Counter-intervention in Chinese naval strategy

ABSTRACT

The prospect of U.S. military involvement in a regional war looms large in Chinese naval strategy. This article examines the Chinese Navy’s evolving role in countering U.S. military intervention in a conflict over Chinese-claimed offshore islands. This role has both wartime and peacetime aspects. In peacetime, the PLA Navy serves a deterrence function, demonstrating China’s ability and resolve to fight the U.S. military if the U.S. were to intervene. In wartime, the operations of the PLA Navy would sit at the heart of any maritime campaign, helping to achieve China’s territorial objectives in spite of U.S. involvement.

KEYWORDS:

• Naval strategy
• Chinese navy
• territorial disputes
• counter-intervention
• maritime strategy
• U.S.-China relations

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, ‘China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms’, Joint Force Quarterly, 3 (2016), 68–75.

² This article adopts the PLA definition of ‘naval strategy’ (海军战略), i.e., the principles guiding the construction and use of the fleet, in war and peace. See 中国人民解放军军语 [PLA Dictionary of Military Terms] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press 2011), 888.

³ Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, ‘Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia’, International Security 41/1 (Summer 2016), 19–29; Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Contested Primary in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection’, International Security 38/4 (Spring 2014), 134–7.

⁴ Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press 2014); Andrew Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories and Strategic Implications (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2013).

⁵ See, for instance, chapters 1 and 2 of Peter Dutton, Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, eds. China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2014), 1–29; Michael McDevitt, ‘Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream’, CNA Report, June 2016, p. 35, www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/IRM-2016-U-013646.pdf; The PLA Navy’s acquisition of four Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia in the late 1990s and early 2000s is often seen as driven by counter-intervention concerns. See Nan Li, ‘The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From “Near Coast” and “Near Seas” to “Far Seas”’, Asian Security 5/2 (2009), 158.

⁶ Recent U.S. government analyses of China’s military modernization contain only superficial discussion of counter-intervention as a PLA Navy mission. See, for instance, Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21^st Century, ONI Website, 2015, pp. 7–8, www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Print_Low_Res.pdf?ver=2015-12-02-081233-733; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2019), U.S. Department of Defense, May 2019, 88, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf; China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, Defense Intelligence Agency, Website of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019, www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdfp, 65. Nan Li, the leading expert on Chinese naval strategy, examines this topic only peripherally. See Nan Li, ‘The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From “Near Coast” and “Near Seas” to “Far Seas”’, 158, 161; Nan Li, ‘China’s Evolving Naval Strategy and Capabilities in the Hu Jintao Era’, published in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (eds.), Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), 274–5, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2014/ssi_kamphausen-lai-tanner.pdf; Michael McDevitt has written about the challenges the PLA Navy must overcome to play a major role in countering U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency. See Michael McDevitt’s ‘The PLA Navy’s Antiaccess Role in a Taiwan Contingency’, in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang (eds.), The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 191–214.

⁷ As Fravel and Twomey write, Chinese strategists and analysts rarely use the term ‘counter-intervention.’ This article uses the term as a short-hand to encompass Chinese preparations and actions intended to deter or defeat U.S. efforts to intervene in a regional conflict (or potential conflict) involving China. M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey, ‘Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-intervention’, The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2015), 171–87.

⁸ Information Office of the State Council, China’s Military Strategy, Government of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm.

⁹ According to China’s 2011 white paper entitled ‘China’s Peaceful Development,’ Beijing’s core interests include ‘national sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, and national unification.’ Claims to disputed islands involve questions of national sovereignty (国家主权). Information Office of the State Council, ‘China’s Peaceful Development’, Xinhua, 6 September 2011, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284646.htm; For a detailed analysis of China’s disputed island claims as ‘core interests,’ see Ryan D. Martinson, Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy, (Newport: U.S. Naval War College Press 2018), 10–11.

¹⁰ 解放军一系列行动针对的是’台独’分裂势力 [‘The Series of Actions Taken By the PLA Are Aimed at Taiwanese Separatists Forces’] 中国军网 [China Military Online] 2 July 2018, www.81.cn/201311jxjjh/2018-07/02/content_8077383.htm.

¹¹ Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia (Arlington, Virginia: The Project 2049 Institute); 习近平 [Xi Jinping], 为实现民族伟大复兴推进祖国和平统一而共同奋斗 – – 在《告台湾同胞书》发表40周年纪念会上的讲话 [‘Struggle Together to Achieve the Great Rejuvenation of the Nation by Promoting the Peaceful Reunification of the Motherland – Speech Given at a Conference to Commemorate the 40^th Anniversary of the Release of the “Open Letter to Taiwan Compatriots”’], 新华社 [Xinhua], 2 January 2019, www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2019-01/02/c_1123937757.htm.

