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ABSTRACT
Terrorism carries high audience costs for militant leaders because the attacks on civilians risk tarnishing the entire group as immoral extremists. Image-savvy militant leaders reduce the reputational fallout to the group whenever members commit terrorism. Specifically, the leaders distance their organization from civilian attacks by denying them. In this paper, I identify two types of denial strategies regularly employed by militant leaders, their effectiveness for image restoration, and how Islamic State paid a price for failing to employ them.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 For summaries of the Strategic Model, see Martha Crenshaw, ‘Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches’, Journal of Strategic Studies 10/4 (1987), 13–31; Gordon H. McCormick, ‘Terrorist Decision Making’, Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003), 482; Max Abrahms, ‘What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy’, International Security 32/4 (2008), 78–105. For applications of the strategic model, see Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House 2005); Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, ‘The Strategies of Terrorism’, International Security 31/1 (2006), 49–80.
2 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd enl. ed. (University of Chicago Press 1970).
3 On the correlation between terrorism and political failure, see Raymond Gillespie Frey and Christopher W. Morris, (eds.), Violence, Terrorism, and Justice (Cambridge University Press 1991); Max Abrahms, ‘Why Terrorism Does Not Work’, International Security 31/2 (2006), 42–78; Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida (Santa Monica: Calif.: Rand Corporation 2008); Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups’, International Security 31/1 (2006), 7–48. On the negative political return of terrorism, see Max Abrahms, ‘The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited’, Comparative Political Studies 45/3 (2012), 366–93; Virginia Page Fortna, ‘Do Terrorists Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes’, International Organization 69/3 (2015), 519–56; Claude Berrebi, Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND 2009), 189–90; Jessica A Stanton, Violence and Restraint in Civil War: Civilian Targeting in the Shadow of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2016); Anna Getmansky and Tolga Sinmazdemir, ‘Settling on Violence: Expansion of Israeli Outposts in the West Bank in Response to Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2017): 1–19.
4 Cronin, ‘How al-Qaida Ends’, 7–48.
5 Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (Princeton University Press 2013).
6 Max Abrahms and Philip B. K. Potter, ‘Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics’, International Organization 69/2 (2015), 311–42.
7 See, for example, Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, (eds.), Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Cambridge University Press 2006).
8 Abrahms and Potter, ‘Explaining Terrorism’, 311–42.
9 A salient historical example was the Irgun attack on the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in July 1946. The best account is in Bruce Hoffman, Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 1917–1947 (New York: Vintage 2016).
10 Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals (New York: Vintage 1971), 44.
11 See, for example, Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University Press 2017).
12 Barry R. Schlenker, Impression Management (Brooks/Cole 1980).
13 William L. Benoit, Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration Strategies (London: Marcombo 1995), 3.
14 Eve Tahmincioglu, ‘Should You Accept Blame for a Mistake?’ MSNBC, 20 October 2020, 2008, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27239935/ns/business-careers/t/should-you-accept-blame-mistake/.
15 Benoit, Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies, 3.
16 B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, ‘They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia’, Quarterly Journal of Speech 59/3 (1973), 273–83.
17 Gresham M. Sykes and David Matza, ‘Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency’, American Sociological Review 22/6 (1957), 664–70.
18 Jennifer Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2010), 3.
19 Quoted in Avinash Dixit, ‘A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Diego Gambetta’s Codes of the Underworld’, Global Crime 12/2 (2011), 136.
20 David J. Lanoue, ‘The Teflon Factor: Ronald Reagan and Comparative Presidential Popularity’, Polity 21/3 (1989), 482.
21 Halford Ross Ryan, Oratorical Encounters: Selected Studies and Sources of Twentieth-Century Political Accusations and Apologies (New York: Greenwood Press 1988).
22 Eliza Barclay, ‘With Lawsuit Over, Taco Bell’s Mystery Meat Is a Mystery No Longer’, NPR, 19 April 2011. http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2011/04/22/135539926/with-lawsuit-over-taco-bells-mystery-meat-is-a-mystery-no-longer.
23 Kevin E. McClearey, ‘Audience Effects of Apologia’, Communication Quarterly 31/1 (1983): 12–20.
24 Catherine A. Riordan, Nancy A. Marlin, and Catherine Gidwani, ‘Accounts Offered for Unethical Research Practices: Effects on the Evaluations of Acts and Actors’, Journal of Social Psychology 128/4 (1988), 495–505.
25 Betty Kaman Lee, ‘Audience-Oriented Approach to Crisis Communication: A Study of Hong Kong Consumers’ Evaluation of an Organizational Crisis’, Communication Research 31/5 (2004), 613.
