Russia’s strategy towards the Nordic region: Tracing continuity and change

ABSTRACT

Since Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014, debates about its behaviour and intentions have increased significantly in the West. This article examines Russia’s strategic interests in its historically peaceful Nordic neighbourhood. It identifies and applies the classic strategy terms ends, ways and means in a 100-year perspective and asks if Russia’s military and political goals in the Nordic region have changed after 2014. Despite increased tensions and a more aggressive Russian rhetoric and behaviour, Russian strategic goals in the region are characterised by an evolving continuity and a reluctant acceptance of the current military-political status quo.

KEYWORDS:

• Northern Europe
• Russia
• security policy
• NATO
• strategy
• the Baltic Sea
• the Barents Sea

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

¹ See for example Taras Kuzio and Paul D’Anieri, The Sources of Russia’s Great Power Politics: Ukraine and the Challenge to the European Order, (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing 2018); Robert Legvold, ‘Managing the New Cold War: What Moscow and Washington Can Learn From the Last One’, Foreign Affairs 93/4 (July/August 2014); Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, ‘Consequences of a New Cold War’, Survival 57/2 (2015).

² See Robert Legvold, Russian Foreign Policy in the 21^st Century & the Shadow of the Past, (Columbia: Columbia University Press 2007): 3, 10; Washington Post, ‘Mr. Putin might actually believe his own Ukraine propaganda’, 4 Marc. 2014. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mr-putin-might-actually-believe-his-own-ukraine-propaganda/>, Politico, ‘Is Putin Having a Brezhnev Moment?’ 11 Marc. 2014. <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putin-brezhnev-moment-crimea>; Tikhon Dzyadko, ‘Putin Doesn’t Know What He Wants In Ukraine’, The New Republic, 3 Marc. 2014. <https://newrepublic.com/article/116833/putin-doesnt-know-what-he-wants-ukraine>.

³ Kristian Åtland, ‘North European security after the Ukraine conflict’, Defense & Security Analysis 32/2 (2016), 163; Julia Gurganus & Eugene Rumer, ‘Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working paper (February 2019).

⁴ See Ekaterina Klimenko, ‘Russia’s new Arctic policy document signals continuity rather than change’, SIPRI, 6 Apri. 2020; Keir Giles, Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West (New York: Brookings Inst. Press/Chatham House 2020).

⁵ This is an interpretive case study. The approach is mainly qualitative due to the nature of the data collection and the qualitative reading and presentation of the empirical material. In phase one of the data collection, the author identified three inclusion criteria for relevant search words and results. The words used included basic search words, e.g., Russia (Rossiya) and security (bezopasnost) (used in all searches) and specific search words, e.g., ‘the Nordic region’ (Severny region), ‘the Baltic region’ (Baltiyskiy region) (used individually or in combination with basic search words). The key words were applied in relevant databases. Phase one allowed for a more focused second search phase, honing in on specific actors, incidents, military activities etc. The empirical data were read and organised in a systematic manner, by time (2012–2019) and relevance with regards to the categories ends, ways and means. Please contact the author for access to complete step-by-step collection process.

⁶ Lawrence Freedman, Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press 2013), xi, 592.

⁷ Sverre Diesen, ‘Forord’, in Sverre Diesen (ed.), Strategi: mellom vitenskap, intuisjon ogetikk (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 2012), 7.

⁸ John K. Skogan, ‘Sikkerhetspolitikk: mål, utfordringer og virkemidler’, in Jon Hovi and Raino Malnes (eds.), Normer og makt: Innføring i internasjonal politikk (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag 2011), 102–103; Dmitry Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy’, Institut français des relations internationals, Proliferation Papers 54 (2015).

⁹ Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Crimea and Russia’s strategic overhaul’, Parameters, 44/4 (2014).

¹⁰ As compared to earlier decades where strategy to a larger degree served the purpose of winning wars, Kersti Larsdotter, ‘Military Strategy in the 21^st century’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42/2 (2019), 156.

¹¹ Stephen J. Flanagan, Jan Osburg, Anika Binnendijk, Marta Kepe and Andrew Radin, Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance, Rand Corporation, Research Report 2779-OSD (2019), 5.

¹² See Presidential Decree, ‘O voyenno-administrativnom delenii Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, 5 Jun. 2020. <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/>.

¹³ Joakim Erma Møller and Magnus Petersson, ‘Sweden, Finland, and the Defence of the Nordic-Baltic Region – Ways of British Leadership’, in Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions and Partnerships (Switzerland: Palgrave McMillan 2019), 222, 230–233.

¹⁴ Empirical evidence supporting the argument of continuity is possible to trace back even further in time as suggested by Martin Kragh (2018) in his article on Swedish relations with Russia. See Martin Kragh, ‘Sveriges relationer med Ryssland: kontinuitet och förändring historiskt och i dag’, Nordiskt Østforum 32 (2018), 54–74.

¹⁵ Peter Pomerantsev, This is Not Propaganda. Adventures in the War Against Reality (London: Faber and Faber 2019), 66, 68–69.

¹⁶ Martin Kragh, Erik Andermo and Liliia Makashova, ‘Conspiracy theories in Russian security thinking’, Journal of Strategic Studies (2020), 27–28.

¹⁷ Sven Holtsmark, ‘Enemy springboard or benevolent buffer? Soviet attitudes to Nordic cooperation, 1920–1955, Forsvarsstudier 6/92 (1992), 5; Örjan Berner, Soviet Policies Toward the Nordic Countries (Harvard: University Press of America 1986), 2–3,36, 46, 62, 73.

