When the coalition determines the mission: NATO’s detour in Libya

ABSTRACT

In this article, we argue that the composition of coalitions is key to understanding military operations, because it encompasses decisive intra-coalition dynamics such as great power and alliance politics, caveats and institutional constraints. The case study analysis, focused on NATO’s war in Libya, relies on content analysis of national and NATO policy documents as well as interviews with policymakers and military officials. We find that, while great powers predictably shape how missions are designed and carried out, their precise influence is affected by factors that are inherent to a coalition’s composition.

KEYWORDS:

• NATO
• military operations
• Operation Unified Protector
• battlefield coalitions
• mission design

Acknowledgement

We are grateful to Arthur Smith-Windsor, Melika Khajeh Hosseiny, and Hiba Jamai for their valuable assistance in the research for this article. We wish to thank, in addition, Justin Massie, Rosella Cappella, Ryan Grauer, Sara Bjerg Moller, Dan Reiter, as well as anonymous reviewers for their useful feedback. We are also very grateful to the current and former officials who agreed to be interviewed for this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

¹ Rosella Cappella Zielinski and Ryan Grauer, See also ‘A Century of Coalitions in Battle’, this issue.

² See, for example, Michael Barnett and Jack Levy, ‘Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962–73’, International Organization 45/3 (Summer 1991), 369–95; Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Alex Weisiger, ‘Exiting the Coalition: When Do States Abandon Coalition Partners During War?’, International Studies Quarterly 60/4 (Dec. 2016), 753–65. For more background, see also the introduction to this special issue.

³ See Cappella Zielinski and Grauer, ‘A Century of Coalitions in Battle’, this issue. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization 52/4 (Autumn 1998), 887–917; Stéfanie von Hlatky, American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013).

⁴ See, for example, Brett Ashley Leeds, ‘Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties’, International Organization 57/4 (Autumn 2003), 801–27; von Hlatky. American Allies in Times of War; Mark Crescenzi, Jacob Kathman, Katja Kleiberg, and Reed Wood, ‘Reliability, Reputation, and Alliance Formation’, International Studies Quarterly 56/2 (June 2012), 259–74.

⁵ May Darwich, ‘Escalation in Failed Military Interventions: Saudi and Emirati Quagmires in Yemen’, Global Policy 11/1 (Feb. 2020), 103–12; Thomas Juneau, ‘The UAE and the War in Yemen: From Surge to Recalibration’, Survival 62/4 (Aug.–Sep. 2020), 183–208.

⁶ Jason Davidson, America’s Allies and War: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (New York: Palgrave Macmillian 2011); von Hlatky, American Allies in Times of War; Justin Massie and Stéfanie von Hlatky, ‘Ideology, Ballots, and Alliances: Canadian Participation in Multinational Military Operations’, Contemporary Security Policy 40/1 (Aug. 2018), 101–15; Stéfanie von Hlatky and Jessica N. Trisko, ‘Cash or Combat? America’s Asian Alliances during the War in Afghanistan’, Asian Security 11/1 (Mar. 2015), 31–51.

⁷ Benjamin Zyla, Sharing the Burden? NATO and Its Second-Tier Powers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2015); James Sperling and Mark Webber, ‘NATO: From Kosovo to Kabul’, International Affairs 85/3 (May 2009), 491–511.

⁸ Bastian Giegerich and Stéfanie von Hlatky, ‘Experiences May Vary: NATO and Cultural Interoperability in Afghanistan’, Armed Forces & Society 46/3 (July 2020), 495–516; Breede, H. Christian, Defining Success: Canada in Afghanistan 2006–2011’, American Review of Canadian Studies 44/4 (Dec. 2014), 483–501; Aaron Ettinger & Jeffrey Rice, ‘Hell is Other People’s Schedules: Canada’s Limited-term Military Commitments, 2001–2005’, International Journal 71/3 (Sep. 2016), 371–92.

⁹ Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’; Heidi Hardt, NATO’s Lesson in Crisis: Institutional Memory in International Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018); Marina Henke, Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2019).

