Iranian proxies in the Syrian conflict: Tehran’s ‘forward-defence’ in action

ABSTRACT

This article examines Iran’s ‘forward-defence’ strategy, in particular its deployment of proxy forces in the Syrian conflict. Iran’s expanded presence in regional conflicts is regarded by its adversaries as indication of hegemonic intent, while Tehran posits its regional posture as a defensive response to security threats. We argue that Iran’s ‘forward-defence’ strategy offers practical benefits, shaping strategic realities, and performative benefits, allowing Tehran to propagate a discourse of military fortitude. On balance, however, the strategy has fed suspicions of Iran’s intentions and increased hostility towards the Iranian leadership, thus is likely to be counterproductive.

KEYWORDS:

• Iran
• Syria
• forward-defence
• proxy forces
• security dilemmas

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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¹⁰⁷ Wilner, ‘The Dark Side of Extended Deterrence’

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York [G-18-55949].

Notes on contributors

Shahram Akbarzadeh

Shahram Akbarzadeh is Professor of Middle East and Central Asian Politics and Convenor of Middle East Studies Forum at Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Australia. His latest publications include the Routledge Handbook of International Relations in the Middle East (2020) and (with M Pargoo) Presidential Elections in Iran (2021).

William Gourlay

William Gourlay is a Research Associate at the Middle East Studies Forum at Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Australia. His research focuses on issues of ethnicity, minority and national identities, and conflict in the Middle East. His research has been published in journals including Third World Quarterly, Ethnic and Racial Studies, the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies and Ethnopolitics. He is the author of The Kurds in Erdoǧan’s Turkey (Edinburgh University Press, 2020).

Anoushiravan Ehteshami

Anoushiravan Ehteshami is Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University. He is also the Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Chair in International Relations and Director of the HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Programme in International Relations, Regional Politics and Security. He is, further, Director of the Institute for Middle Eastern & Islamic Studies (IMEIS) at Durham, one of the oldest and noted centres of excellence in Middle Eastern studies in Europe.