The client gets a vote: counterinsurgency warfare and the U.S. military advisory mission in South Vietnam, 1954-1965

ABSTRACT

The belief that U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam did not know how to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign underpins belief that reforms are necessary for counterinsurgency success. However, contemporaneous U.S. documents show that military officers in the advisory period, 1954–1965, believed in the need for reforms and pressed their South Vietnamese counterparts to implement them. If advisors urged their partners to liberalize and democratize, yet the state remained autocratic, repressive, and corrupt, what explains the South Vietnamese failure to reform? I identify the client state’s ability and will to resist reforms as an important overlooked element of counterinsurgency campaigns.

KEYWORDS:

• Counterinsurgency
• Vietnam
• military intervention
• patron-client relations
• great power military intervention

Acknowledgments

I thank Dale Andrade, Andrew Birtle, Conrad Crane, Greg Daddis, Brendan Rittenhouse Green, Anthony Lopez, Emily Meierding, Karthika Sasikumar, Richard Sommers, David Stone, Randall Rakers, and all the staff at the U.S. Army Heritage and Information Center for their help. This research was supported by a General and Mrs. Matthew B. Ridgway Research Grant from the U.S. Army Heritage and Information Center.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1986), e.g., 131.

² Journalists such as David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan recognized and reported on the differing goals of South Vietnamese and Americans. See, e.g., David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House 1972) and Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie (New York: Random House 1988). They do not, and cannot be expected to, provide a theoretical or even systematic explanation of the phenomenon. Scholars discussing Vietnam specifically, counterinsurgency and military intervention generally, patron-client tensions, and the perils of state building include Douglas Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era (New York: Free Press 1977). Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience (New York: New Press 1994), Jessica Elkind, Aid Under Fire: Nation Building and the Vietnam War (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky 2016), Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (New York: Cambridge University Press 2015), Daniel Byman, ‘Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism,’ International Security Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), 79–115, Douglas J. Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1992), Walter Ladwig, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relations in Counterinsurgency (New York: Cambridge University Press 2017), and David Lake, The Statebuilder’s Dilemma: On the Limits of Foreign Intervention (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2016), all provide valuable insights. None focuses on the questions I ask in this article about the U.S. advisory mission in Vietnam and its failure to achieve South Vietnamese government reforms. Andrew J. Gawthorpe identifies and discusses a number of these interrelated problems in ‘Agency and Structure in the Study of Nation-Building during the Vietnam War,’ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 8/4 (2014), 387–394.

³ E.g., John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2002 2005); U.S. Department of the Army, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3–24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3–33.5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2000), hereafter FM 3–24.

⁴ Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London: Chatto and Windus 1966), 161; FM 3–24, 39.

⁵ Stephen T. Hosmer, Sibylle O. Crane, ‘Counterinsurgency, a Symposium,’ April 16–20, 1962 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1962), iv; FM 3–24, 295; Ian F.W. Beckett, ‘Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective,’ (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute 2005.)

⁶ FM 3–24, 303.

⁷ Macdonald focuses on what the patron can do to increase the likelihood of client compliance, as Ladwig does more recently.

⁸ Krepinevich, e.g., 131.

⁹ Krepinevich, on insurgency, 7–10; on unity of effort, 10–14; on outcomes, 11.

¹⁰ Krepinevich, e.g., on firepower, 65, 81; on lack of reevaluation, 88.

¹¹ On leverage, see, e.g., Robert Keohane, ‘The Big Influence of Small Allies,’ Foreign Policy No. 2 (Spring 1971) 161–182.

¹² Krepinevich, 58–59.

¹³ Krepinevich, 66 on reforms, 66–68 on Operation Sunrise.

¹⁴ Krepinevich, e.g., 21–25.

¹⁵ Krepinevich, e.g., 68 on leverage; Krepinevich, 63, on Galbraith; Galbraith on Diem in D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure Of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1988), 269, fn 108; Krepinevich, 72, on CIDG, and 131 on the Army Concept.