26 John D. Battersby, ‘A.N.C. Acts to Halt Civilian Attacks’, The New York Times, 21 August 1988. http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/21/world/anc-acts-to-halt-civilian-attacks.html.
27 Nelly Lahoud, Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 222.
28 Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi Books 2010), 232.
29 Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press 2013), 34.
30 BBC, ‘Somali Woman Killed’, 30 July 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28564984.
31 Brennan Weiss, ‘More Than 300 People Died in the Worst Terrorist Attack Ever to Hit Somalia’, Business Insider, 17 October 2017. http://www.businessinsider.com/who-caused-somalia-terrorist-attack-mogadishu-al-shabab-2017-10.
32 Amarnath Amarasingam, ‘Tahrir As-Sham Officially Denies They Were behind Damascus Bombing Today and Says Their Focus Is Only on Military Targets’, Twitter, 15 March 2017. https://twitter.com/AmarAmarasingam/status/842077495352561664.
33 Associated Press, ‘UN: Boko Haram Use of Kids as Human Bombs Soars in 2017’, 22 August 2017. https://apnews.com/8ab141b808f7439a9a7a27e136c634ed.
34 Wahdat Afghan, ‘Afghan Vice-Presidential Candidate Survives Ambush’, Reuters 26 July 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-attack/afghan-vice-presidential-candidate-survives-ambush-idUSTRE56P0R220090726.
35 Azam Ahmed and Matthew Rosenberg, ‘Taliban Deny Responsibility for Attack on Red Cross’, The New York Times, 31 May 2013.
36 United Nations Assistance Mission In Afghanistan, and United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – Afghanistan Annual Report 2013’ Feb. 2014, 32. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/feb_8_2014_poc-report_2013-full-report-eng.pdf.
37 Max Abrahms and Justin Conrad, ‘The Strategic Logic of Credit Claiming: A New Theory for Anonymous Terrorist Attacks’, Security Studies 26/2 (2017): 279–304.
38 Marti H. Gonzales, Debra J. Manning, and Julie A. Haugen, ‘Explaining Our Sins: Factors Influencing Offender Accounts and Anticipated Victim Responses’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62/6 (1992), 958–71.
39 Charles R. Snyder and Raymond L. Higgins, ‘Excuses: Their Effective Role in the Negotiation of Reality’, Psychological Bulletin 104/1 (1988), 23–35.
40 See, for example, Marvin B. Scott and Stanford M. Lyman, ‘Accounts’, American Sociological Review 33/1 (1968), 46–62.
41 Gonzales et al., ‘Explaining Our Sins: Factors Influencing Offender Accounts and Anticipated Victim Responses’, 958.
42 Jennifer Lind, Sorry states: Apologies in international politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2008).
43 Danny Lewis, ‘Five Times the United States Officially Apologized’, Smithsonian, 27 May 2016. http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/five-times-united-states-officially-apologized-180959254/.
44 Lee, ‘Audience-Oriented Approach to Crisis Communication’, 613.
45 Schlenker, Impression Management; Scott and Lyman, ‘Accounts’, 46–62.
46 Scott and Lyman, ‘Accounts’, 46–62.
47 Shane Schutte, ‘CEOs That Used Staff as Scapegoats to Protect the Firm – or Themselves’, Real Business 9 March 2016. https://realbusiness.co.uk/hr-and-management/2016/03/09/ceos-that-used-staff-as-scapegoats-to-protect-the-firm-or-themselves/.
48 Benoit, Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies, 27.
49 Lee, ‘Audience-Oriented Approach to Crisis Communication’, 603.
50 William L. Benoit and Shirley Drew, ‘Appropriateness and Effectiveness of Image Repair Strategies’, Communication Reports 10/2 (1997), 156.
51 Ware and Linkugel, They Spoke in Defense of Themselves, 277.
52 Benoit and Drew, ‘Appropriateness and Effectiveness’, 156.
53 Yi-Hui Huang, ‘Crisis Situations, Communication Strategies, and Media Coverage: A Multicase Study Revisiting the Communicative Response Model’, Communication Research 33/3 (2006), 180–205.
54 Gary S. Schwartz, Thomas R. Kane, Joanne M. Joseph, and James T. Tedeschi, ‘The Effects of Post-Transgression Remorse on Perceived Aggression, Attributions of Intent, and Level of Punishment’, British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 17/4 (1978), 293–97.
