![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Andrew W. Marshall, who shaped the way in which contemporary international security experts think about strategy, has been mostly associated with the invention of net assessment. The intellectual sources of this analytical technique, and of the related competitive strategies concept, could be traced to Marshall’s efforts to uncover Soviet post-World War II defense transformations. This article outlines the essence of these Soviet innovations – the empirical frame of reference that inspired Marshall. It provides a new perspective on the history of the net-assessment methodology, advances the debate within strategic studies over the nature of military innovations, and offers insights for experts examining defense transformations worldwide.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Andrew W. Marshall (late), Stephen P. Rosen, Jacqueline (Jackie) Deal, and Andrew May for the original research idea and for their intellectual guidance, support and encouragement through all the stages of the project. For insightful questions, comments, and advice, thanks are owed to Nehemia Burgin, Thomas Ehrhard, Katherine (Kate) Hasty, Benjamin (Ben) Lamont, Thomas Mahnken, Jessika Nebrat, Nathan (Nate) Picarsic, Phillip Pournelle, and two anonymous reviewers. I appreciate unique research support of MS and MZ. The author owes PNN and PHV a debt of gratitude for making this article a reality.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 Thomas Mahnken, ‘Andrew W. Marshall: in Memoriam’, War on the Rocks, 8 April 2019; Eliot Cohen, ‘The Brain of the Pentagon’, The Atlantic, 8 May 2019; Andrew Krepinevich, ‘On the Lasting Value of Net Assessment’, Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2019; Dakota Wood, ‘Lessons Learned: the Legacy of Andrew W. Marshall’, The Heritage Foundation, 9 April 2019; Editorial, ‘Ask the Right Question. Obituary: Andrew Marshall died on March 26th’, The Economist, 11 April 2019; Editorial, ‘Andrew Marshall, Pentagon’s Threat Expert’, The NYT, 11 April 2019; Matt Schudel,”Andrew Marshall, Pentagon’s gnomic Yoda of long-range planning,” The Washington Post, 28 March 2019; Editorial, ‘Andrew Marshall obituary’, The Times, 22 April 2019; Mie Augier and Wayne Hughes, ‘In Grateful Memory: Andrew Marshall and his Quest for Questions’, CIMSEC, 2 July 2019; David Goldman, ‘Andrew Marshall, the last wise man’, The Asia Times, 1 April 2019; Aaron Mehta, ‘Andy Marshall, the Pentagon’s Yoda dies at age 97’, Defense News, 26 March 2019; Editorial, ‘Umer izvestnyi kak magistr Ioda analitik Pentagona Endriu Marshall’, RBK, 27 March 2019.
2 Krepinevich, ‘On the Lasting Value of Net Assessment’. Also see: Sharon Weinberger, ‘The Return of the Pentagon’s Yoda’, Foreign Policy, 12 September 2018.
3 Krepinevich, ‘On the Lasting Value of Net Assessment’.
4 Marshall’s intellectual credo emphasized asking the right questions, rather than finding definite answers to questions that are, irrelevant. For the central works on the net-assessment analytical technique, on the intellectual history of the Office of Net Assessment, on Mr. Andrew Marshall’s biography and his intellectual legacy, see: Thomas G. Mahnken (ed.), Net Assessment and Military Strategy: A Retrospective and Prospective Analysis (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2020); Thomas G. Mahnken (ed.), Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012; Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of the American Defense Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 2015); Paul Bracken, ‘Net Assessment: A Practical Guide’, Parameters 36/1 (Spring 2006), 90–100; Stephen Peter Rosen, ‘Competitive Strategies: Theoretical Foundations, Limits, and Extension’, in Competitive Strategies; Philip A. Karber, Net Assessment for SecDef Future Implications from Early Formulations (Washington DC: Potomac Foundation, 2014).
5 Krepinevich, ‘On the Lasting Value of Net Assessment’. Interviews with Andrew Marshall, 2016–2017. Interviews with experts of the ONA, 2015–2019.
