Artificial intelligence in China’s revolution in military affairs

ABSTRACT

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seeks not only to equal but also to overtake the US military through seizing the initiative in the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Chinese military leaders believe the form of warfare is changing from today’s ‘informatised’ (信息化) warfare to future ‘intelligentised’ (智能化) warfare. The PLA’s approach to leveraging emerging technologies is likely to differ from parallel American initiatives because of its distinct strategic culture, organisational characteristics, and operational requirements. This research examines the evolution of the PLA’s strategic thinking and concepts of operations, seeking to contribute to the military innovation literature by evaluating major theoretical frameworks for the case of China.

KEYWORDS:

• People’s Liberation Army
• military innovation
• emerging technologies
• artificial intelligence
• intelligentised warfare

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ See, for instance, these remarks from the director of the Central Military Commission Science and Technology Commission ‘Lt. Gen. Liu Guozhi: the development of military intelligentisation is a strategic opportunity for our military to turn sharply to surpass’ [刘国治中将:军事智能化发展是我军弯道超车的战略机遇], CCTV News, 22 October 2017, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2017-10-22/doc-ifymzqpq3312566.shtml. See also Xi Jinping’s remarks as quoted in this article: ‘Scientific and technological innovation, a powerful engine for the world-class military’ [科技创新，迈向世界一流军队的强大引擎], Xinhua, 15 September 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-09/15/content_5225216.htm.

² Pang Hongliang [庞宏亮], ‘The Intelligentisation Military Revolution Starts to Dawn’ [智能化军事革命曙光初现], PLA Daily, 28 January 2016, http://www.mod.gov.cn/wqzb/2016-01/28/content_4637961.htm.

³ Lu Zhisheng [陆知胜], ‘The Typical Style of Intelligentised Operations: Human-Machine Cooperation!’ [智能化作战的典型方式：人机协同！] PLA Daily, 17 October 2018. http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2018-10/17/content_9315760.htm

⁴ For an initial analysis of this trend, see: Elsa B. Kania, ‘Learning Without Fighting: New Developments in PLA AI War-Gaming,’ China Brief, 9 April 2019.

⁵ Emily O. Goldman and Thomas G. Mahnken  (eds.), The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

⁶ João Resende – Santos, ‘Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870–1930,’ Security Studies 5, no. 3 (1996): 193–260.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Relations, Addison-Wesley, 1979.

⁹ See: Thomas G. Mahnken (ed.), Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice, Stanford University Press, 2012.

¹⁰ Mark Zachary Taylor, The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others At Science and Technology, Oxford University Press, 2016.

¹¹ Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, Cornell University Press, 1986.

¹² Owen R. Cote, ‘The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The US Navy and Fleet Ballistic Missiles,’ PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the next war: Innovation and the modern military, Cornell University Press, 1994.

¹⁵ Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power Causes and Consequences for International Politics, Princeton University Press, 2010.

¹⁶ Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel, Stanford University Press, 2010.

¹⁷ Dennis J. Blasko, '“Technology Determines Tactics„: Relationship between Technology and Doctrine in Chinese Military Thinking', Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (2011), 355–381.

¹⁸ ‘Xi Jinping: Accurately Grasp the New Trend in Global Military Developments and Keep Pace with the Times, Strongly Advancing Military Innovation’ [习近平:准确把握世界军事发展新趋势 与时俱进大力推进军事创新], Xinhua, 30 August 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-08/30/c_1112294869.htm.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ ‘Launching the Engine of Innovation for Strengthening and Rejuvenating the Military’[发动强军兴军的创新引擎 – – 军队代表委员热议科技兴军], Xinhua, 12 March 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2019-03/12/c_1210079238.htm.

²¹ ‘Scientific and technological innovation, a powerful engine for the world-class military’ [科技创新，迈向世界一流军队的强大引擎].

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ See: ‘Xi Jinping: Launching the engine of military scientific research and innovation at full speed’.

²⁵ For the best review of the impetus for changes in Chinese military strategy across its history, see: M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949. Vol. 2. Princeton University Press, 2019. M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China’s Changes in Military Strategy.’ International Security 42, no. 3 (2018): 37–83.