55 K. Ohbuchi, M. Kameda, N. Agarie, ‘Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56/2 (1989), 219.
56 Benoit and Drew, ‘Appropriateness and Effectiveness’, 156.
57 Hua-Hsin Wan, ‘Inoculation, Bolstering, and Combined Approaches in Crisis Communication’, Journal of Public Relations Research 6/3 (2004), 301–28.
58 Huang, ‘Crisis Situations, Communication Strategies’, 180–205.
59 Huang, ‘Crisis Situations, Communication Strategies’, 180–205.
60 Andrew Fullerton, Nicole Renfer, and Erin Weiler, ‘TEXACO Case Study: Racial Discrimination Case’, 5 March 2013. https://erincweiler.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/texaco-case-study.pdf.
61 Kelly Bhasin, ‘9 PR Fiascos That Were Handled Brilliantly by Management’, Business Insider, 26 May 2011. http://www.businessinsider.com/pr-disasters-crisis-management-2011-5/#johnson-and-johnsons-cyanide-laced-tylenol-capsules-1982-1.
62 Ioana Emy Matesan and Ronit Berger, ‘Blunders and Blame: How Armed Non-State Actors React to Their Mistakes’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40/5 (2017), 376–98.
63 ‘IRA Says Harrods Bombing Was a Mistake,’ United Press International, 30 December 1983. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1983/12/30/IRA-says-Harrods-bombing-was-a-mistake/2270441608400/.
64 Matesan and Berger, ‘Blunders and Blame’, 388.
65 Howell Raines, ‘Terrorism: With Latest Bomb, I.R.A. Injures Its Own Cause’, New York Times 15 November 1987. http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/15/weekinreview/the-world-terrorism-with-latest-bomb-ira-injures-its-own-cause.html.
66 Paul Delaney, ‘Spain Fears Bombing May Herald an Increase in Terrorist Attacks’, New York Times 23 June 1987. http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/23/world/spain-fears-bombing-may-herald-an-increase-in-terrorist-attacks.html.
67 ‘Rebel Leader Apologizes for Colombian Church Kidnapping’, CNN, 7 June 1999. http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9906/07/colombia/.
68 Shlomi Eldar, Eyeless in Gaza (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot 2005), 186.
69 Or Honig and Ariel Reichard, ‘The Usefulness of Examining Terrorists’ Rhetoric for Understanding the Nature of Different Terror Groups’, Terrorism and Political Violence (2017), 10.
70 Associated Press, ‘Nepal: Rebels Apologize For Bus Attack’, New York Times 8 June 2005. https://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/08/world/world-business-briefing-asia-nepal-rebels-apologize-for-bus-attack.html.
71 Honig and Reichard, ‘The Usefulness of Examining Terrorists’, 9.
72 Michael Scheuer, Osama Bin Laden (Oxford University Press 2011), 148.
73 Yousuf Basil and Catherine E. Shoichet, ‘Al Qaeda: We’re Sorry about Yemen Hospital Attack’, CNN 22 December 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/22/world/meast/yemen-al-qaeda-apology/index.html.
74 ‘Al Qaeda-Linked Militants in Lebanon Apologize for Civilian Deaths’, Reuters 8 March 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-blasts/al-qaeda-linked-militants-in-lebanon-apologize-for-civilian-deaths-idUSBREA270L120140308.
75 Dominique Soguel, ‘Syrian Druze Massacre: Can Jihadists Salvage Their Image?’ Christian Science Monitor 15 June 2015. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0615/Syrian-Druze-massacre-Can-jihadists-salvage-their-image.
76 Paul Armstrong and Hamdi Alkhshali, ‘Rebels in Syria Call Boy’s Beheading a Mistake’, CNN, 20 July 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/20/middleeast/boy-beheaded-in-syria/index.html.
77 Alan O’Day, Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Conflict and Conflict Resolution (Westport, CT: Praeger 1997), 20.
78 Matesan and Berger, ‘Blunders and Blame’, 388.
79 Allister Haddon Sparks, The Mind of South Africa (New York: Ballantine 1991), 247; see Honig and Reichard, ‘The Usefulness of Examining Terrorists’, 14–15.
80 ‘Rebel leader apologizes,’ 7 June 1999.
81 Mohammed Daraghmeh, ‘Militia Leader to Strengthen Army’, Associated Press, 6 March 2002. http://www.myplainview.com/news/article/Militia-Leader-to-Strengthen-Army-9012009.php, quoted in Honig and Reichard, ‘The Usefulness of Examining Terrorists’, 14.
