From the editors

We are pleased to inaugurate the 41st volume of The Journal of Strategic Studies with a double-length issue, headlined by the winner of this year’s Amos Perlmutter Prize. The prize recognises the most outstanding essay submitted for publication by junior faculty members. This year’s Perlmutter Prize goes to Max Smeets of the University of Oxford for his essay, ‘A Matter of Time: On the Transitory Nature of Cyberweapons’.¹ In his essay, Smeets argues that the offensive capabilities of cyber weapons are different in both degree and kind compared with other weapons because of their temporary ability to cause harm. He further argues that the transitory nature of cyber weapons benefits great powers and leads to a different funding structure than that for conventional weapons.

Recent years have seen increased interest in Russian military thought on deterrence and power balancing.² In ‘From Moscow with coercion: Russian deterrence theory and strategic culture’, Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky of the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at the IDC Herzliya, Israel traces the development of contemporary Russian strategy, which links nuclear, conventional and informational (cyber) tools of influence into one integrated mechanism. The article demonstrates how different cultural contexts produce unique strategic concepts and argues for a tailored approach for exploring coercion policies of different actors.

The Journal has been fortunate to publish a number of significant works exploring the strategic approaches of European states in the war in Afghanistan.³ In ‘A Good Ally – Norway and International Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 2001–2014’, Mats Berdal of King’s College London and Astri Suhrke of the Chr. Michelsen Institute explore Norway’s civilian and contributions to operations in Afghanistan. In particular, they explore the case study to provide insight into the challenges that small or medium powers face when operating in coalition with the United States. They also explore how Norwegian efforts in Faryab province illustrate the dilemmas and contradictions of external intervention in Afghanistan.

More generally, the Journal has served as a forum for debating the effectiveness of various approaches to counterinsurgency and security force assistance.⁴ In ‘Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance’, Stephen Biddle of George Washington University, Julia Macdonald of the University of Denver, and Ryan Baker of the George Washington University argue that the ‘small-footprint’ approach to security force assistance faces real limitations stemming from agency problems arising from the misalignment of interests between the US and its partners.

The political and strategic impact of drone strikes has generated considerable scholarship in recent years.⁵ In ‘The Rise of Targeted Killing’, James Igoe Walsh of the University of North Carolina argues that the rise of targeted killings is the result both of growing demand for targeted killings as the United States faced new terrorist threats that could not be effectively countered with conventional military force, as well as increasing demand as the result of concerns about the political consequences of long-term military involvement overseas.

In ‘Israel’s Security Nexus as Strategic Restraint: The Case of Iran, 2009–2013’, Clive Jones of Durham University explores the debates within Israel 2009 and 2013 through the lens of civil-military relations.⁶ In particular, it examines how key actors used media outlets to influence domestic and international opinion over how best to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

In ‘The Other Side of the Iranian Coin: Iran’s Counterterrorism Apparatus’, Ariane M. Tabatabai of Georgetown University examines the under-explored topic of Tehran’s efforts to fight terrorist groups targeting the Iranian state. The article sheds light on the Iranian counterterrorism apparatus and efforts since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, drawing on several years of fieldwork in Iran, interviews with current and former officials, and Persian sources.

In ‘MAD, not Marx: Khrushchev and the Nuclear Revolution’, Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko of Cardiff University argue that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev regarded nuclear war as too dangerous to wage, a decision which manifested itself not so much in foreign policy or military doctrine but in his determination to avoid war when the possibility arose.

In ‘The case for Bush revisionism: Reevaluating the legacy of America’s 43rd president’, Hal Brands of The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and Peter Feaver of Duke University reassess the foreign policy legacy of George W. Bush in light of the emerging historical record of his administration. The authors identify six particular arguments that lend credence to an emerging ‘Bush revisionism’, which are likely to generate a more sympathetic and favourable historical assessment of Bush’s presidency over time.

In ‘“It Isn’t Over Until the Fuel Cell Sings”: A reassessment of the US and French Pledges of Nuclear Assistance in the 1970s’, Or Rabinowitz of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Jayita Sarkar of Boston University draw upon newly declassified archival documents to argue that the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion and its aftermath led to major changes in US and French nuclear export policies as well as the development of a collaborative partnership between the two competing nuclear exporters.⁷

In ‘“Mad Dog?” Samuel Huntington and the Vietnam War’, Andrew J. Gawthorpe of Leiden University explores Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington’s academic work and private policy advice to the US government during the Vietnam War.

China’s rise and analogies to the past have attracted considerable recent attention.⁸ It is thus fitting that the present issue concludes with a review by David Stevenson of the London School of Economics of Xu Qiyu’s Fragile Rise: Grand Strategy and the Fate of Imperial Germany, 1871–1914.

Finally, we are pleased to announce that with this issue Joshua R. Rovner has joined Timothy Hoyt as Deputy Editor of the Journal, further strengthening our editorial team.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ Additional important recent works on cyber include Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, ‘Attributing Cyber Attacks’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1–2 (February 2015), 4–37; Uri Tor, ‘‘Cumulative Deterrence’ as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/1–2 (February 2017), 92–117.

² See, for example, Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, ‘Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-Nuclear Strategic Weapons in Russia’,The Journal of Strategic Studies 37/1 (February 2014), 91–134; Reuben Steff and Nicholas Khoo, ‘Hard Balancing in the Age of American Unipolarity: The Russian Response to U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense During the Bush Administration (2001–2008)’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 37/2 (April 2014), 222–58.

³ Torunn Laugen Haaland, ‘The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-Up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/7 (December 2016), 999–1022; Magnus Petersson and Hakon Lunde Saxi, ‘Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 36/6 (December 2013), 761–88; Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, ‘The Use and Abuse of the “Dutch Approach” to Counter-Insurgency’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 36/6 (December 2013), 867–97.

⁴ Raphael S. Cohen, ‘Just How Important are “Hearts and Minds” Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 37/4 (August 2014), 609–36; Kristen A. Harkness and Michael Hunzeker, ‘Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure’,The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/6 (October 2015), 777–800; Benjamin Jensen, ‘Escaping from the Iron Cage: The Institutional Foundations of FM 3–24: Counterinsurgency Doctrine’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/2 (April 2016), 213–30; Barnett S. Koven, ‘Emulating U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine: Barriers for Developing Country Forces, Evidence from Peru’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/5–6 (October 2016), 878–98; David H. Ucko, ‘Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in Sierra Leone’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/5–6 (October 2016), 847–77.

⁵ C. Christine Fair, Karl Kaltenthaler and William Miller, ‘Pakistani Political Communication and Public Opinion on U.S. Drone Attacks’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/6 (October 2015), 852–72; Jacqueline L. Hazelton, ‘Drone Strikes and Grand Strategy: Toward a Political Understanding of the Uses of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Attacks in U.S. Security Policy’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/1–2 (February 2017), 68–91; Javier Jordan, ‘The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign Against Al Qaeda Central: A Case Study’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 37/1 (February 2014), 4–29.

⁶ On earlier Israeli intelligence forecasting on Iran, see Uri Bar-Joseph, ‘Forecasting a Hurricane: Israeli and American Estimations of the Khomeni Revolution’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 36/5 (October 2013), 718–42.

⁷ On nuclear non-proliferation more broadly, see Liviu Horovitz, ‘Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1–2 (February 2015), 126–58; Matthew Kroenig, ‘The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does it Have a Future?’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1–2 (February 2015), 98–125.

⁸ See, for example, Zhengyu Wu, ‘The Crowe Memorandum, the Rebalance to Asia, and Sino-U.S. Relations’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/3 (June 2016), 389–416.