Nodal defence: the changing structure of U.S. alliance systems in Europe and East Asia

ABSTRACT

Scholars and pundits alike continue to portray the U.S.-led regional alliance systems in Europe and East Asia in stark, dichotomous terms. Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the standard model of multilateralism, the U.S.-led system of bilateral alliances in East Asia is the archetypal ‘hub-and-spokes’ structure in which different allies (the spokes) enjoy deep bilateral strategic ties with Washington (the hub) but not with each other. We argue that these common depictions of U.S.-led alliance systems are obsolete. Instead, we show that what we label ‘nodal defence’ – a hybrid category that combines overlapping bilateral, minilateral and multilateral initiatives – better captures how the U.S.-led alliance systems in Europe and East Asia operate today. Specifically, nodal defence is a hybrid alliance system in which allies are connected through variable geometries of defence cooperation that are organized around specific functional roles so as to tackle different threats. To show how nodal defence is an emerging central feature of the U.S.-led regional alliance systems, we conduct an original cross-regional comparison of how these alliance systems work, drawing on elite interviews, official documents, and secondary literature.

KEYWORDS:

• Alliances
• defence cooperation
• United States
• Europe
• East Asia

Acknowledgements

For useful and constructive feedback, the authors would like to thank Amnon Aran, Jordan Becker, Caterina Carta, Zack Cooper, Mark Erbel, Stephanie Hofmann, Tongfi Kim, and Ulrich Krotz. Thomas Provost created the figures. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 13-14 January 2017 European Initiative in Security Studies conference in Paris. All errors are their own.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

¹ See Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2016); G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2001); and Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Why is There no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism’, International Organization 56/3 (2002), 575–607.

² Andrew Cottey, ‘Europe’s New Subregionalism’, Journal of Strategic Studies 23/2 (2000), 23–47; Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, ‘Does a Multi-tier NATO Matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the Process of Strategic Change’, International Affairs 85/2 (2009), 211–26; Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss, ‘Beyond CSDP: The Resurgence of National Armed Forces in Europe’, in Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss, eds., The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 14–31; and Tuomas Forsberg, ‘The Rise of Nordic Defense Cooperation: A Return to Regionalism?’ International Affairs 80/5 (2013), 1161–81.

³ Lucie Béraud-Sudreau and Bastian Giegerich, ‘NATO Defense Spending and European Threat Perceptions’, Survival 60/4 (2018), 53–74; Olivier de France and Nick Witney, ‘Europe’s Strategic Cacophony’, European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR Policy Brief 77, April 2014; and Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss, ‘Upside Down: Reframing European Defence Studies’, Cooperation and Conflict 54/3 (2019), 16–17.

⁴ Cha, Powerplay.

⁵ See, e.g., Victor D. Cha, ‘Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture’, Asia Policy 11/2 (2011), 27–50; Patrick Cronin et al., The Emerging Asia Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties (Washington, D.C.: Centre for a New American Security 2013); Richard Fontaine et al., Networking Asian Security (Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Security 2017); William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor (ed.), Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending Cooperation (New York: Routledge 2013); and Joel Wuthnow, ‘U.S. “Minilateralism” in Asia and China’s Responses: A New Security Dilemma?’ Journal of Contemporary China 28/118 (2019), 133–150.

⁶ Chien-peng Chung, ‘Southeast Asia-China Relations: Dialectics of “Hedging” and “Counter-Hedging”’, Southeast Asian Affairs 1 (2004), 35–53.

⁷ Minilateralism refers to defence cooperation agreements reached by a small number of countries (usually from three and five) for the purpose of tackling one or more security challenges.

⁸ Between January 2013 and June 2018, thirty interviews were conducted with current and former officials in charge of political-military, European and East Asian affairs in the White House (National Security Council/NSC Staff), the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense (DoD) as well as with NATO officials. All interviewees requested to be anonymized.

⁹ On the existing literature on alliance dynamics in East Asia, see footnote 5.

¹⁰ Stephen M. Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’, Survival 39/1 (1997), 157.

