Nothing fails like success: The London Ambassadors’ Conference and the coming of the First World War

ABSTRACT

During the July Crisis Britain’s foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, focused on organising a conference through which differences could be reconciled. After the war, he maintained that Germany’s unwillingness to join this conference was one of the immediate causes of war. This essay disputes Grey’s contention, arguing that his plans for a conference, based on a misleading analogy to the previous Balkan Crises, actually helped facilitate the outbreak of war in 1914 by sanctioning inaction in the first phase of the crisis (28 June–22 July) and by tacitly encouraging Russian mobilisation in the second phase (23 July–4 August).

KEYWORDS:

• WWI
• Sir Edward Grey
• analogical reasoning
• Balkan Wars
• causes of war

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank David Stevenson for his encouragement and instruction and acknowledge the valuable feedback I received from Paul Schroeder, Pascal Vennesson, Richard Ned Lebow, Alan Sked, Daniel Wei Boon Chua, Cameron G. Thies, Patrick Garrity, Annika McKinney, Caleb Nelson, Jennifer Burton and the article’s anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), 301.

² Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 616.

³ George Santayana, The Life of Reason, vol. One: Reason in Common Sense (New York: Dover Publications, 1980), 284.

⁴ Ernest R. May, ‘Lessons’ of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).

⁵ Quoted in Stephen Benedict Dyson and Thomas Preston, ‘Individual Characteristics of Political Leaders and the Use of Analogy in Foreign Policy Decision Making’, Political Psychology 27, no. 2 (November 2006): 266.

⁶ Allan Collins and Mark Burstein, ‘Afterword: A Framework for a Theory of Comparison and Mapping’, in Stella Vosniadou and Andrew Ortony (eds.), Similarity and Analogical Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 546.

⁷ Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, New Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 233–34.

⁸ Imran Demir, Overconfidence and Risk Taking in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Case of Turkey’s Syria Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 25.

⁹ On which see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 26–27.

¹⁰ As Ole Wæver observes, a structure is ‘anything that is more stable than something else’ (‘International Leadership After the Demise of the Last Superpower: System Structure and Stewardship’, Chinese Political Science Review, 2017, sec. 2, 10.1007/s41111-017–0086-7). In international politics, as in languages and games, structure includes ‘rules and understandings’ that shape outcomes. See Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), xii–xiii.

¹¹ A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), 232–34; K. J. Holsti, ‘Governance without Government: Polyarchy in Nineteenth-Century European Politics’, in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 50–57; on nationalism more generally, Richard C. Hall, Consumed by War: European Conflict in the 20th Century (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010).

¹² David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904–1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); A. J. P. Taylor, War by Timetable: How the First World War Began, Kindle Edition (London: Endeavour Press, 2013); Klaus Hildebrand, ‘The Sword and the Scepter: The Powers and the European System before 1914’, in Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross (eds.), The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014), 18.

¹³ Stephen Van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War’, International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 58–107; Jack Snyder, ‘Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984’, International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 108–46.

¹⁴ Paul Crook, Darwinism, War and History: The Debate over the Biology of War from the ‘Origin of Species’ to the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, ‘World Wars: Definitions and Causes’, in Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (eds.), The Origins of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 26.

¹⁵ Klaus Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Adenauer: The Limits of Statecraft (Abingdon: Routledge, 1989), 113; ‘The Sword and the Scepter’, 18; Günther Kronenbitter, ‘The German and Austro-Hungarian General Staffs and Their Reflections on an ‘Impossible’ War, in Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (eds.), An Improbable War?: The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before 1914 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 149–58; Paul W. Schroeder, ‘Preventive Wars to Restore and Stabilize the International System’, International Interactions 37, no. 1 (2011): 96–107; Jack S. Levy, ‘The Sources of Preventive Logic in Germany Decision-Making in 1914’, in Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez (eds.), The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 139–66.

¹⁶ Avner Offer, ‘Going to War in 1914: A Matter of Honor?’, Politics & Society 23, no. 2 (June 1995): 213–41; Ute Frevert, ‘Honor, Gender, and Power: The Politics of Satisfaction in Pre-War Europe’, in An Improbable War?, 233–55.

¹⁷ Hildebrand, ‘The Sword and the Scepter’, 33; for examples for Russia and Germany respectively: Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, 228, 246, 252; 366, 447, 478.

¹⁸ Friedrich Kießling, ‘Unfought Wars: The Effect of Detente before World War I’, in An Improbable War, 183–99; Hildebrand, ‘The Sword and the Scepter’, 25–30; Jack S. Levy and Jack Snyder, ‘Everyone’s Favored Year for War – or Not?’, International Security 39, no. 4 (Spring 2015): 208–17.

¹⁹ Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, chap. XVII; Michelle Murray, ‘Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War’, Security Studies 19, no. 4 (2010): 656–88; Michelle Murray, ‘Recognition, Disrespect, and the Struggle for Morocco: Rethinking Imperial Germany’s Security Dilemma’, in Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (eds.), The International Politics of Recognition (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 131–51; Steven Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), chap. 3.

²⁰ John C. Röhl, ‘The Curious Case of the Kaiser’s Disappearing War Guilt: Wilhelm II in July 1914’, in An Improbable War?, 75–94; John C. Röhl, ‘Goodbye to All That (Again)? The Fischer Thesis, the New Revisionism and the Meaning of the First World War’, International Affairs 91, no. 1 (2015): 153–66.

²¹ Afflerbach and Stevenson, An Improbable War?; Hildebrand, ‘The Sword and the Scepter’; T.G. Otte, July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 505–24; Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), xxix; Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War, Kindle Edition (London: Profile Books, 2013) Kindle Location (KL), 12,035.

²² Keith Robbins, Sir Edward Grey: A Biography of Lord Grey of Fallodon (London: Cassell, 1971), 266–68; Richard J. Evans, The Pursuit of Power: Europe 1815–1914 (New York: Penguin Books, 2016), 713; Andreas Rose, Between Empire and Continent: British Foreign Policy before the First World War, trans. Rona Johnston (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 441; For an example see Cartwright to Nicolson 11 April 1913 in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, 11 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1926) (hereafter BD), 9.2, no. 837, in which Sir Fairfax Cartwright, Britain’s Ambassador in Vienna, reported that in Austrian circles: ‘The prestige of England in this part of the world and among the Balkan States is supreme just now, and there seems to be a good probability that whatever course Sir Edward Grey may advise the Powers to follow will in the long run be accepted by them…’.

²³ Paul W. Schroeder, ‘Embedded Counterfactuals and World War I as an Unavoidable War’, in David Wetzel, Robert Jervis, and Jack S. Levy (eds.), Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 188 see also 191.

²⁴ Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 3: 205–206; J. Paul Harris, ‘Great Britain’, in Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (eds.), The Origins of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 278–80; MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace, KL 10,753, 10,820, 11,037.

²⁵ Harris, ‘Great Britain’, 293–94.

²⁶ Jérôme aan de Wiel, ‘1914: What Will the British Do? The Irish Home Rule Crisis in the July Crisis’, The International History Review 37, no. 4 (2015): 666; MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace, KL 10,820–10,846.

²⁷ Harris, ‘Great Britain’, 278.

²⁸ Otte, July Crisis, 139–40.

²⁹ Michael G. Ekstein, ‘Some Notes on Sir Edward Grey’s Policy in July 1914’, The Historical Journal 15, no. 2 (June 1972): 321–24.