¹² Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson (eds.), China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 2019).

¹³ Martinson, Echelon Defense, 8.

¹⁴ Ryan Martinson, ‘China’s Great Balancing Act Unfolds: Enforcing Maritime Rights vs. Stability’, The National Interest, 11 September 2015, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-great-balancing-act-unfolds-enforcing-maritime-rights-13821.

¹⁵ Chris Buckley and Chris Horton, ‘Xi Jinping Warns Taiwan That Unification is the Goal and Force is an Option’, The New York Times, 1 January 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/01/01/world/asia/xi-jinping-taiwan-china.html.

¹⁶ Reiji Yoshida, ‘Mattis reaffirms U.S. commitment to defense of Japan, in Tokyo meeting’, The Japan Times, 29 June 2018, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/06/29/national/politics-diplomacy/mattis-reaffirms-u-s-commitment-defense-japan-tokyo-meeting/#.XObz3YhKhaQ.

¹⁷ Taiwan Relations Act, 1 January 1979, Website of the American Institute of Taiwan, www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/.

¹⁸ James Risen, ‘U.S. Warns China on Taiwan, Sends Warships to Area’, Los Angeles Times, 11 March 1996, www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-03-11-mn-45722-story.html; Robert S. Ross, ‘The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force’, International Security 25/2, 2000, p. 110.

¹⁹ Karen Lema and Neil Jerome Morales, ‘Pompeo Assures Philippines of U.S. Protection in Event of Sea Conflict’, Reuters, 1 March 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-usa/pompeo-assures-philippines-of-us-protection-in-event-of-sea-conflict-idUSKCN1QI3NM.

²⁰ Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zach Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, ‘Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 2017, 189–201.

²¹ See 《习近平总书记系列重要讲话读本》 [A Guide to a Series of Important Speeches by General Secretary Xi Jinping]. This volume is available online at 人民网 [People Online], 14 July 2014, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0714/c40531-25275284-2.html. See also 王卫东，曹爱永 [Wang Weidong, Cao Aiyong] 实战化，不可忽视持续动员 [‘Realistic Training, Not Neglecting Continuous Mobilization’], 中国国防报 [China National Defense], 27 August 2014, p. 3.

²² Andrew Erickson and Timothy Heath cite some of these reference in their 2015 China Brief article. See Andrew S. Erickson and Timothy Heath, ‘China’s Turn Toward Regional Restructuring, Counter-Intervention: A Review of Authoritative Sources’, China Brief 15/22, 16 November 2015; 寿晓松 [Shou Xiaosong, ed.], 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: Military Science, 2013), 99, 101, 113, 209, 216. Another volume entitled Science of Military Strategy, published in 2015 by China’s National Defense University, also contains numerous references to countering foreign intervention in a conflict involving China. See 肖天亮 [Xiao Tianliang, ed.], 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: National Defense Univ. Press 2015) 38, 41, 127, 133, 174, 177, 180, 230, 265.

²³ Shou Xiaosong, Science of Military Strategy, 99.

²⁴ Ibid, 100–1.

²⁵ Ibid, 209.

²⁶ 虞章才 [Yu Zhangcai] 顺应时代之需，加快推进海军转型 [‘Meet the Needs of the Era, Accelerate Promotion of Naval Transformation’], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 6 July 2018, p. 3.

²⁷ 张成富 [Zhang Chengfu], 解析联合作战政治工作新特点新要求 [‘Analysis of the New Characteristics and New Requirements for Joint Operations Political Work’], 西安政治学院学报 [Journal of Xi’an Politics Institute] 28/2 (April 2015), 43; 雷鹏 [Lei Peng], 南海岛礁军事运用物流保障体系构建 [‘Construction of Logistics Support System for Military Applications of Islands and Reefs in the South China Sea’], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military Transportation University] 19/12 (December 2017), 45.

²⁸ For earlier PLA assumptions about the spectrum of possibilities for the U.S. military intervention, see 唐复全，李宋，李国庆 [Tang Fuquan, Li Song, and Li Guoqing] 论抗击强敌军事干预中的政治工作 [‘On Political Work for Resisting the Military Intervention of the Powerful Enemy’], 军队政工理论研究 [Theoretical Studies on PLA Political Work] 3/6 (December 2002), 91; 黄金声，李宋，雷声 [Huang Jinsheng, Li Song, and Leisheng], 抗击强敌军事干预行动中的政治工作研究 [‘Research on Political Work in Operations to Resist the Military Intervention of a Powerful Enemy’], 政工导刊 [Political Work] 6 (2003), 14–15. The authors of both articles are PLA Navy officers.

