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ABSTRACT
Existing studies focus on explaining how militaries adapt in different ways to the challenges of war. However, organisation theory suggests that competition and normative pressure will lead overtime to convergence within particular business and policy sectors, as optimal ways of organizing and operating are learned and emulated. I examine this dynamic in the context of the conflict between the Afghan Taliban and the British Army. That there should be convergence in modes of operation or organizational form between these two very different opponents seems most improbable. Yet, as this article shows, convergence did occur as the conflict wore on.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 312.
2 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 1916–18; Amiee Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1914–1918; Michael Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 1944–1945.
3 Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (2010), 567–94; James A. Russell, ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (2010), 594–624; Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011); David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009); James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewar Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James A. Russell, Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013); Sergio Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (2012), 513–539; Nina Kollars, ‘War’s Horizon: Soldier-Led Adaptation in Iraq and Vietnam’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/4 (2015), 529–53; Torunn Laugen Haaland, ‘The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/7 (2016), 999–1022; Olivier Schmitt, ‘French Military Adaptation in the Afghan War: Inward or Outward?’ Journal of Strategic Studies 40/4 (2017), 577–599; Cornelius Friesendorf, How Western Soldiers Fight: Organizational Routine in Multinational Missions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Maarten P. Broekhof, Martijn W. M. Kitzen and Frans P. B. Osinga, ‘A Tale of Two Mosuls, The resurrection of the Iraqi armed forces and the military defeat of ISIS’, Journal of Strategic Studies (2019). DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2019.1694912.
4 A recent exception is Brett Potter Van Ess, ‘Wartime Tactical Adaptation and Operational Success: British and Japanese Armies in Burma and India, 1941–45’, PhD Thesis, King’s College London, 2019.
5 On the origins and early development of Taliban, see Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, An Enemy We Created: The Myth if the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970–2010 (London: Hurst, 2012).
6 Farrell, ‘Improving in War’.
7 Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004–2011’, International Affairs 89/4 (2013), 845–71.
8 The interviews were conducted by six Afghan field researchers, with backgrounds in journalism. The research project was led by myself and Dr. Antonio Giustozzi. Interview transcripts were produced in Pashto based on field notes, and translated into English by our field manager, Claudio Franco. To protect the identity of interviewees, the interviews are coded to reveal only the type of interviewee (‘T’ for Taliban and ‘E’ for local elder), the interviewee number (as a number of interviews were conducted in each district) and location (by district). For expanded discussion on the interview methodology, see Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War’, 846.
9 Theo Farrell, ‘Introduction: Military Adaptation in Afghanistan’, in Farrell et al. (eds.), Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, 2.
10 Farrell, ‘Improving in War’; Serena, Revolution in Military Adaptation; Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War; Catignani, ‘‘Getting COIN’; Farrell et al., Military Adaptation in Afghanistan; Kollars, ‘War’s Horizon’; Haaland, ‘The Limits to Learning in Military Operations’; Schmitt, ‘French Military Adaptation in the Afghan War’; Friesendorf, How Western Soldiers Fight; Broekhof et al., ‘A Tale of Two Mosuls.’
11 Farrell, ‘Improving in War’; Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War.
12 Thomas Rid and Martin Zapfe, ‘Mission Command Without a Mission: German Military Adaptation in Afghanistan’, in Farrell et al. (eds), Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (2013), 192–218; Schmitt, ‘French Military Adaptation in the Afghan War’; Friesendorf, How Western Soldiers Fight.
13 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 28.
14 Ann Hironaka, Tokens of Power: Rethinking War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Theo Farrell, ‘Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional Army,’ European Journal of International Relations 7/1 (2001), 63–101.
15 Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, Organizational Ecology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
16 Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).
17 Arie Y. Lewin and Henk W. Volberda, ‘The Future of Organization Studies: Beyond the Selection-Adaptation Debate’, in Haridimos Tsoukas and Christian Knudson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Organization Theory: Meta-Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 583.