¹⁸ Sven Holtsmark, ‘Enemy springboard or benevolent buffer? Soviet attitudes to Nordic cooperation, 1920–1955, 63,74; Joakim Erma Møller and Magnus Petersson, ‘Sweden, Finland, and the Defence of the Nordic-Baltic Region-Ways of British Leadership’, 215–216

¹⁹ Robert German, ‘Norway and the Bear: Soviet Coercive Diplomacy and Norwegian Security Policy’, 74–76.

²⁰ Sven Holtsmark, ‘Enemy springboard or benevolent buffer? Soviet attitudes to Nordic cooperation, 1920–1955, 5, 33–34

²¹ Ingmar Oldberg, ‘Kaliningrad’s difficult plights between Moscow and Europe, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, UI Paper 2 (2015), 7

²² Jakub M. Godzimirski, ‘Soviet Legacy and Baltic Security: The Case of Kaliningrad’, in Olav F. Knudsen (ed.), Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region (London: Frank Cass Publisher 1999), 31.

²³ See Norman M. Naimark, Stalin and the Fate of Europe (Massachusetts: Belknap Press 2019).

²⁴ Ann-Sofie Dahl, ‘Security in the Nordic-Baltic region: from Cold War to a unipolar world’, in Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää (eds.), Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a post-unipolar world (New York: Routledge 2014), 70.

²⁵ Robert German, ‘Norway and the Bear: Soviet Coercive Diplomacy and Norwegian Security Policy’, 70–71.

²⁶ Ibid, 76.

²⁷ Örjan Berner, Soviet Policies Toward the Nordic Countries, 2–3, 5, 182, 185; Ann-Sofie Dahl, ‘Security in the Nordic-Baltic region: from Cold War to a unipolar world’, 69.

²⁸ Although NATO was not mentioned directly in Russia’s 2000 Military Doctrine, NATOs enlargement was mentioned in the 2000 National Security Concept, see President of Russia, ‘Ob utverzhdenii Voyennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, 21 Apri. 2000. <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/15386>; Russian MFA, ‘National Security Concept of the Russian Federation’, 10 Janu. 2000. <www.mid.ru>.

²⁹ Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (London: Rowman & Littlefield 2016), 57; Ingmar Oldberg, ‘Is Russia a status quo power?’, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, UI Paper 1 (2016), 5, 17–18, 72.

³⁰ Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russian Policies toward the Nordic-Baltic Region’, Carnegie Moscow Center, 7 Sept. 2011. <https://carnegie.ru/2011/09/07/russian-policies-toward-nordic-baltic-region-pub-45788>; Julie Wilhelmsen, ‘The Dynamics of Russian Foreign Policy’, in Russia and the Nordic Countries: The Past, the Present, and Future, Conference Series (Lysebu and Voksenåsen: Skyline: 2015), 11.

³¹ Vladimir Putin was appointed Acting President on 31 December 1999. He won his first presidential election in March 2000 and was Prime Minister before being appointed Acting President, see President of Russia, ‘Biografii prezidentov Rossi’, 2021, <http://www.kremlin.ru/structure/president/presidents>

³² Katarzyna Zysk, ‘Managing military change in Russia’ in Jo Inge Bekkevold, Ian Bowers and Michael Raska (eds.), Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st Century: Cross-regional perspectives (New York: Routledge 2015), 90.

³³ Carolina Vendil Pallin, ‘Ryssland och Norden’, Nordisk tidskrift 85/2 (2009), 120–121; Thomas F. Remington, Politics in Russia (Boston: Longman 2012), 258.

³⁴ Carolina Vendil Pallin, ‘Ryssland och Norden’, 121–122; Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russian Policies toward the Nordic-Baltic Region’, 47.

³⁵ Voennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Military Doctrine), Ministry of Defence, 25 Dece. 2000. <http://www.kremlin.ru>; Kontseptsiya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (National Security Concept), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 Janu. 2000. <www.mid.ru>; Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Foreign Policy Concept), President of Russia, 12 Janu. 2008. <kremlin.ru>; Strategiya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii na period do 2020 goda (National Security Strategy), Security Council of the Russian Federation, 12 May 2009. <www.scrf.gov>.

³⁶ Russian MFA, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, Moscow, April, 28, 2016ʹ, 28 April 2016, <www.mid.ru>; Vladimir Putin, ‘Russia and the changing world’, Russkiy Mir Foundation, 27 February 2012, <https://www.russkiymir.ru/en/publications/139,698/>.

³⁷ Pavel Baev, ‘Russia’s Arctic aspirations’, in Juha Jokela (ed.), ‘Arctic security Matters’, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 24 (2015), 54.

³⁸ David Cenciotti, ‘Russian Tu-22 M Backfire bombers escorted by Su-27 Flankers simulate night attack on Sweden’, The Aviationist, 22 Apri. 2013. <https://theaviationist.com/2013/04/22/backfire-sweden/>; Katarina Tracz, Fredens hav? Ökade spänningar kring Östersjön (Stockholm: Frivärld 2015), 31–32.

³⁹ Russian MFA, ‘Vystuplenie Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova na tretey ministerskoy vstreche «Severnogo izmereniya», Bryussel’, 18 fevralya 2013 goda’, 18 Febr. 2013. <https://www.mid.ru/severnoe-izmerenie/-asset_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/122,018>; Katri Pynnöniemi, ‘Russia and the Nordic region: challenges and prospects for cooperation between the EU and Russia’, Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique Note 29/13 (2013), 7; Reuters, ‘NATO expansion in Nordics would force Russian response: Medvedev’, 4 Jun. 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-idUSBRE9530UH20130604>.