¹⁶ James Lawton Collins, Jr., The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950–1972 (Washington DC: Department of the Army 1975), gives more attention to planning and intentions than execution. He is discreet about client weakness and silent on any misalignment of interests. Ronald H. Spector’s Advice and Support: The Early Years 1941–1960 (Washington DC: Center of Military History 1983) identifies flaws in the South Vietnamese execution of pacification without noting the lack of alignment of interests.

¹⁷ On peasant interests, e.g., Michael E. Latham, ‘Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the Failure of Nation-Building in Vietnam,’ Third World Quarterly 27/1 (2006), 27–41, and Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 2010, revised edition).

¹⁸ E.g., Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House 2012), chronicles multiple examples of U.S. retreats at Diem’s refusal to implement reforms; Richard C. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1995), e.g. 13, 18–21, 25–30, simplifies the U.S. approach to ARVN and overlooks the limits of U.S. leverage and the clash of patron-client interests; Shafer notes the differences among elite and popular Vietnamese interests and U.S. interests; Macdonald identifies the U.S. leverage problem; James M. Carter, Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954–1968 (New York: Cambridge UP 2008), chronicles the state-building effort; Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2013), focuses on personality; Andrew Wiest, ‘The ‘Other’ Vietnam War,’ in Wiest, Mary Kathryn Barbier, Glenn Robins (eds.), America and the Vietnam War: Re-examining the Culture and History of a Generation (New York: Routledge 2010), examines the often-ignored South Vietnamese military perspective; Lewis Sorley, Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2011), 78–79, fails to note that Westmoreland intended U.S. forces to use their conventional capabilities as a security screen so ARVN and local and regional forces could focus on the political objective of pacification with the language and cultural skills considered invaluable for counterinsurgent success.

¹⁹ E.g., George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975 (New York: McGraw-Hill 2002, fourth edition), e.g., on ARVN’s double mission of internal and external security, 70–72, 74, on reforms and pacification, 57, 103, 107–108, 133; Dale Andrade, ‘Westmoreland Was Right: Learning the Wrong Lessons From the Vietnam War,’ Small Wars and Insurgencies 19/2 (2008), 145–181; and Gregory A. Daddis, Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam (New York: Oxford UP 2014), 9, 149, 233, 45, 48, 59, considers Westmoreland’s assessment of the character of the war as well as that of his predecessors.

²⁰ Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam, e.g., 670–672 on ARVN, 695–697 on reforms.

²¹ Richard C. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds, e.g. 13, 18–21, 25–30.

²² Shafer, op cit.

²³ Douglas J. Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World.

²⁴ James M. Carter, Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954–1968.

²⁵ Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam.

²⁶ Andrew Wiest, ‘The “Other” Vietnam War,’. Regarding conventional insurgent capabilities, see, e.g., Carter, pp. 150–151. Regarding development of local and regional security forces, Samuel Popkin notes the challenge that such efforts posed to ARVN officers, who typically served as district and provincial chiefs, just as development of local and national civilian administrative capabilities through pacification threatened military power and influence. Samuel L. Popkin, ‘Pacification: Politics and the Village,’ Asian Survey 10:18 (August 1970), pp. 662–671.

²⁷ Lewis Sorley, Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam.

²⁸ Birtle recognizes the client management problem. In ‘“Triumph Forsaken’”as Military History,’’ in Andrew Wiest and Michael J. Doidge, Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the Vietnam War (New York: Routledge 2010), he notes the difficulties of implementation but not local elites’ resistance to changes threatening their interests, 125.

²⁹ George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, e.g., on ARVN, 70–72, 74; on reforms and pacification, 57, 103, 107–108, 133.

³⁰ Andrew J. Birtle, ‘PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal,’ The Journal of Military History 72 (October 2008), 1213–1247.

³¹ Birtle, ‘“Triumph Forsaken’”as Military History,’’ 121.

³² Dale Andrade, ‘Westmoreland Was Right: Learning the Wrong Lessons From the Vietnam War,’ 145–181.