18 Fox, Learning to Fight, 53–72. On horizontal learning, see also R. T. Foley, ‘A Case Study of Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/6 (2015), 777–880; and Kollars, ‘War’s Horizon.’
19 Sergio Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army?’ Journal of Strategic Studies 37/1 (2013), 31, 59.
20 Raphael D. Marcus, Israel’s Long War with Hezbollah: Military Innovation and Adaptation Under Fire (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018), 10.
21 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 195.
22 Adam M. Jungdahl and Julia M. MacDonald, ‘Innovation Inhibitors in War: Overcoming Obstacles in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/4 (2015), 467–499.
23 Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War.
24 David Tohn and Jaron Wharton, ‘Learning Under Fire: Progress and Dissent in the US Military’, Survival 51/4 (2009), 31–48.
25 Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 125–35.
26 Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation, 163.
27 Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell, eds., A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).
28 Theo Farrell and Sten Rynning, ‘NATO’s Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences and the War in Afghanistan’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/5 (2010), 673–99.
29 Emily Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, (eds.), The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
30 Adam Grissom, ‘Shoulder-to-Shoulder Fighting Different Wars: NATO Advisors and Military Adaptation in the Afghan National Army, 2001–2011’, in Farrell et al. (eds.), Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (2013), 263–87.
31 Terry Terriff, ‘Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational Culture in the US Marine Corps’, Defence Studies 6/2 (2006), 215–247.
32 Emily O. Goldman, ‘Cultural Foundations of Military Diffusion’, Review of International Studies 32/1 (2006), 69–91.
33 Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
34 Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, ‘The Spread of Military Innovations: Adoption Capacity Theory, Tactical Incentives, and the Case of Suicide Terrorism’, Security Studies 23/3 (2014), 513–47.
35 Theo Farrell Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 2018), 136–42.
36 Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 575–8.
37 Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 591.
38 Author interview with Major General Andrew Mackay, London, 6 February 2013.
39 Commander British Forces, Op HERRICK 7, ‘Counterinsurgency in Helmand, Task Force Operational Design’, TFH/COMD/DO7, 1 January 2008, 2.
40 Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 579–80.
41 Author interview with SO3 J2 Plans, 52 Bde HQ, Redford Cavalry Barracks, Edinburgh, 29 June 2009.
42 Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 585–87.
43 Author interview with Major General Andrew Mackay, London, 6 February 2013.
44 Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 584.
45 Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War’, 229–273.
46 Theo Farrell, Appraising Moshtarak: The Campaign in Nad-e-Ali District, Helmand, Royal United Services Institute, June 2010.
47 The Helmand PRT also included a number of American, Danish and Estonian civilian personnel.
48 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Wilton Park, Report: Capturing the Lessons from the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Wednesday 3 – Friday 5 December 2014, WP1322, 13–18.
49 Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, ‘COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan’, The RUSI Journal 154/3 (2009), 24.
50 Presentation by Col. Alex Alderson, Land Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency Centre, ‘Writing doctrine for counterinsurgency: the British experience (2001–11),’ Merton College, University of Oxford, May 2011.
51 Army Code 71,876, British Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency, Vol. 1, Part 10 (London: Ministry of Defence, November 2009), para. 1.3.
52 Colonel Alex Alderson OBE, PhD, DACOS COIN, ‘What has changed since AFM 1–10 was published? Is there a model, beyond expeditionary COIN, fit for 2018?’, unpublished paper, 2018, 2.
53 Alexander Alderson, ‘The British Approach to COIN and Stabilisation: A Retrospective on Developments since 2001’, The RUSI Journal 157/4 (2012), 63.
