From the editors

As 2021 comes to a close, the international environment remains unsettled. New variants of COVID-19 continue to emerge, disrupting economies and global health. Russian reinforcements near the Ukrainian border, and the willingness of Belorussia’s government to flood neighbours with refugees, reinforce concerns about great power competition and the use of allies, proxies and marginalised populations as geopolitical tools. New technologies and methods increase uncertainty, and alliance relationships are changing in response both to needs and perceptions of partner reliability. This issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies, the last one of 2021, addresses many of these problems.

A critical component of alliances and coalitions in great power competition is extended deterrence. Rupal Mehta of the University of Nebraska–Lincoln examines how emerging technologies may impact the ability to deliver both extended deterrence and assurance. Assessing a range of new technologies, ‘Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment’ suggests that because of the development of non-kinetic technologies, the net number of extended deterrence providers may increase, as barriers to entry change. In addition, alliance demands and structures may also evolve – new technologies may simultaneously increase capacity for extended deterrence while also increasing the need for assurance from alliance or coalition partners.¹

Eric Gartzke of the University of California–San Diego also examines the impact of technology on international security. His ‘Blood and robots: How remotely piloted vehicles and related technologies affect the politics of violence’ discusses how new generations of unmanned systems might affect incentives for and prosecution of war in the twenty-first century. The author concludes that new unmanned systems may increase the frequency of fighting while limiting its decisiveness. More disturbingly, he argues that new technologies may make territorial occupation more affordable, allowing those who have the technology to intervene abroad with lower costs and, perhaps, more expansive objectives.²

Cooperation is essential in global efforts to constrain nuclear proliferation, and counterproliferation operations against Iran involved both US and Israeli cooperation and new forms of covert activity. Richard Maher of University College Dublin assesses the impact of this counterproliferation programme against Iran. ‘The covert campaign against Iran’s nuclear programme: Implications for the theory and practice of counterproliferation’ examines the US and Israeli covert counterproliferation efforts, concluding first that these were a significant departure from previous US (but not Israeli) practice; second, that they did have an impact by raising costs, delaying and disrupting the Iranian programme and the Iranian economy and third, that this delay may have been much shorter, and less effective, than proponents suggest. Since Iran’s nuclear programme remains an international concern, a careful assessment of both the successes and limitations of the effort is important, and the author concludes with several questions that deserve further scrutiny.³

One aspect of alliances is the remarkable influence smaller members may have in certain circumstances. In ‘Military alliances as a stabilizing force: US relations with South Korea and Taiwan, 1950s-1960s’, Claudia Kim of Harvard University focuses specifically on the US Cold War bilateral alliances with the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The author notes that even though the alliances were intended to restrain aggressive tendencies in each state, the difficulty and costs of restraining them varied as the alliances matured. The author concludes that in periods of alliance formation, small allies will have the greatest leverage, and will be able to maximise their impact on the policy and strategy of the larger power. As the alliance matures and becomes institutionalised, less effort is required by the larger power to restrain small power aggressiveness. As security relationships change in the twenty-first century, the relative agency and leverage of partners will remain a critical concern.⁴

Duncan Redford of the Maritime Warfare Centre writes on the growing importance of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in the emerging international environment. In ‘Full spectrum anti-submarines warfare – The historical evidence from a British perspective’, the author examines the Royal Navy’s historical experience to test emerging concepts of full-spectrum ASW. Focusing on the primary mission – the safe and timely arrival of shipping – he notes that some of the new concepts are difficult to demonstrate with historical experience and that the combination of convoying, evasion, and defensive ASW escorts remains the most cost-effective means of protecting shipping with limited ASW assets.⁵