³⁰ Ekstein explained the apparent paradox of Grey’s relative inaction by arguing Grey had learned from the Balkan Wars that the ‘peace party’ in Berlin would solve the crisis by pressuring Austria. See his ‘Sir Edward Grey and Imperial Germany in 1914’, Journal of Contemporary History 6, no. 3 (1971): 121–31; cf. Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, Second Edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 265. Christopher Clark, in contrast, argues that as early as 8 July Grey had already conceded the near inevitability of a European war, and consequently made no attempt to prevent it. See The Sleepwalkers, 410–411; 495–498. T.G. Otte, meanwhile, rejects the entire narrative, arguing Grey did exercise real leadership, but was powerless to sway the leaders of Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. See his ‘“Postponing the Evil Day”: Sir Edward Grey and British Foreign Policy’, The International History Review 38, no. 2 (2016): 258–60; Otte, July Crisis, 142, 146–49, 520–22.

³¹ MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace, KL 11,089–11,115.

³² Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins, 237.

³³ Keith Neilson, ‘1914: The German War?’, European History Quarterly 44, no. 3 (2014): 406.

³⁴ Otte, July Crisis, 264, 295–302.

³⁵ Annika Mombauer, ‘Sir Edward Grey, Germany, and the Outbreak of the First World War: A Re-Evaluation’, The International History Review 38, no. 2 (2016): 320.

³⁶ Edward Grey, Why Britain Is in the War and What She Hopes from the Future (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916), 5–8.

³⁷ Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins, 274.

³⁸ Albertini, Origins, 2: 335–336 also criticised Grey’s treatment of Russian mobilisation as inevitable, which undercut his own ambassador’s warning to the Russian Foreign Minister; also see John W. Young, ‘Ambassador George Buchanan and the July Crisis’, The International History Review 40, no. 1 (2018): 211–13.

³⁹ Gordon Martel, The Month That Changed the World: July 1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 198–203.

⁴⁰ Joachim Remak, ‘1914–The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered’, Journal of Modern History 43, no. 3 (September 1971): 353–66.

⁴¹ Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 370; Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 319; Jervis, Perception and Misperception, xli; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ‘Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911–1914’, International Security 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986): 121–50.

⁴² On indifference to the Balkan Wars in general, see Eugene Michail, ‘The Balkan Wars in Western Historiography, 1912–2012’, in Katirn Boeckh and Sabine Rutar (eds.), The Balkan Wars from Contemporary Perception to Historic Memory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 320; Dominik Geppert, William Mulligan, and Andreas Rose, eds., The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). The basic text on British foreign policy and the lead-up to the First World War is Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins. It gives the Balkan Wars just nine pages, though Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), chap. 11 gives them more attention. Another key text (Harris, ‘Great Britain’), gives the Balkan Wars three sentences. MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace, chap. 16 offers the best recent general treatment of the crises of 1912–13.

⁴³ Quoted in George Macaulay Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1937), 249. Grey made parallel public comments in Aug.-Sep. 1915. Edward Grey, Edward Grey’s Reply to Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1915), 7–9.

⁴⁴ David E. Rumelhart, ‘Toward a Microstructural Account of Human Reasoning’, in Stella Vosniadou and Andrew Ortony (eds.), Similarity and Analogical Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 300.

⁴⁵ Collins and Burstein, ‘Afterword’, 546.

⁴⁶ David Patrick Houghton, ‘Analogical Reasoning and Policymaking: Where and When Is It Used?’, Policy Sciences 31, no. 3 (1998): n. 1.

⁴⁷ David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: HarperPerennial, 1970), 243.

⁴⁸ Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

⁴⁹ Rand J. Spiro et al., ‘Multiple Analogies for Complex Concepts: Antidotes for Analogy-Induced Misconception in Advanced Knowledge Acquisition’, in Similarity and Analogical Reasoning, 506.

⁵⁰ Spiro et al., 510.

⁵¹ Hal Brands and William Inboden, ‘Wisdom Without Tears: Statecraft and the Uses of History’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 2018, 10.1080/01402390.2018.1428797.

⁵² David Stevenson, ‘Learning from the Past: The Relevance of International History’, International Affairs 90, no. 1 (2014): 12–14.

⁵³ Stevenson, 13–15, 17–20.

⁵⁴ Collins and Burstein, ‘Afterword’, 562.

⁵⁵ An example: George Kennan’s discovery of a third way in-between appeasement and war from Edward Gibbon’s narrative of how imperial overstretch contributed to Rome’s fall. See William Inboden, ‘Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties of Historical Experience: A Taxonomy’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 2013, 16–17, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.829402.

⁵⁶ Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, ‘Foreign Policy Decisionmakers As Practical-Intuitive Historians: Applied History and Its Shortcomings’, International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (June 1986): 234.

⁵⁷ Spiro et al., ‘Multiple Analogies for Complex Concepts’.

⁵⁸ Dyson and Preston, ‘Individual Characteristics’.

⁵⁹ Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013).

⁶⁰ Jonathan St. B. T. Evans and Keith E. Stanovich, ‘Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate’, Perspectives on Psychological Science 8, no. 3 (2013): 224.

⁶¹ Rumelhart, ‘Toward a Microstructural Account’, 300.

⁶² Jervis, Perception and Misperception, xxxviii.

⁶³ Jervis, 233–34.

⁶⁴ Jervis, 278. The aphorism, ‘nothing fails like success’, used in the essay’s title, comes from William Ralph Inge, Outspoken Essays, First Series (London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1919), 41 and 88; quoted and discussed in Jervis, 278 ff.

⁶⁵ Jervis, 230.

⁶⁶ Jervis, xxx; xxxi; lviii, 237, 238.

⁶⁷ Arthur Schlesinger Jr., War and the American Presidency, Revised Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 123.

⁶⁸ May, ‘Lessons’ of the Past; Khong, Analogies at War; Andrew Mumford, ‘Parallels, Prescience and the Past: Analogical Reasoning and Contemporary International Politics’, International Politics 52, no. 1 (2015): 1–19.

⁶⁹ F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System 1814–1914, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2013), 197–211. Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, 255–56, 271.

⁷⁰ Steven Wesley Sowards, Austria-Hungary and the Macedonian Reforms, 1902–1908 (PhD Dissertation, Indiana University, 1981), 26; Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery, 370.

⁷¹ Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers, 275–78.

⁷² Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 214–15 and 107–10, 200, 209–10; David MacLaren McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia 1900–1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 108.

⁷³ Izvolsky, as quoted in Bridge and Bullen, 289. As a German diplomat would comment in December of 1908: ‘in place of the Austro-Russian stepped the Anglo-Russian entente’. Quoted in Anne Louise Antonoff, Almost War: Britain, Germany, and the Bosnia Crisis, 1908–1909 (PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 2006), 80 n. 148; cf. 144.

⁷⁴ Douglas Dakin, ‘British Sources Concerning the Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1901–1909’, Balkan Studies, vol. 2, no. 1/2 (1961): 76–77; Rose, Between Empire and Continent, 371, 375–76, 382, 385; Paul W. Schroeder, ‘Stealing Horses to Great Applause: Austria-Hungary’s Decision in 1914 in Systemic Perspective’, in An Improbable War?, 31, 34.

⁷⁵ McDonald, United Government, 169.

⁷⁶ Antonoff, Almost War, 154 n. 18; 157 n. 35.

⁷⁷ Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 301–2; Bridge and Bullen, 291.

⁷⁸ McDonald, United Government, 135; Antonoff, Almost War, 137; 147–48.

⁷⁹ Rose, Between Empire and Continent, 414–15; Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, 452; Antonoff, Almost War, 259 n. 48.

⁸⁰ McDonald, United Government, chap. 6; Manfried Rauchensteiner, The First World War and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914–1918 (Vienna: Boehlau Verlag, 2014), 19.