²⁶ Although the translation ‘smart’ is used in the official version of this Defence White Paper, I choose to use the translations ‘intelligent’ or ‘intelligentised.’

²⁷ Mininstry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国国防部], ‘China’s Military Strategy’ [中国的军事战略],’ 26 May 2015. See also the official English translation of the white paper: http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm.

²⁸ See also: Li Bingyan [李炳彦], ‘Major Trends in the New Global Revolution in Military Transformation and the Form of Future Warfare’ [世界新军事变革大势与未来战争形态], 24 February 2016. Li Bingyan is a member of the National Security Policy Committee (国家安全政策委员会).

²⁹ See this series in China Brief, organized by Peter Wood for early analyses on these issues: ‘China & the Third Offset,’ https://jamestown.org/programs/cb/china-third-offset/.

³⁰ See: China Military Science Editorial Department [中国军事科学 编辑部], ‘A Summary of the Workshop on the Game between AlphaGo and Lee Sedol and the Intelligentisation of Military Command and Decision-Making’ [围棋人机大战与军事指挥决策智能化研讨会观点综述], China Military Science [中国军事科学], 2 April 2016. Note that the journal’s own English language translation of the title of the workshop is not the direct or literal translation.

³¹ The potential alternative spellings and translations of 智能化 include intelligent, intelligencization, smartification, and/or AI-ification. The notion of ‘cognification’ has also been used in English-language descriptions of a similar phenomenon. I have chosen to render this term ‘intelligentisation’ for consistency with some of the official translations of the term in authoritative journals, such as China Military Science, but I am open to debating alternative translations and conceptualizations with those concerned. Not unlike ‘informatization,’ the notion of ‘intelligentisation’ is difficult to define with precision and appears to be used in a varying and sometimes somewhat inconsistent manner by PLA writings on these issues. My understanding of this concept has evolved since I first discussed it in published writing and testimony in February 2017. See also: Elsa B. Kania, ‘Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission: Chinese Advances in Unmanned Systems and the Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence – the PLA’s Trajectory towards Unmanned, “Intelligentised” Warfare,’ US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 23 February 2017, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Kania_Testimony.pdf.

³² CMC Joint Staff Department [中央军委联合参谋部], ‘Accelerate the Construction of a Joint Operations Command System with Our Military’s Characteristics [加快构建具有我军特色的联合作战指挥体系], Seeking Truth, 15 August 2016, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-08/15/c_1119374690.htm.

³³ ‘Xi Jinping’s Report at the Chinese Communist Party 19^th National Congress’ [习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告].

³⁴ ‘Lt. Gen. Liu Guozhi: the development of military intelligentisation is a strategic opportunity for our military to turn sharply to surpass’.

³⁵ For an excellent academic evaluation of the challenges of catching up, see: Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli. ‘Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage.’ International Security 43, no. 3 (2019): 141–189.

³⁶ For an academic perspective on the notion of leapfrogging, see for instance: Takashi Hikino and Alice H. Amsden, ‘Staying behind, stumbling back, sneaking up, soaring ahead: late industrialization in historical perspective’ Convergence of productivity: Cross-national studies and historical evidence (1994): 285–315.

³⁷ See, for instance: ‘Four Departments Issued a Notice Regarding the ‘“Internet Plus” Artificial Intelligence Three-Year Action Implementation Plan’ [四部门关于印发《’互联网+’人工智能三年行动实施方案》的通知], China Government Network, 25 May 2016, http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146290/n1146392/c4808445/content.html. ‘State Council Notice on the Issuance of the New Generation AI Development Plan’ [国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知], 20 August 2017, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996.htm’MIIT’s Notice Regarding the Release of the Three Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of New-Generation Artificial Intelligence Industry (2018–2020) [工业和信息化部关于印发《促进新一代人工智能产业发展三年行动计划（2018-2020年）》的通], 14 December 2017, http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1652930/n3757016/c5960820/content.html.

³⁸ For the full translation, see: Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Elsa Kania, ‘Full Translation: China’s “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” (2017),’ https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/full-translation-chinas-new-generation-artificial-intelligence-development-plan-2017/.

