From the editors

As of this writing, Russia’s war on Ukraine continues – reduced in scope due to Ukraine’s staunch defense and the surprisingly ineffective military performance of Russia’s mix of professional and conscript troops. This has forced Russia to focus on the Donbass/Luhansk front, where it can bolster its strength with conscripted forces from the “republics.” Information and cyber warfare, previously assessed as a major Russian strength, have not been areas of obvious advantage, and Russian propaganda – while still largely successful at home – has not made much headway in the rest of the world.

Conflict in the 21^st century, both in Europe and in the developing world, re-emphasizes the utility of covert action and non-attributable forces. In our first article, “Revisiting plausible deniability”, Michael Poznansky of the University of Pittsburgh examines this critical concept. He proposes two models – the state model and the executive model. The former attempts to shield the government writ large, when it risks escalation or violations of international law. The latter attempts to protect the head of state, in the event of violations of domestic law or hostile public opinion. He notes that states may pursue plausible deniability for one or both reasons simultaneously and may even shift from one mode to the other. This will complicate signaling efforts in crisis and efforts by historians to understand decision-making in context.¹

Issues of attribution and plausible deniability complicate the assessment of cyber attacks. Richard Harknett (University of Cincinnati) and Max Smeets (ETH-Zurich) examine both the state of the cybersecurity studies field and the potential of future cyber campaigns in their article “Cyber campaigns and strategic outcomes.” They argue that cyber campaigns in the past decade sought to use linked cyber operations to achieve strategic effects without risking escalation to armed conflict. Cyber, they argue, offers an alternative short of war for affecting the national power of rivals, and will become a persistent new element in international power politics without replicating the potential catastrophic consequences of kinetic warfare.²

The prosecution of an overseas war on terror significantly taxed the manpower resources of the U.S. military, leading to claims that the ranks are filled disproportionately from less fortunate groups in society – the poor and the disenfranchised. Andrea Asoni (Charles River Associates), Andrea Gilli (NATO Defence College), Mauro Gilli (ETH Zurich) and Tino Sanandaji (Stockholm School of Economics) examine the post-9/11 US military in “A mercenary army of the poor? Technological change and the demographic composition of the post-9/11 U.S. military”. The authors employ two variables – socio-economic status and technological and cognitive skills and competencies. They find that the demands of technology, operations, tactics, and doctrine require soldiers with higher sklll levels than in older conscript armies. Comparing metrics such as family income, family wealth and cognitive abilities, military personnel are roughly comparable to or slightly better than the average American citizen. The high skill level of recruits, as contrasted for instance with the low quality of Russian conscripts, may help explain the relatively high levels of military effectiveness the US has demonstrated in recent conflicts.³

Critics often claim that domestic debates over strategy and policy harm counterinsurgency efforts by democratic states. Jonathan Monten (University College London) and Radha Iyengar Plumb (RAND Corporation) investigate this hypothesis in their article “Is there an ‘emboldenment’ effect: Evidence from the insurgency in Iraq”, examining the public (and often contentious) US debate over counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. They find that even though Iraqi insurgents knew of the US debates, it does not appear to have resulted in either an increase in attacks on US forces (to exploit casualty sensitivity) or on Iraqi civilians (to increase the impression that the US was losing the counterinsurgency battle, and thereby affect the domestic debate). One possible explanation is the de-centralized nature of the Iraqi insurgency, which may have limited coordination between factions.⁴

Henning Tamm (University of St. Andrew’s) examines the cohesion of rebel militant groups in his article “In the balance: External troop support and rebel fragmentation in the Second Congo War”. The Congo conflict demonstrated the critical role state sponsors can play in the evolution of armed groups. By sending troops to fight alongside foreign rebels, state sponsors can strengthen existing leaders, replace them with a rival, or encourage a rival to form an alternative splinter group (more compatible with the sponsor’s interests).⁵

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ On plausible deniability and covert action, see Cormac, ‘Coordinating Covert Action’, 692–717; Jensen, Valeriano, and Maness, ‘Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls: Cyber Strategy with a Russian Twist’, 212–34; Maher, ‘The Covert Campaign against Iran’s Nuclear Program’, 1014–1040; Wilner ‘The Dark Side of Extended Deterrence’, 410–437; and Scazzieri ‘Europe, Russia and the Ukraine Crisis’, 392–416.

² On cyber war and emerging technological competition, see Jensen, Valeriano, and Maness, ‘Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls’, 212–34; Junio, ‘How Probable Is Cyber War?’, 125–33; Liff, ‘Cyberwar: A New “Absolute Weapon”?’, 401–28, and ‘The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War, Redux’, 134–38; McGraw, ‘Cyber War Is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In)’, 109–19; Rid, ‘Cyber War Will Not Take Place’, 5–32; Smeets, ‘A Matter of Time’, 6–32; Stone, ‘Cyber War Will Take Place!’, 101–08; Tor, ‘“Cumulative Deterrence” as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence’, 92–117; Sechser, ‘Neil Narang & Caitlin Talmadge’,727–735; Talmadge, ‘Emerging Technology and Intra-war Escalation Risks’, 864–887, and ‘Travis Sharp Theorizing Cyber Coercion’, 898–926.

³ See Biddle, ‘Speed Kills? Reassessing the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of Saddam’, 3–46; Biddle and Zirkle, ‘Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World’, 171–212; Zegart, ‘Cheap Fights, Credible Threats’, 6–46; and Broekhof, Kitzen and Osinga, ‘A Tale of Two Mosuls, The Resurrection of the Iraqi Armed Forces and the Military Defeat of ISIS’, 96–118.

⁴ Malkasian, ‘Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle of Fallujah’, 423–52.

⁵ Bowen and Andrew, ‘Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas’, 312–43; Reiter, ‘Command and Military Effectiveness in Rebel and Hybrid Battlefield Coalitions’, 211–233; and Tankel, ‘Beyond the Double Game’,545–575.