⁴⁰ Katri Pynnöniemi, ‘Russia and the Nordic region: challenges and prospects for cooperation between the EU and Russia’, 1.

⁴¹ David A. Baldwin, Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2016).

⁴² Stephen R. Covington, The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia’s Modern Approaches to Warfare (Cambridge: Belfer Center 2016), 13–14.

⁴³ Valery Gerasimov, ‘Vektory Razvitiya Voennoi Strategii’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 Marc. 2019. <http://redstar.ru/vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/>.

⁴⁴ For access to Russia’s Foreign Policy Reviews 2012–2018 (Vneshnepoliticheskaya i diplomaticheskaya dejatelnost Rossiyskoy Federacii), visit Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <https://www.mid.ru/activity/review>; Reuters, ‘EU agrees to extend economic sanctions on Russia until 2020ʹ, 20 June 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-summit-russia-ukraine/eu-agrees-to-extend-economic-sanctions-on-russia-until-2020-idUSKCN1TL1I4>.

⁴⁵ Russian MFA, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s greetings to the international conference Historical Past and Future Outlook for Russia and the Nordic Countries”, 23 June 2016. <https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2327213>.

⁴⁶ Ekaterina Klimenko, ‘Russia’s Arctic Security Policy: Still quiet in the High North?’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Policy Paper 45 (2016); High North News, ‘Putin: – No room for geopolitical games in the Arctic”, 2 Sept. 2016. <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/putin-no-room-geopolitical-games-arctic>.

⁴⁷ Russian MFA, ‘Remarks by First Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov at a ministerial session of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Reykjavik, 20 June 2017ʹ, 22 June 2017. <https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2,794,141>.

⁴⁸ Corriere della Sera, ‘Vladimir Putin, interview to the Italian newspaper “Il Corriere della Sera”’, 7 June 2015. <http://www.corriere.it/english/15_giugno_07/vladimir-putin-interview-to-the-italian-newspaper-corriere-sera-44c5a66c-0d12-11e5-8612-1eda5b996824.shtml>; Ilta-Sanomat, Venäjän uusi Suomen-suurlähettiläs IS:lle: Suomen Nato-jäsenyys johtaisi vastatoimiin’, 7 July 2017. <https://www.is.fi/kotimaa/art-2000005398069.html>; Verdens Gang, ‘Eksklusivt VG-intervju: Slik tenker Russland nå’, 10 Octo. 2014. <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/russland/eksklusivt-vg-intervju-slik-tenker-russland-naa/a/23322511/>.

⁴⁹ Russian MFA, ‘Intervyu zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii A. Yu. Meshkova agentstvu «Interfaks», 1 dekabrya 2014 goda’, 1 Dece. 2014. <https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/802,105>; Russian MFA, ‘Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Second European Department Sergey Belyaev’s interview with Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency, November 18ʹ.

⁵⁰ Strategiya natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (National Security Strategy), President of Russia, 31 Dece. 2015. <www.kremlin.ru>; RT, ‘Russia to boost military capabilities in Crimea, Kaliningrad, Arctic’, 14 Janu. 2015. <http://on.rt.com/s3s9wg>; TASS, ‘Lavrov: There are no threats in Baltic region that would justify its militarization’, 8 June 2016. <http://tass.com/politics/880304>; RT, ‘“Our build-up is defensive, Russia’s aggressive,” says NATO after Putin’s remark – but is that fair?’, 22 Augu. 2018, <https://www.rt.com/news/436617-nato-russia-military-buildup/>.

⁵¹ Russian MFA, ‘Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexandr Lukashevich, March 26th, 2015ʹ, 26 Marc. 2015. <https://www.mid.ru/en/brifingi/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/1,115,451>, RT, ‘Russia to retaliate if US expands its near-border radar facility in Norway – Foreign Ministry’, 23 May 2019. <https://www.rt.com/news/460106-russia-us-norway-radar/>.

⁵² Polina Sinovets, ‘From Stalin to Putin: Russian Strategic Culture in the XXI Century, Its Continuity, and Change”, Philosophy Study 6/7 (2016), 419.

⁵³ There are other categories also used by Russia in the Nordic region, such as the cyber domain. This is not covered in depth here.

⁵⁴ Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Foreign Policy Concept), President of Russia, 30 Nove. 2016. <www.kremlin.ru>; Dmitry Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy’, 24, 27; Keir Giles, ‘Russia’s “New” Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power’, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Research Paper (2016), 33, 35.

⁵⁵ Dmitry Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy’, 36.

⁵⁶ Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2020), 316.

⁵⁷ Johan Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis (London: Macmillan 1996), 4.

⁵⁸ Mark Galeotti, ‘Russian Political War: Moving Beyond The Hybrid’, RUSI, video presentation, 20 Febr. 2019. <https://rusi.org/event/russian-political-war-moving-beyond-hybrid>.

⁵⁹ An example is the plenary session of the International Arctic Forum in St. Petersburg on 9 April 2019, and the side-line meetings between President Putin and the Nordic heads of state (Denmark was represented thought he Minister of Foreign Affairs), President of Russia, ‘Plenary session of the International Arctic Forum’, 9 Apri. 2019, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60250>.

