![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
There has been much controversy about the effectiveness of military command in Iraq and Afghanistan. Contributing to these debates, this article examines the changing character of twenty-first century command through the example of Operation Moshtarak. Mostharak was a major operation conducted to secure Kandahar City in 2009–10 by Combined Joint Task Force-6, commanded by Major-General Nick Carter, that acted as the International Security Assistance Force’s Regional Command (South) in this period. The paper explores Carter’s distinctive decision-making method during this campaign to argue that Carter exemplifies a more collective method of command than typically adopted in the twentieth century.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. However, it is important to state a formal disclaimer: UK MOD review of this work, has been undertaken for security purposes only and should not be construed as endorsement.
Notes
1 A selection of this large, predominantly Anglophone literature includes: Seymour Hersch, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (London: HarperCollins 2009); Tom Ricks The Gamble (London: Penguin 2009); Dan Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of Iraq and Afghanistan (New York: First Mariner Books 2015); Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism: how Americans are Seduced by War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013); Andrew Bacevich, Washington Rules: American’s Path to Power (New York: Metropolitan Books 2010); Tom Ricks, The Generals: American Military Command from World II to Today (London: Penguin 2012); Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, ‘Blair’s wars and Brown’s Budgets: From Strategic Defence Review to Strategic Decay in Less than a Decade’, International Affairs 85/2 (March 2009), 247–61; Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, ‘National Defence in the Age of Austerity’, International Affairs 85/4 (July 2009), 733–5; Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013); David Betz and Anthony Cormack ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy’, Orbis (Spring 2009), 319–36; Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon ‘COIN Machine: The British military in Afghanistan’ RUSI Journal 154/3,18–25;Tim Bird and Alex Marshall Afghanistan: How the West Lost its Way (New Haven: Yale University Press 2011); Robert Egnell and David Ucko Counter-Insurgency in Crisis (Columbia University Press 2015); Christopher Elliott, High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (London Hurst 2015). In the UK, the discourse probably reached its apogee with the Chilcot Inquiry.
2 Hew Strachan ‘Strategy and Democracy’, Journal of Strategic Studies; Lawrence Freedman ‘Political Impatience and Military Caution’, Journal of Strategic Studies; Rob Johnson ‘Re-defining Command in the Operational Dimension: Challenges in the Information Age’, Journal of Strategic Studies.
3 Tom Clancy and Anthony Zinni Battle Ready (London: Pan 2005).
4 Ibid., 132.
5 Ibid., 225.
6 General Sir David Richards, ‘The Art of Command in the Twenty-First Century: Reflections of Three Commands’, in Julian Lindlay-French and Yves Boyer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 346, 356; General Sir Richard Shirreff, ‘Conducting Joint Operations’, in Julian Lindlay-French and Yves Boyer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 382, 383.
7 Ryan Grauer recent work on command is relevant here, although he focuses on historical examples: Commanding Military Power; Organizing Victory and Defeat On the Battlefield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016). Grauer explores the way the organisational differentiation and centralisation has determined the system of command in any army.
8 Michael Hammer and James Champy, Re-Engineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution (London: Nicholas Brealey 1995), 19.
9 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Change Masters: Corporate Entrepreneurs at Work (London: Unwin 1987); When Giants Learn to Dance: Mastering the Challenges of Strategy, Management and Careers in the 1990s (London: Unwin 1990).
10 Keith Grint, The Arts of Leadership (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001).
11 Operation Moshtarak, which means ‘co-operation’ in Dari, consisted of three phases; the first involved the re-organisation of Regional Command South, the second the securing of Central Helmand, and the third, the securing of Kandahar City. Phase III became known as Hamkari (together) which referred to a broader civil and political development programme.
12 Lieutenant General Nick Carter, ‘The Divisional Level of Command’, British Army Review 157 (Summer 2013).
13 OF-6, Brigadier (now Major-General retired) Dickie Davis, Chief of staff, interviewee 049, personal interview, 2 December 2014.
14 Ibid.
15 Lieutenant General Nick Carter, ‘The Divisional Level of Command’, British Army Review 157 (Summer 2013).
16 Theo Farrell, ‘Appraising Moshtarak: The Campaign in Nad-e-Ali, Helmand’ RUSI briefing note June 2010, 1–13.
17 Gian Gentile et al., Re-Imagining the Character of Urban Operations for the US Army (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Centre 2017); Bing West etc. Richard Iron, ‘Operation Charge of the Knights’, in Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds.), British Generals in Blair’s Wars (Farnham: Ashgate 2013), 187–200; Jonathan Shaw, ‘Basra 2007: The Requirements of a Modern Major General in Iron’, in Bailey, Jonathan, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds.), British Generals in Blair’s Wars (Farnham: Ashgate 2013), 175–80; Justin Maciejewski ‘“Best effort”: Operation Sinbad and the Iraq Campaign’, in Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds.), British Generals in Blair’s Wars (Farnham: Ashgate 2013), 157–174; Dick Camp, Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah, Iraq (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith 2009); Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam 2005).