³³ Gregory A. Daddis, Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam.

³⁴ See Macdonald and Shafer.

³⁵ Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1997 reprint), 12. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2005), 137.

³⁶ Van Evera, 55–78.

³⁷ On thick analysis, see David Collier, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright, ‘Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology,’ in Brady and Collier (eds.), Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2010), 180–181; Van Evera on doubly decisive tests, 31–32. David Collier, in ‘Understanding Process Tracing,’ PS: Political Science and Politics 44/4 (2011), 823–830. David Collier, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright, ‘Causal Inference: Old Dilemmas, New Tools.’

³⁸ Van Evera, 63, 66.

³⁹ University of California, Santa Barbara, The American Presidency Project, President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem, 23 Oct., 1954 (Department of State Bulletin, 15 November 1954). http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/vietnam/showdoc.php?docid=1. Also e.g., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume I, Vietnam, Document 183, Memorandum From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Ambassador-Designate to Vietnam (Reinhardt), Saigon, 10 May, 1955. Miller analyzes how U.S. views on modernization clashed with Diem’s.

⁴⁰ Ambassador Maxwell Taylor in 1964, Secretary of State Dean Rusk in July 1965, White House advisor Roger Hilsman in 1961, and the ‘action program for Vietnam’ in 1962, Shafer, 248.

⁴¹ Shafer, 249.

⁴² Hunt, 14.

⁴³ Hunt, 29.

⁴⁴ Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, MACV Command Historian’s Collection, Series VIII, document: ‘U.S. Army Support Command Vietnam Debriefing Report,’ Maj. Gen. Delk M. Oden.

⁴⁵ MACV, Series VIII, Oden debriefing; Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College Library, memorandum, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam. The concept of rural reconstruction and certain definitions and procedures. 2 March 1965, signed MG Richard G. Stilwell, chief of staff, for commander.

⁴⁶ Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation 1962–1967 (Washington DC: Center of Military History 2006); Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (New York: Cambridge UP 1996).

⁴⁷ Spector, 224.

⁴⁸ On pacification, e.g., MAAG Vietnam, Minutes of Conference at MAAG, 29 November 1954, reports that MAAG chief Gen. John O’Daniel and South Vietnamese Gen. Nguyen Vy agreed on the U.S. pacification plan. On larger reforms, see, e.g., MAAG Vietnam, Narrative Study, 24 August 1958, a memo to the Pentagon saying ‘Next to national security, economic development is the most urgent requirement for the future stability and progress of Vietnam.’

⁴⁹ MAAG Vietnam, file folder: US Committee on Province Rehabilitation, Vietnam. Miscellaneous documents and official correspondence with Government of Vietnam, July 1962-April 1963; document, Clear and hold operations, 1 February 1963, to chief MAAG, Senior Advisor I-IV Corps. Also see, e.g., Wilbur Wilson Papers, Box 2 of 6, U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group III Corps Saigon, Vietnam 7 October 1963, Memorandum for: General Dinh Commanding General III Corps, Subject: Estimate of the situation (3rd Quarter 1963) (U) From Col. Wilbur Wilson.

⁵⁰ Donald D. Blackburn Papers 1916–1983, Oral History Transcript Volumes I and II (unbound)], file folder: Donald D. Blackburn Oral History Transcript, Vol. 1 1983 1 of 2, document: debriefing report, 10 June 1964, Major General Charles J. Timmes. Also see, e.g., William C. Westmoreland Collection, Series I official correspondence, COMUSMACV Back Channel Messages Outgoing for Jan. 1964 to June 1965, 1 January 1964–30 June 1965, Box 17, file folder: Backchannel messages sent Feb. 1-31 December 1964; memo from Sharp CINCPAC and Westmoreland to Wheeler and Goodpaster, Oct. 1964.

