State or soldier? Explaining China’s decisionmaking in India-China border crises

ABSTRACT

Prevailing explanations for India-China border crises rely on rational actor models and assumes centralized decisionmaking. Instead, I argue that the several recent India-China border crises cannot be understood without separately interrogating the role of the PLA in China’s national security policymaking. I argue that the PLA uses its operational independence to continuously challenge Indian forces on the contested border. The Indian forces, when confronted, pushed back. The several recent border standoffs are a manifestation of the interactions between the two armed forces.

KEYWORDS:

• India
• China
• PLA
• India-China border
• crises

Acknowledgments

The author is very grateful to Rajesh Basrur, Taylor Fravel, Sumit Ganguly, Sheena Greitens, Dinshaw Mistry, Rajesh Rajagopalan, Andrew Scobell, Susan Shirk, and Jeremi Suri for their thoughtful comments on various drafts of the article. I also thank the two reviewers for providing thoughtful comments and suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

¹ Shreya Dhoundial, ‘Exclusive: India Has Not Ceded Land; China Has Just Earned a Bad Name; At Least 45 Chinese Soldiers Were Killed, Says Lt Gen YK Joshi’, News 18, 17 February 2021, https://www.news18.com/news/india/exclusive-india-has-not-ceded-land-china-has-just-earned-a-bad-name-at-least-45-chinese-soldiers-were-killed-3444080.html.

² Kunal Purohit, ‘China Using Border Tensions to Warn India Not to Side with US: Ex-Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran’, South China Morning Post, 1 June 2020, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3087030/china-using-border-tensions-warn-india-not-side-us-ex-foreign.

³ James Griffiths, ‘Why Are China and India Fighting over an Inhospitable Strip of the Himalayas?’, CNN, 18 June 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/17/asia/india-china-aksai-chin-himalayas-intl-hnk/index.html.

⁴ M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Sovereignty Obsession: Beijing’s Need to Project Strength Explains the Border Clash With India’, Foreign Affairs, 26 June 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-06-26/chinas-sovereignty-obsession.

⁵ Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘Evasive Balancing: India’s Unviable Indo-Pacific Strategy’, International Affairs 96, 1 (2020): 81 & 89.

⁶ Rajesh Basrur, ‘Modi’s Foreign Policy Fundamentals: A Trajectory Unchanged’, International Affairs 93/1 (2017), 13–16.

⁷ Liu Zongyi, ‘India Playing Wily Game with US, Russia and China’, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 11 September 2018, http://www.siis.org.cn/Commentary/3032.jhtml.

⁸ Liu Zongyi, ‘US, India to Remain Strange Bedfellows Regardless of Any Military Pact’, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 10 October 2020, http://www.siis.org.cn/Commentary/3539.jhtml; and Liu Zongyi, ‘Pro-US Strategy May Push India into the Abyss’, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 7 January 2021, http://www.siis.org.cn/Commentary/3613.jhtml.

⁹ Lou Chunhao, ‘印度在莫迪第二任期内的外交政策重新定位和未来前景 [India’s Foreign Policy Re-Orientation in Modi’s Second Term and Future Prospects]’, Contemporary International Relations 5 (2019), 122–24.

¹⁰ Lou, ‘印度在莫迪第二任期内的外交政策重新定位和未来前景 [India’s Foreign Policy Re-Orientation in Modi’s Second Term and Future Prospects]’, 133.

¹¹ Sheela Bhatt, ‘We Have to Be Prepared for China Trying to Take It to the next Level’, Rediff.com, 10 July 2020, https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/be-prepared-for-china-taking-it-to-next-level/20200706.htm.

¹² Ye Hailin, ‘中国崛起与次要战略方向挑战的应对——以洞朗事件后的中印关系为例 [China’s Rise and the Response to Challenges in Secondary Strategic Directions——Examining Sino-Indian Relations after the Doklam Incident as an Example]’, World Economics and Politics 4 (2018), 106–28; 158–59. See also M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Stability in a Secondary Strategic Direction: China and the Border Dispute with India after 1962’, in Kanti Bajpai, Selina Ho, and Manjari Chatterjee Miller (ed.), Routledge Handbook of China-India Relations 1st edition (London, UK: Routledge, 2020), 169–79.