³⁹ See again China’s ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan.’

⁴⁰ ‘New Generation AI Strategic Advisory Committee Established’ [新一代人工智能战略咨询委员会成立], 21 November 2017, http://www.ia.cas.cn/xwzx/ttxw/201711/t20171121_4896939.html.

‘The New-Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Planning Promotion Office Convened a 2019 Working Conference’ [新一代人工智能发展规划推进办公室召开2019年工作会议], 20 February 2019, http://www.most.gov.cn/tpxw/201902/t20190221_145137.htm.

⁴¹ The details are available upon request.

⁴² For a noteworthy commentary from Lt. Gen. Gao Jin, then president of the Academy of Military Science and later the inaugural commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force, see: ‘Academy of Military Science President: Reforms Must Resolve the Restraints Upon Systematic Assurance for a Powerful Military’ [军事科学院院长:改革要解决羁绊强军的体制性障碍], PLA Daily, 2 November 2015, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2015/11-02/7600724.shtml.

⁴³ For the authoritative assessment of the PLASSF, see: John Costello and Joe McReynolds, ‘The Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era,’ National Defence University, 2 October 2018.

See also: Elsa Kania and John Costello, ‘The Strategic Support Force and the Future of Chinese Information Operations,’ Cyber Defence Review, Spring 2018, https://cyberDefencereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/CDR%20Journal%20Articles/The%20Strategic%20Support%20Force_Kania_Costello.pdf?ver=2018-07-31-093713-580.

For primary source documentation highlighting the PLA’s role in innovation, see: ‘How Can the Strategic Support Force Forge New Quality Weapons’ [战略支援部队如何锻造新质利器], PLA Daily, 11 March 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2016/03-11/7792939.shtml.

⁴⁴ For a basic description of the CMC Science and Technology Commission’s mandate, see: ‘Shoulder the functional mission of strengthening the military through science and technology’ [肩负起科技强军的职能使命], PLA Daily, 28 April 2016, http://www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2016-04/28/content_4651316.htm.

⁴⁵ This concept (弯道超车), which often recurs in PLA writings, alludes to idea of two cars racing towards a corner, of which one cuts the turn more sharply and takes the inside track, thus passing by the other. I’m open to other suggestions on how to translate this term.

⁴⁶ ‘Xi Jinping: Strive to build a high-level military scientific research institution to provide strong support for the party’s strong military objective in the new era’ [习近平：努力建设高水平军事科研机构 为实现党在新时代的强军目标提供有力支撑], Xinhua, 16 May 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-05/16/c_1122843283.htm.

⁴⁷ ‘President Xi came to the military school for the first time’ [习主席第一次到军校视察就来到这里], China Military Online, 20 March 2018, https://new.qq.com/omn/20180320/20180320A1G5SK.html .

⁴⁸ ‘Chief Engineer Hu Xiaofeng, General Manager of China’s Bingqi Program, Delivered a Lecture: the Challenge of the Intelligentisation of Command information Systems’ [中国兵棋工程总师胡晓峰少将演讲：指挥信息系统的智能化挑战], 13 July 2016, 2016, http://chuansong.me/n/434595151184.

⁴⁹ ‘Academy of Military Science National Defence Science and Technology Innovation Research Academy – Exploring the “Matrix” Research Model to Enhance Innovation Capability’ [军事科学院国防科技创新研究院 – – 探索’矩阵式’科研模式提升创新能力], PLA Daily, 2 April 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-04/02/content_202957.htm. See also: ‘Academy of Military Science National Defence Science and Technology Innovation Research Academy Has Taken Measures to Gather Top Talents’ [军科院国防科技创新研究院多措并集聚顶尖人才], China Military Network, 4 February 2018, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WDwIAWmc6agJ:www.81.cn/jwgz/2018-02/04/content_7931564.htm+&cd=8&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.

⁵⁰ ‘The Academy of Military Sciences has amassed and selected more than 120 urgently needed scientific research personnel from the whole military’ [军事科学院面向全军集中选调120余名急需科研人才], Xinhua, 1 January 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-01/25/c_129798773.htm.