6 Mahnken, ‘Andrew W. Marshall: in Memoriam’; Cohen, ‘The Brain of the Pentagon’; Krepinevich, ‘On the Lasting Value of Net Assessment’.
7 Andrew Marshall, Problems of Estimating Military Power (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND, 1966); Rosen in Mahnken‘Andrew W. Marshall: in Memoriam’; The Last Warrior; Karber, Net Assessment for SecDef Future Implications from Early Formulations; Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Martinage, Dissuasion Strategy (Washington DC.: CSBA, 2008), 15; Austin Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War (Washington DC: 2008), Chapter 5.
8 Interviews with experts of the ONA, 2015–2019. Also see: Marshall, Problems of Estimating; The Last Warrior; Krepinevich, ‘On the Lasting Value of Net Assessment’; Long, Chapter 5.
9 The main limitation of the historiographical aspect of the research is the lack of accurate Soviet data on budget allocations.
10 I.V, Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny (Moscow: RAN, 2000), chapters 1–6, and pp. 270–271, pp. 124–152, cited in Zaloga (2002), p. 18; Alperovich, Gody Raboty Nad Sistemoi PVO Moskvy (1950-1955): Zapiski Inzhenera, 150.
11 Krepinevich and Martinage, Dissuasion Strategy, 16.
12 Krepinevich and Martinage, Dissuasion Strategy, 15–16; Jay Kosminsky, ‘The Competitive Strategies Concept: Giving the U.S. A Battlefield Edge’, The Heritage Foundation, 1989.
13 For the recent Western efforts to uncover the current Russian art of strategy and the military innovation driving it, see: Michael Kofman, ‘Moscow School of Hard Knocks’, War on the Rocks, 17 January 2017; ‘It’s Time to Talk about A2/AD’, War on the Rocks, 5 September 2019; ‘Raiding and International Brigandry’, War on the Rocks, 14 June 2018; Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 4, 2016; Katrzyna Zysk, ‘Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Military Strategy’, The RUSI 163/2 (2018); Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, Cross-Domain Coercion: the Current Russian Art of Strategy (Paris: IFRI, 2015); Alexander Lanoszka, ‘Russian hybrid warfare’, International Affairs 92/1 (2016); Andrew Monaghan, Power in Modern Russia (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2017); Lawrence Freedman, Ukraine and the Art of Strategy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2019); Johh Deni (ed.), Current Russian Military Affairs (Carlyle: US Army War College SSI, 2018); Stephen Blank (ed.), Russian Military in Contemporary Perspective (US Army War College SSI, 2019); Bettina Renz, Russia’s Military Revival (London: Polity, 2018).
14 Holloway; Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 12–23.
15 David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (Yale UP, 2005).
16 Resilience of the rear; morale and spirit of the military; the quality and quantity of divisions; military equipment and armaments; and the organizational capabilities of the senior military command.
17 Andrei Kokoshin, Armia I Politika (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1995) pp. 132–138. Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 12–23; Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 520.
18 Sudoplatov, chapter 7; Holloway.
19 Chertok, Rakety I Liudi (Chapter: Stanovlenie na rodnoi zemle); V.V. Polunin, ‘Stanovlenie tsentral’nykh Organov Upravleniia Atomnoi Promyshlennostiu SSSR’, Novyi Istoricheskii Vestnik 2/16 (2007).
20 Baluevsky, 18.
21 A.I.Kalistratov, ‘Sovetskoie voennoe isskustvo v pervoe poslevoennoe desiatiletie (1945–1955)’, VM, no. 10, 2009, pp. 2–9.
22 Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 12–23.
23 Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 235–236.
24 Iu. V. Votintsev, ‘Neizvestnye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy’, VIZh, no. 8, 1993; Zaloga (2002), p. 8.
25 Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 21–22.
