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ABSTRACT
Military doctrine assures a nation’s survival. Yet even when faced with a security threat that requires change, militaries rarely innovate but instead adhere to old doctrines that enhance autonomy, reduce uncertainty and claim resources. Existing theories cannot explain an important case of peacetime military innovation when the U.S. Air Force adopted Battlefield Air Interdiction to support the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. A revised theory of peacetime military innovation through inter-service cooperation resulting from external and internal threats explains not only why innovation occurred with Battlefield Air Interdiction but also why such successful cases are so rare.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Barry Posen, Sources of Military Power (NY: Cornell UP 1984), 15–16.
2 Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (NY: Cornell UP 1991), 3.
3 Posen, Sources of Military Power, 45–49.
4 Evidence of this shift can be seen in USAF spending where the budget for strategic forces decreased from $37.4 billion in FY1962 to $7.5 billion in FY78 while the budget on tactical forces increased from $12.4 billion in FY64 to $25.8 billion in FY1985 Kevin Lewis, U.S. Air Force Budget Posture over Time (CA: RAND 1990), 26; and Carl Builder, The Masks of War (MD: Johns Hopkins Press 1989), 67–73.
5 The author has not been able to identify another case of successful peacetime military innovation through inter-service cooperation. As such it is important to learn from this case what the essential elements were to overcome the barriers to cooperation and innovation in peacetime.
6 Kevin Lewis, U.S. Air Force Budget Posture over Time 10, 27.
7 National Security Strategy of the United States (DC: White House 1987), 14.
8 Kevin Sheehan, ‘Preparing for an Imaginary War: Examining Peacetime Functions and Changes of Army Doctrine’, PhD diss., MA, Harvard, 1988, 352–354.
9 William Sherman, Air Warfare 1926 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2002).
10 Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, Security Studies 29/5 (2006), 905–931; and Stuart Griffin, ‘Military Innovation Studies: Multidisciplinary or Lacking Discipline?’ Journal of Strategic Studies 40/1–2 (2017), 196–223.
11 Posen, Sources of Military Power; Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A study in Bureaucratic Politics (NY: Columbia UP 1976); Kimberly Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation 1955–1991 (NJ: Princeton UP 1993); and Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (NY: Cornell UP 1994).
12 On the inter-service model see Harvey Sapolsky, Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (MA: Harvard UP 1972); Michael Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (NY: Columbia UP 1969); Owen Cote, ‘The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The U.S. Navy and Fleet Ballistic Missiles’, PhD diss., MA, MIT, 1998; and Andrew Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The US Army between Korea and Vietnam (DC: National Defense UP 1986).
13 Rosen, Winning the Next War; Suzanne Nielson, ‘Preparing for War: The Dynamics of Peacetime Military Reform’, PhD diss., MA, Harvard, 2003; and Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases (CO: Univ. of Denver Press 1967).
14 Theo Farrell and T. Terriff, The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (CO: Lynne Rienner 2002); Theo Farrell, The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (CO: Lynne Rienner 2005); Carl Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1989); and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton UP 1997).
15 Robert Fitton, ‘A Perspective on Doctrine: Dispelling the Mystery’, Military Review (Feb. 1985), 65.
16 Posen, Sources of Military Power, 13, 67–74.
17 Posen, Sources of Military Power, 47. 13.
18 Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, 907.
19 Cote, The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine, 8.
20 Posen, Sources of Military Power, 171–173; Rosen, Winning the Next War, 58; and Cote, The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine, 166.
21 Posen, Sources of Military Power, 14; Rosen, Winning the Next War, 7; and Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 4.
22 Harold Winton, ‘Partnership and Tension: The Army and Air Force Between Vietnam and Desert Storm’, Parameters (Spring 1996), 100–119.
23 Lewis, U.S. Air Force Budget Posture over Time, 10.
24 William Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, (CT: Yale UP 1998) and Harriet Scott and William Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (CO: Westview Press 1979).