⁵¹ This is the author’s attempt to provide the simplest possible definition of the concept, and I am very open to other suggestions and interpretations.

⁵² For context, see: Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase. ‘Informatization and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy,’in Phillip Saunders, Christopher Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang, The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies (2011): 247–287.

⁵³ This concept (弯道超车), which often recurs in PLA writings, alludes to idea of two cars racing towards a corner, of which one cuts the turn more sharply and takes the inside track, thus passing by the other. I’m open to other suggestions on how to translate this term.

⁵⁴ ‘Experts: Military Intelligentisation Is Not Merely Artificial Intelligence’ [专家：军事智能化绝不仅仅是人工智能].

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ The PLA does not describe what it is doing as an ‘offset’ per se, but that could be the effect in practice.

⁵⁷ Ke Zhengxuan [科政轩], ‘How to build a military scientific research system with our military’s characteristics’ [我军特色军事科学研究体系如何构建形成], PLA Daily, 8 August 2017, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2017-08/04/content_7703373.htm.

⁵⁸ This is the department that has had direct responsibility for the PLA’s formulation of its equivalent to doctrine, operational regulations.

⁵⁹ Zhang Zhanjun [张占军], ‘How to compete for future maritime combat initiative’ [如何争夺未来海上作战主动权], PLA Daily, 24 October 2017, https://web.archive.org/save/http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-10/24/c_129725534.htm.

⁶⁰ The prior edition of the NDU’s SMS dated back to 1999, and it is unusual for a revision of the text to occur so soon.

⁶¹ Note: Although the 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy is often seen as more authoritative, it is the author’s contention that the 2015 and this revised 2017 versions merit greater attention. Xiao Tianliang (ed.), The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], National Defence University Press, 2017.

⁶² For context, see: Elsa B. Kania, ‘When Will the PLA Finally Update Its Doctrine?,’ The Diplomat, 6 June 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/when-will-the-pla-finally-update-its-doctrine/.

⁶³ Wang Yonghua [王永华], ‘How to get through the whole link of combat concept development?’ [如何打通作战概念开发的完整链路？], China Military Network, 29 November 2018,http://www.81.cn/jwgd/2018-11/29/content_9360140.htm.

⁶⁴ Chen Hanghui [陈航辉], ‘Artificial Intelligence: Disruptively Changing the Rules of the Game’ [人工智能：颠覆性改变’游戏规则], China Military Online, 18 March 2016, http://www.81.cn/jskj/2016-03/18/content_6966873_2.htm. Chen Hanghui is affiliated with the Nanjing Army Command College. Please note that I do not assess this to be an official or entirely authoritative perspective, though I do believe that the recurrence of similar sentiments in a range of reasonably authoritative.

⁶⁵ These concepts (i.e., of humans being in, on, or out of the loop) originate in US discussions of the role of humans in decision-making, reflecting the PLA’s close attention to US policies and debates.

⁶⁶ ‘Exploring the winning joints of intelligentised operations’ [探究智能化作战的制胜关节], PLA Daily, 29 March 2018, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0329/c1011-29896429.html.

⁶⁷ Chen Dongheng [陈东恒] and Dong Julin [董俊林], ‘Military Intelligence Development Should Emphasize and Seize Upon Several Dialectical Relationships’ [军事智能化发展应着重把握的几个辩证关系], PLA Daily, 14 May 2019, http://www.81.cn/theory/2019-05/14/content_9502765.htm.

⁶⁸ ‘Exploring the winning joints of intelligentised operations’ [探究智能化作战的制胜关节].

⁶⁹ ‘Unmanned Systems: New Opportunities the Development of Military-Civil Fusion in Artificial Intelligence’ [无人系统：人工智能军民融合发展新契机].

⁷⁰ Hao Yaohong [郝耀鸿], ‘5 G, One Step Closer to the Military Internet of Things’ [5 G,离军事物联网更近一步], Confidential Work《保密工作》 July 2017, http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-BMGZ201707033.htm. Hao Yaohong is an expert on military communications with the PLA Special Operations Academy (特种作战学院).