⁸¹ H. H. Asquith, The Genesis of the War (London: Cassell and Company, 1923), 42; cf. Karl Max Lichnowsky, My Mission to London 1912–1914 (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918), 33. The British position, Harold Temperley would later write, ‘displayed astounding ignorance and naïveté’. ‘Professor Temperley on the Origins of the War of 1914’, The Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1948): 254.

⁸² Nicolson to Grey 17 March 1909, BD 5, no. 701.

⁸³ Grey to Nicolson 27 October 1908, BD 5, no. 412; idem, no. 411; also see Antonoff, Almost War 176 n. 152.

⁸⁴ Pace Rose, Between Empire and Continent, 423; see, in contrast, Grey to Nicolson, 10 November 1908, BD 5, no. 441.

⁸⁵ Antonoff, Almost War, 214.

⁸⁶ Antonoff, 673–75; cf. Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers, 293–95, 297; Rose, Between Empire and Continent, 433, 436.

⁸⁷ Antonoff, Almost War, 675–78; Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers, 295.

⁸⁸ Quoted in Timothy W. Childs, Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War Over Libya 1911–1912 (New York: E. J. Brill, 1990), 5; see also Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, 406. Other Powers had also tacitly accepted this arrangement. See Taylor, 463; Childs, Italo-Turkish Diplomacy, 10; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 244.

⁸⁹ Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, 413–31; Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1:49–52.

⁹⁰ Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers, 302, 304 ff.

⁹¹ Quoted in Childs, Italo-Turkish Diplomacy, 9.

⁹² R. J. B. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy before the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 151–52.

⁹³ Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 244–51; Evans, The Pursuit of Power, 688–93; Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, 474; Richard Ned Lebow, ‘Agency versus Structure in A. J. P. Taylor’s Origins of the First World War’, The International History Review 23, no. 1 (2001): 71.

⁹⁴ Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers, 295, 310–11.

⁹⁵ John F. V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War (London: Palgrave, 1983), 89–93; Luciano Monzali, ‘A Half-Hearted Friendship: France and the Italian Conquest of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica 1911–12’, in Luca Micheletta and Andrea Ungari (eds.), The Libyan War 1911–1912 (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 99–102, 109.

⁹⁶ Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, 484–85; Stevenson, Armaments, 232–33.

⁹⁷ Raymond Poincaré, The Origins of the War (London: Cassell and Company, 1922), 132.

⁹⁸ Ernst C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913 (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1938); Albertini, Origins, vol. 1; Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War (London: Routledge, 2000); also see R. J. Crampton, Bulgaria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), chap. 7.

⁹⁹ McDonald, United Government, 180–81.

¹⁰⁰ Albertini, Origins, 1: 372; Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, 486–88; Stevenson, Armaments, 233; James M. Miller, Jr., The Concert of Europe in the First Balkan War 1912–1913 (PhD Dissertation, Clark University, 1969), 29–30. Also, for example, Buchanan to Grey Received (hereafter R.) 4 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 78.

¹⁰¹ Quoted in Albertini, Origins, 1: 375.

¹⁰² Quoted in MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace, KL 9019. For British comments along the same lines, see the Minute on Paget to Grey, D. Sep. 24 1912, R. Sep 30, BD 9.1, no. 743.

¹⁰³ Quoted in Stevenson, Armaments, 233.

¹⁰⁴ Barclay to Grey Dispatched (hereafter D.) 9 September 1912, R. 16 Sep., BD 9.1, no 711; Cartwright to Nicolson 8 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 165; Paget to Nicolson 2 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 104.

¹⁰⁵ Helmreich, Diplomacy, 153.

¹⁰⁶ Helmreich, 153; Stevenson, Armaments, 234.

¹⁰⁷ McDonald, United Government, 104, 110, 117, 146, 148, 151, 159.

¹⁰⁸ Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 262–63.

¹⁰⁹ Buchanan to Grey D. 18 September 1912, R. 23 Sep., BD 9.1, no. 722.

¹¹⁰ Paget to Grey D. 24 September 1912, R. 30 Sep., BD 9.1, no. 743.

¹¹¹ Grey to Paget 6 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 142. See also Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, 485; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 257; Katrin Boeckh, ‘The Rebirth of Pan-Slavism in the Russian Empire, 1912–13’, in Katirn Boeckh and Sabine Rutar (eds.), The Balkan Wars from Contemporary Perception to Historic Memory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 107; 112; Ethem Çeku, ‘The Policy of Serbian Expansionism, with Specific Reference to Albanians in the Decade Preceding the Balkan Wars’, The International History Review, 2017, 10.1080/07075332.2017.1402802.

¹¹² Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1: 255.

¹¹³ Grey, 1: 179–88; Rose, Between Empire and Continent, 407, 417–18, 426–27.

¹¹⁴ Cartwright to Nicolson 8 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 165.

¹¹⁵ Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, 491.

¹¹⁶ Cartwright to Grey 7 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 146.

¹¹⁷ Albertini, Origins, 1: 382.

¹¹⁸ Saunders to Braham 25 November 1912, The National Archives (TNA, hereafter implied in FO citations) FO 800/161, no. 36.

¹¹⁹ D.C.B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (London: The Macmillan Press, 1983), 44.

¹²⁰ Cartwright to Nicolson 27 August 1912 quoted in T.G. Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 370.

¹²¹ Grey to Bertie 30 October 1912, BD 9.2 no. 82.

¹²² The phrase comes from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Buchanan to Grey 10 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 174.

¹²³ Goschen to Grey 7 November 1912 BD 9.2, no. 151.

¹²⁴ Cartwright to Nicolson 22 November 1912, FO 800/360, no. 53.

¹²⁵ Goschen to Grey 9 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 169.

¹²⁶ McDonald, United Government, 183.

¹²⁷ Goschen to Nicolson 10 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 175.

¹²⁸ Minute on Buchanan to Grey 8 November 1912, BD 9.2, no 161; Minute to Paget to Grey D. 11 November 1912, R. 26 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 176; Grey to Goschen 8 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 162; Buchanan to Grey 9 November 1912, BD 9.2, no 171; Nicolson to Paget, 13 November 1912, no. 197.

¹²⁹ Goschen inquired whether Russia could ‘be told that if she goes to war on such a question she will have to do it alone and at her own risk?’ Goschen to Nicolson 10 November 1912, BD 9.2, no 175. His question was never answered.

¹³⁰ Bruce W. Menning, ‘The Russian Threat Calculation, 1910–1914’, in Dominik Geppert, William Mulligan, and Andreas Rose (eds.), The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 170; Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, 494. Bertie to Grey 16 November 1912, BD 92, no. 213.

¹³¹ 18 December 1912 quoted in Albertini, Origins, 1: 411–412.

¹³² Lieven, Russia and the Origins, 48.

¹³³ Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 293–301.

¹³⁴ Bertie to Nicolson 8 November 1912, FO 800/161, no. 123.

¹³⁵ Buchanan to Grey R. 18 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 195; Buchanan to Nicolson 14 November 1912, no. 205; Buchanan to Grey 17 November 1912, no. 219.

¹³⁶ Nicolson to Bertie 11 November 1912, FO 800/161, no. 125; cf. Buchanan to Grey 17 November 1912, no. 216.

¹³⁷ Cartwright to Grey 13 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 192.

¹³⁸ Buchanan to Grey D. 13 Nov., R. 18 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 195.

¹³⁹ Buchanan to Nicolson 14 November 1912 FO 800/360, no. 26.

¹⁴⁰ Paul W. Schroeder, ‘World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak’, The Journal of Modern History 44, no. 3 (September 1972): 319–45; see also Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers, 336. For the coming Great War as a ‘multiparty game of chicken’ see John A. Vasquez, ‘The First World War and International Relations Theory: A Review of Books on the 100th Anniversary’, International Studies Review 16, no. 4 (December 2014): 623–44.