26 Sudoplatov, chapter 7.
27 I.V. Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshellnyi Kompleks SSSR v Gody Kholodnoi Voiny (1945–1964): Stratetgicheskie Programmy, Instituty, Rukovoditieli (Moscow: PhD Dissertation, Institute of Russian History, 2001), 234–235.
28 Votinsev (1993); Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovieto, 16.
29 For the imprint of the German bombings on the collective memory, see: Konstantin Simonov, Zhivye I Mertvye (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia Literatua, 1984). This traumatic experience was partially tempered by his feeling of potency for having successfully reformed the AD under bombardment in Moscow. Stalin arranged the most concentrated AD of Moscow, more than that of London and Berlin. The Luftwaffe conducted 141 bombing raids on the city, in total involving 8600 airplanes. According to the Soviet statistics, 1400 airplanes were shot down, and 234 actually made it to Moscow, causing some minor damage. Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko. N.N. Bazhenov, D.M. Degtev, and M.V. Zefirov, Svastika nad Volgoi. Liuftvaffe protiv Stalinksoi PVO (Moscow: AST, 2007).
30 I.A. Tkachev, ‘PVO Frontov v Berlinskoi Nastupatel’noi Operatsii’, VIZh, no. 5, 2004; Chertok; Gromadin, the first-ever commander of the PVO Strany, nominated first in 1941 and again in 1946, commanded the AD operations of Lublin, Bialystok, Poznan and Berlin during the Soviet offensive there. V.L.Golotiuk and D.A. Tsapaev, Komandyi sostav Voisk PVO Krasnoi Armii v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi I Sovietsko-Iaponskoi voin 1941–1945gg (Moscow: Veche, 2012).
31 V.M. Kanaev, ‘PVO krupnykh gorodov vo Vtoroi Mirovoi Voine’, VKO, 20 October 2013; Zaloga (2002), p. 18; Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovieto, 30, 44.
32 Sudoplatov, Spetsoperatsii, chapter 7; Holloway.
33 Sudoplatov, Spetsoperatsii, chapter 7; A.I. Kolpakidi and D.P. Prokhorov, Imperia GRU (Moscow: Olma Press, 1999), chapters 9 and 10; Group of Authors, Ocherki Istorii Rossiskoi Vneshnei Razvedki: 1945–1965 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 2003), vol. 5.
34 Orlov, Tainaia Bitva Sverkhderzhav, chapter 2, part 1. Also see: Edward Kaplan, To Kill Nations (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2015).
35 Gordon Barrass, The Great Cold War (Pale Alto: Stanford UP, 2009), pp. 46–47; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 93–95.
36 A.S. Orlov, Tainaia Bitva Sverkhderzhav (Moscow: Veche, 2000), chapter 2, part 1.
37 Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko. The Allies’ airlift during the Berlin blockade impressed the Soviet leadership in term of the U.S. and UK air power capabilities and further fueled their ingrained air defense anxieties. Barrass, p. 58.
38 Dmitry Leonov, Kniga Pamiati o 685 ZRP (Moscow, 2016), chapter 1. Also see: N.N. Iakovlev, TsRU protiv SSSR (Moscow: Pravda, 1983). The concern was so high that in the late 1940 s the head of the sabotage and special operations department of the NKVD was ordered to prepare a plan for neutralizing the U.S. strategic air superiority, by conducting diversionary missions against nuclear targets in the U.S. and in Europe. Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 41–42.
39 Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 44–49; Krinitsky (2005).
40 I.V. Erokhin, ‘Bitva za PVO’, VKO 19 September 2013; Boris Zaretsky, Iurii Alekhin and Sergi Kutsenko, ‘Voiska PVO Strany: Vzlety I Padeniia’, VKO, 27 June 2012.
41 Erokkhin (2013).
42 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko.
43 Ibid.
44 B.F. Cheltsov, ‘Shtab Voisk PVO: Osnovnue Sozdaniia, Razvitiia I Deiatel’nosti’, VM, no. 2, February 2007; Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko.