⁷¹ Zhang Qingliang [张清亮] and Zhang Guoning [张国宁], ‘5 G Promotes the Acceleration of Military Intelligentisation’ [5 G推动智能化作战提速], China National Defence Report [中国国防报], 12 March 2019, http://www.81.cn/gfbmap/content/2019-03/12/content_229076.htm.

⁷² See: ‘What is driving warfare to become more intelligentised?’ [是什么在推动战争向智能化演变?], People’s Daily, 6 November 2018. ‘How does national Defence mobilization embrace the 5 G era?’ [国防动员如何拥抱5 G时代], China Military Network, 27 June 2018, http://www.81.cn/gfbmap/content/2018-06/27/content_209482.htm.

⁷³ Hao Yaohong [郝耀鸿], ‘5 G, One Step Closer to the Military Internet of Things’ [5 G,离军事物联网更近一步].

⁷⁴ ‘Big data builds the strongest “military brain”’ [大数据构筑最强’军事大脑], Qiushi, 12 July 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20190505163610/http://www.qsjournal.com.cn/junshiguofang/46518.html.

⁷⁵ The participation of Alibaba executives in a seminar of this nature is noteworthy and may be indicative of the company’s current or intended future engagement in supporting military innovation.

⁷⁶ He You is also a professor with the Northwestern Polytechnical University, which is closely linked to military research. The propensity of influential researchers to take on many roles and multiple affiliations simultaneously could be characterized as a feature of technological development in China that contributes to easier exchange of ideas between military and technical communities.

⁷⁷ Zuo Dengyun [左登云], ‘Where is the road to intelligent transformation of maritime operations?’ [海上作战智能化变革路在何方], PLA Daily, 12 February 2019. http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0212/c1011-30624347.html.

⁷⁸ Liu Zhanyong [刘战勇], ‘Data: The Lifeblood of Informatized and Intelligentised Warfare’ [数据：信息化智能化作战血液], PLA Daily, 19 February 2019, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-02/19/content_227628.htm.

⁷⁹ The range of books and textbooks on the topic illustrate the PLA's interest in the topic. See, for instance: Wu Mingxi [吴明曦], Intelligent Wars [智能化战争—AI军事畅想], National Defense Industry Press (Beijing), 2020; and Shi Haiming [石海明] and Jia Zhenzhen [贾珍珍]，Artificial Intelligence Disrupts Future Warfare [人工智能颠覆未来战争], People's Press (Beijing), 2019. 

⁸⁰ Yun Guangrong [游光荣], ‘AI Will Deeply Change the Face of Warfare’ [人工智能将深刻改变战争面], PLA Daily, 17 October 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-10/17/content_218050.htm.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ ‘Where is the winning mechanism of intelligent warfare? ‘ [智能化战争的制胜机理变在哪里?]

⁸⁴ Li Dapeng [李大鹏], ‘How should we deal with the challenges of intelligent warfare’ [我们该如何应对智能化战争挑战], China Youth Daily [中国青年报], 4 April 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2019-04/04/c_1210099555.htm.

⁸⁵ Zhu Qichao [朱启超], Wang Jingling [王婧凌], and Li Daguang [李大光], ‘Artificial Intelligence Opens the Door to Intelligentised Warfare’ [工智能叩开智能化战争大门], PLA Daily, 23 January 2017, http://military.china.com.cn/2017-01/23/content_40158456.htm.

⁸⁶ Chen Yufei (陈玉飞) and Xia Wenjun (夏文军), ‘Intelligentised Warfare Quietly Strikes’ [智能化战争悄然来袭], PLA Daily, 16 February 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-02/16/content_169593.htm.

⁸⁷ Li Dapeng [李大鹏], ‘How should we deal with the challenges of intelligent warfare’ [我们该如何应对智能化战争挑战].

⁸⁸ Zuo Dengyun [左登云], Gong Jia [龚佳], Huang Peirong [黄培荣], ‘Why do informationized operations go to intelligized operations’ [信息化作战何以走向智能化作战], PLA Daily, 20 September 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-09/20/c_129957478.htm. Huang Peirong is a professor at the Naval Command Academy.