⁵¹ Westmoreland, Series II official papers, COMUSMACV history backup files, 1–3 for Mar. 62-Apr. 64, Box 34, file folder: Official papers [etc] history backup file #3 17 Feb.-30 April 1964; memo: Headquarters United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 10 March 1964 Counterinsurgency Vitalization, staff study signed by Major General Richard G. Stilwell.

⁵² Library, memo to advisors on the concept of rural reconstruction and certain definitions and procedures, 2 March 1965, signed by Stilwell, chief of staff, for commander.

⁵³ Blackburn, document: USMAAGV, Briefing Notes, senior advisors conference, 4 May 1962, ‘Clearing and holding operations.’ 11 May 1962.

⁵⁴ Wilson, Box 2 of 6, file folder: Memoranda to Gen. Dinh, CG II Corps 1 August 1962; document: III Corps Clear and Hold Operation Plan Kien Hoa, 27 December 1963.

⁵⁵ MAAG Vietnam, file folder: U.S. Committee on Province Rehabilitation, Vietnam. Miscellaneous documents and official correspondence with Government of Vietnam, July 1962-April 1963; document: Lessons learned #16, 19 June 1962.

⁵⁶ MACV, Series VIII, file folder: USMAAGV, Miscellaneous memoranda, June 1962 – May 1963; document: PSYWAR/CA Branch Organization and Training Division, U.S. Army Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, Saigon, Vietnam, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Trip Report – Inspection of Psywar/CA and Information Activities Operation Hai Yen II, Phu Yen Province, 10 July 1962, from Maj. Harold F. Bentz, Jr.

⁵⁷ Collins, 2.

⁵⁸ MACV, Series VIII, Intel Bulletins, document: Narrative Study of Vietnam, 24 August 1958.

⁵⁹ MAAG Vietnam, file folder: ‘Memorandum MAAG J.D. Gallagher LTC adjutant general to Assistant Secretary of Defense ISA 24 August 1958.’

⁶⁰ MAAG Vietnam, file folder, U.S. Committee on Province Rehabilitation, Vietnam. Miscellaneous documents and official correspondence with Government of Vietnam, July 1962-April 1963; document: Concept of Employment, mission of advisor teams, 12 May 1962.

⁶¹ Herring, 82–83.

⁶² Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942–1976 (Washington DC: U.S. Center for Military History 2006), 309.

⁶³ See Jessica Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2013) on challengers to Diem’s rule and his consolidation of power.

⁶⁴ MACV Command Historian’s Collection Series VIII, Intel Bulletins, document, Brief Summary of MAAG-TERM Activities, Nov. 1955-Nov. 1956, dated 18 November 1956.

⁶⁵ Birtle, Counterinsurgency, 309–210.

⁶⁶ Birtle, Counterinsurgency, 309.

⁶⁷ Birtle, Counterinsurgency, 314.

⁶⁸ MAAG Vietnam, file folder: U.S. Committee on Province Rehabilitation, Vietnam. Miscellaneous documents and official correspondence with Government of Vietnam, July 1962-April 1963; document: Memorandum LG Lionel C. McGarr, Subject: First 12-month report of Chief MAAG, Vietnam, 1 September 1961.

⁶⁹ MAAG Vietnam, mission of advisor teams, 12 May 1962.

⁷⁰ Birtle, Counterinsurgency, 316–317.

⁷¹ Hunt, 13, 24–25.

⁷² Birtle, Counterinsurgency, 315.

⁷³ Birtle, Counterinsurgency, 320.

⁷⁴ E.g., Wilson, Box 1 of 6, memorandum, USMAAGV, II VN Corps Detachment Pleiku, Vietnam 7 January 1962, Subject: Analysis of Viet Cong Activity in II Corps Tactical Zone; Wilson, Box 3 of 6, file folder: Memorandums for COMUSMACV; document: Progress Report OPLAN TAY NINH for the period 1 March to 31 May 1963, 1 July 1963; Wilson, Box 3 of 6, file folder: Memorandums for COMUSMACV; document, Progress report OPLAN Binh Duong for the period 1 March to 31 May 1963, 1 July 1963; Wilson, Box 3 of 6, file folder: Suggestions on how to win the war in Vietnam, document: memo to Col. Wilson, 4 February 1964, from Lt. Edward L. Schmidt.