45 Iu. N. Balueevsky, “Deiatel’nost’ GS v pervye poslevoennye gody (1946–1953), VIZh, no. 1, 2003.
46 Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 53; Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 493.
47 B.F. Cheltsov, ‘Zarozhdenie I Razvitie PVO Strany’, VIZh, no. 2, 2004, pp. 18–27.
48 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko.
49 Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 46–49.
50 Erokohin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko; Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 236.
51 Stalin charged Beria with completing the first test in 1948. Zaloga (2002), pp. 7–8.
52 Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 477.
53 Orlov, Tainaia Bitva Sverkhderzhav, chapter 2, part 2. On 10 July 1946, the special committee for coordinating work on radiolocation technique was established and started the crash production of various types of radars and plants producing radiolocation equipment. Between the late 1940 s and early 1950 s, the industry was overwhelmed by orders from the military demanding the new types of radiolocation equipment. Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 236–241.
54 Cheltsov.
55 Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko; Cheltsov.
56 V.L. Telitsyn, Marshal Govorov: Put’ Russkogo Ofitsera (Moscow: Veche, 2013); Cheltsov.
57 Iu. V. Krinitsky, ‘Protivovozdushnaia oborona: otechestvennyi opyt reorganizatsii I sovremennost’’, VM, no. 2, 2005, pp. 76–80.
58 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko.
59 A.D. Volkov, ‘Pervyi Glavnokomanduiuschii Voiskami PVO Strany’, VM, no. 5, 2003.
60 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko.
61 Volkov; Cheltsov; Baluevsky; A.V. Shlykov, ‘Kafedra Operativnogo Iskusstva VVS Voennoi Akadenii GSh RF’, Vestnik AVN 4/21 (2007). Govorov’s commission also recommended establishing the faculty of PVO in the department of Operational Art of the GSh Academy. ‘Govorov Leonid Aleksandrovich: Poslevoennyi Periud’, Biography website established by Govorov’s family (marshall-govorov.ru).
62 Volkov; Cheltsov. A.N.Kiselev, Polkovodtsy I voenachialniki VOV (Moscow: ZhZL, 1960), 35; Gruppa Avtorov, Voiska Protivvozdushnoi Oborny Strany (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), Chapter 3, part 1.
63 E.Ia. Savitsky, Polveka s Nebom (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988) Chapters: ‘Parad v Tushino’, and ‘V Predverii Sverkhzvukovykh.’
64 Aleksandr Kochiukov, ‘Beria, Vstat’! Vy Arestvanny!’, KZ, 29 June 2003.
65 For example, Vasilii Stalin, who in 1948 became the head of the AF of the Moscow District, demanded the re-subordination to him of the best airfields of the IA of the PVO located near Moscow with the modern jets, mainly in order to be able to organize air parades.Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 47.
66 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko.
67 A.V. Samokhin, ‘Vozdushnaia oborona granits SSSR v nachiale 1950-kh godov’, VIZh 12 (2016), 25–28.
68 Cheltsov, ‘Zarozhdenie I Razvitie PVO Stran’.
69 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko.
70 Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 247, 499.
71 Samokhin, ‘Vozdushnaia oborona granits SSSR v nachiale 1950-kh godov’.
72 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko.
73 Samokhin, ‘Vozdushnaia oborona granits SSSR v nachiale 1950-kh godov’.
74 Krintisky (2005).
75 Volkov; ‘Govorov Leonid Aleksandrovich: Poslevoennyi Periud.’
76 Igor’ Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov (Minsk: Kharvest, 2003), 23–25; E. Arseneyev and L.Krylov, Istrebitel’ MIG-15 (Moscow: Armada, 1999).
77 YAK-15, MIG-15, MIG-15b, YAK-17b, MIG-17, MIG-17b, YAK-25, MIG-19 S.A. Bil’ko, V.V.Gindrankov, and T.IA. Kolpakov, ‘Rol’ istrebitel’noi aviatsii v stanovelnii I razvitii protivovozdushnoi oborony strany’, VM, no. 9, 2015; V.S. Mikhailov, ‘K 9- letiu VVS’, VIZh, no. 8, 2002, pp. 2–15.