¹⁴¹ Buchanan to Grey 18 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 226.

¹⁴² Buchanan to Nicolson 28 November 1912, FO 800/360, no. 39.

¹⁴³ Grey to Goschen 14 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 203; Nicolson to Buchanan 19 November 1912, FO 800/360, no. 242; Nicolson to Bax-Ironside 26 Nov., no. 239; Nicolson to Cartwright, 26 November 1912, no. 250.

¹⁴⁴ Keith M. Wilson, ‘The British Démarche of 3 and 4 December 1912: H. A. Gwynne’s Note on Britain, Russia and the First Balkan War’, The Slavonic and East European Review 62, no. 4 (October 1984): 552–59. On 12 December, Grey also warned the King that because of the logic of the Entente, ‘it might become necessary for England to fight…’. Grey to King 9 December 1912, FO 800/103 no. 438; also King to Grey 8 December 1912, FO 800/103, no. 435.

¹⁴⁵ Cartwright to Nicolson 22 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 256.

¹⁴⁶ See, e.g., Nicolson to Grey 17 March 1909, BD 5, no. 701 and Grey to Nicolson 27 October 1908, BD 5, no. 412; idem, no. 411.

¹⁴⁷ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1: 255.

¹⁴⁸ E.g., Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins, 119; Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, 266.

¹⁴⁹ Miller, The Concert of Europe, 49–50; 140–41.

¹⁵⁰ Minutes on Bertie to Grey 19 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 234.

¹⁵¹ Grey to Bertie 21 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 247. The immediate German origins of the proposal are correctly noted in Milan N. Vego, Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy (London: Routledge, 1996), 144.

¹⁵² Grey to Goschen 21 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 243. Also Goschen to Grey 22 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 251.

¹⁵³ Idem, 22 Nov., no. 249.

¹⁵⁴ Buchanan to Grey 25 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 270.

¹⁵⁵ Grey to Buchanan 26 November 1912, in ed. note, p. 200–201 of BD 9.2.

¹⁵⁶ R.G. V. Minute on Buchanan to Grey 27 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 290.

¹⁵⁷ Grey to Bertie 27 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 292.

¹⁵⁸ Idem, 26 Nov., no. 282.

¹⁵⁹ Grey to Buchanan 26 November 1912, in ed. note, p. 201 of BD 9.2.

¹⁶⁰ Cartwright to Nicolson 22 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 256.

¹⁶¹ David Stevenson, ‘Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914’, International Security 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 146; cf. Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery, 494–95.

¹⁶² In his memoirs, Kokovtsov reported this discussion to have occurred on 22 and 23 Nov. See V. N. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past: Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935), 346. However, recent evidence indicates the correct date is 24 Dec. See Bruce W. Menning, ‘Russian Military Intelligence, July 1914: What St. Petersburg Perceived and Why It Mattered’, The Historian 77, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 232 fn. 73.

¹⁶³ Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, 346.

¹⁶⁴ McDonald, United Government, 186–87. The ‘self-esteem’ description comes from Prince Lichnowsky, who sympathised with Russia’s position. See My Mission to London 1912–1914, 11.

¹⁶⁵ Buchanan to Grey D. 11 December 1912; R. 16 Dec., BD 9.2, no. 371. John Zametica insists that Sazonov all along did not support war over the question of an Albanian port, and cites some evidence to this effect. See his Folly and Malice: The Habsburg Empire, the Balkans and the Start of World War One (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 2017), 252–53. This does not negate the argument of this section; to the contrary, it confirms the wild swings in Russian policy the Foreign Office found so confusing.

¹⁶⁶ E.g., Nicolson to Buchanan 19 November 1912, FO 800/360, no. 242. See also Stevenson, Armaments, 253–60.

¹⁶⁷ Pace David Alan Rich, ‘Russia’, in Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (ed.), The Origins of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 211.

¹⁶⁸ Helmreich, Diplomacy, 159–62; Samuel R. Williamson Jr., ‘Military Dimensions of Habsburg-Romanov Relations During the Era of the Balkan Wars’, in Bela K. Kiraly and Dimitrije Djordjevic (eds.), East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 317–37; Stevenson, Armaments, 234, 236–223; ‘Militarization’, 143; Menning, ‘Russian Military Intelligence’, 226.

¹⁶⁹ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1: 255; cf. 257.

¹⁷⁰ Grey to Buchanan 26 November 1912, in ed. note, p. 200–201 of BD 9.2; see also Grey, 1:265–66.

¹⁷¹ Pace many general accounts, including Steiner and Neilson, Britain and the Origins, 120.

¹⁷² Grey to Goschen 4 December 1912, BD 9.2, no. 327.

¹⁷³ Grey to Buchanan 26 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 283; Helmreich, Diplomacy, 220.

¹⁷⁴ R. J. Crampton, ‘The Decline of the Concert of Europe in the Balkans, 1913–1914’, The Slavonic and East European Review 52, no. 128 (July 1974): 393–419; M. B. Hayne, ‘Great Britain, the Albanian Question and the Concert of Europe, 1911–1914’, Balkan Studies 28, no. 2 (January 1987): 327–54.

¹⁷⁵ Quoted in Dominic Lieven, Towards the Flame: Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia (London: Allen Lane, 2015), 252.

¹⁷⁶ Grey to Count de Salis 28 January 1913, BD 9.2, no. 565.

¹⁷⁷ Keith Wilson, ‘Grey’, in Keith Wilson (ed.), British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: From Crimean War to First World War (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 183; F.R. Bridge, ‘Sir Edward Grey and Austria-Hungary’, The International History Review 38, no. 2 (2016): 264–74.

¹⁷⁸ Buchanan to Grey 19 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 235.

¹⁷⁹ This interpretation agrees with Verena Steller’s argument that ‘offensive conferences’ – in which Europe’s powers sought diplomatic victories – had by the twentieth century come to replace the older tradition, which prioritised consensus. See William Mulligan, ‘The Trial Continues: New Directions in the Study of the Origins of the First World War’, English Historical Review CXXIX, no. 538 (2014): 653. Grey found the experience ‘intolerably wearisome’ (Twenty-Five Years, 1: 256; cf. 257–258). Also see Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers, 319–20.

¹⁸⁰ Grey to Goschen 18 December 1912, BD 9.2, no. 395; Grey to Buchanan 3 April 1913, BD 9.2, no. 797; Nicolson to Buchanan 22 April 1913, BD 9.2, no. 871; Grey to Buchanan 1 May 1913, BD 9.2, no. 920; and Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers, 320–21.

¹⁸¹ E.g., Grey to Cartwright 1 May 1913, BD 9.2, no. 926; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 495–98; this had been a position long in the making, see Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers, 282 and 299–300, arguably since the 1908–09 annexation crisis, see Antonoff, Almost War, 213–14, 583, 650–51.

¹⁸² For a map, Helmreich, Diplomacy, 256; Andreas Rose, ‘From “Illusion” and “Angellism” to Détente’ in Dominik Geppert, William Mulligan, and Andreas Rose (eds.), The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 334–36.

¹⁸³ Grey to Bertie 14 April 1913, BD 9.2, no. 850.

¹⁸⁴ John D. Treadway, The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908–1914 (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1998), 157–58; Rauchensteiner, The First World War, 27. Stephen Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, summarised the desultory nature of the Conference’s proceedings: ‘The Powers are floundering about in a way which will probably lead to war. It takes a fortnight for them to agree on a communication to the Balkan Allies who take a fortnight to reply. Their answer is not satisfactory and another fortnight is occupied in considering a counter-reply…’. Bertie to Grey 6 April 1913, Draft, FO 800/161 no. 136.