⁶⁰ Vneshnepoliticheskaya i diplomaticheskaya deyatelnost Rossiyskoy Federacii v 2014 godu (Foreign Policy Review 2014), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Apr. 2015, <www.mid.ru>.

⁶¹ See for example Jyllands-Posten, ‘Regeringen vil genåbne dialog med Rusland, 20 Augu. 2015. <https://jyllands-posten.dk/indland/ECE7952252/Regeringen-vil-gen%C3%A5bne-dialog-med-Rusland/>; Russian MFA, ‘O besede Ministra inostrannyh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova s Ministrom inostrannyh del Danii K. Jensenom’, 1 Marc. 2016, <https://www.mid.ru/et/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2123388>; Russian MFA, ‘Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s meeting with Foreign Minister of Denmark Jeppe Kofod’, 26 Sept. 2019, <https://www.mid.ru/en/maps/dk/-/asset_publisher/i3xwSJUHWfvA/content/id/3811032>.

⁶² See for example Russian MFA, ‘Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s telephone conversation with Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallstrom’, 6 Febr. 2018, <https://www.mid.ru/en/maps/se/-/asset_publisher/Nr26tJIotl7z/content/id/3,057,908>.

⁶³ Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors (Thousand Oaks, Sage Publicaions Inc. 2014), 273–274; Vneshnepoliticheskaya i diplomaticheskaya deyatelnost Rossiyskoy Federacii v 2014 godu, 87.

⁶⁴ RIA Novosti, ‘Rossiya i Shvetsiya podpisali deklaratsiyu o partnerstve, 27 Apri. 2011. <https://ria.ru/economy/20110427/368724733.html>.

⁶⁵ Russian MFA, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions during a joint news conference following talks with Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Margot Wallström, Moscow’, 21 Febr. 2017, <https://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/2654869>; President of Russia, ‘Meeting with Prime Minister of Sweden Stefan Löfven’, 9 Apri. 2019, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60,254>.

⁶⁶ Russian MFA, ‘O besede pervogo zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii V. G. Titova s Ministrom inostrannykh del Norvegii B. Brende i konsultatsiyakh so stats- sekretarem MID Norvegii T. Khattremom’, 12. Aug. 2015. <http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1,845,126>; President of Russia, ‘Meeting with Prime Minister of Norway Erna Solberg’, 9 Apri. 2019. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60253>; Russian MFA, ‘Comment by the Information and Press Department on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Norway’, 24 Octo. 2019, <https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/rso//asset_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/3,861,295>.

⁶⁷ Russian MFA, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at a joint news conference with Foreign Minister of Iceland Gudlaugur Thor Thordarson, Moscow’, 26 Nove. 2019. <https://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches//asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/3,919,554>.

⁶⁸ See for example Russian MFA, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions during a joint news conference following talks with Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Margot Wallström, Moscow’; Russian MFA, ‘Comment by the Information and Press Department on a working visit by Foreign Minister of Iceland Gudlaugur Thor Thordarson’, 25 Nove. 2019, <https://www.mid.ru/en/maps/is/-/asset_publisher/ZlfplZf8n22q/content/id/3,913,818>.

⁶⁹ See for example The Barents Observer, ‘Quest for Nordic-Russian reload’, 15 Oct. 2015, <http://barentsobserver.com/en/politics/2015/10/quest-nordic-russian-reload-15-10>; The Barents Observer, ‘Cautious towards Russian invitation’, 18 Augu. 2016. <http://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2016/08/cautious-towards-russian-invitation>.

⁷⁰ Yle, ‘Tabloid: Supo suspects Russia of buying up Finnish property for military personnel’, 1 Nove. 2016. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/tabloid_supo_suspects_russia_of_buying_up_finnish_property_for_military_personnel/9,266,358>.

⁷¹ See for example Patrik Oksanen, ‘Follow the Money and End up in Real Estate in Strategic Areas’, Frivärld, briefing nr. 1 (2020).

⁷² See for example Iceland Monitor, ‘Report tried to “re-awaken Russian scare”’, 26 Sept. 2016. <http://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/news/2016/09/26/report_tries_to_re_awaken_russian_scare/>; RT, ‘And again not the Russians: Mystery vessel in Swedish waters wasn’t “foreign sub”, military says’, 7 Nove. 2018. <https://www.rt.com/news/443367-sweden-not-foreign-submarine/>; Russian MFA, ‘Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow’, 3 Octo. 2019. <https://www.mid.ru/en/brifingi/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/3,830,068>.

⁷³ See for example Yle, ‘Russian child ombudsman: Finland engaging in “juvenile terror”’, 15 Nove. 2014. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/russian_child_ombudsman_finland_engaging_in_juvenile_terror/7,631,016>; Daniel Boffey, ‘Europe’s new cold war turns digital as Vladimir Putin expands media offensive’, The Guardian, 5 Marc. 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/05/europe-vladimir-putin-russia-social-media-trolls>.

⁷⁴ See for example Russian MFA, ‘Comment by the Foreign Ministry on an article by the ministers of the Nordic countries in the newspaper Aftenposten’, 12. Apr. 2015. <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/>; Dagens Nyheter, ‘Ryska ambassadören: Sämre svensk-ryska relationer än under u-båtsjakten på 1980-talet’, 1 Octo. 2016. <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/ryska-ambassadoren-samre-svensk-ryska-relationer-an-under-u-batsjakten-pa-1980-talet/>; TASS, ‘Russian Foreign Ministry responds to Swedish general’s criticism’, 8 Sept. 2016. <http://tass.com/politics/898754>. Berlingske, ‘Rusland kritiserer Claus Hjort for »uvenlig« retorik’, 12 Okt. 2017. <https://www.berlingske.dk/internationalt/rusland-kritiserer-claus-hjort-for-uvenlig-retorik>.