⁷⁵ Westmoreland, Series I Official Correspondence, COMUSMACV back channel messages, outgoing, for Jan. 1964 to June 1965, Box 17; file folder: Backchannel messages sent February 1-31 December 1964; document: memorandum from Westmoreland to Wheeler CJCS Nov. 1964, assessment of military situation presented to Ambassador Taylor.

⁷⁶ MACV, Series VIII, file folder: US Committee on Provincial Reconstruction, Vietnam misc documents and official correspondence with GVN 7/62–4/63; documents: Headquarters 9th Infantry Division Advisory Detachment, U.S. Army Military Assistance Advisory Group, Qui Nhon, Vietnam, 24 December 1962, Subject: After Action Report on Psywar/CA in Operation Hai-Yen, Phu-Yen Province (27 June-6 October 1962), signed, Capt. Howard C. Walters, Jr.

⁷⁷ E.g., Blackburn, document: Debriefing report on insurgency in the Mekong River Delta of Vietnam by Colonel John P. Connor, US Army Senior Advisor to IV Vietnamese Corps 1 February 1963 to 1 February 1964.

⁷⁸ Wilson, Box 1 of 6, document: memo, USMAAGV, II VN Corps Detachment Pleiku, Vietnam 10 April 1962, Subject: Civic Action Program, II CTZ, To: Chief MAAG, Vietnam, From Col. Wilbur Wilson.

⁷⁹ Wilson, Box 3 of 6, file folder: Memorandums for COMUSMACV; document: memorandum, 1 July 1963, Subject: Progress Report OPLAN TAY NINH for the period 1 March to 31 May 1963.

⁸⁰ E.g., Wilson, Box 3 of 6; file folder: Suggestions on how to win the war in Vietnam, Col. Wilson, 4 February 1964; document: memo from Schmidt; Wilson, Box 3 of 6, file folder: Memorandums for COMUSMACV; document: 1 July 1963 Subject: Progress report OPLAN Binh Duong for the period 1 March to 31 May 1963.

⁸¹ MAAG Vietnam, file folder: Brief summary of major activities and accomplishments February 62-June 64: The Harkins fact book; document, Special Report, 15 June 1964.

⁸² Westmoreland, Series I Official Correspondence, COMUSMACV Back Channel Messages, outgoing, for January 1964 to June 1965, Box 17; file folder: Backchannel messages sent February 1-31 December 1964; document: memorandum from Westmoreland to Brig. Gen. E.C. Dunn, Ft. Hood, repeating instructions issued to all junior advisors, Dec. 1964.

⁸³ E.g., MAAG Vietnam, Lessons learned #16; Wilson, Box 1 of 6, document: USMAAGV, II VN Corps Detachment Pleiku, Vietnam 7 January 1962, Memorandum, Subject: Analysis of Viet Cong Activity in II Corps Tactical Zone; Wilson, Box 3 of 6, file folder, Memorandums for COMUSMACV; document: 1 July 1963 Subject: Progress Report OPLAN TAY NINH for the period 1 March to 31 May 1963; Wilson, Box 3 of 6, file folder: Memorandums for COMUSMACV, memorandum 1 July 1963, Subject: Progress report OPLAN Binh Duong for the period 1 March to 31 May 1963.

⁸⁴ MACV, Oden debriefing.

⁸⁵ Westmoreland, Series II official papers, COMUSMACV History Backup Files 8–11 for 1 Sept. to 31 December 1964, 27 Aug.-30 December 1964, Box 36; file folder, Official Papers – Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) – History Backup File #9, 9 Oct.-13 Nov.1964 [Part 4 of 4]; document: Memorandum for: Ambassador Taylor, Subject: 3rd Quarter Review of IV Corps, from Westmoreland, 11 November 1964. On training, e.g., Wilson, Box 1 of 6, memorandum from MAAG, Vietnam II VN Corps Detachment Pleiku, Vietnam, 9 September 1962, to MAAG Saigon commanders, Subject: Analysis of Viet Cong Activity in II Corps Tactical Zone, Aug. 1962.