25 NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons (Brussels: NATO Information Service 1984), 9.
26 Mark Clodfelter, Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (NY: The Free Press 1989).
27 Winton, ‘Partnership and Tension’, 100–119.
28 William Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (AL: Air UP 2003), 380.
29 Edgar Puryear, George S. Brown, General, U.S. Air Force: Destined for Stars (CA: Presidio 1983), 170.
30 Richard Davis, The 31 Initiatives (DC: Office of Air Force History 1987), 26.
31 Robert Dixon, ‘TAC-TRADOC Dialogue’, Strategic Review 6/1 (Winter 1978), 46.
32 In 1974 Abrams died from lung cancer and Brown was appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Paul Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DuPuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100–5, Operations (KS: Leavenworth Papers 1988), 68.
33 Puryear, George S. Brown, 223.
34 William DePuy, ‘Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy’ compiled by Richard Swain (KS: Combat Studies Institute 1994), 78–79; and Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter that Transformed the Middle East (NY: Schocken 2004), 497.
35 Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 31.
36 DePuy, ‘Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy’, 76.
37 Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force Volume II, 1961–1984 (AL: Air UP 1989), 488.
38 Programmes included the F-15, F-4 Wild Weasel, EF-111 and the F-117.
39 Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, ‘40 Years of the “Fighter Mafia”’, The American Conservative, 20 Sep. 2013; and Denny Smith, ‘The Roots and Future of Modern-Day Military Reform’, Air University Review (Sep.–Oct. 1985).
40 Ralph Taft and William Lind, ‘White Paper on Defense: A Modern Military Strategy for the United States’, The Congressional Record 22, 43 (25 Mar. 2025 1976); See also Gary Hart, with William Lind, ‘What’s Wrong with the Military’, The New York Times Magazine (14 Feb. 1982); James Slife, Creech Blue (AL: Air UP 2004), 65–72; and Edward Keefer, Harold Brown: Offsetting the Soviet Military Challenge 1977–1981 (DC: Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense 2017), 600.
41 Peter Chiarelli and Raymond Gagnon, ‘The Politics of Military Reform’, (RI: U.S. NWC CNWS 1985), 10; Jeffrey Record, ‘The Military Reform Caucus’, The Washington Quarterly 6, 2 (1983), 125–29; and Michael Gordon, ‘Budget Crunch Gives Shot in the Arm to Growing Military Reform Movement’, National Journal 5 (Sep. 1981), 1572.
42 Franklin Spinney, Defense Facts of Life (5 Dec. 1980).
43 Robert Dixon, ‘TAC-TRADOC Dialogue’, Strategic Review 6/1 (Winter 1978), 47.
44 Dixon, ‘TAC-TRADOC Dialogue’, 48; and Davis, The 31 Initiatives, 27.
45 Davis, The 31 Initiatives, 29; and Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 70.
46 U.S. Army Field Manual 100–5, Operations, 1976; For an assessment of the FM-100–5 see Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done.
47 U.S. Army Field Manual 100–5, Operations, 1976, 1–1 and 1–2.
48 Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 7.
49 Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 10.
50 Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 31.
51 Lind, ‘Reading, Writing, and Policy Review’; John Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973–1982 (VA: US ARMY TRADOC 1984), 17–21; and Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 96.
52 Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 41.
53 William Bielefeld, Air Interdiction: Will It Support AirLand Battle? (KS: SAMS 1986), 4.
54 Donn Starry, ‘Extending the Battlefield’, Military Review (Mar. 1981), 32.
55 TRADOC PAM 525–5 1981 US Army Operations Concepts, the AirLand Battle and Corps 86 (Mar. 1981), 10.
56 Bernard Rogers, ‘Follow-On Forces Attack: Myths and Realities’, NATO Review (Dec. 1984), 7.
57 Stein, The Development of NATO Tactical Air Doctrine: 1970–1985 (CA: RAND 1987), viii.
58 William Hanne, ‘Maneuver in the Deep Battle’, Military Review (May 1982), 55.
59 Richard Simpkin, Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii (UK: Brassey’s 1987).
60 John Hines and Philip Petersen, ‘The Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe’, Military Review (Apr. 1984), 8–9.