⁷⁵ See for example Corriere della Sera, ‘Vladimir Putin, interview to the Italian newspaper “Il Corriere della Sera”’, President of Russia, ‘Press statements and answers to journalists’, questions following Russian-Finnish talks’, 1 July 2016. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52,312>; Russian MFA, ‘Otvet ofitsialnogo predstavitelya MID Rossii M.V. Zakharovoy na vopros informatsionnogo agentstva TASS o narashchivanii voyennogo prisutstviya NATO v severnoy Norvegii’, 2 Octo. 2018. <https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3,365,510>.

⁷⁶ Rossiyskaya Gazeta, ‘V Minoborony nazvali “lichnoy fantaziey” zayavlenye MID Islandii’, 27 Sept. 2016. <https://rg.ru/2016/09/27/minoborony-soobshcheniia-ob-opasnom-Sblizhenii-samoletov-plod-fantazii.html>; Berlingske, ‘Ambassadør: Lad være med at provokere den russiske bjørn’, 16 Dece. 2014. <http://www.b.dk/globalt/ambassadoer-lad-vaere-med-at-provokere-den-russiske-bjoern>; Russan MFA, ‘Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Lukashevich on Norway’s response to Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin’s visit to Svalbard archipelago’, 20 Apri. 2015. <https://www.mid.ru/en/posledniye_dobavlnenniye/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/1,189,235>. See also Jylland-Posten, ‘Danmark og missilforsvaret: Helliger målet midlet?’, 20 Marc. 2015. <http://jyllands-posten.dk/debat/breve/ECE7573006/Danmark-og-missilforsvaret-Helliger-m%C3%A5let-midlet/>; Dagens Nyheter, ‘Ryska ambassadören: Sämre svensk-ryska relationer än under u-båtsjakten på 1980-talet’; Ilta-Sanomat, ‘Venäjän uusi Suomen-suurlähettiläs IS:lle: Suomen Nato-jäsenyys johtaisi vastatoimiin’.

⁷⁷ See for example Russian MFA, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s comments and answers to media questions during the joint news conference following talks with Foreign Minister of the Republic of Finland Timo Soini, Moscow’, 12 Febr. 2019. <https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/3,513,560>.

⁷⁸ See for example Dagens Nyheter, ‘Man kan inte behandla oss som småbarn’, 15 June 2014. <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/man-kan-inte-behandla-oss-som-smabarn/>; TASS, ‘Lavrov: There are no threats in Baltic region that would justify its militarization’

⁷⁹ Jylland-Posten, ‘Danmark og missilforsvaret: Helliger målet midlet?’.

⁸⁰ Robert German, ‘Norway and the Bear: Soviet Coercive Diplomacy and Norwegian Security Policy’, 62.

⁸¹ Dagbladet, ‘Putins advarsel til Norge: – Kan få katastrofale følger for sikkerheten’ 9 Marc. 2017. <https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/putins-advarsel-til-norge—kan-fa-katastrofale-folger-for-sikkerheten/67,373,618>; Sputnik News, ‘Norway Risks Facing “Russian Military Power” if It Joins NATO Missile Network’, 19 Marc. 2017. <https://sputniknews.com/europe/201703191051738758-norway-nato-missile-defense-system/>.

⁸² Russian MFA, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova’s answer to a question from Norway’s NRK broadcasting corporation on plans to deploy US marines in Norway’, 28 Octo. 2016. <https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/no/-/asset_publisher/f4MKo6byouc4/content/id/2,508,717>; Russian MFA, ‘Comment by the Information and Press Department on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Norway’.

⁸³ Robert German, ‘Soviet Coercive Diplomacy and Norwegian Security Policy’, 2019: 62. See also RT, ‘Russia to retaliate if US expands its near-border radar facility in Norway – Foreign Ministry’.

⁸⁴ Jylland-Posten, ‘Danmark og missilforsvaret: Helliger målet midlet?’; Russian MFA, ‘Kommentariy MID Rossii v svyazi s zayavleniem predstavitelya shvedskikh vooruzhennykh sil, 13 Apri. 2015. <http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/se//asset_publisher/Nr26tJIotl7z/content/id/1160367>.

⁸⁵ Russian MFA, ‘Comment by the Foreign Ministry on an article by the ministers of the Nordic countries in the newspaper Aftenposten’; RIA Novosti, ‘Ministr oborony Shvetsii otvetil na slova Shoigu o sotrudnichestve s NATO’, 3 Augu. 2018. <https://ria.ru/20180803/1525889046.html>.

⁸⁶ President of Russia, ‘Press statements and answers to journalists’, questions following Russian-Finnish talks’; Russian MFA, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, Moscow’; RT, ‘Russia to boost military force if Sweden allies with NATO – senator’, 29 Apri. 2016. <http://on.rt.com/7bde>.

⁸⁷ Reuters, ‘Russia beefs up Baltic Fleet amid NATO tensions: report’, 26 Octo. 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-defence-baltic-sweden-idUSKCN12Q1HB>; RIA Novosti, ‘Senator: Rossiya razrabatyvaet novye rakety, neuyazvimye dlya sistem PRO NATO’ 29 Apri. 2016. <https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20160429/1422966940.html>; Reuters, ‘Russia deploys Iskander nuclear-capable missiles to Kaliningrad: RIA’, 5 Febr. 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-missiles/russia-deploys-iskander-nuclear-capable-missiles-to-kaliningrad-ria-idUSKBN1FP21Y>; President of Russia, Soveshchaniye s rukovodstvom Minoborony i predpriyatiy OPK’, 3 Dece. 2019. <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62,228>.