¹³ Zhou Bo, ‘China and India Should Look Back to Move Forward on Border Impasse’, South China Morning Post, 15 June 2021, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3137178/china-and-india-should-look-back-move-forward-border-impasse.

¹⁴ ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on October 31, 2019’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Iceland, 31 October 2019, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceis//eng/fyrth/t1712371.htm.

¹⁵ Lou, ‘印度在莫迪第二任期内的外交政策重新定位和未来前景 [India’s Foreign Policy Re-Orientation in Modi’s Second Term and Future Prospects]’, 118–22; Wang Shida, ‘印度教民族主义强势崛起及其影响 [The Rise of Hindu Nationalism and Its Impact]’, Contemporary International Relations 30/3 (2020), 67; and Liu Zongyi, ‘Kashmir Issue Proves India Unqualified for UN Security Council Seat’, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 12 August 2019, http://www.siis.org.cn/Commentary/3214.jhtml.

¹⁶ Sheela Bhatt, ‘India-China: “More Dangerous than Before”, Redff.com, 16 December 2021, https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/india-china-more-dangerous-than-before/20200703.htm.

¹⁷ Sumit Ganguly and Andrew Scobell, ‘The Himalayan Impasse: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Wake of Doklam’, Washington Quarterly 41/3 (2018), 183.

¹⁸ Committee on External Affairs (2017–18), Sixteenth Lok Sabha, India, ‘Sino-India Relations Including Doklam, Border Situation and Cooperation in International Organizations’, (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, September 2018), 5 & 37, http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/External%20Affairs/16_External_Affairs_22.pdf.

¹⁹ Liu Zongyi, ‘How Should China Respond to the Current Provocations of India?’, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 4 October 2020, http://www.siis.org.cn/Research/info/5130.

²⁰ Mathieu Duchâtel, ‘Military Options for Xi’s Strategic Ambitions’ (Paris, France: Institut Montaigne, Februay 2021), https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/publications/china-trends-8-military-options-xis-strategic-ambitions.

²¹ James Mulvenon, ‘China: Conditional Compliance’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 325.

²² Ibid., 318.

²³ James Mulvenon, ‘China: Conditional Compliance’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 325. You Ji refers to the shaping role as PLA’s directional leadership (方向主导). See: You Ji, ‘The PLA and Diplomacy: Unraveling Myths about the Military Role in Foreign Policy Making’, Journal of Contemporary China 23/86 (2014), 238.

²⁴ Mulvenon, ‘China: Conditional Compliance’, 2001, 317.

²⁵ Michael D. Swaine, ‘The PLA Role in China’s Foreign Policy and Crisis Behavior’, in Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (ed.), PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking (Washington DC: Stanford University Press, 2015), 147.

²⁶ Ibid., 153.

²⁷ Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell, ‘Introduction: PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking’, in Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (ed.), PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, Stanford Security Series (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 15.

²⁸ Mulvenon, ‘China: Conditional Compliance’, 2001, 332–33.

²⁹ Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders, Civil-Military Relations in China: Assessing the PLA’s Role in Elite Politics (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, August 2010), 5.

³⁰ Saunders and Scobell, ‘Introduction: PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking’, 8–9. See also Nan Li, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China: From Symbiosis to Quasi-Institutionalization (Singapore, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 12.

³¹ Saunders and Scobell, ‘Introduction: PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking’, 8.

³² Ibid., 12.

³³ Swaine, The PLA Role in China’s Foreign Policy and Crisis Behavior, 155.

³⁴ International Crisis Group, ‘Stirring up the South China Sea (I)’ (Beijing/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 23 April 2012), 14–16, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/south-china-sea/stirring-south-china-sea-i.

³⁵ Yun Sun, ‘Chinese National Security Decision-Making: Processes and Challenges’, CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, May 2013), 20, https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinese-national-security-decision-making-processes-and-challenges/.

³⁶ Isaac B. Kardon and Phillip C. Saunders, ‘Reconsidering the PLA as an Interest Group’, in Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (ed.), PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking (Washington DC: Stanford University Press, 2015), 42–43; and Phillip C. Saunders and Michael Kiselycznyk, ’Assessing Chinese Military Transparency’, (Washington DC: National Defense University, 2010), 35–36.

³⁷ Saunders and Scobell, ‘Introduction: PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking’, 17–18.

³⁸ Suisheng Zhao, ‘From Affirmative to Assertive Patriots: Nationalism in Xi Jinping’s China’, The Washington Quarterly, 2021.

³⁹ Saunders and Scobell, ‘Introduction: PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking’, 13.

⁴⁰ Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, ‘Conclusion: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms’, in Phillip C. Saunders et al. (ed.), Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019), 711.

⁴¹ David M. Finkelstein, ‘Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization and Reform of the PLA’, CNA China Studies (Arlington, VA: CNA, 15 January 2016), 19, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-U-012560-Final.pdf.

⁴² David M. Lampton, ‘Xi Jinping and the National Security Commission: Policy Coordination and Political Power’, Journal of Contemporary China 24/95 (2015), 766, 773.

⁴³ Tai Ming Cheung, ‘The Chinese National Security State Emerges from the Shadows to Center Stage’, China Leadership Monitor, 1 September 2020, https://www.prcleader.org/cheung.

⁴⁴ Lampton, ‘Xi Jinping and the National Security Commission: Policy Coordination and Political Power’, 766, 773.

⁴⁵ ‘Hearing on CCP Decision-Making and the 20th Party Congress’ (Washington, DC, 27 January 2022), 231, https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/ccp-decision-making-and-20th-party-congress.

⁴⁶ Sheena Chestnut Greitens, ‘The China Questions 2: Critical Insights Into US-China Relations’, in Maria Adele Carrai, Jennifer Rudolph, and Michael Szonyi (ed.), How Does China Think About National Security? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2022), 172–73.

⁴⁷ Susan L. Shirk, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2023), 210 & 292.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Linda Jakobson, ‘China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors’, (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, December 2014), 1, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/china%E2%80%99s-unpredictable-maritime-security-actors.

⁵⁰ Yu Jie and Lucy Ridout, ‘Who Decides China’s Foreign Policy? The Role of Central Government, Provincial-Level Authorities and State-Owned Enterprises’ (London, UK: Chatham House, November 2021), 18–19, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/11/who-decides-chinas-foreign-policy.

⁵¹ Shirk, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise, 279–80.

⁵² Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 22.

⁵³ PTI, ‘China Prefers Border Pact with India on “Code of Conduct”, Differs with PM Modi’s LAC Clarification’, The Indian Express, 5 June 2015, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/china-prefers-pact-with-india-on-code-of-conduct-for-border-peace/.

⁵⁴ Ananth Krishnan, India’s China Challenge: A Journey Through China’s Rise and What It Means for India (Noida, India: Harper Collins, 2020), 179–80.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 180–81.

⁵⁶ Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, 2016, 19.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Manoj Joshi, Sino-Indian Border Deadlock: Time to Rewrite India Playbook (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation (ORF) August 2020), 22.

⁶¹ 戴秉国 [Dai Bingguo], 战略对话: 戴秉国回忆录 [Strategic Dialogues: Dai Bingguo’s Memoirs] (Beijing, China: 人民出版社 [People’s Press] 2016), 270.

⁶² Dr. P. B. Sinha and Col. A. A. Athale, History of the Conflict with China, 1962 (New Delhi, India: Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992), xxiv; G. S. Bajpai, China’s Shadow over Sikkim: The Politics of Intimidation (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1999), 166–67.