¹⁰ Andrew Mumford, The West’s War against Islamic State: Operation Inherent Resolve in Syria and Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris 2021).

¹¹ Olivier Schmitt, ‘International Organization at War: NATO Practices in the Afghan Campaign’, Cooperation and Conflict 52/4 (2017), 502.

¹² Alan J. Kuperman, ‘The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans’, International Studies Quarterly 52/1 (Mar. 2008), 49–80.

¹³ We promised strict anonymity to each. Both authors obtained the required ethics clearances from their universities. The full list of interview questions is available upon request.

¹⁴ Stéphane Lacroix and Jean-Pierre Filiu (eds.), Revisiting the Arab Uprisings: The Politics of a Revolutionary Moment (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018).

¹⁵ Ethan Chorin, Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution (PublicAffairs 2012).

¹⁶ Jeffrey Michaels, ‘Able but Not Willing: A Critical Assessment of NATO’s Libya Intervention’, in Kjell Engelbrekt, Marcus Mohlin, and Charlotte Wagnsson (eds.), The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign (Routledge 2014), 19.

¹⁷ ‘Canadian to Lead NATO’s Libya Mission’, CBCNews 25 Mar. 2011, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canadian-to-lead-nato-s-Libya-mission-1.1046678.

¹⁸ Press Briefing by NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu, 31 Mar. 2011, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_71897.htm?selectedLocale=en.

¹⁹ The extension was renewed a second time in September.

²⁰ Libya has, since then, collapsed into civil war. The scope of this article, however, ends with the termination of the NATO mission. For more, see Frederic Wehrey, The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2018).

²¹ Schmitt, ‘International Organization at War’; Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, ‘Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya’, European Journal of International Relations 20/4 (2014), 889–911.

²² Ryan Lizza, ‘The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama’s Foreign Policy’, The New Yorker 2 May 2011.

²³ Deborah Kidwell, ‘The U.S. Experience: Operational’, in Karl P. Mueller (ed.), Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 146.

²⁴ The importance of holding key positions was also mentioned in Schmitt’s study of NATO in Afghanistan, where he identified several mechanisms of US domination in an alliance setting. Beyond the material contributions that the US makes, procedural practice can also deliver some benefits. See Schmitt, ‘International Organization at War’.

²⁵ In an analysis, Jonathan Paquin found that the coded theme ‘multilateralism’ was found in 20 of 21 official statements dealing with the crisis in Libya. Jonathan Paquin, ‘Is Ottawa Following Washington’s Lead in Foreign Policy? Evidence from the Arab Spring’, International Journal 67/4 (Fall 2012), 1023.

²⁶ Matt Negrin, ‘Obama: Allies to Take Libya Lead Soon’, Politico, 21 Mar. 2011. https://www.politico.com/story/2011/03/obama-allies-to-take-libya-lead-soon-051680.

²⁷ ‘We had … an international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves.’ Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. ‘President Obama’s Speech on Libya’, 28 March 2011.

²⁸ ‘Libye: Que signifie la prise de commandement de l’OTAN?’ Le Monde, 28 Mar. 2011, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/03/28/libye-que-signifie-la-prise-de-commandement-de-l-otan_1499512_3212.html.

²⁹ Camille Grand, ‘The French Experience: Sarkozy’s War’, in Karl Mueller (ed.), Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2015), 188.

³⁰ Grand, ‘The French Experience’, 199.

³¹ In French, ‘la France s’est battue sans relâche.’ See for example Prime Minister François Fillon in a debate in the National Assembly on 22 March, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cri/2010-2011/20110144.asp.

³² Philippe Gros, De Odyssey Dawn à Unified Protector: Bilan transitoire, perspectives et premiers enseignements de l’engagement en Libye (Paris: Fondation pour la recherche stratégique 2011). Avril; see for example Prime Minister François Fillon the National Assembly on 22 March, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cri/2010-2011/20110144.asp.

³³ Senior officials repeatedly emphasised that Qaddafi ‘has to go.’ See for example Foreign Minister Alain Juppé in a debate in the National Assembly on 9 March 2011, http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q13/13-3048QG.htm.