⁸⁸ NATO, ‘Press conference by the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, for the launch of the Annual Report 2014, NATO HQ, Brussels’, 30 Janu. 2015. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117022.htm>; Lukasz Kulesa and Denitsa Raynova, ‘Russia-West Incidents in the Air and at Sea 2016–2017: Out of the Danger Zone?’, European Leadership Network, Report (2018).

⁸⁹ For examples and an overview of incidents collected from open sources, see Attachment 1 (at the end of this article).

⁹⁰ Susanne Oxenstierna and Fredrik Westerlund (eds.), ‘Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2019, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Report FOI-R–4758 – SE (2019), 39, 66.

⁹¹ Fredrik Westerlund, ‘Russia’s Military Strategy and Force Structure in Kaliningrad’, RUFS Briefing No. 40 (2017).

⁹² Svenska Yle, ‘Ökat nordiskt säkerhetssamarbete i Östersjön’, 4 May 2017. <https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2017/05/04/okat-nordiskt-sakerhetssamarbete-i-ostersjon>.

⁹³ Berlingske, ‘Danske F-16-kampfly rykker ud til flere ubudne gæster’, 28 Nove. 2019. <https://www.berlingske.dk/danmark/danske-f-16-kampfly-rykker-ud-til-flere-ubudne-gaester>.

⁹⁴ NRK, ‘Har ikke identifisert flere russiske fly siden den kalde krigen’, 12 Janu. 2019. <https://www.nrk.no/nordland/har-ikke-identifisert-flere-russiske-fly-siden-den-kalde-krigen-1.14375463>.

⁹⁵ The Barents Observer, ‘NATO: Russian submarine activity equals Cold War levels’, 3 Febr. 2016, <https://thebarentsobserver.com/ru/node/396>; Politico, ‘Russian submarine activity “highest since Cold War” warns NATO chief’, 23 Dece. 2019, <https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-submarine-activity-highest-since-cold-war-warns-nato-chief/>.

⁹⁶ Katarzyna Zysk, ‘The new normal: Russia to increase northern European naval Operations’, IHS Jane’s Navy International, 2016, <www.janes.com> [Accessed through author]; Klassekampen, ‘Styrkeoppvisning i nord’, 15 Augu. 2019. <https://www.klassekampen.no/article/20190815/ARTICLE/190,819,977>; President of Russia, ‘Russian Federation Marine Doctrine’, 26 July 2015 <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50060>.

⁹⁷ Ihor Kabanenko and Kristian Åtland, ‘Russia and its Western Neighbours: a Comparative Study of the Security Situation in the Black, Baltic and Barents Sea Regions’, Europe-Asia Studies, (2019), 18, 20. DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2019.1690634.

⁹⁸ Kathleen H. Hicks (ed.), ‘Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe’, Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, Report (2016), 2.

⁹⁹ Susanne Oxenstierna and Fredrik Westerlund (eds.), ‘Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2019ʹ, 40, 44.

¹⁰⁰ Kathleen H. Hicks (ed.), ‘Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe’, 3–4. See also the famous Cold War incident ‘Whiskey on the Rocks’, named after a Soviet Whiskey-class submarine stranded inside Swedish territorial waters, Gordon H. McCormick, ‘Stranger than Fiction: Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters’, RAND Corporation, R-3776-AF (1990), 4–9.

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Russian MFA, ‘Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexandr Lukashevich, March 26th, 2015ʹ; RT, ‘And again not the Russians: Mystery vessel in Swedish waters wasn’t “foreign sub”, military says’.

¹⁰² Russian MFA, ‘Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow, 22 February 2017ʹ, 22 Febr. 2017. <https://www.mid.ru/en/brifingi/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/3,540,526>.

¹⁰³ The Barents Observer, ‘Russian bombers simulated an attack against this radar on Norway’s Barents Sea coast’, 5 Marc. 2018. <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/03/russian-bombers-simulated-attack-against-radar-norways-barents-sea-coast>; The Barents Observer, ‘Two Kalibr cruise missiles test fired from Barents Sea in last few days’, 8 Dece. 2018. <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/12/two-kalibr-cruise-missiles-test-fired-barents-sea-last-few-days>; Reuters, ‘Russia deploys Iskander nuclear-capable missiles to Kaliningrad: RIA’.

¹⁰⁴ Voennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Military Doctrine), Ministry of Defence, 25 Dece. 2014. <http://www.scrf.gov.ru>;.BBC, ‘Chto nuzhno, chtoby rossiyane perestali schitat Zapad vragom?’, 15 Octo. 2015. <https://www.bbc.com/russian/society/2015/10/151014_qd_russia_west_views>; RIA Novosti, ‘Putin nazval rasshireniye NATO potentsialnoy ugrozoy’, 3 Dece. 2019. <https://ria.ru/20191203/1561916284.html>.

