–34.
70 For typical interpretations of Spykman’s geopolitics along this path, see: Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations, 26–7; Geoffrey R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890–1987 (New York: St. Martin’s 1988), 17–8.
71 For this kind of interpretation of Spykman’s geopolitical framework, see: James T. Lowe, Geopolitics and War: Mackinder’s Philosophy of Power (Washington, DC: University Press of America 1981)), 70–1; J. R. V. Prescott, The Geography of State Policies (London: Hutchinson University Library 1968), 28–40.
72 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 110–111.
73 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 73–74.
74 Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Superpower (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press 1988), 42.
75 Gerace, ‘Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and after’, 353.
76 Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, 37.
77 Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, 51.
78 Gray, ‘Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order’, 884.
79 Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, 43.
80 Gerace, ‘Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and After’, 354.
81 Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, 195.
82 Makcinder’s viewpoint on Russia as the heartland continental power had changed significantly at the last stage of his career. In his 1943 version of the heartland theory, Mackinder had pointed out the possibility that the postwar cooperation between sea powers and the heartland power (the Soviet Union) could constitute an effective bulwark against the revival of German militarism. See: Mackinder, ‘The Round World and the Winning of Peace’, 595–605.
83 Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, 57.
84 Harold Sprout, ‘Geopolitical Theories Compared’, Naval War College Review 7/5 (1954), 32.
85 Gerace, ‘Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and after’, 356.
86 As indicated previously, classical geopolitics is holistic rather than reductionist by nature. It integrates both the unit- and system-level variables. The three canonical classical geopolitical thinkers, Mahan, Mackinder, and Spykman, would have conceded that the internal makeup and dynamic of a country has effects on its internal and external policies. Mahan’s distinction between a state-sponsored navy and a naturally grown navy, Mackinder’s definition of a country as ‘a Going Concern’, and Spykman’s discussion of American grand strategy are typical examples in this respect.
87 For classical balance of power theories, see: Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge 1996); Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979); Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf 1967); Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle; Inis L. Claude Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House 1962); Edward V. Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton 1955).
88 For the definition of balance of power theory, see: G. John Ikenberry, ‘Introduction’, in G. John Ikenberry, (eds.), America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2002), 7–8. For the definition of theories power balances, see: Daniel H. Nexon, ‘The Balance of Power in the Balance’, World Politics 61/2 (2009), 338. For the definition of theories of balancing, see: T. V. Paul, ‘Introduction’, in T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann (eds.), Balance of Power Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2004), 2.
89 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 124, 128. For two excellent studies on Waltz’s structural realist theory, especially on his balance of power theory, see: Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy125–41; Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press 1993), 22–80.
90 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 118, 122. Also see: Susan B. Martin, ‘From Balance of Power to Balancing Behavior: The Long and Winding Road’, in Andrew K. Hanami (eds.), Perspectives on Structural Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003), 61–82; Stephen Haggard, ‘Structuralism and Its Critics’, in Emmanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press 1991), 403–38.
91 Martin, ‘From Balance of Power to Balancing Behavior: The Long and Winding Road’, 63. For neoclassical realism, see: Brian Rathbun, ‘A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism’, Security Studies 17/22 (2008), 294–321; Bernard I. Finel, ‘Black Box or Pandora’s Box: State Level Variables and Progressivity in Realist Research Programs’, Security Studies 11/2 (2001), 187–227.
92 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 72. For the linkage between structural realism and neoclassical realism, see: Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics 51/1 (1998), 144–172; Colin Elman, ‘Horses for courses: Why Nor Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?’ Security Studies 6/1 (1996), 7–53.
93 All versions of balance of power theory contain, implicitly or explicitly, those two scope condition, see: Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ‘The End of Balance-of-Power Theory? A Comment on Wohlforth et al.’s ‘Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History’, European Journal of International Relations 15/2 (2009), 364.
94 Claude Jr., Power and International Relation, 47. Further on this point, see: Levy, ‘What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?’ in T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (eds.), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2004), 29–51.
95 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 70. Also see: Gray, ‘In Defense of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On’, 9–25; Deudney, ‘Greater Britain or Greater Synthesis’, 187–208; Sloan, ‘Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland theory then and now’, 15–38.
96 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, especially Chapter 3, 4, 5. Also see:Hughes and Heley, ‘Between Man and Nature: The Enduring Wisdom of Sir Halford J. Mackinder’, 898–935; Ashworth, ‘Realism and the Spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics and the Reality of the League of Nations’, 279–301.
97 French, The British Way in Warfare 1688–2000, xiii. Also see: Murray and Mansoor, ‘U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case for a Continental Commitment’, 19–34; Robert Art, ‘The United States, the Balance of Power, and World War II: Was Spykman Right?’ Security Studies 14/3 (2005), 365–406.
98 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, 505, 538. Also see: Gerald S. Graham, Tides of Empire: Discussions on the Expansion of Britain Overseas (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1972); Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army: A Military, Political and Social History of the British Army, 1509–1970 (London: Allen Lane 1970).
99 For the dual character of Russia in history, see: Paul W. Schroeder, Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2004); Gerace, ‘Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and after’, 347–64; Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle.