²⁹ 刘文平 [Liu Wenping], 多维战场检验诸军兵种联合作战配戏 [‘Assessing Joint Operations Capabilities of Several Services on a Multi-Dimensional Battlefield’], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 24 September 2014, p. 1.

³⁰ The PLA Dictionary of Military Terms defines ‘command of the sea’ as ‘control over a given maritime area within a given time period.’ It also says that ‘in modern warfare, command of the sea relies on a comparative command of the air in order to be sustained.’ The Dictionary defines ‘command of the air’ as ‘control over a given airspace within a given time period of time.’ See PLA Dictionary of Military Terms, 79. For a PLA outline of requirements for air and sea control requirements when conducting a joint ‘landing campaign’ (登陆战役) and when conducting a campaign to seize an offshore land feature (对珊瑚岛礁进攻战役), see 张玉良 [Zhang Yuliang], 战役学 [Science of Campaigns] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), 296, 505.

³¹ For a useful discussion of the concept of “command of the sea” in Chinese strategic discourse, see Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, Second Edition, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Pres, 2018), 44–7.

³² 张晓林 [Zhang Xiaoling], 毛泽东积极防御战略思想与我国’近海防御’的海军战略 [‘Mao Zedong’s Active Defense Strategic Thought and China’s “Near Seas Defense” Naval Strategy’], 军事历史研究 [Military History Research] 2, (1992), 17.

³³ 刘华清 [Liu Huaqing], 刘华清回忆录 [Liu Huaqing Memoirs] (Beijing: PLA 2004), 438. See also 赵克增 [Zhao Kezeng], 见证中国海军战略的创建 ——— 纪念刘华清诞辰100 周年[‘Witness to the Creation of China’s Naval Strategy – Commemorating 100 Year Anniversary of the Birth of Liu Huaqing’], 军事历史 [Military History] 2, (2016), 14.

³⁴ 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室 [Information Office of the State Council], 2004年中国的国防 [China’s National Defense in 2004], 国防部 [Website of the PRC Ministry of Defense], December 2004, www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-01/06/content_4249947.htm; 梁芳 [Liang Fang, ed.], 海战史与未来海战研究 [Research on the Past and Future of Naval Warfare] (Beijing, Ocean Press 2007), 195; 李杰 [Li Jie], 中国海军发展战略分析：坚持近海防御，提高综合能力 [‘Analysis of the Chinese Navy’s Development Strategy: Continue to Embrace Near Seas Defense, Improve Overall Capabilities’], 中国日报 [China Daily], 23 April 2009, www.chinadaily.com.cn/zgrbjx/2009-04/23/content_9088174.htm.

³⁵ 李吉祥 [Li Jixiang], 在海军转型建设中找准定位发挥作用 [‘Finding a Position from Which to Exert Effects in the Context of the Navy’s Transformative Construction’], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 19 December 2017, p. 3.

³⁶ 尚金锁, 吴子欣, and 陈立旭 [Shang Jinsuo, Wu Zixin, and Chen Lixu], 毛泽东军事 思想与高技术条件下局部战争 [The Military Thought of Mao Zedong and Local War under High-Tech Conditions] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2002), 248–9; 师小芹 [Shi Xiaoqin], 论海权与中美关系 [On Sea Power and Sino-U.S. Relations] (Beijing: Military Science, 2012), p. 207.

³⁷ 史滇生，孙文欣，汪丽 [Shi Diansheng, Sun Wenxin, and Wang Li] 人民海军战斗力建设的历史经验 [‘The Historical Experiences of the People’s Navy in Constructing Combat Power’], 军事历史 [Military History] 1, (2018), p. 51. See also 张勇, 苏小东 [Zhang Yong and Su Xiaodong], 在更高起点上推动人民海军建设又好又快发展 [‘Promote the Good and Rapid Development of People’s Navy Construction from a Higher Starting Point’], 军事历史研究 [Military Historical Research] 4, (2012), p. 8.

³⁸ 王晋：海军近海防御远海护卫战略是与时俱进 [Wang Jin: The Navy’s Near Seas Defense Far Seas Protection Strategy is Keeping Up with the Times’], 人民网 [People Online], 26 May 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0526/c1011-27058025.html.

³⁹ Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, ‘Future Warfare in the Western Pacific’, 25–26.

⁴⁰ Liu, Liu Huaqing Memoirs, 355, 437; Shou Xiaosong, Science of Military Strategy, 216; Xiao Tianliang, Science of Military Strategy, 342.