¹⁰⁵ See for example, The Business Insider, ‘Russian defense minister explains why the Kremlin is militarizing the Arctic’, 26 Febr. 2015. <http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-kremlin-is-militarizing-the-arctic-2015-2?r=US&IR=T&IR=T>; Russian MoD, ‘Russian Minister of Defence General of the Army Sergei Shoigu held another session of the Board of the military department’, 29 June 2016. <http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12088799@egNews>; Gazeta.ru, ‘Masshtabniy konflikt: v Genshtabe rasskazali o podgotovke NATO k voyne’, 12 Dece. 2019. <https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2019/12/18/12871460.shtml>.

¹⁰⁶ Johan Norberg, ‘Training to Fight – Russia’s Major Military Exercises 2011–2014ʹ, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Report FOI-R-4128-SE (2015), 5, 24; RIA Novosti, ‘Minoborony RF prodolzhit vnezapnye proverki boegotovnosti, 18 Febr. 2015, <https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20,150,218/1,048,340,060.html>.

¹⁰⁷ Anna Maria Dyner, ‘Russian Military Exercises: A Message for Opponents and Allies Alike’, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 99/694 (2014).

¹⁰⁸ Johan Norberg, ‘Training to Fight – Russia’s Major Military Exercises 2011–2014ʹ, 23; Lucas, Edward, ‘The Coming Storm’, Center for European Policy Analysis, Report (2015), 9; Pauli Järvenpää, ‘Zapad-2013: A view from Helsinki’, The Jamestown Foundation, Report (2014), 8.

¹⁰⁹ Johan Norberg, ‘Training to Fight – Russia’s Major Military Exercises 2011–2014ʹ, 37–38.

¹¹⁰ RIA Novosti, ‘Shoigu zayavil, chto NATO vynuzhdayet Rossiyu prinimat otvetnie meri’, 2 Nove. 2016. <https://ria.ru/20161102/1480535212.html>.

¹¹¹ Johan Norberg, ‘Training for War: Russia’s Strategic-level Military Exercises 2009–2017, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Report FOI-R–4627–SE (2018), 72.

¹¹² Aftonbladet, ‘Rysslands militär övade chockattack mot Sverige’, 20 Dece. 2017. <https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/m6Bqk1/rysslands-militar-ovade-chockattack-mot-sverige>; Verdens Gang, ‘E-sjefen: Russland øvde på angrep mot Nord-Norge’, 5 Marc. 2018. <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/1kye4W/e-sjefen-russland-oevde-paa-angrep-mot-nord-norge>.

¹¹³ Igor Fedyk, ‘Zapad 2017: A Test for the West’, Eurasia Daily Monitor 14/122 (2017); The New York Times, ‘Vast Exercise Demonstrated Russia’s Growing Military Prowess’, 1 Octo. 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/us/politics/zapad-russia-military-exercise.html>.

¹¹⁴ Johan Norberg, ‘Training for War: Russia’s Strategic-level Military Exercises 2009–2017ʹ, 73.

¹¹⁵ Gazeta.ru, ‘Shvetsiya gotovitsya k voyne’, 11 Septe. 2017. <https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2017/09/11/10,883,780.shtml>; RT, ‘Sweden, NATO allies launch biggest military exercise in 23 yrs amid “Russian threat”’, 11 Sept. 2017. <https://www.rt.com/news/402919-sweden-military-exercise-russia/>.

¹¹⁶ Russian MFA, ‘Otvet ofitsialnogo predstavitelya MID Rossii M.V.Zakharovoy na vopros informatsionnogo agentstva TASS o narashchivanii voyennogo prisutstviya NATO v severnoy Norvegii’; Russian MFA, ‘Kommentariy Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v svyazi s ucheniyami OVS NATO «Trident Juncture-2018»’, 25 Octo. 2018. <https://www.mid.ru/web/>.

¹¹⁷ Dagbladet, ‘Russerne om Nato-øvelsen: Ødeleggende for tillit og stabilitet i regionen’ 3 Nove. 2018. <https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/russerne-om-nato-ovelsen–odeleggende-for-tillit-og-stabilitet-i-regionen/70,404,608>.

¹¹⁸ See for example coverage in Klassekampen, ‘Krisemøte i kulissene’, 31 Octo. 2018. <https://www.klassekampen.no/article/20181031/article/181039993>; RT, ‘Russia to hold live missile drills outside Norway amid massive NATO drills’, 30 Octo. 2018. <https://www.rt.com/news/442665-norway-russia-missile-drills/>; The Barents Observer, ‘Russia announces rocket shootings just outside Finnmark in final days of NATO’s Trident Juncture’, 31 Octo. 2018. <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/10/russian-navy>.

¹¹⁹ See also Margot Light, ‘Russian Foreign Policy Themes in Official Documents and Speeches: Tracing Continuity and Change’, in David Cadier and Margot Light (eds.), Russia’s Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Policies and External Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2015), 24.

¹²⁰ Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence’, The Washington Quarterly 32/4 (2009), 19–20.

¹²¹ Andrew Monaghan, ‘The New Russian Foreign Policy Concept: Evolving Continuity’, Chatham House, REP 2013/03 (2013); Julia Gurganus and Eugene Rumer, ‘Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective’.

¹²² See Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare; Timothy L. Thomas, ‘Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17 (2004), 237–256; Valery Geramisov, ‘Vektory Razvitiya Voennoi Strategii’.

¹²³ Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence’, 4–5.

¹²⁴ The US has reopened its military base on Iceland (closed in 2006). See, for example, Stars and Stripes, ‘Navy aircraft returning to former Cold War base in Iceland’, 9 Febr. 2016. <http://www.stripes.com/news/navy-aircraft-returning-to-former-cold-war-base-in-iceland-1.393156>.