61 Tactical Air Command Manual 1–1 Tactical Air Forces in Joint Operations Mar. 1966.
62 David Zook, The Fire Support Coordination Line (KS: SAMS 1992).
63 Terrance McCaffrey, What Happened to BAI? (AL: Air UP 2002), 18.
64 Merrill McPeak ‘TACAIR Missions and the Fire Support Coordination Line’, Air University Review (Sep.–Oct. 1985).
65 Joseph Redden, AirLand Battle – The Global Doctrine? (PA: U.S. Army War College, 1983), 48.
66 Thomas Cardwell, ‘One Step Beyond – AirLand Battle, Doctrine not Dogma’, Military Review (Apr. 1984), 48.
67 United States Air Force Manual 1–1 Basic Doctrine (11 Feb. 1979) AFHRA K168.13 MICFILM 39779, 2–13; U.S. Air Force Air Force Manual 1–1: Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force (1979), 2–13; NATO Allied Tactical Publication 27(B), Offensive Air Support, (May 1980).
68 David Stein, The Development of NATO Tactical Air Doctrine: 1970–1985 (CA: RAND 1987), 9.
69 Stein, The Development of NATO Tactical Air Doctrine, 10.
70 Steven Canby, ‘Tactical Air Power in Armored Warfare: The Divergence within NATO’, Air University Review 30 (May–Jun. 1979), 2–20; and Stein, The Development of NATO Tactical Air Doctrine, 26.
71 ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Initiation of a Joint US Army – US Air Force Force Development Process’ 2 November 1983 appendix 2 in Davis, The 31 Initiatives, 99–100.
72 U.S. Army Field Manual 100–5, Operations, (20 Aug. 1982), 7–11.
73 U.S. Air Force Air Force Manual 1–1: Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force (DC: Department of the Air Force 1984), 3–4.
74 Robert Rasmussen, ‘The Central Europe Battle-Doctrinal Implications for Counterair Interdiction’, Air University Review (Jul.–Aug. 1978); Thomas Cardwell, ‘Extending the Battlefield: An Airman’s Point of View’, Air University Review (Mar.–Apr. 1983); and McPeak, ‘TACAIR Missions and the Fire Support Coordination Line’.
75 John Holly, ‘The Forgotten Dimension of AirLand Battle’, Military Review (Aug. 1985), 23.
76 Keefer, Harold Brown, 586–589.
77 Robert Tomes, ‘The Cold War Offset Strategy: Assault Breaker and the Beginning of the RSTA Revolution’, War on the Rocks 20 Nov. 2014.
78 U.S. General Accounting Office, ‘The Army’s Standoff Target Acquisition System – A Program Having Development Difficulties’, 18 Feb. 1981.
79 U.S. Air Force, ‘Fact Sheet: E8C Joint Stars’, 23 Sep. 2015.
80 Comptroller of the Air Force, ‘The United States Air Force Summary FY 1988/89 (Amended)’ Fourteenth Edition (DC: Comptroller of the Air Force 1988), A-24.
81 U.S. General Accounting Office The Comptroller General Report to Congress: Issues Identified in 21 Recently Published Major Weapon Systems Reports (DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, Jun. 1980), 50–53; General Accounting Office ‘Tactical Intelligence: Army Needs to Reconsider and Test All-Source Analysis System Alternative’, GAO/NSIAD-94–49, 7 Mar. 1994.
82 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Force Attack, OTA-ISC-309 (DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Jun. 1987), 32–33.
83 This purchased 10,000 IIR Mavericks. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment New Technology for NATO, 32–33.
84 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment New Technology for NATO, 32–33.
85 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment New Technology for NATO, 32–33.
86 Not all the $10 billion on new systems came from Air Force research and development funds. The IIR Maverick and CBU 87/89 funds were in delivery of weapons as was HARM spending.
87 Slife, Creech Blue, 37.
88 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment New Technology for NATO, 32–33.
89 Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, 905–931; and Griffin, ‘Military Innovation Studies: Multidisciplinary or Lacking Discipline?’.