78 Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko; Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 115–135; Zaloga (2002), p. 15.
79 Zaloga (2002), p. 19.
80 Leonov, chapter 2.
81 Still, by 1952, less than 30% of the forces had a sufficient number of radars, and several areas of the Soviet border were still uncovered. Bystrova,Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 242.
82 Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 48–49.
83 Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 248–252.
84 Volkov.
85 ‘Govorov Leonid Aleksandrovich: Poslevoennyi Periud.’
86 K.S. Alperovich, Rakety Vokrug Moskvy (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1995), p. 5.
87 Votintsev, ‘Neizvestnye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy’,; Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 242.
88 Evtif’ev, pp. 49.
89 Kisun’ko, Sekretnaia Zona, chapter 8.
90 G.V. Kisun’ko, Sekretnaia Zona (Moscow: Sovremmenik, 1996), chapter 8.
91 Kisun’ko, Sekretnaia Zona, chapter 8.
92 Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 242; Kisun’ko (1996), chapter 8; Alperovich, Rakety Vokrug Moskvy, 6; Anatolii Dokucahev, ‘Rasskazivaem vpervye: gordaia taina Almaza’, KZ, 12 September 1992.
93 Alperovich, Rakety Vokrug Moskvy, ; Chertok; Kisun’ko; G. Dyakonov and K. Kuznetsov, ‘Zenitnye upravliaemye rakety tretego reikha’, Tekhnika I Vooruzhenie 5–6 (1997), 11–23.
94 K.S. Alperovich, Gody Raboty nad Sistemoi PVO Moskvy (1950–1955): Zapiski Inzhenera (Moscow: Uniserv, 2003), 7–8.
95 M.D. Evtif’ev, Iz Istorii Sozdaniia Zenitno-Raketnogo Schita Rossii (Moscow: Vuzovskaia Kniga, 2000), 25–26.
96 Evtif’ev, pp. 45–47.
97 Chertok, vol. 1, chapter 4, pp. 231–232.
98 Boris Chertok, Rakety I Liudi (Moscow: Mashiostroenie, 1999), vol. 1, chapter 5, pp. 266–272; Evtif’ev, p. 45.
99 Chertok; Evtif’ev.
100 Evtif’ev, pp. 45–47.
101 Votintsev, ‘Neizvestnye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy’,; Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 242; Alperovich, Gody Raboty Nad Sistemoi PVO Moskvy (1950-1955): Zapiski Inzhenera, 15.
102 Kisun’ko, Sekretnaia Zona, chapter 8; Alperovich (2003), pp. 21–22; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko; Evtif’ev, p. 50.
103 Votintsev, ‘Neizvestnye voiska.’
104 Zaloga (2002), p. 19; Alperovich, Rakety Vokrug Moskvy, 11.
105 Kisun’ko, Sekretnaia Zona, chapter 8. Votintsev, ‘Neizvestnye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy’,; Alperovich, Rakety Vokrug Moskvy, 10–11; Alperovich, Gody Raboty Nad Sistemoi PVO Moskvy (1950-1955): Zapiski Inzhenera, 9–12.
106 Evtif’ev, p. 50; Alperovich, Gody Raboty Nad Sistemoi PVO Moskvy (1950-1955): Zapiski Inzhenera, 15; Alperovich, Rakety Vokrug Moskvy, 6, 10.
107 Alperovich, Gody Raboty Nad Sistemoi PVO Moskvy (1950-1955): Zapiski Inzhenera, 18. He was also influential in delicate situations when it came to preserving the Jewish scientists of his bureau from repression. The work on Berkut coincided with the peak of the anti-Semitic campaign, which resulted in massive firing of Jews from important positions. Alperovich, Gody Raboty Nad Sistemoi PVO Moskvy (1950-1955): Zapiski Inzhenera, 32–33; Evtif’ev, p. 48.