100 Claude Jr., Power and International Relations, 49.
101 Dehio, The Precarious Balance, 71.
102 For the policy relevance of classical geopolitics to contemporary world politics, see: Phil Kelly, Classical Geopolitics: A New Analytical Model (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2016); Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations; Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change; Michael Sheehan, The International Politics of Space (London: Routledge 2007); Walton, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century; Ceorge J. Demko and William B. Wood (eds.), Geopolitical Perspectives on the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: West view Press 1999); Gray and Sloan (eds.), Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy; Geoffrey Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy 1890–1987 (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books 1988).
103 Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate (New York, NY: Random House 2012), 61. This is an important characteristic of classical geopolitics, see: Owens, ‘In Defense of Classical Geopolitics’, 463–478; Fettweis, ‘On Heartlands and Chessboards: Classical Geopolitics, Then and Now’, 233–48.
104 A series of prominent studies made by Jack S. Levy, William R. Thompson have unequivocally proven this point, see: Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, ‘Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?’ International Security 35/1 (2010), 7–43; Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, ‘Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495–1999’, Security Studies 14/1 (2005), 1–33.
105 Michael Sheehan, ‘The Place of the Balancer in Balance of Power Theory’, Review of International Studies 15/2 (1989), 127–28. Also see: Levy, ‘What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?’ in T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (eds.), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2004), 29–51; Levy, ‘Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design’, 128–153.
106 Eyre Crowe, ‘Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, 1 January 1907’, in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, Vol. 3, The Testing of the Entente, 1904–6 (London: HMSO 1928), 402, 403. Also see: Zhengyu Wu, ‘The Crowe Memorandum, the Rebalance to Asia, and Sino-US Relations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/3 (2016), 389–416; T.G. Otte, ‘Eyre Crowe and British Foreign Policy: A Cognitive Map’, in T.G. Otte and Constantine A. Pagedas (eds.), Personalities, War and Diplomacy (London: Frank Cass 1997), 14–37.
107 Brands, ‘Fools Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing’, 10. For major theses of the offshore balancing, see: Barry Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2014); Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
108 Jones, ‘Global Strategic Views’, 494. For critiques of the offshore balancing, see: Art, A Grand Strategy for the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), esp. 181–222. Also see: Brands, ‘Fools Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing’, 7–28; Murray and Mansoor, ‘U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case for a Continental Commitment’, 19–34.
109 For this point, see: Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
110 For this point, see: Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle. Also see: Levy and Thompson, ‘Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?’ International Security 35/1 (2010), 7–43; Levy and Thompson, ‘Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495–1999’, 1–33.
111 For the key role of the United States to the balance of power in East Asia after the Second World War, see: James E. Auer & Robyn Lim, ‘The Maritime Basis of American Security in East Asia’, Naval War College Review 54/1 (2001), 39–58; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton & Company 2012); John Bradford, ‘The Maritime Strategy of the United States: Implications for Indo-Pacific Sea-Lanes’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 33/2 (2011), 183–208.
112 Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, 57. Also see: Gerace, ‘Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and after’, 347–64. For the dual role of Russia in the European states system, see: Schroeder, Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe. Especially see: Paul W. Schroeder, ‘Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?’ American Historical Review 97/3 (1992), 683–706; Paul W. Schroeder, ‘The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?’ Review of International Studies 15/2 (1989), 135–153.
113 For revisionist studies on German Geopolitik, see: David Thomas Murphy, ‘Hitler’s Geostrategist?: The Myth of Karl Haushofer and the “Institut für Geopolitik”’, Historian 76/1 (2014), 1–25; Mark Bassin, ‘Race contra Space: The Conflict between German Geopolitik and National Socialism’, Political Geography Quarterly 6/2 (1987), 115–134.
114 For the positivistic standards for theory and its application to geopolitical studies and theorising, see: Fettweis, ‘On Heartlands and Chessboards: Classical Geopolitics, Then and Now’, 233–248; Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, 21–37.
115 For those two critical viewpoints on classical geopolitics, see: Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2016); Martin Libicki, ‘The Emerging Primacy of Information’, Orbis 40/2 (1996), 261–74; Edward N. Luttwak, ‘From Geopolitics to Geo-economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce’, The National Interest 20/2 (1990), 17–24; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand 1962).
116 Further on this point, see: Owens, ‘In Defense of Classical Geopolitics’, 463–478; Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change; Walton, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century; Deudney, ‘Greater Britain or Greater Synthesis’, 187–208; Sempa, Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century.
117 Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, 437.
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Zhengyu Wu
Zhengyu Wu is a professor of International Politics in School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (Beijing, China), where he has taught since 2002. He was a visiting professor in Department of War Studies at King’s College London and a visiting scholar in Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Department of Politics at Durham University. Professor Wu received his PhD in Department of History at Nanjing University (Nanjing, China) and completed postdoctoral study at London School of Economics and Political Science. His current research fields include Theory of International Politics, Geopolitics and Grand Strategy and East Asian Maritime Security. His major books include Geopolitics and Grand Strategy (2012); The Logic of Hegemony: Geopolitics and American Grand Strategy in the Postwar Era (2010) and A Study of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (2003). He also is the author of numerous Chinese and English articles and contributed book chapters.