82 Eldar, Eyeless in Gaza, 186; see Honig and Reichard, ‘The Usefulness of Examining Terrorists’, 14.
83 Associated Press, ‘Nepalese Rebels Apologize for Deadly Bombing of Civilian Bus’, USA Today, 7 June 2005. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-06-07-nepal-rebels_x.htm.
84 V. S. Subrahmanian, Aaron Mannes, Amy Sliva, Jana Shakarian, and John P. Dickerson, Computational Analysis of Terrorist Groups: Lashkar-e-Taiba (New York: Springer 2013), 34.
85 Basil and Shoichet, Al Qaeda.
86 ‘Al Qaeda-Linked Militants in Lebanon Apologize for Civilian Deaths’, 8 March 2014.
87 Soguel, ‘Syrian Druze Massacre’.
88 Norman Byrd, ‘Child Beheading Video: US-Backed Syrian Rebel Group Video Execution of Young Boy Spy’ Inquisitr, 22 July 2016. https://www.inquisitr.com/3336176/child-beheading-video-us-backed-syrian-rebel-group-video-execution-of-young-boy-spy/.
89 Matesan and Berger, ‘Blunders and Blame’, 388.
90 Reuters staff, “Al Qaeda-Linked Militants in Lebanon Apologize for Civilian Deaths’, Reuters, 8 March 2014. .
91 Eldar, Eyeless in Gaza, 186.
92 Byrd ‘Child Beheading Video’.
93 Matesan and Berger, ‘Blunders and Blame’, 388.
94 Associated Press, ‘Nepalese rebels apologize,’ 7 June 2005.
95 Associated Press, ‘Syria’s Al-Qaeda Affiliate Says It Regrets Killing of Druze’, The Times of Israel, 13 June 2013, 2015. http://www.timesofisrael.com/syrias-al-qaeda-affiliate-says-it-regrets-killing-of-druze/.
96 Honig and Reichard, ‘The Usefulness of Examining Terrorists’, 15.
97 Quoted in Honig and Reichard, ‘The Usefulness of Examining Terrorists’, 8.
98 See Honig and Reichard, ‘The Usefulness of Examining Terrorists’, 16.
99 Honig and Reichard, ‘The Usefulness of Examining Terrorists’, 7.
100 Hicham Safieddine, ‘Adult Israelis Seen as Targets by Foe’, Toronto Star, 23 October 2004.
101 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks 2007), 6.
102 Bashir Ahmad Naadem, ‘Dead Bodies of 27 Killed by Taliban Recovered’, Pajhwok Afghan News, 19 October 2008. https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Dead+bodies+of+27+killed+by+Taliban+recovered.-a0187384698.
103 Bill Roggio, ‘Taliban Kill 21 Afghans in Double Suicide Attack’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 6 June 2012. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/06/taliban_killed_21_af.php Roggio, 6 June 2012.
104 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sharīʻa and Islamic Criminal Justice in Time of War and Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press 2014), 140.
105 Al-Qaeda, ‘A Statement from Al-Qaeda Al-Jihad Regarding the Mandates of the Heroes and the Legality of the Operations in New York and Washington,’ 24 April 2004.
106 Associated Press, ‘Nepalese rebels apologize,’ 7 June 2005.
107 Eldar, Eyeless in Gaza, 186; see Honig and Reichard, ’The Usefulness of Examining Terrorists‘, 14.
108 ‘Rebel leader apologizes,’ 7 June 1999.
109 Raines, ‘Terrorism’.
110 Armstrong and Alkshali, 20 July 2016.
111 Reuters staff, “Al Qaeda-Linked Militants in Lebanon Apologize for Civilian Deaths’, Reuters, 8 March 2014.
112 Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 2016), 184.
113 Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 2016), 184.
114 Danielle Breitenbücher, ‘Syria, Code of Conduct of the Free Syrian Army: How Does Law Protect in War?’ International Committee of the Red Cross. Accessed 6 August 2016. https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/syria-code-conduct-free-syrian-army.
115 ‘Syria’s White Helmets Suspend Members Caught on Camera during Rebel Execution’, RT, 20 May 2017. https://www.rt.com/news/388960-white-helmets-execution-footage/.
116 Max Abrahms, Nicholas Beauchamp, and Joseph Mroszczyk, ‘What Terrorist Leaders Want: A Content Analysis of Terrorist Propaganda Videos’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40/11 (2017), 899–916.
117 Malcolm Nance, Defeating ISIS: Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe (New York: Skyhorse Publishing 2016), 393.
118 Scheuer, Osama Bin Laden, 144.
119 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, ‘Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi (English Translation)’, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 9 July 2005. https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2.