108 Kisun’ko, Sekretnaia Zona, chapter 8.
109 Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 243, 510.
110 Alperovich, Rakety Vokrug Moskvy, 6. For example, German and Russian teams working in parallel ended up with different design solutions. Alperovich (1995), pp. 29–31. Alperovich (2003), pp. 39, 53, 55, 57–71.
111 Alperovich, Gody Raboty Nad Sistemoi PVO Moskvy (1950-1955): Zapiski Inzhenera, 39, 53, 55, 57–71, 151.
112 Alperovich, Gody Raboty Nad Sistemoi PVO Moskvy (1950-1955): Zapiski Inzhenera, 71–123, 136, 142; Evtif’ev, pp. 52–53.
113 Alperovich, Gody Raboty Nad Sistemoi PVO Moskvy (1950-1955): Zapiski Inzhenera, 125; Alperovich, Rakety Vokrug Moskvy, 56.
114 Alperovich, Gody Raboty Nad Sistemoi PVO Moskvy (1950-1955): Zapiski Inzhenera, 144–148.
115 Votintsev (1993); Orlov, Tainaia Bitva Sverkhderzhav, chapter 2, part 2; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko; Alperovich, Gody Raboty Nad Sistemoi PVO Moskvy (1950-1955): Zapiski Inzhenera, 149; Leonov, chapter 2; Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 258; Volkov.
116 Orlov, Tainaia Bitva Sverkhderzhav, chapter 2, part 2; Evtif’ev, pp. 53–54; Sergei Ganin, Vladimir Korovin, Aleksandr Karpenko, Rostislav Angelskii, ‘Sistema 75’, Teknika I Vooruzhenie, nos. 10, 12, 2002 and nos. 1, 3, 4, 2003. Bystrova (2001), p. 514.
117 Alperovich, Rakety Vokrug Moskvy, 54–55.
118 Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 258.
119 Erokhin; Volkov; ‘Govorov Leonid Aleksandrovich: Poslevoennyi Periud;’Vladimir Iaroshenko, ‘Osnova Ognevoi Moschi’, VKO, 10 February 2013; Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 258–259; Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 138–144.
120 Zaloga (2002), pp. 19–27.
121 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko.
122 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko; ‘Govorov Leonid Aleksandrovich: Poslevoennyi.’
123 Cheltsov.
124 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko.
125 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko; Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 253–254.
126 Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko.Nikolai Simonov, Voenno Promyshlennyi Kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950e gody (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 257–263. Grigorii Lazun, ‘TsOK RTV’, VKO, 15 February 2013. Still, the significant lag in the field of radiolocation resulted in the systematic failures to countermeasure air threats in the Soviet Union and in Korea. Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 244–247.
127 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko; Krinitsky, ‘Protivovozdushnaia oborona: otechestvennyi opyt reorganizatsii I sovremennost’’, .
128 Krinitsky, ‘Protivovozdushnaia oborona: otechestvennyi opyt reorganizatsii I sovremennost’’, . Although the PVO service enjoyed an almost twenty year-long ‘Golden Era’, it abruptly ended in 1978 when the Chief of the GS Ogarkov reassigned almost half of the PVO Strany assets back to the MDs. Volter Krasovsky, ‘Krestnyi Otets Sovietskoi PVO’, NVO, 30 June 2000.
129 Erokhin; Zaretsky, Alekhin and Kutsenko; Cheltsov.
130 Aleksei Frolov, ‘O Sluzhbe Tyla’, VKO, 13 February 2013.
131 In the second half of the 1950 s, when the PVO Strany reached its maximum dominance in the inter-service struggles, they ensured that the PVO of the GF lacked a modern C2 system, resulting in its very low functioning and effectiveness. The PVO of the GF bombarded Khrushchev with complaints that the PVO Strany had usurped all state-of-the-art C2 systems and forces to itself. In parallel, the IA still refused to concede defeat, for in 1959 it started to equip itself with modern radars and air-to-air rockets. Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 256–261, 269.