¹¹ See note 1 above.

¹² These categories are not mutually exclusive: security partners need not have only one function. The extent to which certain states relate to certain functions is always a matter of degree. Two states can both perform regional hub functions, but one may do so more robustly than the other.

¹³ Diverse roles are also possible because of variation in states’ capabilities.

¹⁴ See note 1 above.

¹⁵ The Philippines and Taiwan were originally members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) before its dissolution in 1977. This multilateral alliance was largely ineffective. Furthermore, most members were not even located in Southeast Asia.

¹⁶ See Cha, Powerplay; Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, The Evolution of the South Korea-United States Alliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2018); Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press 1997); and Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to Beyond Containment (Westport, CT: Praeger 1994).

¹⁷ See, e.g., Hemmer and Katzenstein, ‘Why is There no NATO in Asia?’.

¹⁸ Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, ‘Now for the Hard Part: NATO’s Strategic Adaptation to Russia’, Survival 59/3 (2017), 135.

¹⁹ Margherita Bianchi, Guillaume Lasconjarias, and Alessandro Marrone, ‘Projecting Stability in NATO’s Southern Neighbourhood’, NATO Defence College Conference Report 3, July 2017, p. 3; Béraud-Sudreau and Giegerich, ‘NATO Defense Spending and European Threat Perceptions’; Meijer and Wyss, ‘Beyond CSDP’.

²⁰ Multiple interviews with U.S. and NATO officials in Washington, D.C. and Brussels, 2013–2018; and General Philip Breedlove, ‘Statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Forces’, 25 February 2015, 13.

²¹ See Nathaniel D.F. Allen, ‘Assessing a Decade of US Military Strategy in Africa’, Orbis 62/4 (2018), 655–59; and David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan. Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2014).

²² Alexander Mattelaer, ‘The NATO Warsaw Summit: How to Strengthen Alliance Cohesion’, Strategic Forum 296, 2016.

²³ Andrew Dorman, ‘The Future of British Defense Policy’, Focus Stratégique 74 (Paris: IFRI 2017).

²⁴ Interviews with multiple U.S. and NATO officials in Brussels and Washington, D.C., 2013–2018.

²⁵ Ulrich Krotz, History and Foreign Policy in France and Germany (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2015), 108–13.

²⁶ On French defence policy within NATO and its relations with the U.S. and Britain, see Olivier Schmitt, ‘The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/4 (2017), 463–74; and Alice Pannier, ‘From One Exceptionalism to Another: France’s Strategic Relations with the United States and the United Kingdom in the post-Cold War Era’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/4 (2017), 475–504.

²⁷ Bruno Tertrais, ‘French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces, and Future’, Foundation for Strategic Research, January 2019.

²⁸ See Leo Michel, ‘Cross-Currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests’, Strategic Perspectives 10 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies 2012).

²⁹ Interview with U.S. defence official in Washington, D.C., 22 January 2013.

³⁰ Pannier, ‘From One Exceptionalism to Another’, 475–504.

³¹ Barack Obama and François Hollande, ‘France and the U.S. Enjoy a Renewed Alliance’, The Washington Post, 10 February 2014.

³² Multiple interviews with U.S. defence officials in Washington, D.C., 2013–2018.

³³ Alice Pannier and Olivier Schmitt, ‘To Fight Another Day: France Between the Fight against Terrorism and Future Warfare’, International Affairs 95/4 (2019): 908, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz050.

³⁴ Félix Arteaga, ‘The Coming Defense: Criteria for the Restructuring of Defense in Spain’, Elcano Policy Paper 3 (14 January 2014); Piero Ignazi, Giampiero Giacomello and Fabrizio Coticchia, Italian Military Operations Abroad: Just Don’t Call it War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012); Jordan Baev, ‘Bulgaria and Romania’, in Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss, eds., The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018), 263–78; and Marcin Zaborowski, ‘Poland: NATO’s Front Line State’, Whitehall Papers 93/1 (2018), 88–97.

