From the editors

This issue of The Journal of Strategic Studies covers what is perhaps the central issue in twenty-first century international politics: US-China relations and the implications of a possible power shift. The authors combines insights from international relations, defence analysis, and strategic theory, and cover everything from broad patterns of great power interaction to specific policy issues animating debates in Washington and Beijing.

Leading great powers often fear rising challengers. Their fears may be misplaced. Joshua Shifrinson of Boston University explains why in ‘The rise of China, balance of power theory and US national security: Reasons for optimism?’ According to Shifrinson, rising powers facing multiple potential adversaries cannot focus their time and effort on any single state, and over the long term they may see value in working with the leading power against common foes. China is rising in what Shifrinson calls a ‘crowded geopolitical neighborhood,’ meaning that has incentives to rein in its geopolitical ambitions and seek opportunities with the United States.¹

Carlos Solar of the University of Oxford also deals with the possible implications of a changing US-China balance of power by focusing on a specific issue: foreign arms sales. In ‘China’s weapons transfer in the Western hemisphere,’ Solar traces China’s history of ‘weapons diplomacy’ and discusses why its reach has been limited in some areas. While the Western hemisphere has not been a major destination for Chinese arms, Solar speculates that this might change in an era of what he calls ‘post-hegemony.’ Declining U.S. influence may open the door for more Chinese influence.²

Changes in the balance may stem from military and economic shifts. In other cases they arise because states are not all able to exploit the possibilities of new technologies. Many analysts have speculated that this may be the case with regards to cyberspace operations. The great powers all grapple with cyber tools, but they do not all use them effectively. In ‘US cyber deterrence: Practice guiding theory’, Alex S. Wilner of Carleton University suggests that he United States is struggling to bring conceptual clarity to its ongoing efforts. According to Wilner, the United States has been implementing its approach to deterrence in the absence of a clear theoretical foundation. That said, there is time for theorists to catch up with policy, and Wilner ends by asking a series of provocative questions about how they may conceptualise deterrence in radically different domain.³

What is the view from Beijing? Do Chinese strategists view cyberspace operations as asymmetric means of overcoming their conventional military disadvantages? Simone Dossi of the University of Milan addresses both questions in his article, ‘On the asymmetric advantages of cyberwarfare. Western literature and the Chinese journal Guofang Keji’, Focusing on the professional journal of the People’s Liberation Army National University of Defence Technology, Dossi explores evolving Chinese military views of the opportunities and limits of cyberspace. Chinese ideas are certainly not monolithic. Strategists are concerned about US advantages in the domain, but also note that it also suffers from real vulnerabilities. Similarly, concerns that the United States is the unquestioned ‘global’ leader in cyberspace, some strategists believe that China enjoys ‘local’ advantages that it may use to facilitate China’s rise. As in the United States, Dossi concludes that Chinese thinkers remain cautious given the novelty and uncertainty of the domain.⁴

Under these conditions, states may struggle to effectively assess the balance of power. They may also struggle to signal their own capabilities. In ‘Signals of strength: Capability demonstrations and perceptions of military power,” Evan Braden Montgomery of the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments provides a new theory of capability demonstrations, explaining their logic and hypothesising on when they are more or less effective. This framework is likely to inspire continued research among defence analysts, but it also has important consequences for great power politics. As Montgomery notes, the United States and China are both attempting to convert emerging technologies for military use. But because new weapons have uncertain battlefield effects, it will not be easy to send clear and credible signals about how new technologies change the balance.⁵

The issue concludes with two book reviews. C. Christine Fair reviews Walter C. Ladwig, The Forgotten Front: Patron Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge University Press, 2017); and Damien Van Puyvelde reviews Matthieu Suc, Les Espions de la Terreur (HarperCollins, 2018).

Notes

¹ For related discussions, see Boon, H.T., ‘Hardening the hard, softening the soft: Assertiveness and China’s regional strategy’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/5 (2017); Kim, M.H., ‘Why provoke? The Sino-US competition in East Asia and North Korea’s strategic choice’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/7 (2016); Jackson, Van, ‘Red teaming the rebalance: The theory and risks of US Asia strategy,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/3 (2016); Wu, Zhengyu, ‘The Crowe Memorandum, the rebalance to Asia, and Sino-US relations’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/3 (2016); Saunders, P.C., and Bowie, J.G., ‘US-China military relations: Competition and cooperation’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/5–6 (2016).

² On arms sales, strategy, and diplomacy see Meijer, Hugo, Béraud-Sudreau, Lucie, Holtom, Paul, and Uttley, Matthew, ‘Arming China: Major powers’ arms transfers to the People’s Republic of China’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 41/6 (2018); Thomas, Martin, ‘To arm an ally: French arms sales to Romania, 1926–1940ʹ, The Journal of Strategic Studies 19/2 (1996); Layne, Christopher, and Metzger, Robert S., ‘Reforming post-Cold War US arms sales policy: The crucial link between exports and the defense industrial base’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 18/4 (1995).

³ On US cyber strategy and some underlying theoretical questions see Schneider, Jacquelyn, ‘The capability/vulnerability paradox and military revolutions: Implications for computing, cyber, and the onset of war’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/6 (2019); Smeets, Max, ‘A matter of time: On the transitory nature of cyberweapons’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 41/1–2 (2018);Tor, Uri, ‘Cumulative deterrence’ as a new paradigm for cyber deterrence’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/1–2 (2017).

⁴ On Chinese peacetime and wartime approaches to cyberspace see Rovner, Joshua, ‘Two kinds of catastrophe: Nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/5 (2017); Newmyer, Jacqueline, ‘The revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (2010).

⁵ For related discussions about the implications of emerging technologies see Sechser, Todd S., Narang, Neil, and Talmadge, Caitlin, ‘Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/6 (2019), and the other articles in that issue.