18 For a detailed discussion of the transformation of command in the twenty-first century, see Anthony King, Command: The Twenty-First Century General (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
19 OF-7, Major-General (now General Sir) Nick Carter, interviewee 080, personal interview, 29 September 2015.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid. The United States Marine Corps decided to invest in Helmand and eventually created their own Regional Command South-West in July 2010.
24 Theoretically, ISAF HQ was under the operational command of NATO Joint Forces Command, Brunssum. In reality Brunssum exerted no influence on operations in Afghanistan and, at most, provided a reserve staff capacity for ISAF, coordinating with the Troop Contributing Nations in Europe. General Carter and CJTF-6 had minimal communications with Brunssum throughout its tour.
25 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984), 88.
26 Ibid., 114.
27 Ibid.
28 OF-6, Brigadier (now Major-General retired) Dickie Davis, Chief of staff, interviewee 049, personal interview, 2 December 2014.
29 OF-6, Brigadier-General (now Lieutenant-General) Ben Hodges US Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, interviewee 058, personal interview 7 April 2015; OF-3, SO2 J3/5, British Army, interviewee 046, personal interview, 11 December 2014.
30 OF-6, Brigadier (now Major-General retired) Dickie Davis, Chief of staff, interviewee 049, personal interview, 2 December 2014.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Carter, ‘The Divisional Level of Command’, 8.
34 Ibid.
35 OF-6 US Army, DCOS Operations, personal interview 7 April 2015.
36 OF-6, Brigadier (now Major-General retired) Dickie Davis, Chief of staff, interviewee 049, personal interview, 2 December 2014.
37 OF-5, British Army, Prism Cell, interviewee 054, personal interview, 12 March 2015.
38 OF-7, Major-General (now General Sir) Nick Carter, interviewee 080, personal interview, 29 September 2015.
39 OF-6, Brigadier (now Major-General retired) Dickie Davis, Chief of staff, interviewee 049, personal interview, 2 December 2014.
40 OF-5, British Army, Prism Cell, interviewee 054, personal interview, 12 March 2015.
41 Ibid.
42 OF-6, Brigadier (now Major-General retired) Dickie Davis, Chief of staff, interviewee 049, personal interview, 2 December 2014.
43 Ibid.
44 OF-6, Brigadier-General (now Lieutenant-General) Ben Hodges US Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, interviewee 058, personal interview 7 April 2015.
45 OF-6, Brigadier (now Major-General retired) Dickie Davis, Chief of staff, interviewee 049, personal interview, 2 December 2014.
46 OF-5, British Army, Prism Cell, interviewee 054, personal interview, 12 March 2015.
47 Ibid.
48 OF-6, Brigadier-General (now Lieutenant-General) Ben Hodges US Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, interviewee 058, personal interview 7 April 2015.
49 OF-4, SO 1 J5, British Army, interviewee 046, personal interview 11 October 2014.
50 OF-6, Brigadier (now Major-General retired) Dickie Davis, Chief of staff, interviewee 049, personal interview, 2 December 2014.
51 OF-6, Brigadier-General (now Lieutenant-General) Ben Hodges US Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, interviewee 058, personal interview 7 April 2015.
52 OF-7, Major-General (now General Sir) Nick Carter, interviewee 080, personal interview, 29 September 2015.
53 Carter, ‘The Divisional Level of Command’, 9.
54 OF-5, British Army, Prism Cell, interviewee 054, personal interview, 12 March 2015.
55 Ibid.
56 OF-6, Brigadier (now Major-General retired) Dickie Davis, Chief of staff, interviewee 049, personal interview, 2 December 2014.
57 General David Petraeus, interviewee 096, personal interview, 7 January 2016.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 See Anthony King, Command: The Twenty-First Century General (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2018) for a full account of this argument.
61 Official historian, CJTF-6, interviewee 48, email communication, 14 November 2014.
62 General David Petraeus, interviewee 096, personal interview, 7 January 2016.
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Anthony King
Anthony King holds the Chair of War Studies at Warwick University. His most recent publications include The Combat Soldier (Oxford University Press paperback, 2019) and Command: the twenty-first-century general (Cambridge University Press, 2019).