¹²⁵ President of Russia, ‘O Mezhvedomstvennoy komissii Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii po voprosam obespecheniya natsionalnykh interesov Rossiyskoy Federatsii v Arktike’, 25 Augu. 2020. <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202008250033>; Security Council of the Russian Federation, ‘Obrazovana Mezhvedomstvennaya komissiya Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossii po voprosam obespecheniya natsionalnykh interesov Rossii v Arktike’, 25 Augu. 2020. <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/allnews/2825/>.

¹²⁶ Russia’s conventional military build-up in Kaliningrad has increased dramatically since 2011. According to Sergey Sukhankin, it reached a qualitatively new level in 2018, when Russia openly declared it was permanently deploying (nuclear-capable) Iskander-M missile complexes to the region. See Sergey Sukhankin, ‘The End of “Hide and Seek”: Russian Iskanders Permanently in Kaliningrad’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 15/28 (2018).

¹²⁷ Andrew Monaghan, ‘The New Russian Foreign Policy Concept: Evolving Continuity’, 8.

¹²⁸ Jyri Lavikainen (ed.), ‘Russia of Power’, Finnish Ministry of Defence, Report (2019), 13; Kristian Åtland, ‘North European security after the Ukraine conflict’, 166; Catherine Belton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took On the West (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2020).

¹²⁹ Colin Wight, ‘The Continuity of Change, or a Change in Continuity?’, The International Studies Association 3/1 (2001), 82.

¹³⁰ Charles F. Hermann, ‘Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy’, International Studies Quarterly 34/1 (1990), 8; Jakob Gustavsson, ‘How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?’, Cooperation and Conflict 34/1 (1999).

¹³¹ Russian MFA, ‘Press release on a meeting of Russian ambassadors to North European and Baltic countries’, 7 Octo. 2017. <https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2,892,161>.

¹³² The Barents Observer, ‘A united Nordic front sits down with Putin’, 10 Apri. 2019. <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2019/04/united-nordic-front-sits-down-putin>.

¹³³ For example, to avert Western military operations in the Baltic Sea theatre (anti-access) or deny Nordic countries and NATO access to strategic facilities and control in the region (area denial).

¹³⁴ This is due to China acting independently but also the possibility of closer Russia China cooperation, e.g., in the military sphere. See for instance Svenska Yle, ‘Ryska och kinesiska krigsfartyg övar i Östersjön’, 24 July 2019. <https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2017/07/24/ryska-och-kinesiska-krigsfartyg-ovar-i-ostersjon>.

¹³⁵ Kristian Åtland, ‘North European security after the Ukraine conflict’, 163.

¹³⁶ Russian MFA, ‘Comment by the Foreign Ministry on an article by the ministers of the Nordic countries in the newspaper Aftenposten’’.

¹³⁷ Margot Light, ‘Russian Foreign Policy Themes in Official Documents and Speeches: Tracing Continuity and Change’, 23. See also, Russian MFA, ‘Press release on a meeting of Russian ambassadors to North European and Baltic countries’.

¹³⁸ Icelandic Coast Guard, ‘Rússneskar herflugvélar á íslenska loftrýmiseftirlitssvæðinu’, 4 July 2020. <https://www.lhg.is/frettir-og-fjolmidlar/frettasafn/frettayfirlit/russneskar-herflugvelar-a-islenska-loftrymiseftirlitssvaedinu-1>; AP News, ‘2 Russian aircraft suspected of violating Finland’s airspace’, 28 July 2020. <https://apnews.com/article/russia-finland-europe-air-force-helsinki-903880c2582b72e8ba64f8e2c997d4ee>; The New York Times, ‘Sweden Raises Alarm over Russian Military Exercises’, 26 Augu. 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/world/europe/sweden-russia-NATO-Baltic-Sea.html>; Försvarsmakten, ‘Rysk och dansk överträdelse av tillträdesförordningen’, 21 Sept. 2020. <https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/aktuellt/overtradelser-mot-tilltradesforordningen/>; The Barents Observer, ‘Russian influence ops seek to fuel discord between Arctic Norway and Oslo’, 10 Febr. 2020. <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2020/02/chief-nis-says-russian-influence-operations-fuel-disagreements-between-north-and>.

¹³⁹ The economic indications are based on the empirical data and an aggregated review of export/import figures provided by the World Bank. It is not a perfect measure. To gain a more accurate picture, more indicators should be consulted. See World Integrated Trade Solution, ‘Russian Federation Imports by country in US$ Thousand 2010–2018ʹ, 3 Sept. 2020. <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/RUS/StartYear/2010/EndYear/2018/TradeFlow/Import/Partner/BY-COUNTRY/Indicator/MPRT-TRD-VL>; World Integrated Trade Solution, ‘Russian Federation Exports by country in US$ Thousand 2010–2018, 3 Sept. 2020. <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/RUS/StartYear/2010/EndYear/2018/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/BY-COUNTRY/Indicator/XPRT-TRD-VL>.

¹⁴⁰ See also Helge Blakkisrud, ‘Introduction: Can Cooperative Arctic Policies Survive the Current Crisis in Russian-Western Relations?’, Arctic Review on Law and Politics 9 (2018).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Karen-Anna Eggen

Karen-Anna Eggen is a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and part of the the research programme Security and Defence in Northern Europe (SNE). She holds an MA in political science from the University of Oslo. Her research interests include Russian strategy and security policy, influence operations, transatlantic relations and NATO, security and cooperation in Northern Europe.