¹⁸⁵ John G. Röhl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941, trans. Sheila De Belliaigue and F.R. Bridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 925–27.

¹⁸⁶ Helmreich, Diplomacy, 293–96.

¹⁸⁷ Cartwright to Nicolson 31 January 1913 BD 9.2, no. 582. See also Röhl, Wilhelm II, 926, 928–29.

¹⁸⁸ F.R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866–1914 (New York: Routledge, 1972), 349–52; cf. Stevenson, Armaments, 266.

¹⁸⁹ Crackanthorpe to Grey D. 10 September 1913, BD 10.1, no. 6.

¹⁹⁰ E.g., Idem, D. 12 Sep., no. 8; Miranda Vickers, The Albanians: A Modern History (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 78–79.

¹⁹¹ Crackanthorpe to Grey D. 19 September 1913, BD 10.1, no. 11.

¹⁹² Minute on Communication from M. Cruic 20 September 1913, BD 10.1, no. 12.

¹⁹³ Grey to Bertie 5 May 1914, BD 10.1, no. 128; Vickers, The Albanians, 81.

¹⁹⁴ Poincaré, in his usual conspiratorial manner, later attributed this development to Austrian influence. See The Origins of the War, 153.

¹⁹⁵ Crackanthorpe to Grey 23 September 1913, BD 10.1, no. 15.

¹⁹⁶ Idem, D. 25 Sep., no. 20.

¹⁹⁷ Cartwright to Nicolson 27 September 1913, BD 10.1, no. 23.

¹⁹⁸ Crackanthorpe to Grey D. 8 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 33.

¹⁹⁹ Minute on Crackanthorpe to Grey 2 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 30.

²⁰⁰ Stevenson, Armaments, 275.

²⁰¹ Minute on Goschen to Grey 16 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 38.

²⁰² William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 83–84, 209; cf. Stevenson, Armaments, 278.

²⁰³ Crackanthorpe to Grey 19 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 45.

²⁰⁴ Goschen to Grey 19 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 46.

²⁰⁵ Cartwright to Grey 20 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 47.

²⁰⁶ Crackanthorpe to Grey D. 20 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 49 and Ed. note p. 43.

²⁰⁷ Grey to Cartwright 22 October 1912, BD 10.1, no. 51.

²⁰⁸ Crackanthorpe to Grey D. 22 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 52.

²⁰⁹ O’Beirne to Grey D. 28 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 56; Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (London: Palgrave, 1991), 154.

²¹⁰ Idem, D. 30 Oct., no. 61.

²¹¹ Cartwright to Grey 29 October 1913, BD 10.2, no. 56.

²¹² Stevenson, Armaments, 278; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 287–88; Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers, 326–27; Mulligan, The Origins, 82–87. ‘Our purpose ultimately will be only to go under honorably … like a sinking ship’, wrote Conrad von Hötzendorf, Austria’s chief of the general staff, that Dec. Quoted in Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse (Boston: Humanities Press, 2000), 135.

²¹³ Ibid., no 61 and O’Beirne to Nicolson 30 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 62.

²¹⁴ Grey to Buchanan 26 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 283; Helmreich, Diplomacy, 220.

²¹⁵ Grey to Goschen 4 December 1912, BD 9.2, no. 327.

²¹⁶ E.g., Nicolson to Buchanan 19 November 1912, FO 800/360, no. 242.

²¹⁷ R.G. Vansittart Minute on Buchanan to Grey 27 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 290; Buchanan to Grey, R. 18 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 195; Buchanan to Nicolson 14 November 1912, no. 205; Buchanan to Grey 17 November 1912, no. 219; Grey to Bertie 27 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 292. Buchanan believed Sazonov’s wobbles merely reflected the Russian Tsar’s swaying states of mind. See his My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories (London: Cassell, 1923), 1: 126.

²¹⁸ Miller, The Concert of Europe, 259.

²¹⁹ Buchanan to Grey R. 10 April 1913, BD 9.2, no. 820.

²²⁰ Nicolson minute on ibid. Heretofore this minute seems to have gone unnoticed by scholars other than Miller, The Concert of Europe, 321, who quotes it in part.

²²¹ Grey to Buchanan 12 April 1913, BD 9.2, no. 839; cf. Buchanan to Grey R. 21 April 1913, BD 9.2, no. 849; Buchanan to Grey R. 19 May 1913, BD 9.2, no. 975.

²²² Stevenson, Armaments, 251–52.

²²³ E.g., Minutes on Buchanan to Grey 1 January 1913, no. 431.

²²⁴ Grey to Cartwright 1 May 1913, BD 9.2, no. 926.

²²⁵ Nicolson to Cartwright 13 May 1913, BD 9.2, no. 972. Charles Hardinge had made a similar comment during the first Balkan Crisis of 1908–09, where Grey allowed Europe’s peace to rest on what ‘those two pugnacious states – Servia and Montenegro’ decided to do. Quoted in Rose, Between Empire and Continent, 427; cf. 429, 433.

²²⁶ Grey to Cartwright 22 October 1912, BD 10.1, no. 51; Minute on Goschen to Grey 16 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 38; Crackanthorpe to Grey D. 22 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 52; O’Beirne to Grey D. 28 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 56; Idem, D. 30 Oct., no. 61.

²²⁷ Ibid., no 61 and O’Beirne to Nicolson 30 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 62; Goschen to Grey 19 October 1913, BD 10.1, no. 46.

²²⁸ Grey Minute on O’Beirne to Grey R. 3 November 1913, BD 10.1, no. 61.

²²⁹ O’Beirne to Grey R. 3 November 1913, BD 10.1, no. 61; also O’Beirne to Nicolson 11 December 1913, FO 800/371 no. 43.

²³⁰ E.g., Nicolson Minute on O’Beirne to Grey R. 3 November 1913, BD 10.1, no. 61; Buchanan to Grey R. 19 May 1913, BD 9.2, no. 975. Even today, scholars continue to debate the influence of the press on Russian foreign policy. Compare McDonald, United Government, 183, 189, 218 with Ronald Bobroff, ‘Behind the Balkan Wars: Russian Policy toward Bulgaria and the Turkish Straits, 1912–13’, The Russian Review 59, no. 1 (January 2000): 79; and Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860–1914, trans. Bruce Little (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 315.

²³¹ This interpretation rejects the view that Britain, acting as the ‘leader’ of the Entente, had ‘restrained’ the Russians in the crises of 1912–1913, as argued by, for example, Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy, 106–9. Russia’s leaders, believing peace was imperative for internal stability and war undesirable until about 1917, by and large restrained themselves. See McDonald, United Government, 186–87, 206, 217–18; Geyer, Russian Imperialism, 310–11; Rose, Between Empire and Continent, 436. William Mulligan has argued (‘We Can’t Be More Russian than the Russians’: British Policy During the Liman von Sanders Crisis, 1913–1914’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 17, no. 2 [2006]: 261–82) that Britain’s role in the Liman von Sanders Crisis (Nov. 1913-Jan. 1914) demonstrates that Britain used its Entente to restrain Russia, that she remained the shaper of Entente policy, and that the Concert of Europe continued to function and the system was not on the verge of war. As Mulligan shows, Grey refused to support Russia’s escalatory demands (264–265, 270, 276–277), and France followed the British position (268). As with the previous crises, the affair seemed rather like a manufactured quarrel to the British (269) and it was understood that it was driven by Russia’s unpredictability (270). Where it differed, as Mulligan acknowledges, is that both the British and the French had independent interests at the Porte (271), the British, of course, with a figure analogous to Sanders in the Ottoman Navy. What Mulligan misses is the new recklessness of Russian policy: Sazonov and his coterie of hawkish ministers were determined to deploy ‘firm resolve’ to gain political concessions, explicitly risking an ‘all-European war’ (McDonald, United Government, 193–95). In this specific instance, likely because of their own imperial interests, the British and French demurred; at the same time Kokovtsov, a lone voice in the wilderness, opposed Sazonov’s policy in his last involvement in questions of foreign affairs (McDonald, 194–97). Immediately thereafter, the Tsar dismissed him, and in the coming crisis Russia’s policy of ‘firmness’ would be unchecked by Britain and France.