⁸⁹ This program was contemporaneous with in response to the US Strategic Computing Initiative and Japan’s Fifth-Generation Computing. Alex Roland, Philip Shiman, and William Aspray. Strategic computing: DARPA and the quest for machine intelligence, 1983–1993. MIT Press, 2002.

⁹⁰ Deborah R. Harvey and Barbara R. Felton, ‘Military Operations Research in China: A Defence S&T Intelligence Study,’ March 1994, DST-1820S-187-94. This document was regarded as unclassified and released in March 1998.

⁹¹ ‘National University of Defence Technology’s Liu Zhong: Creating a Powerful “External Brain” for Command and Control’ [国防科大刘忠:为指挥控制打造强大’外脑’], People’s Daily, 28 December 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2015/1228/c401735-27986608.html.

⁹² For an authoritative assessment, see: Lora Saalman, ‘China’s Integration of Neural Networks into Hypersonic Glide Vehicles,’ December 2018, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/AI-China-Russia-Global-WP_FINAL.pdf.

⁹³ See this report from the China Aerospace Studies Institute: Elsa Kania ‘The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems New Capabilities for a “New Era” of Chinese Military Power,’ China Aerospace Studies Institute, 8 August 2018, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/1596429/the-plas-unmanned-aerial-systems-new-capabilities-for-a-new-era-of-chinese-mili/.

⁹⁴ Upon request, more details on these projects based on open sources are available from the author.

⁹⁵ ‘Military Delegates Hotly Discussed Accelerating and Improving Innovative Development of National Defence Mobilization’ [军队人大代表热议加速推进国防动员创新发展], China Military Network, 15 March 2019, https://web.archive.org/save/http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/army/content/2019-03/15/content_7802049.htm.

⁹⁶ Artificial Intelligence Research Direction 2017 Double Certificate Master’s Degree [人工智能研究方向2017年双证硕士], http://soft.buaa.edu.cn/BuaaPublic/html/ShowNews_60_4896.html.

⁹⁷ ‘A First-Class Military; New-Type Military Talent Cultivation’ [一流军队，新型军事人才咋培养], PLA Daily, 2 January 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-01/02/c_129780635.htm .

⁹⁸ For context on the trajectory of these developments, see: Department of Defence, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018,’ https://media.Defence.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF.

⁹⁹ Liu Zhanyong [刘战勇], ‘Data: The Lifeblood of Informatized and Intelligentised Warfare’ [数据：信息化智能化作战血液], PLA Daily, 19 February 2019, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-02/19/content_227628.htm.

¹⁰⁰ ‘Data-labeling: the human power behind Artificial Intelligence,’ Xinhua, 17 January 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-01/17/c_137752154.htm.

¹⁰¹ For instance, certain Chinese military writings have articulated a more skeptical perspective, and it is likely there is still some disagreement among PLA stakeholders.

¹⁰² For translation and discussion, see: ‘Intersections of Ideology with China’s Approach to Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence,’ https://www.battlefieldsingularity.com/musings-1/intersections-of-ideology-with-china-s-approach-to-military-applications-of-artificial-intelligence.

¹⁰³ Ke Zhengxuan [科政轩], ‘How to build and form a military scientific research system with our military’s characteristics’ [我军特色军事科学研究体系如何构建形成].

¹⁰⁴ ‘Xi Jinping’s Report at the Chinese Communist Party 19th National Congress’ [习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告], Xinhua, 27 October 2017, http://www.china.com.cn/19da/2017-10/27/content_41805113_3.htm.

¹⁰⁵ China Institute of Information and Communications (CAICT), ‘AI Security White Paper’ [人工智能安全白皮书], September 2018, http://www.caict.ac.cn/kxyj/qwfb/bps/201809/P020180918473525332978.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ For an excellent assessment of this issue see: Heather Roff, ‘The frame problem: The AI “arms race” isn’t one,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 April 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/04/the-frame-problem-the-ai-arms-race-isnt-one/.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Elsa B. Kania

Elsa B. Kania is a PhD candidate in Harvard University’s Department of Government, and she is also an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).