54 Farrell, Unwinnable, 274–88.
55 COMISAF/COMUSF-A, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, HQ ISAF, Tactical Directive, 1 July 2009.
56 David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2014).
57 ISAF Joint Command Study, October 2010. Copy with author.
58 Headquarters RC(S) OPORD, Op MOSHTARAK, December 2009.
59 HQTFH, LKG, Op HERRICK 11, Post-Operation Report, 10 April 2010.
60 Author interview with Brigadier Richard Felton, TFH Headquarters, Lashkar Gah, Helmand, 27 May 2010.
61 Author interview with CO, 1 LANCS Battlegroup, FOB Shawqat, Nad-e Ali, Helmand, 27 May 2010.
62 Neil Shortland and John Bohannon, ‘Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan’, Science 345/6198 (2014), 723–4, https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/345/6198/723.full.pdf.
63 Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War’, 857.
64 Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War’, 851. Quotes from T3 Nahr-e Seraj and T3 Sangin.
65 Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War’, 862–3.
66 Kate Clark, The Layha: Holding the Taleban to Account (Kabul: Afghan Analysts Network, 2011) 3, 11, 21.
67 Muhammad Munir, ‘The Layha for the Mujahideen: An analysis of the code of conduct for the Taliban fighters under Islamic law,’ International Review of the Red Cross 93/881 (2011) 85, 93–4, 102.
68 Thomas H. Johnson and Matthew C. DuPee, ‘Analysing the new Taliban Code of Conduct (Layeha): An Assessment of Changing Perspectives and Strategies of the Afghan Taliban’, Central Asian Survey 31/1 (2012) 81–2.
69 Ashley Jackson and Rahmatullah Amiri, Insurgent Bureaucracy: How the Taliban Makes Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2019), 16–17.
70 Antonio Guistozzi and Claudio Franco, The Battle for the Schools: The Taleban and State Education (Berlin: Afghan Analysts Network, 2011).
71 Jackson and Amiri, Insurgent Bureaucracy, 31–3.
72 Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War’, 855–6.
73 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Penguin Press, 2013).
74 Antonio Giustozzi, The Taliban at War, 2001–2008 (London: Hurst, 2019), 65, 87–8.
75 There was considerable variation in organisational structures of mujahedeen parties during the Soviet War. For comparative analysis, see Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
76 Guistozzi, Taliban at War, 88–9.
77 Claudio Franco and Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Revolution in the Counter-Revolution: Efforts to Centralize the Taliban’s Military Leadership,’ Central Asian Affairs 3/3 (2016) 272–75.
78 On the importance of ‘resource control’ to the leadership of insurgent groups, see Alec Worsnop, ‘Who Can Keep the Peace? Insurgent Organizational Control of Collective Violence’, Security Studies 26/3 (2017), 482–516.
79 Guistozzi, Taliban, 92.
80 Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War’, 861.
81 T1 Marjah and T2 Nad-e Ali.
82 T3 Kajaki; T5 Musa Qala; T6 Musa Qala; T2 Now Zad; T3 Marjah; T7 Garmser; T8 Garmser. See also Carter Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier (London: Hurst, 2013) 123–6.
83 This was confirmed by 12 Taliban interviewees from across Helmand. See Farrell and Giustozzi, ‘Taliban at War’, 865 (fn 134).
84 T3 Marjah; T5 Marjah; T4 Garmser; T6 Garmser; T3 Sangin; T6 Sangin.
85 Author correspondence with Chief of the General Staff, General Sir David Richards, 3 July 2011.
86 Alderson, ‘British Approach,’ 68.
87 Farrell et al., Military Adaptation.
88 Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W. W. Norton, 2018).
89 Shawn Snow, ‘Taliban fighters try to storm base in Helmand province housing US Marines and Afghan forces,’ Marine Corps Times, 1 March 2019.
90 Rudra Chaudhuri and Theo Farrell, ‘Campaign Disconnect: Operational Progress and Strategic Obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011’, International Affairs 87/2 (2011), 276–96.
91 Guistozzi, Taliban, 199–200.
92 Theo Farrell and Michael Semple, Ready for Peace? The Afghan Taliban after a Decade of War (January 2017).
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Theo Farrell
Theo Farrell is Professor and Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Education) at the University of Wollongong, and Visiting Professor in the Department of War Studies at King's College London.