²³² Holger Afflerbach, ‘The Topos of Improbable War in Europe before 1914’, in An Improbable War?, 161–82.

²³³ Asquith, The Genesis of the War, 66.

²³⁴ Asquith, 65; the King had made parallel comments expressing his confidence in Grey in the Winter of 1912/13, see Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, 268. .

²³⁵ Keith M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chap. 8. In his memoirs, Asquith says nothing of British action or thinking in the crisis before 24 July, illustrating the totality of his focus on the Irish question and his confidence in Grey’s concert diplomacy. See The Genesis of the War, 142–186, 187 ff. The same confidence in Grey’s concert diplomacy can also be found in Poincaré’s memoirs. See The Origins of the War, 183, 187. On the evolving views of the Cabinet in the crisis’s last days: John W. Young, ‘Lewis Harcourt’s Journal of the 1914 War Crisis’, The International History Review, 2017, 10.1080/07075332.2017.1387164.

²³⁶ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1: 309, 299; Harold Nicolson, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart, First Lord Carnock: A Study in the Old Diplomacy (London: Constable & Company, 1937), 413.

²³⁷ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1:314.

²³⁸ Grey, 1: 292.

²³⁹ Grey, 1: 296.

²⁴⁰ Bertie Memorandum 25 June 1914, F.O 800/171 no. 71.

²⁴¹ Grey to Goschen 24 June 1914, BD 11, no. 4; Lynn-Jones, ‘Détente and Deterrence’.

²⁴² Grey to Rumbold 6 July 1914, BD 11, no. 32.

²⁴³ Quoted in Otte, July Crisis, 146.

²⁴⁴ Grey to Buchanan 8 July 1914, BD 11, no. 39.

²⁴⁵ Otte, ‘“Postponing the Evil Day,”’ 258.

²⁴⁶ Grey to Rumbold 9 July 1914, BD 11, no. 41.

²⁴⁷ Bunsen to Grey D. 5 July 1914, R. 9 July, BD 11, no. 40.

²⁴⁸ Rumbold to Grey D. 11 July 1914, R. 13 July, BD 11, no. 44.

²⁴⁹ Alexander Cadogan for Bunsen to Grey D. 11 July 1914, R. 15 July, BD 11, no. 46.

²⁵⁰ Memorandum by Bertie 16 July 1914, FO 800/161, no. 168.

²⁵¹ Bunsen to Grey 16 July 1914, BD 11, no. 50.

²⁵² Crackanthorpe to Grey 17 July 1914, BD 11, no. 53.

²⁵³ Bunsen to Grey D. 13 July 1914, R. 18 July, BD 11, no. 55.

²⁵⁴ Buchanan to Grey 18 July 1914, BD 11, no. 60.

²⁵⁵ Karl Kautsky, Outbreak of the World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), DD. I, 92.

²⁵⁶ Müller to Grey D. 14 July 1914, R. 21 July, BD 11, no. 70.

²⁵⁷ Grey to Bertie 21 July 1914, BD 11, no. 72. Belief that Germany would restrain Austria was another one of the ‘lessons’ of the Balkan crises. Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 325.

²⁵⁸ Grey to Buchanan 22 July 1914, BD 11, no. 79.

²⁵⁹ Crackanthorpe to Grey D. 18 July 1914, R. 23 July, BD 11, no. 70.

²⁶⁰ Grey to de Bunsen 24 July 1914, BD 11, no. 91; Grey to Rumbold 24 July 1914, BD 11 no. 99.

²⁶¹ Grey to Buchanan 25 July 1914, BD 11, no. 112.

²⁶² Lichnowsky to Foreign Office 25 July, D. 2 PM, DD. I, no. 180 in Kautsky, Outbreak.

²⁶³ Stevenson, ‘Militarization’, 154.

²⁶⁴ Crowe Minute (25 July 1914) on Buchanan to Grey 24 July 1914, BD 11, no. 101. On the importance of this shift, see Herbert Butterfield, ‘Sir Edward Grey in July 1914’, Historical Studies, no. 5 (1965): 12–15.

²⁶⁵ Marc Trachtenberg, ‘French Foreign Policy in the July Crisis, 1914: A Review Article’, H-Diplo/ISSF, no. 3 (1 December 2010), http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ISSF/PDF/3-Trachtenberg.pdf.

²⁶⁶ Sean McMeekin, The Russian Origins of the First World War (Harvard: Belknap Press, 2013), 53 ff.; Albertini, Origins, vol. 2.

²⁶⁷ Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 461–69.

²⁶⁸ Buchanan to Grey 25 July 1914, BD 11, no. 125.

²⁶⁹ Summarised succinctly in Buchanan’s memoirs: ‘During the Balkan Wars Russia had had on more than one occasion to recede from positions which she had somewhat rashly taken up’ (My Mission, 149).

²⁷⁰ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1: 267.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 314.

²⁷² Trevelyan, Grey, 249.

²⁷³ Buchanan, My Mission, 195–96; Young, ‘Ambassador George Buchanan’, 213.

²⁷⁴ Grey to Buchanan 25 July 1914, BD 11, no. 112.

²⁷⁵ Grey to Buchanan 25 July 1914, BD 11, no. 132.

²⁷⁶ Nicolson to Grey 26 July 1914, BD 11, no. 139.

²⁷⁷ Communication by German Ambassador 26 July 1914, BD 11, no. 146.

²⁷⁸ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1: 315.

²⁷⁹ Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 495–96; Albertini, Origins, 2: 417.

²⁸⁰ McMeekin, The Russian Origins, 62 ff.

²⁸¹ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1: 306.

²⁸² On the many competing proposals, see the annoyance of the Foreign Office in Nicolson’s Minute on Buchanan to Grey 27 July 1914, BD 11, no. 179. For detailed explanations: Albertini, Origins, vol. 2; Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War, Second Edition (New York: Macmillan, 1964), vol. 2; Otte, July Crisis, chaps. 5–6; Martel, The Month That Changed the World, 165–335; Sean McMeekin, July 1914: Countdown to War (London: Icon Books, 2014), chaps. 14–21; MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace, chaps. 19–20.

²⁸³ Quoted in Trevelyan, Grey, 249.

²⁸⁴ Grey to Buchanan 25 July 1914, BD 11, no. 112.

²⁸⁵ Stevenson, ‘Militarization’, 152–54; Hew Strachan, The First World War, vol. 1, To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 83–90; Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Ernest R. May, ‘An Identity of Opinion: Historians and July 1914’, Journal of Modern History 79, no. 2 (June 2007): 366–71; Vasquez, ‘The First World War’, 633–35; Levy, ‘The Sources of Preventive Logic’, 158. It is debated whether partial mobilisation or only full mobilisation made war inevitable. Marc Trachtenberg has argued forcefully that partial mobilisation did not make war inevitable, but that full mobilisation was war. See his History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 72–95. Stephen Cimbala has convincingly argued that mobilisation was understood in different ways by Russia’s leaders. For Sazonov, the Period Preparatory to War, implemented on the 25th and 26th, was a way to engage in ‘brinkmanship’ and ‘manipulate risk’, but for the military it was a way to preempt and gain an advantageous position vis-à-vis Germany. Sazonov’s strategy apparently failed when Austria declared war on Serbia on the 28^th, and, now believing war to be inevitable, he sought mobilisation instead. Partial mobilisation (originally proposed on the 24^th as a tool of coercive diplomacy) now became the ‘bridge’ to general mobilisation (for this term, Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 95). Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 27–59. For our purposes, it is adequate to see each move as part of a chain of escalation towards war; each, moreover, severely restricted the diplomatic time window. Even if, as Trachtenberg argues, Russian partial mobilisation provoked Bethmann’s last minute peace overtures, it also contributed to a growing ‘feeling of helplessness in the face of doom’ (MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace, KL 11,219; cf. Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 525).