90 Posen, Sources of Military Power, 59.
91 Denny Smith, ‘The Roots and Future of Modern-Day Military Reform’, Air University Review (Sep.–Oct. 1985).
92 Todd Larson, John Boyd and the AirLand Battle Doctrine (KS: SAMS 2012), 4.
93 Sapolsky, Polaris System Development; and Cote, ‘The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine’.
94 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 96.
95 ibid., 105.
96 James Ford, Air Force Culture and Conventional Strategic Airpower (AL: Air UP 1995) 41.
97 Ford, Air Force Culture and Conventional Strategic Airpower, 68–71.
98 C.R. Anderegg, Sierra Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade after Vietnam (DC: Air Force History and Museum Program 2001).
99 The exception was the Air Warrior exercise supporting the Army’s large-force exercises at the National Training Center at nearby Ft. Irwin which exercised the joint tactical air control system, but was not well designed for BAI training.
100 Farrell, The Sources of Military Change.
101 Dixon, ‘TAC-TRADOC Dialogue’, 48; Davis, The 31 Initiatives, 27, 29; and Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 70.
102 Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 61–68.
103 Builder, The Masks of War.
104 Jon Powell, ‘AirLand Battle: The Wrong Doctrine for the Wrong Reason’, Air University Review 36/4 (May–Jun. 1985); Redden, AirLand Battle – The Global Doctrine?; and Stephen Rippe, ‘An Army and Air Force Issue: Principles and Procedures for AirLand Warfare’, Air University Review 37 (May–Jun. 1986).
105 U.S. Air Force, Air Force Manual 1–1, 3–4.
106 John Warden, The Air Campaign (NY: ToExcel 1998); and Winton, ‘Partnership and Tension’, 100–119.
107 Warden, The Air Campaign, 145.
108 John Warden, ‘The Enemy as a System’, Airpower Journal (Spring 1995).
109 McCaffrey, What Happened to BAI? 33–49.
110 Eliot Cohen and Thomas Keaney, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume 7 (DC: U.S. Govt Printing Office 1993), 87.
111 Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume 2, 387.
112 Fred Franks, ‘Frontline Interview’, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/franks/1.html .
113 Tank plinking was the employment of F-111 and F-15Es with infrared targeting pods dropping laser guided bombs on Iraq tanks.
114 McCaffrey, What Happened to BAI? 47.
115 United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document (1 Sep. 1997).
116 Ibid., 16.
117 Thomas Ehrhard and Robert Work, Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking: The Case for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air System (DC: CSBA 2008); Jan Van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (DC: CSBA 2010); and Andrew Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle (DC: CSBA 2010).
118 Van Tol, AirSea Battle A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, xii.
119 Ehrhard, Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking, 3–8.
120 Michael O’Hanlon and James Steinberg, ‘Beyond “Air-Sea Battle”: A Military Concept that Challenges Policymakers’, Washington Post, 23 Aug. 2012; and Amitai Etzioni, ‘Who Authorized Preparations for War with China?’ Yale Journal of International Affairs (Summer 2013), 40.
121 Aaron Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia (UK: IISS 2014), 80, 85–6; Noel J. Williams, ‘Air-Sea Battle: An Operational Concept Looking for a Strategy’, Armed Forces Journal (Sep. 2011); T.X. Hammes, ‘AirSea Battle Isn’t about China’, National Interest, 19 Oct. 2012; and Etzioni, ‘Who Authorized Preparations for War with China?’ 40.
122 Chuck Hagel, ‘Secretary of Defense Speech: “Defense Innovation Days” Opening Keynote Southeastern New England Defense Industry Alliance’, 3 Sep. 2014.
123 David Goldfein, ‘Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons’, 8 Jan. 2015.
124 John Richardson, ‘Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson: Deconstructing A2AD’, The National Interest (3 Oct. 2016).
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Phil Haun
Phil Haun is Professor and Dean of Academics U.S. Naval War College and author of Coercion, Survival and War (CA: Stanford UP, 2015) and editor with commentary of Lectures of the Air Corps Tactical School and American Strategic Bombing in World War II (KY: UP Kentucky, 2019).