⁶³ Taylor M. Fravel, ‘The PLA and National Security Decisionmaking: Insights from China’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes’, in Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (ed.), PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, Stanford Security Series (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 254.

⁶⁴ Mohan Malik, ‘Victory Without Bloodshed: China’s India Strategy’, The Diplomat, 20 August 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/victory-without-bloodshed-chinas-india-strategy/.

⁶⁵ John Cherian, ‘Defused by Diplomacy’, Frontline, 31 May 2013, https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/defused-by-diplomacy/article4705449.ece.

⁶⁶ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ‘Transcript of External Affairs Minister’s Media Briefing on His Visit to China’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 11 May 2013, https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/21694/Transcript_of_External_Affairs_Ministers_media_briefing_on_his_visit_to_China.

⁶⁷ Shivshankar Menon, India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021), 330.

⁶⁸ Indrani Bagchi, ‘Depsang Bulge Incursion Accidental, Chinese Miliary Thinktank Says’, Times of India, 15 July 2013, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Depsang-Bulge-incursion-accidental-Chinese-military-thinktank-says/articleshow/21088756.cms.

⁶⁹ Sanjeev Miglani, ‘With Canal and Hut, India Stands up to China on Disputed Frontier’, Reuters, 24 September 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/india-china-modi-chumar-army-ladakh/insight-with-canal-and-hut-india-stands-up-to-china-on-disputed-frontier-idINKCN0HJ2FU20140924.

⁷⁰ Jason Burke and Tania Branigan, ‘India-China Border Standoff Highlights Tensions before Xi Visit’, The Guardian, 16 September 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/16/india-china-border-standoff-xi-visit.

⁷¹ Shishir Gupta, ‘China, India in Border Skirmish Ahead of Xi Visit’, Hindustan Times, 16 September 2014, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/china-india-in-border-skirmish-ahead-of-xi-visit/story-es46bqLyFXY5qgosyMnQAK.html.

⁷² Nitin A. Gokhale, Securing India the Modi Way: Pathankot, Surgical Strikes and More (New Delhi: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 128.

⁷³ Srijan Shukla, ‘How India and China Resolved Three Major Stand-Offs in the Modi Era’, The Print, 27 May 2020, https://theprint.in/defence/how-india-and-china-resolved-three-major-stand-offs-in-the-modi-era/430594/.

⁷⁴ John Elliott, ‘India and China Cement Trade Deal as Troops Face Off Across the Border’, Newsweek, 20 September 2014, https://www.newsweek.com/india-and-china-cement-trade-deal-troops-face-across-border-271855.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 25.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ ‘Press Statement by Prime Minister during the Visit of President Xi Jinping of China to India (September 18, 2014)’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 18 September 2014, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/24014/Press+Statement+by+Prime+Minister+during+the+visit+of+President+Xi+Jinping+of+China+to+India+September+18+2014.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Gautam Bambawale, ‘China: End of the Era of Expansionism’, in Harsh V. Pant (ed.), Politics and Geopolitics: Decoding India’s Neighbourhood Challenge (New Delhi: Rupa Publications India, 2021), 42.

⁸¹ Eric Meyer, ‘Who Sabotaged Chinese President Xi Jinping’s India Visit?’, Forbes, 23 September 2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericrmeyer/2014/09/23/who-sabotaged-xi-jinpings-india-visit/?sh=64adab6770fa; Shirk, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise, 214.

⁸² Rajeev Sharma, ‘China Objects to Sikkim Bunkers’, The Tribune, 2 September 2007, https://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070903/nation.htm#7.

⁸³ Jonathan Holslag, ‘The Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32/6 (2009), 818.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Gokhale, Securing India the Modi Way: Pathankot, Surgical Strikes and More, 137.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Mitra Devirupa, ‘In Official Testimony to MPs, Government Revealed Full Story of Doklam’, The Wire, 15 August 2018, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/doklam-parliamentary-standing-committee-india-china.

⁸⁸ Gokhale, Securing India the Modi Way: Pathankot, Surgical Strikes and More, 138.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 139.

⁹⁰ Sushant Singh, ‘Five Months on, Understanding Doklam “Disengagement”, a Few Other Issues’, The Indian Express, 22 January 2018, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/five-months-on-understanding-doklam-disengagement-a-few-other-issues-india-china-5033943/.

⁹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Government of Bhutan, ‘Press Release’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Government of Bhutan, 29 June 2017, https://www.mfa.gov.bt/?p=4799.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ‘Recent Developments in Doklam Area’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 30 June 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/28572/Recent_Developments_in_Doklam_Area.

⁹⁴ Committee on External Affairs (2017–18), Sixteenth Lok Sabha, India, ‘Sino-India Relations Including Doklam, Border Situation and Cooperation in International Organizations’, 21.

⁹⁵ Hu Shisheng, ‘洞朗对峙危机与中印关系的未来 [The Doklam Standoff Crisis and the Future of Sino-Indian Relations]’, Contemporary International Relations 1 (February 2018), 127; and Luo Jianbo, ‘印度对中国的主要担忧和中印关系的未来 [India’s Major Concerns about China and the Future of China-India Relations]’, Contemporary International Relations 4 (2017), 97, 130–31.

⁹⁶ Hu, ‘洞朗对峙危机与中印关系的未来 [The Doklam Standoff Crisis and the Future of Sino-Indian Relations]’, 133–34.

⁹⁷ Snehesh Alex Philip, ‘India-China Border Tensions Flare up Again as Soldiers Get into Scuffles in Ladakh, Sikkim’, The Print, 10 May 2020, https://theprint.in/defence/india-china-border-tensions-flare-up-again-as-soldiers-get-into-scuffles-in-ladakh-sikkim/418429/.

⁹⁸ Dinakar Peri, ‘Indian, Chinese Troops Face off in Eastern Ladakh, Sikkim’, The Hindu, 10 May 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-chinese-troops-face-off-in-eastern-ladakh-sikkim/article31548893.ece.

⁹⁹ Ananth Krishnan, ‘Behind New Incidents, a Changed Dynamic along India-China Border’, The Hindu, 19 May 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/news-analysis-behind-new-incidents-a-changed-dynamic-along-india-china-border/article31627397.ece.

¹⁰⁰ Shubha Roy, ‘As LAC Heats up, India and China Activate Border Mechanism Talks’, The Indian Express, 27 May 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/as-lac-heats-up-india-and-china-activate-border-mechanism-talks-6428896/.

¹⁰¹ Sushant Singh, Shubhajit Roy, and Krishn Kaushik, ‘Delhi Prepares for Long Haul: Military, Diplomatic Engagements to Continue’, The Indian Express, 8 June 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-china-ladakh-lac-border-6447884/.

¹⁰² Krishn Kaushik, ‘Army Chief: Disengagement Started from Galwan, Both Doing It in Phased Manner’, The Indian Express, 14 June 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-china-troops-disengagement-galwan-6457738/.

¹⁰³ Shiv Aroor, ‘3 Separate Brawls, “outsider” Chinese Troops & More: Most Detailed Account of the Brutal June 15 Galwan Battle’, India Today, 21 June 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/3-separate-brawls-outsider-chinese-troops-more-most-detailed-account-of-the-brutal-june-15-galwan-battle-1691185–2020-06-21.

¹⁰⁴ Shiv Aroor, ‘Violent India-China Clash at LAC: What Really Happened That Night’, India Today, 17 June 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/bloody-india-china-faceoff-at-lac-timeline-of-galwan-clash-1689785–2020-06-17.

¹⁰⁵ Hu Shisheng and Wang Jue, ‘印度对华示强外交的行为逻辑 [The Behavioral Logic behind India’s Tough Foreign Policy toward China]’, Contemporary International Relations 30/5 (October 2020), 38.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 39 & 47.

¹⁰⁷ Hu and Wang, ‘印度对华示强外交的行为逻辑 [The Behavioral Logic behind India’s Tough Foreign Policy toward China]’, 39 & 47.

¹⁰⁸ Ajay Banerjee, ‘Sukhois, Tanks Stacked up along LAC’, Tribune India News, 19 June 2020, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/sukhois-tanks-stacked-up-along-lac-101532; and Shishir Gupta, ‘India Deploys T-90 Tanks in Galwan Valley after China’s Aggressive Posturing at LAC’, Hindustan Times, 30 June 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-deploys-t-90-tanks-in-galwan-valley-after-china-s-aggressive-posturing-at-lac/story-eTMbY40wHoV5w55edknd9K.html.

¹⁰⁹ Rahul Singh, ‘“Mutual Consensus to Disengage” Reached during Top-Level India-China Military Talks’, Hindustan Times, 23 June 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/mutual-consensus-to-disengage-reached-during-top-level-india-china-military-talks/story-sPYmSFW9UWaUWOd5G3CojL.html.

¹¹⁰ Vijaita Singh and Dinakar Peri, ‘After Chinese Pullback, Indian Troops Also Move 1.5 Km Away from Galwan Valley Clash Site’, The Hindu, 7 July 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/after-chinese-pullback-indian-troops-also-move-15-km-away-from-galwan-valley-clash-site-official/article32009878.ece.

¹¹¹ Anirban Bhaumik, ‘China’s PLA Fortifies Position on India’s Territory It Transgressed into on North Bank of Pangong Tso’, Deccan Herald, 2 August 2020, https://www.deccanherald.com/national/north-and-central/chinas-pla-fortifies-position-on-indias-territory-it-transgressed-into-on-north-bank-of-pangong-tso-868795.html.

¹¹² Gaurav C Sawant, ‘Op Snow Leopard: Inside Story of How Army Reclaimed Heights in Eastern Ladakh’, India Today, 16 September 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/snow-leopard-inside-story-army-reclaimed-heights-ladakh-exclusive-1722311–2020-09-16.

¹¹³ Snehesh Alex Philip, ‘China Dismantles Jetty, Helipad & Other Structures as Part of Pangong Tso Disengagement’, The Print, 15 February 2021, https://theprint.in/defence/china-dismantles-jetty-helipad-other-structures-as-part-of-pangong-tso-disengagement/605533/.

¹¹⁴ Paul H. B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller, China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threats and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American Military Confrontation (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, April 2013), 1 & 5, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-6.pdf.

¹¹⁵ PTI, ‘India-China Ties Going through “Bad Patch”; Beijing Has “No Explanation” on Violation of Agreements: Jaishankar’, The Tribune, 19 November 2021, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/india-china-ties-going-through-bad-patch-beijing-has-no-explanation-on-violation-of-agreements-jaishankar-340282.

¹¹⁶ ‘Hearing on CCP Decision-Making and the 20th Party Congress’, 221.

¹¹⁷ Ananth Krishnan and Dinakar Peri, ‘Xi Jinping’s Mobilisation Order, Months of Planning Preceded Border Moves’, The Hindu, 13 July 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/lac-standoff-xi-jinpings-mobilisation-order-months-of-planning-preceded-border-moves/article32061608.ece.

¹¹⁸ Aroor, ‘3 Separate Brawls, “outsider” Chinese Troops & More: Most Detailed Account of the Brutal June 15 Galwan Battle’.

¹¹⁹ U.S. Intelligence sources may have reached a similar conclusion, see Paul D. Shinkman, ‘U.S. Intel Source: China Ordered Attack on Indian Troops in Galwan River Valley’, U.S. News, 22 June 2020, https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2020-06-22/us-intel-source-china-ordered-attack-on-indian-troops-in-galwan-river-valley.

¹²⁰ Orville Schell, Susan Shirk, and Ankit Panda, ‘Reassessing U.S. China Relations: Competition…Confrontation…or Collision Course?’, Carnegie Reporter, Fall 2019, 16.

¹²¹ On the 2001 EP-3 Collision, see Steven Lee Myers and Christopher Drew, ‘Collision with China: Washington; Chinese Pilot Reveled in Risk, Pentagon Says’, The New York Times, 6 April 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/06/world/collision-with-china-washington-chinese-pilot-reveled-in-risk-pentagon-says.html; James Mulvenon, ‘Civil-Military Relations and the EP-3 Crisis: A Content Analysis’, China Leadership Monitor (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Winter 2002), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/clm1_JM1.pdf; Nan Li, ’Top Leaders and the PLA: The Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi’, in Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (ed.), PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking (Washington DC: Stanford University Press, 2015), 126. On the 2007 Anti-Satellite test, see James Mulvenon, ‘Rogue Warriors? A Puzzled Look at the Chinese ASAT Test’, China Leadership Monitor (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Winter 2007), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/clm20jm.pdf; David E. Sanger and Joseph Kahn, ‘U.S. Tries to Interpret China’s Silence Over Test’, The New York Times, 22 January 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/22/world/asia/22missile.html. On the 2010 U.S.-South Korea naval exercises, see Al Pessin, ‘US, South Korean Navies Will Exercise in Yellow Sea despite Chinese Objections’, VOA, 13 July 2010, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia/us-south-korean-navies-will-exercise-yellow-sea-despite-chinese-objections; International Crisis Group, ‘China and Inter-Korean Clashes in the Yellow Sea’, (New York, NY: International Crisis Group, 27 January 2011), 9, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/china-and-inter-korean-clashes-yellow-sea; Andrew Scobell, ‘Civil-Military “Rules of the Game” On the Eve of China’s 19th Party Congress’, (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 11 October 2017), 11, https://www.nbr.org/publication/civil-military-rules-of-the-game-on-the-eve-of-chinas-19th-party-congress/. Finally, on the J-20 incident, see Elisabeth Bumiller and Michael Wines, ‘Test of Stealth Fighter Clouds Gates Visit to China’, The New York Times, 11 January 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/world/asia/12fighter.html; and Andrew Scobell, ‘TESTIMONY: The J-20 Episode and Civil Military Relations in China’, (RAND Corporation, March 2011), https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT357.html.

¹²² Nan Li, ‘Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era’, China Maritime Studies, (Newport, Rhode Island: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, January 2010), 22, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/6/.

¹²³ Ibid., 23.

¹²⁴ Andrew Scobell and Scott W. Harold, ‘An “Assertive” China? Insights from Interviews’, Asian Security 9/2 (2013), 119.

¹²⁵ Michael Collins, ‘Secretary of State Blinken Still Wants to Visit Beijing amid Tensions between U.S., Beijing’, USA Today, 29 March 2023, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/03/29/u-s-china-blinken-still-wants-visit-beijing-amid-tensions/11564020002/.

¹²⁶ Courtney Kube and Carol E. Lee, ‘Chinese Spy Balloon Gathered Intelligence from Sensitive U.S. Military Sites, despite U.S. Efforts to Block It’, NBC News, 3 April 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/china-spy-balloon-collected-intelligence-us-military-bases-rcna77155.

¹²⁷ David Pierson, ‘China’s Balloon Dispute Aims Attention at Xi’s Leadership’, The New York Times, 6 February 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/06/world/asia/china-balloon-xi-jinping.html.

¹²⁸ Stephen Losey, ‘“Dangerously” Close: Video Shows Chinese Jet Buzzing US Spy Plane’, Defense News, December 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/12/29/dangerously-close-video-shows-chinese-jet-buzzing-us-spy-plane/; Michael Heath, ‘Australian Surveillance Plane Cut Off by Chinese Fighter Jet’, Bloomberg, 4 June 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-05/australian-surveillance-plane-cut-off-by-chinese-fighter-jet; and Chad De Guzman, ‘Philippines Coast Guard Accuses China of Blinding Crew With “Military-Grade” Laser’, Time, 14 February 2023, https://time.com/6255012/philippines-laser-south-china-sea-tensions-escalate/.

¹²⁹ Menon, India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present, 339. See also Kevin Rudd, ‘Why the Quad Alarms China: Its Success Poses a Major Threat to Beijing’s Ambitions’, Foreign Affairs, 6 August 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-06/why-quad-alarms-china; Tanvi Madan, ‘India Is Not Sitting on the Geopolitical Fence’, War on the Rocks, 27 October 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/india-is-not-sitting-on-the-geopolitical-fence/.

¹³⁰ Viswanathan R, ‘Thirukkural and the “India Way” of Diplomacy’, The Week, 10 November 2020, https://www.theweek.in/review/books/2020/11/10/thirukkural-and-india-way-of-diplomacy.html. See also ‘External Affairs Minister’s Speech at the 4th Ramnath Goenka Lecture, 2019’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 14 November 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32038.

¹³¹ In 2014, a buffer zone was enforced in the wake of the 2014 Demchok-Chumar standoff with a patrolling moratorium which was ‘observed for almost two years with transgressions coming down to zero’. See Ananth Krishnan, ‘Border Tension More Serious than in the Past, Say Former Generals’, The Hindu, 3 June 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/border-tension-more-serious-than-in-the-past-say-former-generals/article31743030.ece.

¹³² Bo, ‘China and India Should Look Back to Move Forward on Border Impasse’.

¹³³ Ananth Krishnan, ‘Ladakh Face-off | Status Quo at Pangong Tso Has Been Changed, Says Colonel Dinny (Retd.)’, The Hindu, 30 June 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/the-pla-has-never-taken-such-a-blatant-step-at-pangong-tso-colonel-dinny-retd/article31956455.ece. There are several challenges in developing unbiased buffer zones, but given their temporary nature it may be feasible to do so in a mutually agreeable fashion. See: Lt Gen Rakesh Sharma (Retd.), ‘Eastern Ladakh: NTR - “Trust but Verify” Information!’, Vivekananda International Foundation, 26 April 2021, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2021/april/26/eastern-ladakh-ntr-trust-but-verify-information.

¹³⁴ Vijaita Singh and Dinakar Peri, ‘India Has Lost Access to 26 out of 65 Patrolling Points in Eastern Ladakh, Says Research Paper’, The Hindu, 24 January 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-has-lost-access-to-26-out-of-65-patrolling-points-in-eastern-ladakh-says-research-paper/article66428193.ece.

¹³⁵ Devirupa Mitra, ‘In Official Testimony to MPs, Government Revealed Full Story of Doklam’, The Wire, 15 August 2018, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/doklam-parliamentary-standing-committee-india-china; John Cherian, ‘Defused by Diplomacy’, Frontline, 31 May 2013, https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/defused-by-diplomacy/article4705449.ece; and Prabhash K Dutta, ’How India, China Compromise: A Look at How Standoffs before Doklam Were Resolved’, India Today, 31 August 2017, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/doklam-standoff-india-china-compromise-demchok-chumar-daulta-beg-oldi-1034861–2017-08-31.

¹³⁶ Ritu Sarin et al., ‘Indian, Chinese Soldiers Engage in Tawang Face-off; “Minor Injuries” to Both Sides’, The Indian Express, 13 December 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-china-troops-clash-lac-tawang-sector-minor-injuries-8320729/.

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Jaganath Sankaran

Jaganath Sankaran is an assistant professor in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin and a nonresident fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. He studies the impact of emerging technological advances on weapons systems deployed by the United States, Russia, India, China, and other states. His research focuses on missile defenses, space weapons, military net assessment, and arms control. He has held fellowships at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, and the RAND Corporation. He has served on study groups of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Physical Society, examining missile defenses and strategic stability.