²⁸⁶ Taylor, War by Timetable, KL 798, 1213; Otte, July Crisis, 347.

²⁸⁷ Quoted in Martel, The Month That Changed the World, 313.

²⁸⁸ Todd H. Hall, ‘On Provocation: Outrage, International Relations, and the Franco-Prussian War’, Security Studies 21, no. 1 (2017): 16.

²⁸⁹ Offer, ‘Going to War in 1914’, 226.

²⁹⁰ Quoted in Martel, The Month That Changed the World, 388.

²⁹¹ Stephen Peter Rosen, War and Human Nature, Kindle Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 51.

²⁹² Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 239–358.

²⁹³ T. G. Otte, ‘Détente 1914: Sir William Tyrrell’s Secret Mission to Germany’, The Historical Journal, 56, no. 1 (2013): 175–204. The causes of the détente – the Anglo-German convention on the Baghdad railway and agreement on the Portuguese colonies question (184), the relaxation of the naval arms race (190), and the growth of Russian power and assertiveness in Persia (191–193) – were independent from, but obviously in a sense connected with, cooperation in the Balkans.

²⁹⁴ This point is well made in Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914 (New York: Humanity Books, 1980), 456; cf. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 279 and Keiger, France and the Origins, 101; and overlooked in many standard accounts, which simply recapitulate the version of events given in Grey’s later memoirs; e.g., Martel, The Month That Changed the World, 44; and even Richard Langhorne, The Collapse of the Concert of Europe: International Politics 1890–1914 (London: The Macmillan Press, 1981), 105–10.

²⁹⁵ Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus (New York: Routledge, 2002), 198–99; see also Harris, ‘Great Britain’, 293–94.

²⁹⁶ In contrast, for example, in July 1914 Francis Bertie decried Russia’s ‘pretension’ to be the ‘protectress of all the Slavs’ to be ‘rubbish’ and unworthy of a general war. See G. P. Gooch, Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy (London: Longmans, 1927), 184.

²⁹⁷ Keith Wilson, ‘Grey and the Russian Threat to India, 1892–1915’, International History Review 38, no. 2 (2016): 275–84.

²⁹⁸ Buchanan’s summary is representative: ‘Sazonow is so continually changing his ground that it is difficult to follow the successive phases of pessimism and optimism though which he passes…. it is very despairing having to deal with a man who is never of the same mind for two days in succession’. Buchanan to Nicolson 28 November 1912, FO 800/360, no. 36. Also see, in addition to the other references above, Nicolson to Goschen FO 2 December 1913, FO 800/371, no. 149; and idem 8 Dec., no. 162.

²⁹⁹ MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace, KL 9019.

³⁰⁰ Albertini, Origins, 1: 375; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 466; 499; Otte, July Crisis, 519.

³⁰¹ Nicolson Minute on Buchanan to Grey R. 10 April 1913, BD 9.2, no. 820.

³⁰² On which see, Douglas Newton, The Darkest Days: The Truth Behind Britain’s Rush to War, 1914 (London: Verso Books, 2014).

³⁰³ McDonald, United Government, 198, 203.

³⁰⁴ O’Beirne to Nicolson 18 September 1913, FO 800/370, no. 89.

³⁰⁵ Bertie Memo 11 February 1914, quoted in Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 335.

³⁰⁶ Nicolson to de Bunsen 2 March 1914, FO 800/373, no. 62.

³⁰⁷ Buchanan to Grey R. 25 March 1914, BD 11, no. 528.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, n. 131.

³¹⁰ Buchanan to Nicolson 14 March 1914, FO 800/374, nos. 42–43; Buchanan to Nicolson 18 March 1914, FO 800/373, no. 21; Nicolson to Bax-Ironside 25 May 1914, FO 800/374, no. 15; Nicolson to Hardinge 11 June 1914, FO 800/374, no 209.

³¹¹ Nicolson to Cartwright 8 July 1912, quoted in Zara S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 134; also see Keith Neilson, ‘“My Beloved Russians”: Sir Arthur Nicolson and Russia, 1906–1916’, The International History Review 9, no. 4 (1987): 546–47; Christopher Clark, ‘1914 in Transnational Perspective’, in David Lederer (ed.), German History in Global and Transnational Perspective (New York: Palgrave, 2017), 59–60.

³¹² E.g., Cartwright to Nicolson 31 January 1913, BD 9.2, no. 582; Nicolson to Bunsen 30 March 1914, FO 800/373, no. 80.

³¹³ Nicolson to Hardinge 11 June 1914, FO 800/374, no 209.

³¹⁴ Bax-Ironside to Nicolson 17 June 1914, FO 800/374, no. 17; Bertie Memo 23 July 1913 quoted in Otte, The Foreign Office Mind, 374.

³¹⁵ Nicolson to Goschen 10 March 1914, FO 800/373, no. 104; Buchanan to Grey D. 3 April, R. 7 April, BD 11, p. 95; Grey to F. Elliot 27 September 1913, BD 10.1, no. 150; Grey to Bertie 13 March 1914, BD 10.1, no. 260 fn. 2; Buchanan to Grey 22 April 1914, BD 10.1, no. 266; Marling to Grey R. 1 September 1913, BD 10.1, no. 567.

³¹⁶ Grey to Bertie 16 October 1912, BD 9.2, no. 38.

³¹⁷ Hence the proposal was contingent on the suspension of ‘active military operations’. Only once the Conference solution had failed would Grey pivot back to localisation, as discussed below, but by then it was too late.

³¹⁸ Grey to Goschen 27 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 293; Grey to Goschen 29 November 1912, BD 9.2, no. 310.

³¹⁹ Grey to Goschen 4 December 1912, BD 9.2, no. 327.

³²⁰ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1: 314. In Aug.-Sep. 1915, Grey said one week. See Grey, Edward Grey’s Reply, 7–9.

³²¹ Prime Minister Stürgkh, Cabinet Council for Mutual Affairs 31 July 1914 in Austrian Red Book: Official Files Pertaining to Pre-War History, vol. 3 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1920), vol. III, no. 79; Fay, The Origins of the World War, vol. II: 381. Cf. Bertie to Grey 27 July 1914, BD 11, no. 192.

³²² Schroeder, ‘Embedded Counterfactuals’, 189; Egbert Jahn, ‘Sarajevo 1914. A Century of Debate About the Guilt for the First World War’, in World Political Challenges, vol. 3 (Berlin: Springer, 2015), 111–14.

³²³ A point reinforced in the Liman von Sanders episode. See Mulligan, ‘We Can’t Be More Russian’, 270 ff.

³²⁴ Pace Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 222.

³²⁵ Buchanan to Grey 25 July 1914, BD 11, no. 125.

³²⁶ Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., ‘The Origins of World War I’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring 1988): 814.

³²⁷ Michael G. Ekstein and Zara Steiner, ‘The Sarajevo Crisis’, in F. H. Hinsley (ed.), British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 400.

³²⁸ Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 339.

³²⁹ Ekstein, ‘Some Notes’; Otte, July Crisis.