³⁵ Interview with U.S. defence official in Washington, D.C., 13 February 2013.

³⁶ Luis Simón, ‘Understanding US Retrenchment in Europe’, Survival 57/2 (2015), 165.

³⁷ William H. McMichael, ‘Admiral: Rota DDG mission goes beyond BMD’, Navy Times, 5 March 2012.

³⁸ Sam LaGrone, ‘Spain and U.S. Sign Permanent Basing Agreement for up to 3,500 U.S. Marines’, USNI News, 18 June 2015.

³⁹ Baev, ‘Bulgaria and Romania’; and Zaborowski, ‘Poland.’

⁴⁰ Zaborowski, ‘Poland.’

⁴¹ Interviews with multiple U.S. and Baltic defence officials, 2013–2018.

⁴² Statement of General Philip Breedlove, Commander U.S. Forces Europe, 25 February 2016.

⁴³ Tomáš Valášek and Milan Šuplata, ‘Towards a Deeper Visegrad Defence Partnership’, Central European Policy Institute, 2012.

⁴⁴ General Philip Breedlove, ‘Statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Forces’, 1 April 2014, 19.

⁴⁵ General Philip Breedlove, ‘Statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Forces’, 1 March 2016.

⁴⁶ General Philip Breedlove, ‘Statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Forces’, 25 February 2015, 12.

⁴⁷ Interviews with multiple U.S. officials in Brussels and Washington, D.C., 2013–2018.

⁴⁸ Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, ‘Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial and Precision Strike Challenge in the Baltic Region’, The RUSI Journal 161/5 (2016), 12–18.

⁴⁹ Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, Conventional Deterrence and Landpower in Northeastern Europe (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2019); and Luis Simón, ‘The “Third” US Offset Strategy and Europe’s “Anti-Access” Challenge’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/3 (2016), 417–45.

⁵⁰ Masha Hedberg and Andres Kasekamp, ‘The Baltic States’, in Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss, eds., The Handbook of European Defense Policies and Armed Forces (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018), 219.

⁵¹ Franklin D. Kramer and Magnus Nordenman, ‘A Maritime Framework for the Baltic Sea Region’, Atlantic Council Issue Brief, 2016.

⁵² Interviews with multiple U.S. defence officials, 2013–2018.

⁵³ Håkon Lunde Saxi, ‘The Rise, Fall and Resurgence of Nordic Defence Cooperation’ International Affairs 95/3 (2019), 659–80.

⁵⁴ See Michael Green et al., Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies 2016).

⁵⁵ Interview with former White House senior official, Washington, D.C., 7 March 2017.

⁵⁶ Michael J. Green,  Kathleen H. Hicks and Zack Cooper, Federated Defense in Asia (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014); Van Jackson, ‘Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14/3 (2014), 331–56.

⁵⁷ Daisuke Akimoto, The Abe Doctrine: Japan’s Proactive Pacifism and Security Strategy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2018).

⁵⁸ Interview, 14 February 2017, Washington, D.C.

⁵⁹ Junya Nishino, ‘Japan’s Security Relationship with the Republic of Korea’, CSIS Strategic Japan Working Paper, 2017.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Richard Fontaine et al., Networking Asian Security; and Tomohiko Satake and John Hemmings, ‘Japan–Australia Security Cooperation in the Bilateral and Multilateral Contexts’, International Affairs 94/4 (2018), 815–34.

⁶² See Seng Tan, ‘The ADMM-Plus: Regionalism That Works?’ Asia Policy 22 (July 2016), 70–5. Multilateral collective security initiatives and multilateral alliance structures are analytically distinct. The former aims to build confidence among potential adversaries and to tackle non-traditional security challenges. One example is the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). In contrast, multilateral alliance structures are primarily mutual defence treaties aimed at confronting inter-state threats.

⁶³ See, for instance, Harry J. Kazianis, ed., Tackling Asia’s Greatest Challenges: A U.S.-Japan-Vietnam Trilateral Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for the National Interest 2015).

⁶⁴ U.S. State Department, ‘The U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty’, Fact Sheet (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 18 January 2017).