⁴¹ Wu Shengli [吴胜利], 深刻吸取甲午战争历史教训坚定不移走经略海洋维护海权发展海军之路 [‘Learn Profound Historical Lessons from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and Unswervingly Take the Path of Planning and Managing Maritime Affairs, Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests, and Building a Powerful Navy’], 中国军事科学 [China Military Science] 4, (2014), 3.

See 杜哲元 [Du Zheyuan], 中国海军战略演变中的作战海区问题研究 [‘Research on Sea Area of Operations in the Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy’], 太平洋学报 [Pacific Journal] 25/4, (April 2017), 74–5.

⁴² Xiao Tianliang, Science of Military Strategy, 342–3.

⁴³ This was the argument made by two PLA Navy researchers at the Naval Research Institute (Lieutenant Commander Tang Jianfeng and Commander Yang Zukuai) in a 2016 issue of the Journal of Naval Research (海军军事学术), an internal-distribution only military periodical. See 唐剑峰，杨祖快 [Tang Jianfeng, Yang Zukuai], 新形势下经略两洋应着重把握的几个问题 [‘Several Issues that Must Be Prioritized in the Context of Strategic Management of the Two Oceans in the New Situation’], 海军军事学术 [Journal of Naval Research] 3 (2016), 2.

⁴⁴ The author is a scholar at the PLA Navy Command Academy. 刘一建 [Liu Yijian], 中国未来的海军建设与海军战略 [‘China’s Future Naval Construction and Naval Strategy’], 战略与管理 [Strategy and Management] 5 (1999), 97.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 97.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 100.

⁴⁷ 卢胜君 [Lu Shengjun], 打造一流海军，我们应该怎么做 [‘How We Can Build a First-Rate Navy’], 中国军网 [China Military Online], 5 May 2016, www.81.cn/jkhc/2016-05/05/content_7037336_2.htm.

⁴⁸ 史常勇，陈炎 [Shi Changyong, Chen Yan], 试论新时代海军战略定位 [‘Views on the Navy’s Strategic Status in the New Era’], 国防 [National Defense], 5 (2018), 36. Three faculty members from the PLA Equipment Academy described the primary tasks of far seas protection in a paper on equipment support for far seas operations. These include anti-access (反介入) and area denial (区域拒止). They assume that one of the primary forms (主要样式) for far seas operations is to ‘seize partial command of the sea in the far seas.’ 周慧贞, 李福生, 郭全魁 [Zhou Huizhen, Li Fusheng, and Guo Quankui], 远海防卫作战装备保障准备问题研究 [‘Research on Equipment Support Preparation for Far Seas Defense Operations’], 装备学院学报 [Journal of the Equipment Academy] (June 2014), 10–11.

⁴⁹ 沈金龙 [Shen Jinlong], 深入贯彻党的十九大精神，统筹和推进新时代海军转型建设 [‘Thoroughly Implement the Spirit of the 19^th Party Congress, Plan and Promote Transformational Construction for the Navy in the New Era’], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 13 December 2017, 2.

⁵⁰ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2019), 36–38.

⁵¹ 杜文龙, 石志坤 [Du Wenlong, Shi Zhikun], 南沙群岛 – 遥远的蓝色国土 [‘The Spratly Archipelago – Remote Blue National Territory], 兵器知识 [Ordnance Knowledge] 1 (2008), 27.

⁵² Thomas Shugart, ‘China’s Artificial Islands Are Bigger (And a Bigger Deal) Than You Think’, War on the Rocks, 21 September 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/chinas-artificial-islands-are-bigger-and-a-bigger-deal-than-you-think/.

⁵³ Xiao Tianliang, Science of Military Strategy, 345.

⁵⁴ Kathrin Hille, ‘Beijing’s First China-Built Aircraft Carrier Enters Service’, Financial Times, 17 December 2019, www.ft.com/content/1249f934-20dd-11ea-92da-f0c92e957a96.

⁵⁵ Greg Torode, Ben Blanchard, ‘Exclusive: Images show construction on China’s third and largest aircraft carrier – analysts’, Reuters, 7 May 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-carrier-exclusive/exclusive-images-show-construction-on-chinas-third-and-largest-aircraft-carrier-analysts-idUSKCN1SD0CP.

⁵⁶ 中国海军最大补给舰二号舰将入役 航母与其编队将获最强战力 [‘The Second Ship of Chinese Navy’s Largest Supply Ship is Commissioned, Aircraft Carrier and Other Task Forces Will Gain Maximal Combat Power’], 央视网 [CCTV Online], 21 February 2019, http://military.cctv.com/2019/02/21/ARTIHtUyglsboSRcx8acPPOn190221.shtml.

