From the editors

It is with sadness that we note the passing of Professor Colin S. Gray in February 2020. Colin exerted a major influence in the strategic studies community worldwide through his scholarship, the many students he taught over the years, and the even larger number of scholars and policy makers whom he and his work touched in various ways.¹ Colin was a loyal long-time member of the editorial board of The Journal of Strategic Studies and published major works in the journal’s pages over the years.² We will miss him greatly.

Headlining this inaugural issue of the 44^th volume of The Journal of Strategic Studies is the winner of this year’s Amos Perlmutter Prize. The prize recognizes the most outstanding essay submitted for publication by junior faculty members. This year’s Perlmutter Prize goes to Kristin Ven Bruusgaard of the University of Oslo for her essay, ‘Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority.’³ In her essay, Ven Bruusgaard offers a Conventional Balance of Forces thesis for explaining changes in Russia’s nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War. She shows how Russian nuclear debates and strategy decisions have been influenced by perceived conventional vulnerability. She also assesses how the orthodox Western interpretation of Russian nuclear strategy today as one of ‘escalating to de-escalate’ comes short of explaining the circumstances under which Russia would use nuclear weapons.

This issue also contains a special section on command in contemporary war. In ‘Operation Moshtarak: Counter-Insurgency Command in Kandahar, 2009–2010, Anthony King of the University of Warwick, examines the changing character of twenty-first century command. In particular, he argues that the campaign exemplifies a more collective approach to command than typically adopted in the twentieth century. In Operation TELIC VII to XI: Difficulties of Twenty-First Century Command,’ Daniel Patrick Marston of The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) analyzes the complexity of coalition warfare in the twenty-first century through the prism of the British Army’s experiences in southern Iraq during the Iraq War. Finally, in ‘Political Impatience and Military Caution,’ Laurence Freedman of King’s College London examines attempts by civilian policy-makers to influence the conduct of ongoing military operations as the result of their frustration with slow progress. Drawing upon the Falklands War of 1982 and the Iraq War of 2003, he highlights the importance of higher command structures acting as a buffer between the government and field commanders. He also highlights the problems that can emerge when key strategic questions are left unanswered in the run-up to a campaign.

Continuing the theme of strategy in contemporary war, the issue concludes with a review essay on strategic failure in Afghanistan by Todd Greentree of the Changing Character of War Center at Oxford University.

We look forward to continuing to offer our readers cutting-edge scholarly research on strategic studies throughout 2021 and beyond.

Notes

¹ See, for example, David J. Lonsdale, ‘Colin S. Gray: A Reminiscence’, War on the Rocks, 22 June 2020, available at https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/colin-s-gray-a-reminiscence/; Thomas G. Mahnken and A. Bradley Potter, ‘The Translator in Chief: Colin S. Gray’s Approach to Strategy and War’, Texas National Security Review, 27 July 2020, available at https://tnsr.org/roundtable/remembering-colin-gray/

² Most recently, Colin S. Gray, ‘Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 6 (October 2015): 873–897.

³ See also Mark S. Bell, ‘Nuclear Opportunism: A Theory of How States use Nuclear Weapons in International Politics’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 1 (February 2019): 3–28; Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, ‘MAD, not Marx: Khrushchev and the Nuclear Revolution’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 41, nos. 1–2 (February 2018): 208–233; Benjamin Jensen, Brandon Valeriano & Ryan Maness, “Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls: Cyber Strategy with a Russian Twist, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 42, no. 2 (April 2019): 212–234; Sergey Radchenko, ‘“Nothing but Humiliation for Russia”: Moscow and NATO’s Eastern Enlargement, 1993–1995’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 43, nos. 6–7 (October 2020): 769–815.