⁶⁵ Australian Department of Defence, ‘United States Force Posture Initiatives in Australia’, retrieved from http://www.defense.gov.au/Initiatives/USFPI.

⁶⁶ Michael Heazle and Yuki Tatsumi, ‘Explaining Australia–Japan Security cooperation and its Prospects: ‘The Interests that Bind?’ The Pacific Review 31/1 (2018), 42.

⁶⁷ Michael Green, Kathleen H. Hicks and Zack Cooper, Federated Defense in Asia (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014); and Satake and Hemmings, ‘Japan-Australia Security Cooperation’.

⁶⁸ Interview with former senior U.S. defence official, 15 February 2017.

⁶⁹ Edward Kwon, ‘South Korea’s Deterrence Strategy Against North Korea’s WMD,’ East Asia 35/1 (2018), 1–21.

⁷⁰ Harry J. Kazianis (ed.), Tackling Asia’s Greatest Challenges: U.S.-Japan-Vietnam Trilateral Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for the National Interest 2015); Walter Lohman, Lewis Stern, and William Jordan, U.S.–Vietnam Defense Relations: Investing in Strategic Alignment (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation 2012).

⁷¹ Do Thanh Hai, ‘Vietnam: Riding the Chinese Tide,’ The Pacific Review 31/2 (2018), 205–20.

⁷² Chris Rahman, ‘Singapore: Forward Operating Site’, in Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson, eds., Rebalancing the Force: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2014).

⁷³ See ‘Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific’, U.S. Navy, 15 December 2015, retrieved from http://www.clwp.navy.mil/.

⁷⁴ Adam P. Liff, ‘Whither the Balancers? The Case for a Methodological Reset,’ Security Studies 25/3 (2016), 448.

⁷⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S National Security in a Changing Environment (Washington, D.C. 2015), 23.

⁷⁶ ‘The White House ‘U.S. Building Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia’,’ Fact Sheet, 17 November 2015.

⁷⁷ Charmaine G. Misalucha and Julio S. Amador III, ‘U.S.‐Philippines Security Ties: Building New Foundations?’ Asian Politics & Policy 8/1 (2016), 51–61.

⁷⁸ Interview with former U.S. defence official, Washington, D.C., 13 February 2017.

⁷⁹ Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1997).

Additional information

Funding

Luis Simón’s work on this project was supported by the Global Research Network program through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea’s National Research Foundation of Korea [grant number NRF-2016S1A2A2911284].

Notes on contributors

Luis Simón

Luis Simón is research professor at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute. He is also an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI, London) and the Baltic Defense College, and a member of the editorial board of Parameters: The US Army War College Quarterly. Luis received his PhD from the University of London, and held a postdoctoral fellowship at the School of International and Public Affairs (Columbia University). His research has appeared in such journals as Security Studies, International Affairs, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Geopolitics, Survival, and The RUSI Journal.

Alexander Lanoszka

Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo. His research agenda encompasses international security, alliance politics, and theories of war, with special focus on Central and Northeastern Europe. He sits on the editorial board of the journal Contemporary Security Policy and is an Honorary Fellow at City, University of London, where he previously taught prior to coming to Waterloo. He held fellowships at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Dartmouth College upon finishing his PhD at Princeton University. He has published Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Cornell University Press, 2018) as well as articles in journals such as International Security, International Affairs, Security Studies, and The Nonproliferation Review.

Hugo Meijer

Hugo Meijer is CNRS Research Fellow at the Centre for International Studies of Sciences Po (Paris) and the founding director of The European Initiative for Security Studies (EISS), a multidisciplinary network of scholars and universities that share the goal of consolidating security studies in Europe. Previously, he was Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the European University Institute (EUI, Florence) and Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College London. He received his PhD in International Relations from Sciences Po. He recently compiled Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces (OUP, 2018), co-edited with Marco Wyss. He has also published in such journals as Cooperation and Conflict, Journal of Strategic Studies, European Journal of International Security and the Journal of Cold War Studies.