⁸⁶ MAAG Vietnam, file folder: U.S. Military Assistance Command VN; document: Memorandum, Subject: The concept of rural reconstruction and certain definitions and procedures, Serial #o577, 23 April 1965, To: Advisors, signed Major General Richard G. Stilwell, chief of staff, for commander.

⁸⁷ Wilson, Box 4 of 6, file folder: III Corps Estimate of Situation 1st Quarter, 1964, Col. Wilson; document: Memorandum for General Tam, 10 April 1964, Estimate of the situation in III Corps (1st Quarter 1964), from Col. Wilbur Wilson. On population and resources controls, e.g., Wilson, Box 3 of 6, file folder: Suggestions on how to win the war in Vietnam, Col. Wilson, 4 February 1964; memo from Major Casilear Middleton.

⁸⁸ E.g., Logevall, 5; Carter, 8; John Prados, Vietnam: History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 2009), 68; Birtle, Counterinsurgency, 318.

⁸⁹ Blackburn, U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam Briefing Notes, senior advisors conference, 4 May 1962, ‘Clearing and holding operations,’ 11 May 1962.

⁹⁰ E.g., Thomas Carothers, ‘The “Sequencing” Fallacy,’ Journal of Democracy 18/1 (Jan. 2007), 12–27. Also, e.g., Prados, 68, 73, Race, 204, Carter, 10, 131, Logevall, 5, Birtle, Counterinsurgency, 319.

⁹¹ Carter, 135, Race, 42.

⁹² Race, 41.

⁹³ Race, 47–48.

⁹⁴ Race, 72.

⁹⁵ E.g., Birtle, Counterinsurgency, 305, Carter, 55.

⁹⁶ Race, 42; Birtle, Counterinsurgency, 305.

⁹⁷ E.g., Herring, 83.

⁹⁸ E.g., Prados, 75, 117.

⁹⁹ Between U.S. FY 1955 and 1964, total economic aid totaled $230.6 million and military assistance totaled $190.9 million. Carter, 147; Prados, 58. On the gamut of efforts, from economic development to infrastructure to administration, see Carter, e.g., 13, 49, 79.

¹⁰⁰ E.g., Prados, 64, 59, 75; Race, 224.

¹⁰¹ Prados, 59.

¹⁰² E.g., Prados, 60, 75.

¹⁰³ Prados, 75.

¹⁰⁴ Birtle, Counterinsurgency, 311; Prados, 64; Alexander B. Woodside, Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam (New York: Houghton Mifflin 1976), 303.

¹⁰⁵ Race, 72.

¹⁰⁶ MACV, Series VIII, file folder: US Committee on Provincial Reconstruction, Vietnam misc documents and official correspondence with GVN 7/62–4/63; document: Bien Hoa Province, Republic of Vietnam, 1 December 1962, Headquarters U.S Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff – J2.

¹⁰⁷ E.g., MAAG Vietnam, file folder: U.S. Committee on Province Rehabilitation, Vietnam. Miscellaneous documents and official correspondence with Government of Vietnam, July 1962-April 1963 DS 557.4.U56 1962 c. 1; document: Memorandum of Conversation, meeting 8 January 1963, Subject: Resources control and rural internal security, participants Nguyen Van Hay, deputy director National Police; Glenn Dodge, USOM Public Safety Advisor; Bui Xuan Toan, USOM program assistant; E.H. Adkins, Jr., USOM public safety advisor.

¹⁰⁸ Wilson, Box 4 of 6, file folder: III Col Wilson Dec 1963; document: memorandum, 10 April 1964, Subject: Status G-5 program (31 March 1964).