³³⁰ George H. Cassar, Asquith as War Leader (London: The Hambledon Press, 1994), 11–12. TNA, CAB 41/35/20. Also see Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918, Second Edition (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 27. The choice to leave the cabinet – which was entirely focused on the Irish Home Rule debate – ignorant of European developments was likely a way to retain a free hand in the management of the crisis. On the role of the Home Rule crisis, see Wiel, ‘1914’.

³³¹ Williamson, Jr., ‘The Origins of World War I’, 814.

³³² Quoted in Ekstein and Steiner, ‘The Sarajevo Crisis’, 402.

³³³ Michael Waterhouse, Edwardian Requiem: A Life of Sir Edward Grey (London: Biteback Publishing, 2013), 335.

³³⁴ Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, 290.

³³⁵ Schroeder, ‘Embedded Counterfactuals’, 189.

³³⁶ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1: 315–17.

³³⁷ Grey to Goschen 31 July 1914, BD 11, no. 340.

³³⁸ Otte, July Crisis, 343–348.

³³⁹ Grey to Goschen 29 July 1914, BD 11, no. 285.

³⁴⁰ Otte, July Crisis, 386.

³⁴¹ Albertini, Origins, 2: 232–236.

³⁴² Frevert, ‘Honor, Gender, and Power’, 250.

³⁴³ Barry O’Neill, ‘Mediating National Honour: Lessons from the Era of Dueling’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159, no. 1 (March 2003): 229–47.

³⁴⁴ Goschen to Grey 31 July 1914, BD 11, no. 349.

³⁴⁵ Private communication with Paul W. Schroeder 31 August 2016; cf. Otte, July Crisis, 510.

³⁴⁶ Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 356. See also 427–8, 449–50, 480–1, 558.

³⁴⁷ Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 255; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 429.

³⁴⁸ Crampton, ‘The Decline of the Concert’; R. J. Crampton, The Hollow Détente: Anglo-German Relations in the Balkans, 1911–1914 (London: George Prior, 1981).

³⁴⁹ De Bunsen to Grey 1 September 1914, BD 11. No. 676.

³⁵⁰ Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 56.

³⁵¹ K. E. Boulding, ‘National Images and International Systems’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, no. 2 (June 1959): 130.

³⁵² Albertini, Origins; Clark, The Sleepwalkers. For an example of a historian pulled both ways on this question, Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Coming of the War: 1914, vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1930), 480–82. Representative views that stress Germany’s desire to dominate Europe – and therefore real incompatibility – include Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968); Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975); Röhl, ‘The Curious Case’; Keir A. Lieber, ‘The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory’, International Security 32, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 155–91; Dale C. Copeland, ‘International Relations Theory and the Three Great Puzzles of the First World War’, in Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez (eds.), The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 167–98; Röhl, ‘Goodbye to All That’.

³⁵³ Otte, July Crisis, 507.

³⁵⁴ Martel, The Month That Changed the World; MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace; McMeekin, July 1914; Hew Strachan, ‘Review Article: The Origins of the First World War’, International Affairs 90, no. 2 (2014): 429–39; Mulligan, ‘The Trial Continues’; Richard Ned Lebow, Archduke Franz Ferdinand Lives!: A World without World War I (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). Naturally, a scholar can hold that individual decisions mattered, but that Grey’s were still relatively inconsequential (as does T. G. Otte).

³⁵⁵ O’Neill, ‘Mediating National Honour’, 15.

³⁵⁶ Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 258.

³⁵⁷ Jelavich, 248–55; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 407–9.

³⁵⁸ Martel, The Month That Changed the World, 172–74, 192–94.

³⁵⁹ See the comments of Alexander Krivoshein on 24 July in Lieven, Russia and the Origins, 142–44; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 412, 486; Reinhard Wolf, ‘Status Fixations, the Need for “Firmness,” and Decisions for War’, International Relations 28, no. 2 (2014): 256–62.

³⁶⁰ Lieven, Russia and the Origins, 140.

³⁶¹ Samuel R. Williamson Jr., ‘Aggressive and Defensive Aims of Political Elites? Austro-Hungarian Policy in 1914’, in An Improbable War?, 61–74; Samuel R. Williamson Jr., ‘Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War’, in Ernest R. May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner (eds.), History and Neorealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 103–28; Private communication with Alan Sked 31 May 2017.

³⁶² Otte, July Crisis, 360.

³⁶³ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1: 297.

³⁶⁴ Menning, ‘Russian Military Intelligence’, 251.

³⁶⁵ McDonald, United Government, 207; cf. 195.

³⁶⁶ Dominic Lieven, Nicholas II: Emperor of All the Russias (London: John Murray, 1993), 196–202 quote at 202.

³⁶⁷ Otte, July Crisis, 397, see also 402.

³⁶⁸ As it was, the Kaiser’s plan was poorly communicated by Jagow and Bethmann, undercut by the German ambassador to Vienna, and ignored by Berchtold. See Otte, July Crisis, 352–54, 372, 384–85, 397, 406, 416–17.

³⁶⁹ Albertini, Origins, 2: 578.

³⁷⁰ Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1: 90.

³⁷¹ David Stevenson, ‘Land Armaments in Europe, 1866–1914’, in Thomas Mahnken, Joseph Maiolo, and David Stevenson (eds.), Arms Races in International Politics: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 41–60; Niall Ferguson, ‘Public Finance and National Security: The Domestic Origins of the First World War Revisited’, Past & Present, no. 142 (1994): 141–68.

³⁷² William Thompson, ‘A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures’, International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 3 (September 2003): 453–74; Stevenson, ‘Militarization’. This assessment does not necessarily conflict with Richard Ned Lebow’s argument that: ‘There was a narrow window in which war was possible, and it required a very special kind of catalyst’ (‘What Can International Relations Theory Learn from the Origins of World War I?’, International Relations 28, no. 4 (2014): 395).

³⁷³ Jack S. Levy and William Mulligan, ‘Shifting Power, Preventive Logic, and the Response of the Target: Germany, Russia, and the First World War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 5 (2017): 731–69.

³⁷⁴ On which in general see, Jack S. Levy, ‘Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations’, International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 87–112.

³⁷⁵ McDonald, United Government, 217; Geyer, Russian Imperialism, 251–54.

³⁷⁶ Schroeder, ‘Stealing Horses’; Williamson, ‘Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War’.

³⁷⁷ A point demonstrated half a century ago in Miller, The Concert of Europe, but generally ignored since.

³⁷⁸ Called, technically, the ego-centric attribution bias, and described in another context as ‘something of a law of political psychology’. Christopher J. Fettweis, ‘Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace’, Security Studies 26, no. 3 (2017): 448.

³⁷⁹ An alternative explanation of the same evidence, consistent with Christopher Clark’s interpretation of Grey in the July Crisis (The Sleepwalkers, 410–11, 495–98) is that Grey chose to believe, or represent himself as believing, the generalised Conference story because he was simply unwilling to risk the existence of the Entente by taking any action that Russia would look unfavourably upon; this interpretation, indeed, would seemingly fit the pattern of the previous Balkan crises. The Conference, it could be argued, functioned as a suitable justification to the Cabinet for British policy and as a psychic crutch to Grey, both as the crisis developed and thereafter. The most compelling evidence against this view is that Grey, as the prospect of a general war loomed, expressed his willingness to abandon the Entente were Germany and Austria to put forward ‘any reasonable proposal’ not reciprocated by Russia and France. Grey to Goschen 31 July 1914, BD 9.2, no. 340.

³⁸⁰ Schroeder, ‘Embedded Counterfactuals’, 184.

³⁸¹ Schroeder, 189–90.

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Notes on contributors

Jared Morgan McKinney

Jared Morgan McKinney is a PhD Candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore).