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ABSTRACT
This article conducts a fresh analysis of the key developments – strategic and technological – that resulted in the world’s first penetrating stealth bomber. It explores the tectonic shift in defense thinking, which began in the late 1960s as it became widely understood that the Soviet Union had matched the United States’ advantage in nuclear weaponry. It then examines how the United States grappled with the issue of Soviet conventional numerical superiority and whether advances in air defenses rendered penetrating airpower – the air leg of the nuclear triad and a critical component of the United States’ emerging strategy – impotent.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Daniel Moran, John Sheehan, James Wirtz, Emily Meierding, Erik Dahl, David Young and Rebecca Young for their guidance and useful feedback. The author also thanks the two anonymous reviewers who provided constructive criticism and sound advice.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 The nuclear triad consists of air-breathing strategic bombers, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). Each leg is critical to nuclear deterrence.
2 Richard A. Hunt, Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post Vietnam Military 1969–1973 (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense 2015), Vol. 7, 314; Gordon S. Barrass, ‘The Renaissance in American strategy and the Ending of the Great Cold War’, Military Review 90/1 (2010), 103.
3 President Richard Nixon’s National Security Decision Memorandum-95, published in November 1970, reveals the extent to which the shift to conventional warfare occurred. See NSDM 95 for more.
4 Boyd D. Sutton, John R. Landry, Malcolm B. Armstrong, Howell M. Estes III and Wesley K. Clark, ‘Deep attack concepts and the Defense of Central Europe’, Survival 26/2 (1984), 51.
5 Jim Tegnelia and Rich Wagner, ‘Technology-Strategy Seminar: NATO’s AirLand Battle Strategy and Extended Deterrence’, YouTube, 13 Sept. 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rSukv1CcORk&t=3657s.
6 Sutton et al., ‘Deep attack concepts’, 50–70; Tegnelia and Wagner, ‘Technology-Strategy Seminar’.
7 Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1969–1972 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the JCS 2013), 114–5.
8 Barrass, ‘American Strategy’, 103.
9 Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Airpower (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2000), 13. Detailed analysis of the losses revealed that AAA claimed the lion’s share at 89% followed by 8% attributed to SAMs, and a mere 3% to enemy fighters. See: Kenneth P. Werrell, Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air Defense (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press 2005) 2nd ed., 118.
10 Ronald Bruce Frankum, Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964–1975 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2005), Vol. 3, 164.
11 Calvin R. Johnson, Linebacker Operations, September – December 1972, Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Prepared by HQ PACAF, Hickam AFB, HI, 31 Dec. 1978. Declassified from Secret, 60–66.
12 Werrell, Archie to SAM, 149–155.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 154–5; John Kreis, Air Warfare and Air Base Air Defense, 1914–1973 (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History 1988), 336.
15 Joseph S. Doyle, The Yom Kippur War and the Shaping of the United States Air Force (Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press 2019), 17–9.
16 Edward C. Keefer, Harold Brown: Offsetting the Soviet Military Challenge 1977–1981 (Washington DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense 2017) Vol. 9, 575.
17 Department of Defense Directive, ‘Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’, 7 Feb. 1958, https://www.darpa.mil/ddm_gallery/ARPA-Founding-Directive.JPG.
18 Richard J. Barber Associates, Inc., ‘The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958–1974’, Dec. 1975, III-9, https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/dtic/a154363.pdf.
19 Barber, ‘Advanced Research Projects’, X-3.
20 Peter J. Westwick, ‘Oral History Interview with Malcolm R. Currie’, 9 May 2013, https://hdl.huntington.org/digital/collection/p15150coll7/id/9220/rec/1.
21 Ian A. Maddock, ‘DARPA’s Stealth Revolution: Now You See Them…’ DARPA (2012), 152, https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/2O24%20Global%20Nav%20-%20About%20Us%20-%20History%20-%20Resources%20-%2050th%20-%20Stealth%20-Approved.pdf.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 James Tegnelia, email message to author 23, August 2021.
25 Westwick, ‘Interview with Malcolm R. Currie’; William D. O’Neil, What to Buy? The Role of Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E): Lessons from the 1970s, (Alexandria VA: Institute for Defense Analyses 2011), 44; Richard H. Van Atta, Seymour J. Deitchman and Sidney G. Reed, DARPA Technical Accomplishments (Alexandria VA: Institute for Defense Analyses 1991) Vol. III, II–14.
26 Van Atta et al., DARPA Technical Accomplishment, II–14.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Robert H. Van Atta, Michael J. Lippitz, Jasper C. Lupo, Rob Mahoney and Jack H. Nunn Transformation and Transition: DARPA’s Role in Fostering an Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs, Volume I – Overall Assessment (Alexandria VA: Institute for Defense Analyses 2003), 12.
30 Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition, Vol. I, 11–2.
31 Ibid., 11.
32 O’Neil, What to Buy? 62–3.
33 See note 30 above.
34 National Research Council, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, Air Force Studies Board and Committee on Future Air Force Needs for Survivability, Future Air Force Needs for Survivability (Washington DC: The National Academies Press 2006), 78. https://doi.org/10.17226/11743.