³⁴ UK Parliament (Defence Committee), ‘Minutes of Evidence’, 12 Oct. 2011, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/950/11101201.htm.

³⁵ Domestically, questions were constantly raised about the nature of British involvement in light of the country’s controversial participation in the 2003 Iraq War.

³⁶ UK Parliament Debate (Commons Chamber), ‘UN Security Council Resolution (Libya)’, Volume 525, 18 Mar. 2011, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-03-18/debates/11031850000007/UNSecurityCouncilResolution(Libya).

³⁷ UK Parliament Debate (Commons Chamber), ‘UN Security Council Resolution (Libya)’, Volume 525, 18 Mar. 2011, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-03-18/debates/11031850000007/UNSecurityCouncilResolution(Libya).

³⁸ UK Parliament (Defence Committee), ‘Minutes of Evidence – HC950’, 26 Apr. 2011, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/950/11042701.htm.

³⁹ Frederic Wehrey, ‘NATO’s Intervention’, in Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn (eds.), The Libyan Revolution and its Aftermath (Oxford University Press 2015), 112.

⁴⁰ Chivvis, ‘Libya and the Future of Liberal Intervention’ (2014), 100.

⁴¹ Alastair Cameron, ‘The Channel Axis: France, the UK and NATO’, in Adrian Johnson and Saqeb Mueen (eds.), Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign (RUSI 2012), 18.

⁴² Stian Kjeksrud, Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Andreas Øien Stensland Cedric de Coning, Walter Lotze and Erin A. Weir, ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – Comparing Organisational Approaches’, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) – FFI-rapport 2011/01888 (2011), https://publications.ffi.no/nb/item/asset/dspace:2236/11-01888.pdf.

⁴³ Wehrey, ‘NATO’s Intervention’, 114–115.

⁴⁴ Wehrey, ‘NATO’s Intervention’.

⁴⁵ This was highlighted in our interviewees and is also discussed in the academic literature; see for example Chivvis, ‘Libya and the Future of Liberal Intervention’, 74.

⁴⁶ See the mid-April, Obama, Sarkozy and Cameron joint statement: the mission’s humanitarian objectives could only be reached once Qaddafi was no longer in power; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13090646.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [Insight Grant #435-2017-1206]. This research was undertaken, in part, thanks to funding from the Canada Research Chairs Program.

Notes on contributors

Stéfanie von Hlatky

Stéfanie von Hlatky is the Canada Research Chair on Gender, Security and the Armed Forces, an associate professor of political studies at Queen’s University and Director of the Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP). She is the co-host of the Canadian security and defence podcast Battle Rhythm and co-director of the Network for Strategic Analysis. She has published in the Canadian Journal of Political Science, the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Contemporary Security Policy, International Politics, the Journal of Global Security Studies, International Journal, International Politics, European Security, Asian Security, as well as the Journal of Transatlantic Studies. She has published a book with Oxford University Press entitled American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry (2013), and four edited volumes, including The Future of US Extended Deterrence (co-edited with Andreas Wenger) with Georgetown University Press (2015) and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Assessing Domestic and International Strategies (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020).

Thomas Juneau

Thomas Juneau is associate professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. His research focuses on the Middle East, in particular Iran and Yemen, on the role of intelligence in national security and foreign policy making, on Canadian foreign and defence policy, and on international relations theory. He is the author of Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical realism and Iranian foreign policy (Stanford University Press, 2015) and of Le Yémen en guerre (Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2021), co-author of Intelligence Analysis and Policy Making: The Canadian Experience (Stanford University Press, 2021), and co-editor of Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice (2019), Top Secret Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2021) and Iranian Foreign Policy Since 2001: Alone in the World (Routledge, 2013). He has published articles in, among other publications, International Affairs, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Survival, Political Science Quarterly, Nonproliferation Review, Orbis, International Journal, Canadian Foreign Policy, Canadian Public Administration, Middle East Policy, and International Studies Perspectives. He is also a non-resident fellow with the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies. From 2003 until 2014, he worked with Canada’s Department of National Defence, mostly as a policy analyst covering the Middle East.