⁵⁷ Ronald O’Rourke, ‘China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service, 22 January 2020, 8–11.

⁵⁸ “十三五”海洋领域科技创新专项规划 [13^th Five Year Plan for Marine Scientific and Technological Innovation], 科技部 [Ministry of Science and Technology], 8 May 2017, www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/fgzc/gfxwj/gfxwj2017/201705/t20170517_132854.htm.

⁵⁹ Dennis J. Blasko, ‘The Chinese Military Speaks to Itself, Revealing Doubts’, War on the Rocks, 18 February 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-chinese-military-speaks-to-itself-revealing-doubts/.

⁶⁰ Shen Jinlong, ‘Thoroughly Implement the Spirit of the 19^th Party Congress’, p. 2.

⁶¹ 李贵宾 [Li Guibin], 无敌编队斩浪向战场 – 来自北海舰队某驱逐舰支队首长机关演练现场的见闻 [‘The Peerless Task Force Cuts Waves on the Way to the Battlefield – A First Hand Account of the Exercise from Command Organ of a Certain Destroyer Squadron from the North Sea Fleet’], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 25 July 2012, 1–2.

⁶² 刘鑫，潘小员 [Liu Xin and Pan Xiaoyuan], 磨砺联合制胜的铁拳 [‘Grinding the Iron First of Joint Victory’], 人民海军[People’s Navy], 8 August 2018, p. 3.

⁶³ 闫欣雨 [Yan Xinhu], 海军赴西太平洋训练实现常态化 [‘The Navy’s Training in the Western Pacific Achieves Normalization’], 新京报 [Beijing News], 2 November 2013, http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2013-11/02/content_475146.htm?div=−1.

⁶⁴ 张纪昌 [Zhang Jichang], 海军’机动-5ʹ实兵演习取得圆满成功 [‘The Navy’s Maneuver-5 Exercise Ends with Success’], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 4 November 2013, p. 1.

⁶⁵ 沈抒，王元元 [Shen Shu and Wang Yuanyuan], 考场？战场！–直击指挥学院毕业联合演习 [‘Examination Room? Battlefield! A Look at the Command Academy’s Capstone Joint Exercise’], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 10 February 2014, p. 4.

⁶⁶ 王建超，沈抒，柏杨 [Wang Jianchao, Shen Shu, and Bai Yang], 长剑出鞘露锋芒 – 指挥学院学员毕业联合演习纪实 [‘Long Sword is Unsheathed to Show How Sharp It Is – A Record of Capstone Joint Exercise Involving Students from the Command College’], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 20 January 2016, p. 3.

⁶⁷ The article also states that the exercise sought to game out f the ‘difficult points of maritime joint operations in the complex situation of military intervention of the powerful enemy.’ 沈抒，柏杨 [Shen Shu, and Bai Yang], 在硝烟中领取战 场’通行证’ – 海军指挥学员’筹海-2018’学员毕业联合演练侧记 [‘Obtaining a Battlefield “Pass” through Gunpowder – A Chronicle of the Navy Command College “Chouhai-2018” Student Capstone Exercise’], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 25 January 2018, p. 3.

⁶⁸ Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974), 17–20.

⁶⁹ Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘Top US Navy Officer Visits US Aircraft Carrier in South China Sea’, The Diplomat, 7 June 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/top-us-navy-officer-visits-us-aircraft-carrier-in-south-china-sea/.

⁷⁰ Dan Lamothe, ‘In rare move, the Navy sends two aircraft carriers near the Philippines’, The Washington Post, 20 June 2016, www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/06/20/in-rare-move-the-navy-sends-two-aircraft-carriers-near-the-philippines/?noredirect=on&utm_term=c6a1291cb858.

⁷¹ 郭媛丹 [Guo Yuandan], 专家解析南海军演 战役级规模就是回击美舰挑衅 [‘Experts Interpret South China Sea Military Exercise, Campaign Scale is a Response to the Provocations of U.S. Warships’], 人民网 [People Online], 11 July 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0711/c1011-28542503.html.

⁷² 梁庆松 [Liang Qingsong], 一次真正意义上的远海对抗训练 – 专访’机动-5号’实兵演习执行导演，海军副参谋长廖世宁 [‘A True Instance of a Far Seas Confrontation Training – An Interview with the Director of the Maneuver-5 Exercise, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy Liao Shining’], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 5 November 2013, p. 1.

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Notes on contributors

Ryan D. Martinson

Ryan D. Martinson is a researcher in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College.