35 Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition, Vol. II, I–2. Myers originally called the project ‘Harvey’ after a movie depicting an invisible rabbit in the 1950s.
36 Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition, Vol. I, 12; Peter J. Westwick, Stealth: The Secret Contest to Invent Invisible Aircraft (New York NY: Oxford University Press 2020), 26.
37 Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition, Vol. I, 11.
38 David C. Aronstein and Albert C. Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A: Evolution of the Stealth Fighter (Reston VA: American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics 1997), 14.
39 Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 14; O’Neil, What to Buy, 63.
40 Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 14.
41 Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 14–5; Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed (London: Warner 1995), 23–4.
42 Rich and Janos, Skunk Works, 23–4.
43 Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 14–5; Rich and Janos, Skunk Works, 23–4. Critical to Lockheed’s entrance into the competition was Ben Rich’s approval to share early efforts to decrease detectability in the U-2 and SR-71 programs that were so highly classified by the CIA that DARPA did not know of them. See Rich and Janos, Skunk Works, 22–5.
44 Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition, Vol. I, 13; George Heilmeier, ‘Interview by Unknown’, 16 Jan. 2007, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/DARPA/15-F-0751_DARPA_Director_George_Heilmeier.pdf.
45 Rich and Janos, Skunk Works, 18; Robert C. Seamans, Secretary of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974: Hearings Before the Senate: Subcommittee on Appropriations (2 April, 1973) 93rd Cong, 1st Session, 39; John D. Ryan, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974: Hearings Before the Senate: Subcommittee on Appropriations (2 April, 1973) 93rd Cong, 1st Session, 65–6.
46 In addition to other missions (i.e., Close Air Support, Aerial Interdiction, etc.), official Air Force analysis following the Vietnam War concluded that air superiority greatly increased the chances of bombers making it to their targets. See: Melvin F. Porter, Linebacker: Overview of the First 120 Days, Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Prepared by HQ PACAF, Hickam AFB, HI, 27 Sept. 1973. Declassified from Top Secret. 63.
47 Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition, Vol. I, 13; Westwick, ‘Interview with Malcolm R. Currie’; David C. Jones, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976: Hearings Before the Senate: Subcommittee on Appropriations (26 February, 1975) 94th Cong, 1st Session, 215, 225–6.
48 Keefer, Harold Brown, 578–9.
49 On September 15, 2021, the author spoke with Dr. James Tegnelia who noted that at the time ‘The Air Force leadership (primarily General Wilber Creech) believed that the strategy of a larger Air Force was the most effective strategy for the Air Force with or without stealth. A smaller Air Force dependent on stealth was a riskier strategy for air superiority particularly before stealth was thoroughly investigated. The U.S. military, in general, will not agree to applying technical improvements to offset force size because as a rule, countermeasures to technical advances are developed by a potential enemy and the U.S. is thus left with a smaller less effective force’.
50 Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition, Vol. II, S-3; Heilmeier, ‘Interview by Unknown’.
51 Heilmeier, ‘Interview by Unknown’.
52 James Tegnelia, email message to author November 15, 2021.
53 James Tegnelia, email message to author August 23, 2021.
54 Heilmeier, ‘Interview by Unknown’; O’Neil, What to Buy? 64–65.
55 Heilmeier, ‘Interview by Unknown’.
56 Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 28; Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition, Vol. II, I–4; Keefer, Harold Brown, 579.
57 Westwick, Stealth, 29.
58 Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 195–6; Rich and Janos, Skunk Works, 19–21.
59 Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 26 & 29.
60 Westwick, Stealth, 29; Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 195–6.
61 Ken Perko and John M. Griffin, Pioneers of Stealth: From Have Blue to B-2 (Location Unknown: Lulu Publishing 2017), 265; Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 32.
62 Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 33.
63 James Tegnelia, email message to author August 23, 2021.
64 Westwick, Stealth, 94.
65 Rich and Janos, Skunk Works, 26.
66 Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 39; James Tegnelia, email message to author August 23, 2021.
67 Rich and Janos, Skunk Works, 36, 63.
68 Keefer, Harold Brown, 580–581.
69 Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 56.
70 Paul G. Kaminski, ‘Low Observables: The Air Force and Stealth’, in Jacob Neufeld, George M. Watson, Jr., and David Chenoweth (ed.), Technology and the Air Force: A Retrospective Assessment (Washington DC: Air Force History and Museums Program 1997), 302; Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 56.
71 Kaminksi, ‘Low Observables’, 303; Aronstein and Piccirillo, 56.
72 Kaminksi, ‘Low Observables’, 303; Joseph Ralston in Griffin, Pioneers of Stealth, 268–269.
73 Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 58.
74 Kaminksi, ‘Low Observables’, 303. General David C. Jones went on to serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
75 Kelly Burke, interview by Hugh Ahmann, April 22–23, 1991, in Shalimar, FL, transcript, United States Air Force Oral History Program, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL. 282.