Finally, Frank Gavin of the Johns Hopkins University writes an extended review of William Burns’ The back channel: A memoir of American diplomacy and the case for its renewal.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ The potential role of emerging producers in new technologies is discussed in Yoram Evron, ‘4IR technologies in the Israel Defence Forces: blurring traditional boundaries’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 44/4 (2021), 572–93; Paul Kallender & Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Japan’s Emerging Trajectory as a “Cyber Power”: From Securitisation to Militarisation of Cyberspace’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/1-2 (2017), 118–45; and Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘Military-technological innovation in small states: The cases of Israel and Singapore’, The Journal of Strategic Studies (forthcoming). On the problems of extended deterrence, see Se Young Jang, ‘The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/4 (2016), 502–20; and Joseph F. Pilat, ‘A Reversal of Fortunes? Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Europe and East Asia’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/4 (2016), 580–91. New alliance structures, formed in response to changing technology and international conditions, are discussed in Timothy Andrews Sayle, ‘A nuclear education: the origins of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 43/6-7 (2020), 920–56; and Luiz Simon, Alexander Lanoszka & Hugo Meijer, ‘Nodal defence: The changing structure of U.S. alliance systems in Europe and Asia’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 44/3 (2021), 360–88.

² Recent publications on the destabilising effect of new technologies include Jacquelyn Schneider, ‘The capability/vulnerability paradox and military revolutions: Implications for computing, cyber, and the onset of war’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/6 (2019), 841–63; Todd S. Sechser, Neil Narang & Caitlin Talmadge. ‘Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/6 (2019), 727–35; and Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Emerging technology and intra-war escalation risks: Evidence from the Cold War, implications for today’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/6 (2019), 864–87. A discussion of the impact of unmanned systems on U.S. grand strategy can be found in Jacqueline L. Hazelton, ‘Drone Strikes and Grand Strategy: Toward a Political Understanding of the Uses of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Attacks in US Security Policy’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/1-2 (2017), 68–91. On autonomous systems, see Magnus Petersson, ‘Small States and Autonomous Systems – the Scandinavian Case’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 44/4 (2021), 594–612; and Michael C. Horowitz ‘When Speed Kills: Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence and Stability’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/6 (2019), 764–88.

³ On the issue of controlling emerging technologies, see Tristan A. Volpe, ‘Dual-Use Distinguishability: How 3D-Printing Shapes The Security Dilemma for Nuclear Programs’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/6 (2019), 814–40; and Heather Williams, ‘Asymmetric Arms Control and Strategic Stability: Scenarios for Limiting Hypersonic Glide Vehicles’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/6 (2019), 789–813. On counterproliferation, see Or Rabinowitz, ‘The dilemma of a “trigger happy” protégé – Israel, France and President Carter’s Iraq policy’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 44/3 (2021), 389–417; and Steven E. Lobell, ‘Why Israel Launched a Preventive Military Strike on Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program (1981): The Fungibility of Power Resources’, The Journal of Strategic Studies (forthcoming).

⁴ A more recent examination of the US-ROK relationship is Se Young Jang, ‘The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/4 (2016), 502–52. Recent publications on asymmetric alliance relationships include Jason J. Castillo & Alexander B. Downes, ‘Loyalty, Hedging, or Exit: How Weaker Alliance Partners Respond to the Rise of New Threats’, The Journal of Strategic Studies (forthcoming); Mats Berdal & Astri Suhrke. ‘A Good Ally – Norway and International Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 2001–2014’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 41/1-2 (2018), 61–88; and Stephen Tankel, ‘Beyond the Double Game: Lessons from Pakistan’s Approach to Islamist Militancy’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 41/4 (2018), 545–75. Other examinations of the formation of Cold War alliances include Jeffrey H. Michaels, ‘Visions of the Next War or Reliving the Last One? Early Alliance Views of War with the Soviet Bloc’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 43/6-7 (2020), 990–1013; Simon J. Moody, ‘Enhancing Political Cohesion in NATO during the 1950s or: How it Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Tactical) Bomb,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/6 (2017), 817–38; and Hassan Elbahtimy, ‘Allies at Arm’s Length: Redefining Egyptian–Soviet Relations in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 42/1 (2019), 91–113.

⁵ On emerging submarine threats, see Adam Lajeunesse & Timothy Choi ‘Here There Be Dragons? Chinese Submarine Options in the Arctic’, The Journal of Strategic Studies (forthcoming); Ian Bowers & Sarah Kirchberger, ‘Not So Disruptive After All: The 4IR, navies and the search for sea control’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 44/4 (2021), 613–36; and Luiz Simón, ‘The “Third” US Offset Strategy and Europe’s “Anti-access” Challenge’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 39/3 (2016), 417–45.