132 I.V. Bystrova and G.E. Riabov, ‘Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR’, in Iu.N. Afanas’ev, Sovetskoe Obschestvo: Vozniknovenie, Razvitie, Istoricheskii Final (Moscow: RGU, 1997), pp. 150–208.
133 Chertok, vol. 1, chapter 4, pp. 226–228.
134 Still, family blat was not an ultimate weapon that could force opponents to capitulate in the inter-service rivalries. Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 262, 501–504; Kisun’ko.
135 Pavel Suduplatov, Spetsoperatsii (Moscow: Olma Press, 1997), chapter 7.
136 Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 493.
137 Baluevsky, 16–17.
138 A.P. Skotnikov, A.B. Ruchkin, E.S. Klimovich, ‘Ot vidovykh semeistv ZRS S-300 k edinoi sisteme zenitnogo oruzhiia’, VM, no.10, 2007. The authors, colonels, two on active duty and one retired, serve in the 2nd TsNII.
139 For a relatively long time there were two parallel channels of procurement of weaponry – the Main Armaments Directorate of the PVO and Main Artillery Directorate of the MoD. One worked for the interests of the PVO Strany and the other for the interests of the AD of the Ground Forces. The AD of the Navy based its procurement on both of the above.
140 Skotnikov, Ruchkin, and Klimovich; Editorial, ‘General’nyi Zakazchik Vooruzheniia: general’nomu zakazchiky vooruzheniia PVO 50 let’, VKO, 21 February 2013.
141 Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 10, 17; Zaloga (2002), p. 4; Bystrova (2001), p. 504.
142 Zaloga, (2002), p. VI, p. 19.
143 Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 269–270.
144 Adamsky (2010).
145 Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 18, 57.
146 During the war non-combat losses of the Soviet AF accounted for more than 50% of the overall losses. After the war, accusations regarding the low quality and backwardness of Soviet aviation, specifically the systematic transfer to the AF of deficient airplanes and concealment of the defects in weapons quality, were one of the drivers of the ‘Aviators Trial’ in 1946. Drogovoz, Vozdushnii Schit Strany Sovietov, 57–59, 70.
147 Bystrova, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Komplex SSSR v gody Kholodnoi Voiny, 487–489, 493.
148 For example, see: Colin Grey, ‘Strategic Culture as Context’, Review of International Studies 25/1 (January 1999); Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture (Fort Belvoir VA: DTRA, 2006); Jeffrey Lantis and Darryl Howlett, ‘Strategic Culture ’, in John Baylis, James Wirtz and Colin Grey (eds .), Strategy in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2016).
149 For example, Stalin’s diminution of the role of nuclear-missile capabilities was aimed at concealing his mega efforts in exactly these fields.
150 For instance, due to the unique nature of Soviet postwar civil-military relations, the military was completely unaware of the strategic orientation and force buildup driven by the leadership, and thus did not reflect them at all in its doctrinal-theoretical discussions. The seeming stagnation of military thought did not reflect the advanced thinking of the senior political leadership on the subject.
151 Krepinevich and Martinage, Dissuasion Strategy, 15–16.
152 For a detailed discussion, see Rosen in Mahnken.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky
Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky is a Professor at the School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at the IDC Herzliya University, Herzliya, Israel, and a Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Politics and Diplomacy at the Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. His research interests include international security, cultural approach to IR, and American, Russian and Israeli national security policies. He has published on these topics in Foreign Affairs, Security Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, Intelligence and National Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Washington Quarterly and Survival. His books Operation Kavkaz and The Culture of Military Innovation (Stanford UP) earned the annual (2006 and 2012) prizes for the best academic works on Israeli security. His book Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy (Stanford UP) won the 2020 ISA best book award in the category of Religion and IR.