120 Gerges, ISIS, 187.
121 Max Fisher, ‘Al-Qaeda Faction in Syria Hands out Teletubbies and Spiderman Dolls’, Washington Post, 13 August 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/08/13/al-qaeda-faction-in-syria-hands-out-teletubbies-and-spiderman-dolls/.
122 Gerges, ISIS, 187.
123 ‘Iraq’s Rambo out of Favour with His Own Militia after Brutally Violent Videos’, France 24, 15 June 2017. http://observers.france24.com/en/20170615-iraq-rambo-out-favour-own-militia-after-brutally-violent-videos.
124 Gerges, ISIS, 146–147.
125 ‘Death Toll from France Truck Attack Rises to 85’, BNO News, 4 August 2016. http://bnonews.com/news/index.php/news/id4998.
126 Mohamad Bazzi, ‘Commentary: Little Known Jihadist Inspired Latest Wave of Lone Wolf Attacks’, Reuters, 28 July 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lone-wolf-attacks-commentary/commentary-jihadist-who-wrote-1600-page-manifesto-inspired-wave-of-lone-wolf-attacks-idUSKCN1071OS.
127 James Rothwell, Chris Graham, and Barney Henderson, ‘German Axe Attack on Train: Isil Claim Afghan Refugee Who Injured Four as One of Its ‘Fighters’, The Telegraph, 18 July 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/18/german-train-axe-attack-many-injured/.
128 Noemie Olive, ‘Islamists Attack French Church, Slit Priest’s Throat’, Reuters, 26 July 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-hostages/two-knifemen-take-several-hostages-in-french-church-police-source-idUSKCN1060VA.
129 See, for example, Saphora Smith, ‘Las Vegas Shooting: ISIS Claim of Responsibility Is Sign of Desperation,’ NBC News, 3 October 2017. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/las-vegas-shooting/las-vegas-shooting-isis-claim-responsibility-sign-desperation-say-experts-n807076.
130 Gerges, ISIS.
131 Jacob Siegel, ‘Islamic Extremists Now Crucifying People in Syria – And Tweeting Out the Pictures’, The Daily Beast, 30 April 2014. https://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/30/islamic-extremists-now-crucifying-people-in-syria-and-tweeting-out-the-pictures.
132 Nance, Defeating ISIS, 256.
133 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan Arts 2015), 171.
134 Joseph M. Brown, ‘Notes to the Underground: Credit Claiming and Organizing in the Earth Liberation Front’, Terrorism and Political Violence (2017), 1–20.
135 Gerges 2016, 266.
136 Maya Gebeily, ‘How ISIL Is Gaming the World’s Journalists’, Public Radio International, 26 June 2014. https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-06-26/how-isil-gaming-worlds-journalists.
137 Colin Clark and Charlie Winter, ‘The Islamic State May Be Failing, But Its Strategic Communications Is Here to Stay’, War on the Rocks, 17 August 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/the-islamic-state-may-be-failing-but-its-strategic-communications-legacy-is-here-to-stay/.
138 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, xv, 171.
139 Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 240, 4.
140 Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: Harper Collins 2015), 120.
141 Anne Barnard and Neil MacFarquharnov, ‘Paris and Mali Attacks Expose Lethal Qaeda-ISIS Rivalry’, New York Times, 20 November 2015.
142 Pamela Engel, ‘It’s Similar to North Korea: Inside ISIS’s Sophisticated Strategy to Brainwash People in the Caliphate’, Business Insider, 28 November 2015. http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-propaganda-strategy-2015-11.
143 Max Abrahms, ‘Does Terrorism Work As a Political Strategy? The Evidence Says No’, Los Angeles Times, 4 April 2016.
144 Nance, Defeating ISIS, 403.
145 Alexander B. Downes, ‘Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy’, Civil Wars 9/4 (2007), 420–44.
146 See, for example, Amy X. Wang, ‘The Aftermath of the Airstrike on Doctors Without Borders’, The Atlantic, 4 October 2015; Brian Stelter, ‘Assad Denies Chemical Attack in Interview for U.S. Viewers’, New York Times, 8 September 2013.
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Max Abrahms
Dr Max Abrahms is an assistant professor of political science and public policy at Northeastern University and a member at the Council on Foreign Relations. Previously, he has been awarded fellowships and other research positions at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, the Empirical Studies of Conflict project at Princeton University, the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Military Academy, the Center for Cyber and Homeland Security at George Washington University, the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, the Economics Department at Bar Ilan University, the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, the Political Science Department at Johns Hopkins University, and the Belfer Center at Harvard University.