76 Kaminksi, ‘Low Observables’, 303; Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 58.
77 Joseph Ralston in Griffin, Pioneers of Stealth, 269.
78 Keefer, Harold Brown, 582; Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 60; Joseph Ralston in Griffin, Pioneers of Stealth, 269.
79 To lead the LRRDPP, Lukasik and Rosengren enlisted heavy hitters across the U.S. defense apparatus, notably Albert Wohlstetter. The directors of DARPA and the Defense Nuclear Agency hoped Wohlstetter’s notoriety would overcome any resistance to the study as it was commissioned outside the walls of the Pentagon. See: Sharon Weinberger, The Imagineers of War: the Untold History of DARPA, the Pentagon Agency That Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2017).
80 D. A. Paolucci, ‘Summary Report of the Long Range Research and Development Planning Program, Draft’, 7 Feb. 1975, declassified from Top Secret, 2. www.albertwohlstetter.com/writings/LRRDPP. Of note, there is no evidence to suggest that Currie motivated the commissioning of the LRRDPP.
81 Weinberger, Imagineers of War, 216.
82 Paolucci, ‘Long Range Research’, 2.
83 Ibid., 7–8.
84 As precision laser guided weapons were used to great effect at the conclusion of Vietnam and in the Yom Kippur War, it is likely the authors were influenced by those conflicts. For more on the first uses of precision, laser guided munitions see: David R. Mets, ‘Stretching the Rubber Band: Smart Weapons for Air-to-Ground Attack’, in Jacob Neufeld, George M. Watson, Jr., and David Chenoweth (ed.), Technology and the Air Force: A Retrospective Assessment (Washington DC: Air Force History and Museums Program 1997), 130; Doyle, Yom Kippur War, 40.
85 Robert C. Wolcott and Michael J. Lippitz, ‘Innovation in Government: The United States Department of Defense- Two Cases’, Case 5-207-251 (KEL346), January (Evanston, IL: Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University 2007), 8; Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition, Vol. I, 17.
86 Wolcott and Lippitz, ‘Innovation in Government’, 8; Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition, Volume I, S4; Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition, Volume 2, S6.
87 Wolcott and Lippitz, ‘Innovation in Government’, 8.
88 David W. Cheney and Richard Van Atta, ‘DARPA’s Process for Creating New Programs’, in William B. Bonvillian, Richard Van Atta, and Patrick Windham (eds.), The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies Perspectives on the U.S.: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Cambridge UK: Open Book Publishers 2019), 246. https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.
89 Wolcott and Lippitz, ‘Innovation in Government’, 8–9.
90 While it was not directly stated, the 1976 DSB study was a direct outgrowth of the LRRDPP. See: Defense Science Board, ‘1976 Summer Study Final Report on Conventional Counterforce Against a PACT Attack ODDR&E’, 26 May 1977 (Declassified from Secret), 1.
91 Defense Science Board, ‘Conventional Counterforce’, 1.
92 Ibid., 21.
93 Keefer, Harold Brown, 588.
94 Westwick, Stealth, 125–6; Peter J. Westwick, ‘Oral History Interview with John Cashen. First Interview’, 15 Dec. 2010, https://hdl.huntington.org/digital/collection/p15150coll7/id/45053/rec/1. Of note, the radar would have Moving Target Indicator and Synthetic Aperture Radar capabilities.
95 Westwick, ‘Interview with John Cashen’.
96 Westwick, Stealth, 124, 133; Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 33.
97 Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition, Vol. 2, I–5; Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 33.
98 See note 95 above.
99 The story of how Northrop was able to achieve stealth through curved designs is well told in Peter J. Westwick, Stealth, Chapter 9.
100 Volker Jannsen, ‘Oral history interview with James Kinnu. Second Interview’, 8 Dec. 2010, https://hdl.huntington.org/digital/collection/p15150coll7/id/45046/rec/11; Westwick, Stealth, 133.
101 The story of how Northrop gained a sole-source contract is only summarized here. There is more to the story and is well-told in Westwick, Stealth, Chapter 9. Irving Waaland, interview by Volker Janssen, November 10, 2010, in Fullerton, California, transcript, The Huntington Library and University of Southern California Institute on California and the West Aerospace Oral History Project. https://hdl.huntington.org/digital/collection/p15150coll7/id/45052/rec/1; Westwick, Stealth, 133.
102 Of Note, the first Tacit Blue prototype would not fly until 1982.
103 Peter J. Westwick, ‘Oral History Interview with Kent Kresa’, 7 Dec. 2018, https://hdl.huntington.org/digital/collection/p15150coll7/id/45047/rec/2.
104 Arthur Goldberg, ‘Interview with William Perry’, 9 Jan. 1981, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_PerryWilliam1-9-81.pdf?ver=2020-03-02-085133-340.
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Adam B. Young
Adam B. Young is the Deputy Director of Intelligence for Air University. He is a career Air Force intelligence officer and holds degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School (Ph.D.), the University of Kansas (M.A.), the Air University (M.A.), and the University of Southern California (B.S.). His research interests include military history, technology, strategy, organizational culture, and politics. The views in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect those of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.