¹⁰⁹ Westmoreland, Series II official papers, COMUSMACV, History backup files, 4–7 for 15 Feb.-31 August 1964, Box 36; file folder: Official papers – commander United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) – history backup file #9, 9 Oct. – 13 November 1964 [part 2 of 4]; document: 24 October 1964 Memorandum for Ambassador Taylor, Subject Hop Tac Evaluation, from Lieutenant General J.L. Throckmorton, deputy commander.

¹¹⁰ Wilson, Box 4 of 6, file folder: Memorandums for General Dinh; document: Memorandum, 13 January 1964, Subject: Status G-5 programs (31 December 1963).

¹¹¹ Blackburn, Debriefing report: 10 June 1964, Major General Charles J. Timmes.

¹¹² Wilson, Box 3 of 6, file folder: Suggestions on how to win the war in Vietnam Col. Wilson, Feb. 1964; document Schmidt memo.

¹¹³ MACV, Series VIII, document: Memorandum, Bien Hoa Province, Republic of Vietnam, 1 December 1962, Headquarters U.S Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff – J2.

¹¹⁴ Wilson, Box 4 of 6, file folder: III Corps Briefing for chief MAAG and chief army section, 13 April 1964, Col. Wilson; document: Memorandum, 10 April 1964, for Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, Saigon, Subject: Status G-5 program (31 March 1964).

¹¹⁵ Wilson, Box 4 of 6, file folder: Memorandums for General Dinh; document: 13 January 1964 Memorandum.

¹¹⁶ MACV, Series VIII, Walters. Also, e.g., Wilson, Box 1 of 6, document: Memorandum, United States Army Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, III Zone Corps Detachment, Pleiku, Vietnam, 31 August 1962, subject: Discussion, Analysis, and Lessons Learned, Operation Hai Yen II, Phase I.

¹¹⁷ MACV, Series VIII, file folder: Brief summary of major activities and accomplishments Feb. 62-June 64: The Harkins fact book; document: Memorandum to Harkins, 11 June 1964, Advisory Team #91, Binh Duong, from LTC Frank B. Simons.

¹¹⁸ Wilson, Box 3 of 6, file folder: Suggestions on how to win the war in Vietnam, Col. Wilson; document: Memorandum from Colonel Joel W. Lawson.

¹¹⁹ MAAG Vietnam, document: Memorandum, MAAG adjutant general Lieutenant Colonel J.D. Gallagher to Assistant Secretary of Defense ISA. 24 August 1958.

¹²⁰ Library, McGarr.

¹²¹ Westmoreland, Throckmorton to Taylor.

¹²² MACV, Walters.

¹²³ E.g., Herring, 84, 93, 100–101, and 108 for examples of U.S. officials, including Kennedy, pressing Diem for reforms such as increased civil liberties, governmental reorganization for greater efficiency, and broadening the circle of Diem’s Vietnamese advisors, and Diem’s often successful resistance. On Diem’s awareness that democratizing reforms would weaken rather than strengthen him, 112.

¹²⁴ Prados, 65.

¹²⁵ Senior Officer Oral History, Lieut. Gen. Henry E. Emerson, interviewed by Jonathan Jackson, 2004, edited by Col. John R. Dabrowski.

¹²⁶ Westmoreland, Series II official papers, COMUSMACV, History backup files, 4–7 for 15 Feb.-31 August 1964, Box 36; file folder Official papers – commander United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) – history backup file #9, 9 Oct. – 13 November 1964 [3 of 4]; document: Memorandum, 31 October 1964, to Ambassador Taylor, Subject U.S. Posture Toward the Emerging GVN, from Westmoreland.

Additional information

Funding

General and Mrs. Matthew B. Ridgway Research Grant from the U.S. Army Heritage and Information Center.

Notes on contributors

Jacqueline L. Hazelton

Jacqueline L. Hazelton is an assistant professor in the Department of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College. She is completing revisions to a scholarly book explaining success in counterinsurgency.